TRANSMIGRASI:
Indonesian Resettlement Policy, 1965 – 1985

By Mariël Otten
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Myth: Transmigration Settlement in West Papua as seen in the Indonesian propaganda campaign.
Reality: Swampland settlement in East Kalimantan - (Thekla Kolbeck).
TRANSMIGRASI:
MYTHS AND REALITIES

Indonesian Resettlement Policy, 1965 - 1985

By Mariël Otten
(Komitee Indonesië)

Copenhagen, October, 1986
AUTHOR NOTE

Mariël Otten is a student of anthropology at the University Amsterdam. In 1983 she did fieldwork in the mountains of Northern Greece among Greek partisans and refugees of the 1940s Civil War. In 1984 she joined the Dutch Indonesian Committee. Since then she has published several articles in 'Indonesië: Feiten & Meningen' and has contributed to the May, 1986 Ecologist issue on transmigration.

The Dutch Komitee Indonesië was formed in 1968. One of its main aims is to spread critical information on human rights and the socio-economic as well as the political situation in Indonesia, West Papua and East Timor.

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Photographs are taken mainly from the Indonesian press while the series of ecological consequences of transmigration in Kalimantan are by Thekla Kolbeck.
FOREWORD

In 1931, a few weeks after my first arrival as a member of the judiciary in the Netherlands Indies, I passed through Gedong Tataan. It was a typical Javanese village, surrounded by irrigated ricefields, in the midst of the impenetrable jungle of South Sumatra, at that time still infested by tigers, rhinoceroses and elephants. There was a strange contrast between the sedentary agriculture practised by the Javanese settlers and the slash-and-burn type of food crop cultivation on swidden land, customary among the autochthonous Lampung people.

The "colonisation" project in South Sumatra had been started by the Dutch in the first years of this century - allegedly in order to alleviate the over-population problem of Java. But by 1931 it was already clear that the project had been far from successful.

However, a quarter of a century later, in 1956, when I visited South Sumatra again, Sukarno, as the President of the independent Republic of Indonesia, had proclaimed that inter-island migration should become the final solution for the population problems of Indonesia. He planned a transfer of many millions of Javanese to the Outer Islands starting from the supposition - or rather myth - that the latter were underpopulated. After having studied the local situation I came to the conclusion that a quantitative approach to the inter-island migration issue was both dangerous and impracticable. Yet, the seriousness of the situation seemed to lose some of its stringency since, during the Sukarno era, realisation of the President's over-ambitious plans proved to lag far behind the proclaimed targets.

However, under the present Suharto regime the old myth of an overpopulated Java and the under-populated Outer Islands appears still to haunt not only the minds of the Indonesian present rulers, but also of those determining the policies of the World Bank and other Western donors of so-called 'develop-
ment aid' co-operating in the IGGI (Inter-governmental group on Indonesia). And exactly at the moment when civilian authorities in Indonesia start to doubt the feasibility of the quantitative approach to the transmigrasi issue, the military power-holders are, in spite of all the failures experienced in the course of the past decade, intent upon putting the most ambitious quantitative targets into practice, being mainly motivated by strategic and security considerations.

The present excellent study by Mariël Otten, a graduate student of cultural anthropology at the University of Amsterdam, exposes the falseness of most of the pretended achievements of the more recent transmigration policies. An important feature of her study is that she places the total transmigration problem in a proper historical context. She shows to what extent the transmigrasi policy is being pursued in defiance of all the ecological and humanitarian reservations and conditions stipulated by the World Bank and the other aid donors. The book also convincingly shows that the transmigrasi strategy, far from being operated in consultation with the people concerned and on a voluntary basis, is both in the area of origin and in the locality of destination largely being effectuated through sheer compulsion and deceit.

In analysing, on the basis of a host of literature, the disastrous effects of the policies of the past and the still worse menacing effects if the present official plans are going to be fulfilled, the study of Mariël Otten should become required literature for anybody interested in Southeast Asia as a region, in the preservation of an ecological balance in that area, and in the fate of ethnic minorities fighting for their cultural identity and for a preservation of the very foundation of their subsistence - namely their own land.

W.F. Wertheim
INTRODUCTION

"Minister Concedes Failure in Past Migration Programme" (Jakarta Post, 22 May 1984)
"Transmigration Will Be Crucial in the Fourth Repelita" (Jakarta Post, 28 May 1984).

This document begins with the announcement made at Jakarta in May 1984 by General Suharto that the transmigration programme was to play a crucial role in the overall development strategy of Indonesia during its Fourth Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, or Five-Year-Development Plan), which had started on the 1st of April. Under the heading, "Transmigration Will Be Crucial in the Fourth Repelita", the Jakarta Post quoted Suharto as saying that whatever progress or setbacks are made during the current Repelita in the national project of transmigration, "they will have a strong bearing on the progress of development in Indonesia for the future, especially for the endeavours to lay down the foundation of the Pancasilaist* society, long cherished by the Nation" (28 May 1984).

This announcement came as a surprise to observers both within and outside Indonesia, since only a week before, Transmigration Minister Martono had officially conceded that transmigration could not be marked as "an Indonesian success story" during Repelita III (April 1979-April 1984).

With an emphasis on quantity - fulfilling the target figure of a specific number of families to be moved within a certain period - rather than on quality, the Repelita III programme had aimed at the resettlement of 500,000 families, or about two million people. The authorities asserted afterwards

* The Pancasila is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian State, consisting of five principles: belief in one supreme God; just and civilised humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Indonesia Handbook 1984)
Minister Martono (Kompas, 6 September, 1985)
that they had succeeded in fulfilling the target, but that they had had to work with a system called the "plan as you proceed method".

Martono admitted that "this has helped us to meet the target figure, but on the other hand it was disadvantageous because some of the locations were not properly selected"

and he added that "we will call it a success only when those people we have moved to resettlement centres feel happy at home in their new surroundings with a prospect of a better future".

During Repelita III, more than 2,000 families had abandoned the new settlements, "mostly because the authorities failed to provide them with the facilities promised them before their move".

In addition 67 of 800 resettlement centres already constructed needed rebuilding in order to be suitable for the new settlers, "because, feeling themselves forced into reaching the target, the authorities could work with neither co-ordination nor efficiency" (Jakarta Post, 22 May 1984*)

In spite of the qualitative failure of the programme, but encouraged by its quantitative achievements, the programme's major backer, the World Bank, spoke glowingly about its future prospects. It was claimed that "transmigration has the potential to reap substantial benefits. It can provide employment and land ownership to some of the poorest members of the labour force in Java, it also brings underutilised land into intensive cultivation, raises agricultural production and contributes more broadly to economic development in the Outer Islands"(1985a:117)

The World Bank's optimism spurred on the ambitions of the Transmigration Department's bureaucrats, who increased the Repelita IV (April 1984-April 1989) target of families for moving up to 750,000 (fifty percent up on Repelita III). Instead of devoting its full attention and the limited funds available to amending its previous mistakes, the Indonesian government decided that transmigration should play a crucial role in the future and that the programme's activities be stepped up, resettling more people and creating more new settlement centres

*In the 67 units requiring rehabilitation, 138,878 families had been settled (Hardjono, 1986: 38).
than ever before.

Myths and Realities: the Politics of Demography

Indonesia as a whole, is not critically overpopulated. Overpopulation in Indonesia is a local phenomenon which has resulted largely from ecological, social and political conditions. Breaking through the age-old myths, it is very important to understand that the demographic inequality between the various islands is not simply a matter of statistics. Population density figures have to be related to other factors, such as soil fertility, land use, industrial employment etc. On top of this, historical, social and political development over the centuries has played an important role in determining the current demographical situation.

Inequality has always been a distinctive feature of Indonesian society. It is present at all levels of life, whether social, economic, ethnic, political or demographic. Over the years, transmigrasi, and its predecessor, kolonisasi, have been presented as efforts to overcome this inequality. For a long time, the fundamental rationale for government-run schemes of population resettlement has been unequal demographic distribution. Up to 70% of Indonesians have lived on the islands of Java and Madura, which cover less than 7% of the total land area. On the other hand, over 90% of the land supports only one third of the total population (see table 1).

In his book Agricultural Involution, Clifford Geertz remarks that "if ever there was a tail which wagged a dog, Java is the tail, Indonesia the dog" (1963:15). Instead of the more wellknown distinction between the islands of Java, Madura and Bali as the centre of Indonesia and the 'Other' or 'Outer' islands as the periphery, Geertz divides the archipelago into 'Inner Indonesia', consisting of northwest, central and east Java, south Bali and west Lombok, and 'Outer Indonesia', consisting of the rest including southwest Java (see map 1). This distinction is based on contrasting
ecological patterns - these patterns, however, provide only part of the explanation of the unequal distribution of popula-

Politically and commercially motivated élites and power groups have played a decisive role in the upgrading of Java's position as Indonesia's 'heartland'. For the lords who have governed Indonesia, transmigrasi as well as kolonisasi have been mighty weapons for spreading their own and Javanese influence over the widely-spread islands. The continuous removal of Javanese settler families from their 'overpopulated' homelands to the other relatively underpopulated islands have turned 'overpopulation' into a (inter-)national problem. The transfer of Javanese poverty has thus become a reality, not only for the settlers themselves, but also for the local populations in the areas of resettlement.

Myths and Realities: Transmigrasi, a Crucial Controversy

When I started the research for this document, the Repeli-
ta IV transmigration programme had just begun. It was obvious at the time that, although Kalimantan (Borneo) was to become the most important transmigrant-receiving area in terms of numbers of settler families, West Papua, annexed by Indonesia in the 1960s, and East Timor, occupied by the Indonesian Armed Forces in the 70s, were main target areas of the programme.

The demographic justification of transmigrasi - the 'popu-
lation motive' - had lost much of its significance, and eco-
nomically it was not clear that transmigrants were indeed "better off" after resettlement. The two other aims of trans-
migrasi - national integration and national security - were to become more significant in the discussion on the transmigration issue as my work progressed.

Finishing the work on the document in the summer of 1986, Indonesia's transmigration programme has become more crucial and controversial than ever. An international campaign, laun-
ched by a variety of groups and organisations in the spring of
1986, has aroused a lot of attention, particularly in the Indonesian press. It seems that finally the age-old and new myths used by the Suharto regime to justify and cover up its violent and aggressive policy for submitting the Indonesian population to Jakarta rule are being replaced by a more realistic outlook of what goes on behind the scenes of 'transmigrasi'.

The document is part of this development. Its main purpose is to expose the myths and tell the tale as it is. The information on which the document is based, has been largely derived from Indonesian newspapers. The fact that the press in Indonesia is subject to censorship suggests that the reality is even more tragic than described by Indonesian journalists. Additional and very useful information has been gathered from rather critical but seldom published reports from the World Bank. Although the information sources could be called 'neutral', this document is not written with the pretension of being objective, as it is in my view impossible to be 'objective' towards the military dictatorship of General Suharto.

In addition, the transmigration programme has such a long history of failure and disappointment that it is not difficult to be critical and call for action. Millions of Javanese families are being resettled into an uncertain future in places thousands of miles from their homeland; the programme presents a serious threat to the environment in the areas of settlement; the survival of various ethnic groups in Indonesia is at stake; and, Indonesia's natural as well as financial resources are quickly diminishing as a consequence of these overambitious transmigration and resettlement programmes.

**Myths and Realities: the Structure of this Document**

The document is divided into three main parts. The first part on the 'Myths' of transmigrasi and resettlement serves as an introduction to resettlement policy and the workings of the transmigration programme in Repelita IV. Chapter one consists of a short historical summary of resettlement policy.
Transmigrants leaving for the Outer Islands
Chapter two introduces the programme as it is implemented in the current Five-Year Plan.

The second part on the 'Realities' of transmigrasi and resettlement gives a description of how transmigration functions in practice. Chapter one presents information on the recruitment and selection process in the areas of origin. Chapter two describes the site selection and land/site preparation process in the areas of settlement. Chapter three on transmigration settlement shows what happens after transmigrant families have arrived at their locations and the consequences which the (re-)settlement programme has on the migrant population.

The third part of the document presents an analysis of the main goals of the transmigration/settlement programme and its results. Chapter one is concerned with the demographic goal of distributing the population more evenly over the archipelago and diminishing population pressures in the areas of origin. Chapter two concentrates on the second aim of stimulating regional development in the areas of settlement. The third chapter describes the impact of integrating various distinct groups into one Nation and one State. Programmes aimed particularly at the indigenous peoples of the areas of settlement and inter-ethnic tensions between them and the immigrant populations are there described. The fourth chapter provides information on the last and rarely mentioned goal of the programme, namely the strengthening of the Nation's security through the transmigration programme.

Finally, some conclusions on the hows and whys of transmigrasi are presented, future perspectives of transmigrasi examined and Indonesia's reactions on the international campaign against the programme discussed.

The production of this book would not have been possible
without the assistance and support of various persons and organisations. I would like to thank the Stichting Humanitair Fonds, IMBAS-Giessen, INDOC-Leiden, Rob Otten, Rosemiek Cupers, Yvette Lawson, Carmel Budiardjo, Liem Soei Liong, Prof. W.F. Wertheim, Loek Amstel, Jan Müter and the members of the Komitee Indonesië for their contribution.

Mariël Otten,
Amsterdam October 1986
PART ONE

TRANSNIGRASI: THE OFFICIAL VIEW -

MYTHS, IDEOLOGIES AND TARGETS
CHAPTER 1. A SHORT HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT POLICY

1. Kolonisasi in the Pre-Independence Period, 1905-1941

The uneven distribution of population within and between the islands of the Southeast Asian archipelago was already a distinct feature of Indonesian society at the beginning of this century. Overpopulation in Java pressed the Dutch colonial administration to introduce a resettlement programme, known as 'kolonisasi'. The kolonisasi programme, which is generally seen as the predecessor of transmigration, was presented by the Dutch as an integral part of its Ethical Policy ('Ethische Politiek'), allegedly aimed at putting a stop to the increasing poverty in the rural parts of Java.

The fundamental notion behind kolonisasi was that there were 'too many people' in Inner Indonesia, particularly in Java. This resulted from population growth which itself caused landlessness, unemployment, land fragmentation, overcultivation and deforestation. Thus, the Dutch came to consider a large part of the Javanese population as 'surplus people', who were moreover a potential source of social and political unrest. It was argued by the Dutch that moving these 'surplus people' away would lead to improved social and economic conditions and raise living standards.

This notion could be called 'the population motive' in resettlement policy and relied on a demographic approach to provide solutions for what in reality were social and economic or even political problems. The approach doomed the resettlement programme to failure from the start.

The first Javanese to be moved under this programme were 155 families who were relocated in Gedong Tataan, a newly developed settlement site in the southern Sumatran province of Lampung. Most of the Dutch settlements were established here, though certainly not all. In 1909, for instance, Bengkulu was opened for colonists and in 1921, 250 families were settled
in Kalimantan. In fact, all areas outside Inner Indonesia were considered to be available and suitable. The Dutch simply assumed that there was land enough for everyone. The very low population densities in the so-called Outer Islands were not related to other factors, such as geographic and climatic conditions that were markedly different from those in Inner Indonesia. Herewith, the Dutch created a 'myth of emptiness', the erroneous assumption of 'underpopulation' that would provide the justification for resettlement policies for many years to come.

The Dutch pursued an 'enclave' policy, relocating Javanese in separate communities. "As the willingness to move to 'the land beyond' had not yet developed very greatly at the time, the Dutch tried to make settlement attractive by reshaping conditions as nearly as possible to resemble those in the homeland" (Wertheim, 1964: 199).

Javanese social institutions, leadership patterns, village regulations and organisation, place names and traditions were all recreated. In this way it was hoped that the Javanese would feel 'at home' and remain in the new area (Guinness et al., 1977: 75). It was expected that the Javanese settlers would introduce their sawah system of rice cultivation on the Outer Islands and for this reason they received one bau (0.71 ha) per family.

In general, kolonisasi in the pre-Independence period was not very successful. The number of colonist families moved out of Java was too insignificant to have any impact on the areas of origin. Up to the time of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, not many families were moved although some 200,000 were shifted between 1932 and 1941 to the Outer Islands. Furthermore, conditions proved unfavourable for wet rice cultivation. The sawah system had been developed in Java during several centuries and could not be copied in such a short time and under far more difficult circumstances. Co-ordination problems led to a considerable time-lag in providing irrigation and other facilities. In her book on transmigration, Joan
Hadjono concluded that "from the point of view of living standards of the new settlers, very little was achieved and the outward appearance of prosperity disguised the fact that economically the individual farmer even in the Sukadana district, the 'best' of all the Dutch settlement areas, was not really much better off than his relatives back in Java" (1977:20).

The Bawon Scheme in Kolonisasi Policy

The World Crisis also had an effect on the export market in the Dutch East Indies. Production was reduced, and unemployment in Java worsened. At the same time, 'coolies' who had been fired, were returned to Java from the plantations in the Outer Islands. Therefore, the colonial administration considered the necessity for kolonisasi- being the chosen remedy for overpopulation and unemployment - more acute, while available funds for kolonisasi projects were more scarce than ever.

The Dutch decided to implement fully the bawon system, which had existed in experimental form since 1928. 'Bawon' is the traditional Javanese system of employing labourers in return for a share of the harvest. Under this scheme, the pioneer settlers would employ new settlers, usually relatives or friends, for a period, which enabled them to become accustomed to the area.

According to a Gajah Mada Team study, the Dutch "were influenced in their planning by the fact that migrants in Gedong Tataan, at that time numbering 30,000 residents, had approached the Government to bring some of their relatives to join them. In exchange they offered to support the new arrivals during the initial period of settlement. This persuaded the Government, anxious to keep costs to a minimum, to introduce the bawon system whereby new settlers were brought to an established settlement just before harvest, in which they then took part. Settlers agreed not only to support temporarily members of their own families, but also others who came from Java under the scheme. During the next ten years the annual migration under the Government scheme rose to a peak of 60,000 in 1941" (Guinness et al., 1977:3).
MacAndrews points to the fact that in the early 1930s this mutual assistance system, although officially encouraged, was voluntary. But later, the pioneer settlers in some schemes were required to support newcomers in the ratio of five colonist families to one incoming family (1982:11, quoting from Pelzer, 1945).

The bawon system, again according to the Gajah Mada Team, laid a heavy burden on the migrants themselves.

"Earlier settlers bore the cost of feeding new families, who in many cases were unrelated to them. In the Metro area of Lampung the ratio of old to new settlers was 3:1, but in Belitang farmers of only three years standing were burdened with new arrivals. The latest migrants had to build their own homes, clear their land and construct irrigation channels, none of which were familiar tasks to villagers from Java, where settlement and irrigation had existed for generations. Health services were poor, with the result that death rates, particularly from malaria, remained high" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 81).

2. Transmigration Policy in the Sukarno Period, 1945-1965

In the history of resettlement, the period immediately following Independence can be seen as an interim period. Because of political and economic problems of the time, transmigration could not become a major issue. There were some, although not fundamental, changes in certain features.

Resettlement was taken out of its colonial context and made part of an overall effort to build up the newly independent state. Moreover, this colonial context was more or less replaced by the Javanese domination over the rest of Indonesia. The inhabitants of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia were considered to be citizens of the Nation/State belonging to one big family of Indonesians. Therefore, the problem of 'overpopulation' did not exist. In Sukarno's view, the problem that had to be dealt with was underproduction. "My solution is, exploit more land, because if you exploit all the land in Indonesia, you can feed 250 million, and I have only 103 million ... In my country, the more children
the better" (Newsweek, 5 October 1964).

Family planning, an alternative government policy in dealing with overpopulation, was not seriously contemplated. This was only possible because of the myth of emptiness, created long before Sukarno was born. Gunnar Myrdal has suggested that this myth of emptiness was used by the Sukarno administration for postponing the introduction of an 'effective birth control programme' (1968: 2144).

After 'underproduction' was identified as the crucial issue, it was decided that agriculture in Inner Indonesia would be further intensified and in Outer Indonesia agricultural land would be expanded. Through the resumption of resettlement, now called transmigrasi, farmers were brought in from outside. Larger plots of land were allotted to each family in comparison with the previous period "in an effort to avoid the high population density that had already occurred in South Lampung" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977:84).

The primary occupation in the settlements remained (wet) rice cultivation and south Sumatra the main recipient area. The most characteristic feature was high ambition. "If an examination is made of the policies followed in transmigration in this early period, the most striking feature is the extremely unrealistic targets. In 1952, the Transmigration Service began the implementation of a fifteen-year Transmigration Plan originally prepared in 1947 with the aim of moving 31 million people. This plan had been reformulated in 1951, the intention being to cover the thirty-five year period from 1953 to 1987. The aim was to move 48,675,000 during those years"(Hardjono, 1977:23).

President Sukarno had neither the time nor the capability to move that many people. More people than in the previous period were settled, about 400,000 people between 1950 and 1965."Quite a large number of people did in fact leave Java as a consequence of extensive government propaganda and of the participation of political parties and other non-government bodies in transmigration schemes" (Hardjono, 1977:25).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>Padang</td>
<td>3,406,800</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>8,360,900</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>2,611,300</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>Telukbetung</td>
<td>4,624,800</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>2,486,100</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td>Palangkaraya</td>
<td>954,400</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP 2: INDONESIA
1:21,000,000

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South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Maluku
Nusa Tenggara Barat
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Timor Leste (West Papua)
West Timor

Banjarmasin 2,664,600 59
Samarinda 1,218,100 6
Menado 2,115,400 87
Palu 1,289,600 14
Ujungpandang 6,062,200 73
Kendari 942,300 29
Ambon 1,411,000 16
Denpasar 2,469,900 444
Mataram 2,724,700 135
Kupang 2,737,200 57
Jayapura 1,173,900 2
Dili 555,400 37

Note: Statistik Indonesia 1983 Tables III 1.3 and 1.4 (Statistik Indonesia - Census 1980).
Willingness among the population exceeded sending capabilities by far, with the consequence that only a small part of those who had registered actually left.

In this period, additional land was allocated to each family for the cultivation of commercial crops, as earlier projects had shown that additional land was needed for the increasing number of new migrants and for the second and third generation of settlers. This amount of land would have been sufficient, but "irrigation works were lagging behind. After a few harvests the soil was exhausted and the settlers were driven to look for other land. Thus, the process of deforestation progressively extended to other areas, and alang grass covered the relinquished land." (Wertheim, 1964: 188-9).

The government was not quite pleased with these achievements and looked for new initiatives. Hardjono, quoting from the highly unrealistic Eight-Year-Plan for Overall National Development which was to guide the national economy in the 1961-1969 period, mentions an effort by the government to connect transmigration with regional development."... the failure now experienced is due to the fact that what has been taking place up to the present is merely agricultural transmigration...Therefore a radical change is considered necessary, namely, transmigration should follow the course of regional development outside Java in the fields of industry, mining, fisheries, plantations, and so on". (1977: 23).

President Sukarno was replaced by General Suharto before these plans could be put into practice.

3. Traditional Resettlement Policy, 1965 - 1984

The 'Population Motive' under the New Order

Under the 'New Order' regime of General Suharto, the 'population motive' was restored in all its glory. Once again, 'surplus people' were blamed for the government's problems. Martono, referring to Inner Indonesia stated that "the consequences of the high rate of population on basic services, improvement of welfare, and even preservation of social order and the physical environment are indeed
serious" (1984:iv).
The removal of large numbers of families from Java would lead to better conditions, it was said. From 1969, when the first Five Year Development Plan started, the target of families to be resettled grew by leaps and bounds: 45,000 families under the first Repelita (1969-1974), 250,000 (reduced later to 100,000) under the second (1974-1979), half a million under the third (1979-1984) and finally 750,000 families under the current Repelita (1984-1989). Recently, Minister Martono announced that at least 20 million people had to leave Java if life on the island were to be improved (Jakarta Post, 31 July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

In stressing the need to remove 'surplus people' from Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok, the Indonesian government concentrated almost exclusively on quantitative targets. Apparently, this has been successful as it claims that the target of 500,000 families for the Repelita III period has been met.*

There was no escaping the fact, however, that population growth in Java was far exceeding the number of transmigrants. Therefore, in contrast to the 'Old Order', the Suharto regime launched a stringent birth control programme in addition to transmigration. From a remark made by Minister Martono it seems as though the government even wanted to control the fertility of transmigrant families. Martono, states that "efforts to raise settler welfare will be ineffective if steps are not taken to control birth rates: High birth rates will not only hamper agricultural activities but will also eventually reduce the size of individual land holdings. Thus efforts will be made to sustain and increase family planning"(1984:45).

To justify the mass migratory movement in the direction of the Outer Islands, the myth of emptiness played its role. In 1972, the Director General of Transmigration stated that

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* For targets and numbers of families moved within the transmigration programme see Chapter 1 of Part 3.
"the natural resources to be found outside Java have barely been touched" (quoted in Jones, 1979: 217).

Some years later, Subroto, at that time Minister for Manpower, Transmigration & Cooperatives, said that "40 million hectares of land outside Java remain open for trans-migration and development" (Indonesia Times, 3 July 1975, quoted in Jones 1979: 221).

Transmigration Minister Martono once described the Outer Islands as 'labour scarce areas' (1984: ix). And recently, in a World Bank Report, the myth of emptiness was clearly used to explain the existence of population resettlement programmes.

"Vast tracts of forest and coastal land lie uncultivated in the Other Islands. The low population densities in some areas (....), impede regional development and economic growth. These facts have been so striking for so long that programmes to wed the under-utilised labour of Java with the underutilised land of the Other Islands have been carried out since the beginning of this century" (World Bank, 1985b: 3)

The myth of emptiness is also used to justify large-scale transmigration to Kalimantan and West Papua, relatively 'new' areas of settlement, where initial investment costs are much higher than in the 'traditional' areas of settlement, due to their greater distance from Java and lack of basic infrastructure. West Papua and Kalimantan together account for about half the country's total land area and only 5% of the total population. These figures are a marked contrast to the situation in Java and make transmigration seem logical.

**Quantity not Quality**

Due to the Jakarta inspired drive to keep expenditure low and to implement the programme as fast as possible, transmigrants confronted many problems in their new environment. On paper, the settlement scheme looked fine. The transmigrant families received 0.25 ha with a house plus one hectare of cleared arable land, ready for cultivation. The amount of land was based on the assumption that this was the maximum a family could cultivate without the help of draught animals or
traction power. In the first few months, transmigrants were supposed to receive food aid and agricultural inputs and extension services. After a period of cultivation, they could receive an additional hectare for the cultivation of cash crops.

The reality was very different. The emphasis was once again on (wet) rice cultivation and for this purpose rainforests were cleared and swampland reclaimed. In many cases, the contractors hired to clear the land felled only the commercially attractive trees, leaving large tree stumps behind. The heavy machinery they used damaged the soil. On arrival, many settlers found that their houses were not built or were of low quality. The absence of roads and other infrastructural developments resulted in difficulties for marketing any surplus production. Irrigation and drainage works could not keep pace with the growth of the settlements.

The majority of the transmigrants kept going to southern Sumatra "due to a desire to keep transportation costs to a minimum rather than to any conscious wish to 'settle' in the region" (Hardjono, 1978:110).

Some areas, particularly in Lampung, were already overcrowded because of a shortage of additional land for the (natural) increase of the migrant population. More and more frequently marginal land was brought into cultivation, which severely damaged the local environment. Some settlers left for the transmigration areas after a period of hardship, part of whom returned to their areas of origin while others settled in towns and cities of the settlement areas.

The Myth of the Happy Transmigrant Family

By 1984, it was clear that transmigration had failed to have more than a marginal impact on social and economic conditions in Inner Indonesia. There simply was no 'crucial role' for transmigrasi in coping with landlessness and unemployment. Despite the failure of resettlement as a population policy,
The Myth of the Happy Transmigrant - "Transmigrants in East Koya, Irian Jaya, display their farm produce to officials visiting the area, proving that they are living better now than they had in their hometowns. Coming from different backgrounds, the transmigrations are apparently well-socialized like the Javanese youth (r) wearing a native Irian Jaya costume and practising shooting arrows. Among them are also native Irianese like the woman (l) who now lives in this transmigration camp." (Jakarta Post, Special Feature, November 1981)."
the regime persisted in setting itself yet more ambitious targets. Suharto himself was so determined to continue the programme that a new myth was invented to compensate for the glaring weaknesses of the 'population motive'. It was proclaimed that, whether or not transmigration could contribute to the solution of Java's problems, it would raise living standards of those Javanese who moved, giving them hope for the future. These transmigrant families would get a once-in-a-lifetime chance to obtain a small plot of land which they could call their own, a chance that was lost forever to those who chose to remain behind. In justifying the continuation of the programme, the myth of the happy transmigrant family was created. This myth was based on an age-old assumption, formulated by Oey, "Since most of those resettled by the government were either landless labourers or had only very small plots of land in their areas of origin (...) it was simply taken for granted that transmigrants would become better off after resettlement" (1982: 44).

In trying to assess the failure of the settlements, the well-known scientist Heinz Arndt has warned us, "it must be remembered that most of the transmigrants are not average Javanese. The majority are recruited from among the landless and poorest. To them, even an average migrant's standard of living, including a piece of land of their own, represents a big improvement" (1983: 56).

It does tell a lot about the conditions of life for the majority of the Javanese population, but it also sheds reasonable doubt on remarks such as the one on Kusman, a 55-year old farmer, "sitting in his porch surveying his plots of land in the South Sumatran settlement of Air Sugihan, Kusman is pleased with life. Whatever else may be wrong, he owns land" (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1985).

In fact, Air Sugihan *, consisting of several settlements between the rivers Suleh and Sugihan in South Sumatra, is such a disaster that it has been included on an official (confidential) list of "the least successful transmigration projects" (Secrett, 1986: 81-2, Caulfield, 1986: 26).

The myth of the happy transmigrant family was shattered by reality even before it could come to full bloom. The small

* See Part 2, Chapter 3, Section 1.
plots allocated to the families turned out to be no guarantee for a better future. In retaining the same pattern of subsis-
tence agriculture found in Java, the government created the self same problems from which the transmigrants were supposed to have been rescued. "Observers suggest", according to May-
ling Cey, "that the main aim is not so much to enable settlers to pull themselves out of the cycle of poverty as to continue their lives at subsistence level, growing only subsistence/basic food crops" (1982:45) But even to attain this level of subsistence, the settler fa-
milies have had to overcome many problems caused both by inade-
quate selection and planning of sites, and insufficient pre-
paration.

An economist who studied the programme for the World Bank came to the conclusion that "none of the settlements had returns anything like what the World Bank said would be the minimum feasible in its economic justification for the programme" (The New Scientist, 17 May 1984). Even in the rare cases where settlers succeeded in surpassing subsistence production, they couldn't market it, because set-
tlements were located in remote and relatively isolated areas with no roads connecting them to other settlements or towns. The World Bank itself came to the conclusion that the food crop model should be avoided unless followed by 'secondary development' such as the cultivation of cash crops, mixed far-
ing etc. (1985c: 33; 1985b: 37).

The combination of the chosen farm model and the overall unfavourable conditions for food production led to what has been described as the transfer of Javanese poverty to the Ou-
ter Islands. The difference was now that it became a reali-
ty not only for the transmigrants but also for the indigenous populations in the areas of settlement.
Transmigration's Role in Regional Development

Some authors suggest that this transfer of Javanese poverty caused dissatisfaction among the regional authorities in the Outer Islands, and that they in their turn pressed for innovations in policy that would be beneficial to the local population in the areas of settlement. "In order to meet criticism from regional governors, often reluctant to acquiesce to their land being used for purposes of transmigration because of a general belief that it moves poverty onto their lands", Oey writes, "transmigration settlements had been designed since Repelita II as part of overall regional development schemes" (1982: 49-50).

The idea to direct transmigration towards the development of the Outer Islands was certainly not new. Several suggestions were made during the Sukarno period to devote the transmigration programme to regional development goals thereby getting rid of the exclusively agricultural pattern for settlements.

"One has only to disengage oneself from the notion that there is but one possible way", writes Wertheim. He says that the scheme of shifting from the extensive land use to the wet ricefield cultivation as practised in Java was not only impractical but illogical. "Why repeat a pattern which has produced a scarcely enviable situation in Java? Why should a solution of the population problems of the Outer Islands be exclusively sought in the agrarian sector, which inevitably leads to increasing competition for land? Why not try, in this early stage of development, an industrial development which would attract workers both from Java and Sumatra with appreciably less friction?" (1964: 202-3)

It would take a long time before these suggestions were taken seriously. Every new Repelita brought the concept of regional development a step closer to reality. Finally, the government decided that in order to stimulate regional development through transmigration, a growth model would be put into practise. Transmigration settlements were to become 'growth poles' with tree crop estates, oil refineries and fertiliser factories as some of their attractions. With these growth poles
springing up, the government expected that spontaneous (trans-) migrants would feel attracted to move on their own initiative and at their own expense and that its own role would then decrease accordingly, (Martono, 1984: vii).

A related argument is that large investments in the Outer Islands were not remunerative because of their under population. Therefore transmigrants should be moved in. Besides, it was claimed that local populations would benefit from the incoming transmigrants, because these 'native' hunters, gatherers and shifting cultivators would be able to 'learn from the Javanese'.

Experiments started with the establishment of plantation communities such as Rimbo Bujang in Jambi and Pematang Panggang in South Sumatra, where settlers were provided with up to five hectares which they had to clear and partly plant with rubber. Under the auspices of the World Bank, which had started funding the transmigration programme in 1974, and with the assistance of other international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the NES-scheme (Nucleus Estate Smallholder-scheme) was introduced into Indonesia.


The Myth of the Spoon-Fed Transmigrants

At the end of the Third Repelita in March 1984, the government saw itself confronted with huge problems in resettlement policy. The food crop model was declared bankrupt, ambitious targets resulted in unfeasibly high investments, remigration was frequent and criticism mounted, both within Indonesia and internationally. The programme again needed a face-lift, a new

*In reality, shifting cultivation (peladang nomades) has proved to be a sound, rational and ecologically wise agricultural system (see part 3, chapter 1). Instead of locals learning from the Javanese, it often happened that the Javanese copied the agricultural systems of the indigenous peoples.
myth to restore its credibility. This time the transmigrants were held responsible for failure of government policy. It was all because they had been 'spoon-fed' by government assistance and were not prepared to work hard enough. Once their right to food aid expired, many were opting to quit the settlement, leaving their plots unattended. According to official statistics, over 2,000 families left their 'new homes' during Repelita III.

Thus, when describing all the shortcomings, including the absence of an irrigation/drainage system in the Mamosaloto site, Central Sulawesi, one reporter quoted the local transmigration officer as saying, "It is true that all the facilities in the Mamosaloto project have not been completed yet, but the transmigrants should be patient and work hard, not just sit idle and be spoon-fed". (Jakarta Post, 20 January 1984).

Besides throwing the blame on the transmigrants and not on the government, the Suharto regime also used the 'spoon-fed' myth to counteract the adverse publicity which returning migrants attracted among the Javanese population. Later the myth of the 'spoon-fed' transmigrants was used to justify cheaper forms of government-initiated transmigration. Under the heading, "No More Spoon-Fed Transmigrants, Please", it was announced that several parts of the country were to be closed to government-sponsored (and consequently spoon-fed) settler families. "Only those migrants who leave on their own initiative will be accepted because they pose no financial burden to the government".

Stating the transmigrants who leave at their own expense have proven to be more steadfast in overcoming problems and facing challenges, Subagyo, legal and organisation chief in the Transmigration Department continued: "Unlike the state sponsored migrants, the spontaneous migrants are less troublesome and more determined to make a decent living". (Jakarta Post, 15 January 1985).

Thus, the government-sponsored transmigrant (transmigran umum) was pictured as a spoilt and lazy person, spoilt because of all the assistance he received and lazy because he still failed
to build a new life.

PIR Khusus

"It is felt that some new initiatives are required", Martono concluded at the beginning of Repelita IV, "and the government is now planning for the second-stage development of many locations, where initial investment in settlement will be followed by further technical and financial investment that will ensure economic 'take-off' in the areas. For example, assistance may be provided for planting reserve land with tree crops to guarantee the settlers' future (...). For new projects, this second-stage development will be planned more explicitly from the start. Such models already exist, for example in the World Bank assisted nucleus estate and smallholder projects, some of which are opened up for transmigrants" (1984:viili).

After almost a century of persisting largely with subsistence food production, the government was finally admitting that soils outside Inner Indonesia were not generally suitable for wet-rice cultivation. A switch was announced from these food crops to estate-oriented migration. Where food production was still feasible, said Martono, traditional transmigration would continue. Here, settlers would have to fend for themselves regardless of whether they had good harvests or bad. The transmigration authorities would direct all its energies towards developing new sites near state-run or privately-owned estates (Kompas/Sinar Harapan, 7 November 1984).

Several factors account for this major policy shift. In the first place, Indonesia desperately needs to compensate for the loss of earnings from oil exports. The tree crop sector, comprising traditional export commodities such as palm oil, rubber and coffee, has been identified as one of the most promising sectors for development. The decline of oil prices has meant a drop not only in export revenues, but also in the government's development budget. Therefore, there is a growing need to attract private investment to compensate for Jakarta's
tighter financial situation. Thus, secondly, the PIR Khusus* is important because it could stimulate participation from the private sector. Finally, the attainment of self-sufficiency in rice (berswasembada) has made food production sites less attractive to the central government.**

PIR Khusus scheme, giant state-owned plantations (the PTPs ***), and/or private estate companies are responsible for the development of estate land and surrounding smallholdings. Large areas of land are cleared and planted with high yielding tree crops. The estates - predominantly government owned but commercially operated - provide the layout, technical knowhow and organisational capacity. This infrastructure is maintained until the crops mature, and they, along with the smallholders' produce are purchased by the nucleus estate for processing at its own plants. After a certain period of time, blocks of two hectares are allocated to the smallholders. They have to repay two-thirds of what is spent on developing the two hectare plot over a 17-year period at 10½% interest.

The rising involvement of the Department of Transmigration with the NES scheme has particular support from the World Bank and overall expectations are optimistic. Robin Osborne noted that "it indicates a new professional approach towards making transmigrants productive, and the World Bank is pleased" (ACFOA Briefing, 1985a:10)

One disadvantage is the huge initial costs involved, estimated by Heinz Arndt at US$ 15,000 per family (1983: 62). But for the transmigration authorities, responsibilities as well as

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* The combination of NES (Nucleus Estate & Smallholder) Scheme and transmigration is called PIR Khusus; PIR is Perkebunan Inti Rakyat, or People's Nucleus Estate, while 'Khusus' means special.

** Food shortages and hunger certainly exist on many transmigration sites and are particularly acute in the 'resettlement' sites that have been set up in East Timor (See Part 3, Chapter 4).

*** PTP is Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan (Plantation Company Limited).
costs are much less than with the traditional food crop model. The Department's responsibilities are limited to construction of housing and providing village infrastructure. It no longer has the duty of providing full assistance to the transmigrants, since they have become 'smallholders' working on estates.

**Spontaneous Transmigration**

The government has also tried to reduce the financial budget for transmigration by promoting spontaneous transmigration. Martono acknowledged at the beginning of Repelita IV that as the sending of transmigrants still involved using the government's bureaucracy, the system adopted so far had not yet achieved the amount self-reliance actually targeted. The intervention of government institutions on a large scale was explained by Martono from the fact that "many financial, socio-cultural and physical constraints still exist that are obstacles to the development of larger flows of migrants" (1984: vi).

Initially, during the first years of the New Order regime, the policy was to send spontaneous settlers to well established projects, like Belitang in South Sumatra and Parigi in Central Sulawesi, while government-sponsored transmigrants were placed in newly created projects, where heavier work was required (Hardjono, 1977:34). Later, under Repelita II (April 1974-April 1979), a special programme was developed, known as Banpres (Bantuan President, involving presidential funds), moving greater numbers of migrants who were partly assisted with funds to cover transportation and basic necessities for four months (Hardjono, 1977:33). For the Repelita IV programme, Martono's intention is to promote spontaneous transmigration so that it becomes the largest proportion of the total flow of migrants (Kompas, 6 September 1985). Spontaneous transmigrants receive - at least officially - the same assistance as regu-
lar transmigrants after they have arrived at their location. Furthermore, spontaneous transmigrants are encouraged by "facilitating factors concerning procedures, administration, issuing permits, provision of facilities in the areas of settlement, communication between areas of origin and areas of settlement and other matters". (Martono, 1984: 25).

In co-operation with the World Bank, a study is being undertaken to find means to accelerate spontaneous transmigration. The intention is to lower overall transmigration costs per settled family. The choice of this approach is based on the relative success of spontaneous settlers as compared with government-sponsored transmigrants.

The fact that spontaneous transmigrants have been located in well established projects has added to this success. Other factors have been mentioned by Guinness, who has said that these migrants often have friends, acquaintances or relatives to whom they can move. Because they have no land when they arrive, they have to negotiate with local villagers for land, and many of the settlers begin by working full time for local villagers. In addition they experiment much more widely with crops because they are not required to plan a particular crop.

"Here we have people who are moving of their own will, doing their own experimentation, and establishing very good relations, not only with previous settlers but also with local villagers" (1982: 159).

The ties with farmers already established in the new area have proved to be vital in the settlement process.

"They (the new settlers) learned farming techniques while working as labourers, and obtained cattle on loan. Their early search for employment, land and knowledge brought them into contact with local villagers. The two groups have established good relations, and are mutually benefitting from the settlers' success in agriculture" (Guinness et al, 1977:112-3)

For instance, the success of spontaneous settlers in Binuang, South Kalimantan, is based on their banana production. Waves of palms cover the slopes. Because of the lack of motor
transport, bananas are carried to Binuang market on horseback, and from there dealers carry the fruit to Banjarmasin where it has completely replaced banana imports from Surabaya in Java (Guinness et al, 1977:104).

The promotion of spontaneous transmigration was linked with the concept of regional development. The argument was that successful regional development would encourage large numbers of spontaneous settlers. Thus, spontaneous migrants would follow at the heels of a few pioneering transmigrant families, who would receive full government assistance.

"The challenge that faces Indonesian leaders is to create the economic conditions in the Outer Islands that will attract spontaneous movement of Javanese and Balinese there. Transmigrants will then be the pioneers of both successful regional development and a more even distribution of the national population" (Guinness et al, 1977: 121-2).

Generally, 'spontaneous' transmigrants have accounted for 30-35% of the total transmigrant movement, and the government wants to raise the share to 50% of the families moved during the Fourth Repelita.

New Areas of Settlement

Another new trend introduced in the Repelita IV programme is to send transmigrant families further away from Java. Relatively new areas of settlement are supposed to receive more transmigrants than the traditional settlement areas.

According to Arndt, about 60% of the transmigrants have been resettled in Sumatra in each of the previous three Repelitas. The proportion of migrants resettled in Sulawesi declined from 26% in Repelita I to 12% in Repelita III, in 'favour' of the eastern provinces of Maluku and West Papua, whose share has risen to 7%. The proportion resettled in Kalimantan has remained around 15-18% (1983:50-1).
For Repelita IV, the majority of transmigrants are targeted to be resettled in Kalimantan, namely 328,000 families (44%). West Papua is supposed to take 167,000 families or 800,000 migrants during Repelita IV (Van Raay, 1985:7). Although this is the official target for West Papua, all statements from the Transmigration Department refer to a target of 137,800 families (Hardjono, 1986:45). It is not clear how many families are targeted to be resettled in Maluku and East Timor during Repelita IV.

Until now, Sumatra has remained the favourite settlement area. "Some idea of the concentration of settlements in Sumatra in recent years can be gained from the fact that 60% of the 444,222 families still under the care of the transmigration agency in January 1986 were in projects located in Sumatra". (Hardjono, 1986:41)

Community/Parallel Development

One of the latest trends introduced in the transmigration programme is the proposal to aim at the development of indigenous villages with the intention of raising their living standards to the level of the transmigration settlements ('parallel development'). This new trend has been encouraged by the necessity to relocate newcomers increasingly in the vicinity of the indigenous settlements. The World Bank noted that

"as the scale of the programme expands (....), it is inevitable that they (the migrants) will be located among people who are ethnically different or who are sparsely settled and relatively unacculturated. Such people are found in project areas in both Kalimantan and Irian Jaya (West Papua)" (1985b: 38).

The development programmes for local or indigenous communities is called 'parallel' because they run parallel to efforts to develop the transmigrant communities. The government has intended to replace the previously followed policy of integrating local people within the transmigration settlements by this programme of parallel development. This programme
is not only aimed at the development of existing indigenous families, but also at resettlement of local communities. According to Minister Martono, the programme aims at the concentration of people living in groups of 20 to 30 families in larger communities. After their resettlement, these 'local transmigrants' receive a house, 3 hectares of land, foodstuffs for one year and guidance for five years before they are left on their own (Kompas, 29 July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).
CHAPTER 2. THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAMME – AN OVERVIEW

1. Transmigration and the Transmigrants

In popular speech, transmigrasi or transmigration is the transfer of people from overpopulated to relatively underpopulated islands in Indonesia. This transfer is considered necessary because both overpopulation and underpopulation are seen as obstacles to development. The uneven distribution of people between the various parts of Indonesia makes transmigrasi, the resettlement of families from Inner Indonesia in new sites on the Outer Islands, look like a rational solution to the country's problems. The island of Java, covering only 7% of the total land area, supports over 60% of the total population.

This transfer of population is organised in the Transmigration Programme which aims at the establishment of economically viable new communities by allocating land to transmigrant families and providing basic infrastructure for regional development. Transmigration is officially defined in the Basic Transmigration Act of 1972 as the resettlement and/or relocation of population from one region to another within the territory of Indonesia in the framework of National development or for other reasons considered necessary by the government.

The transmigration programme is not only used for redistributing the population more evenly over the country's territory and for promoting regional development in the areas of settlement as well as in the areas of origin, but also for fostering national integration and unity and for strengthening national security. Minister Martono formulated the goals of transmigrasi as follows, "first and foremost, transmigration aims at improving the living standards of the settlers themselves and indirectly of the inhabitants of both the districts of origin and the newly developing districts of settlement. Furthermore, the Programme aims at providing the necessary manpower to make exploitation of natural resources in the Outer Islands more feasible (...). While Indonesia has long enjoyed a time of peace in the region, strengthening the population base
in border regions is also an element of its national security policy. Further, the programme is aimed at nation building, for by the mixing together of settlers from our different ethnic groups, it is hoped to create a heightened awareness of the unity of Indonesia" (1984: vii).

Categories of Transmigrants

Generally, a division is made between four categories of transmigrants: the transmigran² umum or 'general transmigrants', the transmigran² lokal or 'local transmigrants', and the registered and unregistered 'spontaneous' transmigrants or transmigran² spontan.

The sponsored (general) transmigrants are landless agricultural labourers or smallholders living at near subsistence level. They receive extensive support from the government during the initial five years of settlement in the form of transport, land, housing, social services, etc. They also receive a package of subsistence and agricultural inputs for the first few months. These transmigrants will be sent primarily to eastern Indonesia, Sulawesi and Kalimantan (Kompas, 6 September 1985).

Local transmigrants are those people who originate from the settlement areas. They receive the same government assistance as the general transmigrant, if they participate. Before 1965, the category of 'local transmigrants' consisted of transmigrants who had been living on transmigration projects before applying as a participant to a second project, usually within the same island or province. This local transmigration was caused for instance by the overcrowding of old settlements or was used by the migrants to escape huge debts. Local transmigration has been noted as early as 1922, when settlers were relocated from Gedong Tataan to the newly developed Kota Agung location. Nowadays, local transmigrants are "those dwelling in the vicinity of transmigration projects, farmers with little or no land, people with other needed skills or professions, inhabitants of isolated areas, and people living in areas requiring environmental protection" (Martono, 1984: 43).
In new project areas, up to 25% of the land has been reserved for 'local transmigrants'. In West Papua, they are referred to as 'translokal'. In East Timor, the percentage or quota for translocals has been increased to 50%.

The registered spontaneous transmigrants are people who move at their own expense and settle themselves in a location of their own choice. According to the plan, these migrants receive the same amount of land and government assistance as the general transmigrants. But the direct support is somewhat 'lower', according to the World Bank reports, and is mostly provided in form of credit rather than subsidy. The unregistered spontaneous transmigrants are not entitled to any government subsidy.

The term 'spontan' has increasingly been replaced by a new term, 'swakarsa', but this category of settlers is still vague. "The use of the word swakarsa, like spontan before it, to refer, both to partly assisted and completely unassisted transmigrants, has resulted in so much confusion that the term swakarsa murni (truly independent and with no government help of any kind) and swakarsa berbantuan (partly assisted) have been introduced" (Hardjono, 1986: 42-3).

To add to the confusion, she introduces a third term, swakarsa famili. "It is anticipated that at least 150,000 families of these (swakarsa berbantuan) will be transmigran swakarsa famili, that is, unassisted family transmigrants who join relatives in existing projects, an approach that suggests that transmigration planners are at last recognising the value of family ties as a means to move people at a lower cost and with less responsibility on the transmigration agency" (Hardjono, 1986: 43).

The Goals of the Transmigration Programme

In justifying the need for transmigrasi, Minister Martono points to what he calls 'three basic facts', namely the size, the growth and the distribution of population in Indonesia. With a population size of 165 million by 1985, Indonesia is the fifth most populous country in the world. In the past two de-
cades, population growth rates have been risen and now stand at approximately 2.3% per year. Over 60% of the population lives on the island of Java, which accounts for less than 7% of the total land area. Densities on Java average 700 people per square kilometer, compared with 63 in Sumatra, 21 in Kalimantan and 3 in West Papua (Indonesia's province of Irian Jaya). With the burgeoning population and its uneven distribution being seen as obstacles to development, transmigrasi has become a 'crucial remedy' to National Development. Based on the 'population motive', the programme's official aims are to reduce land and population pressures in the areas of origin by transferring parts of their population to relatively empty parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, etc.

Since the beginning of the Second Repelita, the government has adopted an explicit policy of regional development. By this it is intended to exploit more fully the natural resources in Outer Indonesia, particularly land, and in doing so open up new fields of employment which will attract workers from the central region. The major objectives are "to create productive employment to raise income, to increase domestic food supply to keep pace with rising demand, to expand agricultural exports, particularly of tree crops and to ensure productive, sustainable use of Indonesia's varied land, water and other natural resources" (World Bank, 1985b: 1).

The settlement areas were to serve as growth centres by attracting spontaneous transmigrants and by promoting regional development beyond agriculture, in processing and other industries as well as in trade and services.

The reservation of land in transmigration project areas for settlement of local, indigenous people is planned "as a means of national integration" (Martono, 1984: 43). They are 'integrated' into the new communities, where they "will be treated in the same way as regular migrants, and will receive the same assistance. Local people will also be able to use public facilities, such as schools and clinics, in transmigration settlements" (Martono, 1984: 46). The purpose of these efforts is, among other things, to change the lifestyles of the shifting cultivators, gatherers and hun-
ters. "Resettlement (of local people) is intended to re-structure settlement patterns where villages are scattered and inhabitants practice shifting agriculture, so that permanent villages where settled, intensive agriculture is practiced, can be established" (Martono, 1984: 26-7).

The local or 'native' population is thus forced to leave its home areas and be resettled in the midst of Javanese and Balinese transmigrant families, which form the majority of the population in the project areas. Within the villages, the three types of transmigrants (general, local and spontaneous) may be mixed. According to the World Bank, "this is the ideal arrangement from the point of view of promoting integration" (1985b:68).

The transmigration programme is also considered to be vital to Indonesia's security and 'ketahanan nasional' or the ideology of national resilience and 'pembinaan teritorial' or territorial management. It is claimed by the Indonesian government that transmigrants have to be sent to border areas (daerah perbatasan) and to trouble regions (daerah rawah) in order to provide a strong population base. Referring to this policy, Martono mentioned as an example the island of Natuna facing the Sumatran coast and he explained that "the island of Natuna (...) is situated at only approximately 750 km. from Saigon but at about 1,000 km. from Jakarta" (Kompas, 6 September 1985).

In order to prevent foreign forces, whether communist-inspired or not, from invading Indonesia, military personnel and ex-soldiers participate with their families in the transmigration programme as so-called 'saptamarga' migrants. They are preferably resettled in the border areas and trouble spots. But this is not the only way the Armed Forces have taken up roles and functions in the transmigration programme. The presence of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjatan Republik Indonesia, or the Republic of Indonesia's Armed Forces) is very outspoken. Commander-in-Chief of ABRI, general Benny Murdani, explained to the press that "the transmigration programme is the only programme in the economic field that must quite categorically be related to the interests of defence and security. The preparation of sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus because the choice of locations is intima-
terly related to the whole concept of territorial management in the regions" (Sinar Harapan, 8 March 1985). (For further discussion see Part 3, Chapter 4).

2. The Recruitment and Selection Process

Targets in the Areas of Origin

The decisions regarding target figures are taken at the highest level of central state bureaucracy. Targets are fixed for each province, for each kewadanaan (district), for each kecamatan (subdistrict) and within each subdistrict for each desa (village). The recruitment and selection of transmigrant families in this way becomes the responsibility of the village and (sub)district's heads and the local transmigration officers. The pressure on these lower-level officials is very strong. Not providing the required 'quota' of families is unacceptable to higher levels in the strongly hierarchical administration. Therefore, official regulations regarding recruitment and selection are seldom observed.

The official target of families to be moved during Repelita IV is 750,000 families or about 3,750,000 people. The majority of these transmigrants are supposed to be recruited in the over-populated parts of Indonesia, i. e. Java, Madura and Bali. Within living memory, Java has been the prime target for transmigration recruitment. But this is not the only island where migrants are recruited. Numerous Balinese have participated in the programme, although formal recognition for Bali as an area of origin was only given as late as 1974. In the same year Lombok (Nusa Tenggara Barat) was also formally designated as an area of origin. Recently, Presidential Decree No. 4/1986 designated the islands of Flores, Alor, Sumba and (West) Timor as additional sending areas (these islands are referred to as the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur).

In fact, since spontaneous as well as local transmigrants are officially included in the transmigration programme, the
'recruitment' of transmigrants takes place everywhere in Indonesia.

Recruitment and Selection Criteria

Officially, the main objective of the selection process is to ensure maximum impact on solving problems of population density, poverty and unemployment. Therefore, watershed areas, areas subject to natural disasters, areas selected for the construction of dams and other local development projects, areas where conservation efforts are needed and areas where the carrying capacity of the land has been exceeded, are given the highest priority. A remark by Minister Martono that government sponsored transmigrants in the future will be exclusively recruited from areas where natural disasters have taken place (Kompas, 6 September 1985), perhaps gives an indication of how the policy will be implemented in the period up to 1989.

To become a sponsored, local or registered spontaneous transmigrant, the applicants must meet a number of selection criteria, although the most striking one is seldom mentioned, namely that the applicant has to be male. The World Bank summarised the criteria as relating to "Indonesian citizenship, voluntary registration, low income near subsistence, knowledge of farming or of a special skill, being married and below forty years of age, being in good health and an absence of a criminal record" (1985b: 4).

Even if it is true that these criteria have to be observed, it is so that they tend to get more relaxed, in order to facilitate the resettlement process. For instance, the age limit has been dropped recently. "The government", Martono explained, "is not prepared to curb the desire of the population to transmigrate in order to improve their living standards" (Jakarta Post, 9 August 1985).

Nowadays, any head of family in strong physical condition and able to work the fields, is allowed to participate (Kompas/Sinar Harapan, 8 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).
3. Site Selection and Land/Site Preparation

Areas of Settlement

All areas which are not recognised as transmigrant sending areas, plus some areas which are, fall into the category of areas of settlement. This means that not only the provinces of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, but also Maluku and West Papua, even East Timor are designated as areas of settlement. Some provinces, for instance Lombok, are simultaneously sending and receiving areas. Sumatra has been the favoured destination and consistently took 60% of transmigrants as well as the bulk of spontaneous transmigrants from Java. Sumatra and also Sulawesi are now said to be full and will be closed for transmigration. This was announced by Subagyo, legal and organisation chief in the Transmigration Department in January 1985. He said that "Sumatra, Kalimantan* and Sulawesi with the exception of Central Sulawesi will be closed for spoon-fed transmigrants beginning next year because of land shortages. Only those migrants who leave on their own will be accepted because they pose no financial burden to the government".

In addition, North Sulawesi has been declared closed to self-transferred migrants. The official added that state-funded transmigrants will be settled in East Indonesia, particularly in Maluku and West Papua "where land for farming is still vast" (Jakarta Post, 15 January 1985).

There is not much known about the plans for settling transmigrants in Maluku. The majority of transmigrants will be re-located in West Papua and (East) Kalimantan. Until now, West Papua has been the most controversial target area of the two. "Irian Jaya, given its vast potential, is still wide open and Jakarta was indeed planning massive transmigration there, not least for national security reasons. But friction between migrants and the indigenous Melanesian population in Irian Jaya has become a real issue, at home and abroad. While Jakarta

*This is not true, since Kalimantan at least during Repelita IV will take the majority of the transmigrants.
officially rejects any 'foreign interference' in this matter, it may in fact decide to go slower, in view of the high social and political costs of sending many Javanese settlers to the large and extremely sparsely populated province" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1985).

Nevertheless, the government has planned to settle 167,000 transmigrant families in West Papua before the end of Repelita IV.

The overcrowding of Sumatra and Sulawesi and the difficulties concerning West Papua, leaves Kalimantan, particularly East Kalimantan, among "the few promising transmigration destinations for the time being. The new transmigrants will go in unprecedented numbers to the virgin forest areas in Muara Wahau and Sangkulirang up north" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1985).

The government, indeed, plans to relocate no less than 328,000 families in Kalimantan.

In the World Bank funded Transmigration V Project* 230 Phase II and 130 Phase III studies are to be executed in Kalimantan (69% and 57% of the total number of studies). Some 200,000 transmigrant families will be settled in these areas. In West Papua, 60 Phase II and 60 Phase III studies (18% and 26%) will be executed for the resettlement of 55,000 transmigrant families. In Sumatra 40 Phase II and 35 Phase III studies will lead to the relocation of 45,000 transmigrant families (World Bank, 1985b: 15, see map 3).

Neither the World Bank nor the government of Indonesia speaks about the resettlement of transmigrant families in Maluku and East Timor, although it is known that many settlement areas are already developed there. During Repelita IV 6,000 families or about 30,000 persons will be settled in East Timor (Times of Papua New Guinea, 1 September 1985).

*This refers to the fifth major World Bank loan to the transmigration programme. Within this Project V, which will be implemented during the Fourth Repelita, some 300,000 families will be relocated. For further discussion see Section 4 and 5 in this Chapter.
Site Selection

The process of site selection is, at least on paper, a thorough and lengthy one. Officially, priority locations for transmigration settlements are areas whose development potential, particularly in the agricultural sector, is high (Martono, 1984: 26). Where sustained agriculture is not ensured, for instance because of poor soils, and where a "high social or environmental risk" is involved, potential sites have to be rejected (World Bank, 1985b: 4). In the past, it is claimed that sites have also been rejected on other grounds, such as alternative land claims by local people or "other potential users" such as the Forestry, Mining & Energy or Agriculture Department. According to the World Bank, sites are rejected in cases where "agreements cannot be reached with local users or when the number of people is such that the creation of a transmigration settlement would create serious conflicting land claims" (1985b: 39).

The final selection of sites is said to depend on the outcome of detailed technical, social and economic studies, carried out in three Phases. The initial proposal of possible sites is done by the Kakanwil (Kepala Kantor Wilayah, or the provincial transmigration head) and Bappedas (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah, or Regional Development Planning Council). Their proposals are directly reported to the Secretary General of the Transmigration Department.

After an area is designated as a potential transmigration settlement area, several surveys and feasibility studies are conducted, which take 3 to 4 years. Phase I studies are used to survey the basic land resources, regional planning and general site screening. Phase II consists of several field studies intended to determine its feasibility as a settlement area. The Phase III studies - further divided into III A before land clearing and III B after land clearing - are intended for detailed engineering and final site planning.
Site and Land Preparation

The criteria for site planning are determined by several policies pursued in the Repelita IV transmigration programme. "Firstly, the impact of settlement construction and development on the environment will be taken into account, and implementation and development will be designed so as to preserve the environment and the natural resources, and to prevent adverse effects. Thus the strategy is optimally to use the resources without damaging them, to avoid undermining interrelated elements of the ecosystem; and to provide a strong base, offering several alternatives for future development. In addition, regional development is an important factor in designating a location. The location selected should be able to contribute positively, without exceeding environmental and ecological limits" (Martono, 1984: 37).

After the surveying is completed site planning is done. The physical plans are drawn, including settlement lay out, cropping patterns, facilities for marketing the produce and facilities for accommodating social, cultural and other activities. The settlement units are demarcated and their compostion determined, taking into account the local potentials and supporting capacity in accordance with the established criteria.

The planning stage is followed by land clearance and eventually by the construction of the complete settlement. Land clearing is done by private contractors or subcontractors. After the start of Repelita IV, Sastrosuwarno said that there are 193 contractors involved in the programme for opening new land and 560 companies for housing projects for the prospective transmigrants (Indonesia Times, 25 May 1984). It is the government's intention to switch from private contractors to labour-intensive methods in the preparation of the land and the sites.

"As far as possible, such preparation work will be carried out in a labour-intensive fashion; this is primarily to help low-income earners with no specific skill. If heavy equipment must be used, they will be operated carefully so as not to damage the top soil or humus; utmost care will be taken to preserve
soil fertility. If the location is production forest*, its clearing will yield large quantities of timber" (Martono, 1984: 40).

The construction stage consists of boundary marking, land subdivision, construction of houses, schools and clinics, public facilities, roads and bridges. In certain locations with a large settlement capacity, air strips for Hercules and Transall planes will also be built.

4. Transmigrant Settlement

The transmigrant families are not to be brought to the settlement area, before the whole process of site selection, site/land preparation and construction of settlement is completely finished. Thereupon, they are brought by boat or by Hercules and Transall planes to their destination. "Once settlements are ready, transmigrants will be escorted to the new locations accompanied by health and security personnel and provided with food and medicines" (Martono, 1984: 43).

On their arrival, they are provided with houses, gardens and one hectare of arable land, ready for cultivation (Lahan 1). They receive land use certificates (Sertipikat² Hak Pakai, later to be replaced by certificates of land ownership (Sertipikat² Hak Milik). The second farm lot for the cultivation of cash crops (Lahan 2) is also provided at a later stage and has to be cleared by the transmigrants themselves.

During the first eight months (in tidal swamp areas twelve) of settlement, each family receives a package of basic necessities, such as rice, salt fish, cooking oil, kerosine, sugar etc. They also are provided with a package of agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser. In large settlement areas, extension services are created.

This first stage of settlement is called the 'consolidation stage' during which time (1-1¼ years) the settlers are intended

*These are forests which are considered to be suitable for selective extraction and logging.
to become self-sufficient in basic food stuffs. A further 1 to 2 years, called the 'development stage', is used for the expansion of agricultural production. Finally, in the third stage, which takes roughly two years, economic, social and cultural institutions are strengthened, including health care, family planning, education, co-operatives, credit, processing and marketing facilities and the opening up of employment opportunities.

After an average of five years, settlements become fully-fledged villages under the administration of the local authorities. The project status is lifted and the settlement is not entitled to government assistance anymore. The transmigrants become 'local residents' under the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

5. Executing Agencies

During the first and second Five-Year Plan periods (1969-1979), the transmigration programme was the responsibility of the Department of Manpower, Co-operatives and Transmigration. At the time, Transmigration was only a directorate general. However, in view of the marked increase of the programme towards the end of Repelita II, the director general was promoted to the rank of junior minister (KEPPRES, or Presidential Decree No. 13/1978). As many other departments and directorates were involved in activities in the context of the resettlement programme, the junior minister was invested with the function of co-ordinator of inter-departmental activities. For this purpose, KEPPRES No. 26/1978 created BAKOP-TRANS (Badan Koordinasi Penyelenggaraan Transmigrasi, or Transmigration Implementation Co-ordinating Board). The responsibilities of the various departments involved were clearly divided. For example, the Department of Public Works was made responsible for selection and planning of sites, for land clearing and construction of infrastructure; the Department of Home Affairs was to conduct land use planning and deal with questions relating to the legal status of land; the
Department of Agriculture was made responsible for planning and implementing agricultural development; finally, the Department of Manpower, Co-operatives and Transmigration had to construct the community facilities and the houses and take care of socio-cultural and economic development. Under this highly bureaucratic and hierarchical organisational structure, each Ministry involved was to plan its activities and budget in consultation with the Junior Minister. But the authority, budget and staff of the Junior Minister's office were far too limited for efficient co-ordination. Furthermore, co-ordination proved inoperational because the government agencies still worked independently, disregarding the plans which had been programmed by their respective principal institutes. "This lack of co-ordination resulted in hardships suffered by migrants", Martono said later. He said migrants who had been moved to their new settlements, for instance, found that land was still covered with forests (Indonesian Observer, 22 December 1983).

Therefore, in 1983 the directorate general became an independent Department headed by a Transmigration Minister. The Ministry now has a total staff of about 11,000 people. Directly under the Minister come the Inspector General and the Secretary General. There are two directorates general, the DG for Settlement Preparation (DGSP) and the DG for Mobilisation and Development (DGMD).

For the transmigration programme, the three major executing agencies are the directorate of settlement planning and programming, known as BINA PROGRAM PANKIM, (Bina Program Penyiapan Pemukiman, or Settlement Preparation Office), the PLP (Penyiapan Lahan Pemukiman, or Directorate of Land Preparation and Physical Infrastructure), both directorates within DGSP, and BAKOSURTANAL (Badan Koordinasi Survey dan Pemetaan Nasional, or National Co-ordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping), technically attached to the Department of Research & Technology, but administratively to the State Secretariat.
The BINA PROGRAM PANKIM agency is responsible for settlement planning and the PLP for settlement construction, including land clearing, roads, bridges and public buildings. Both agencies are centralised agencies with little direct communication with provincial authorities. BAKOSURTANAL was established in 1969 under KEPPRES No. 83. This agency co-ordinates land resource inventories and evaluation surveys, during which process the topographic and thematic base maps are produced.

The BAKOPTRANS co-ordinating agency, which was considered unable to keep pace with the large number of transmigrants expected during Repelita IV, was abolished by President Suharto on 16 October 1984, when he issued KEPPRES No. 59/1984 putting regional governors in charge of co-ordinating all transmigration-related activities in their provinces (Kompas, 31 October 1984). Martono explained this step by saying that "in the spirit of the Law (No 5/1974), the provincial governors will become more actively involved in programme planning and implementation to ensure harmony and a smooth operation, particularly in such aspects as the impact of settlements on the environment, natural resource potentials and land ownership and status" (1984: 37).

This delegation of co-ordination of transmigration activities was, among other things, intended to ensure that conflicting land claims and related site rejection be kept to a minimum.

KEPPRES No. 59/1984 also created a Secretariat, responsible for co-ordinating the programme among all agencies concerned. Further, a Supervisory and Technical Team was formed to provide technical assistance to the Minister. Finally, construction activities were decentralised in favour of the Kakanwils (Kepala Kantor Wilayah, or provincial heads of transmigration). Prior to this decision, settlement construction activities were managed and supervised by central officers in Jakarta, who had full control with the assistance of their field project managers, the Primpros. The Kakanwil - as has been described under paragraph 3 of this chapter - has been made responsible for site selection in co-operation with Bappedas.

In the site preparation phase, the very size of the surveys together with the limited time available makes the use of many
multi-disciplinary consultant firms necessary. A large part (up to 40%) of these consultants are expatriates. Among the foreign consultant firms which are involved in the transmigration programme are the Dutch Euroconsult and the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), active respectively in West Papua and East Kalimantan. These consultants work under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works with the assistance of an expatriate Technical Advisory Group (TAG).

As has already been noted, land clearing is done mainly by private contractor and subcontractor firms.

Even for the resettlement of the transmigrant families, the Department of Transmigration is not the only department involved, taking only a share of the targeted number. Under the responsibility of the BINA PROGRAM PANKIM - financed through the World Bank's Transmigration III and IV Project - 500,000 families are to be relocated during Repelita IV. BINA PROGRAM PANKIM is also relocating 150,000 families under its local budget.

The Ministry of Agriculture's directorate general of estates is to relocate 130,000 transmigrant families in Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Projects.

The Ministry of Public Works' directorate general of water resources development is to relocate 80,000 families in swamp reclamation and irrigation projects.

The Ministry of Home Affairs' provincial offices, in liaison with the directorate general of Settlement Preparation, are to relocate 40,000 transmigrant families in small-scale ('sisipan') projects.

Because of this division of responsibilities concerning resettlement of transmigrant families, co-ordination problems keep hindering the implementation of the programme. One of the problems, to give an example, is the rather confusing arrangement that while smallholders and private estates come under the
directorate general of estates (Ministry of Agriculture), the
government estates implementing the Nucleus Estate and Small-
holders scheme come under a separate monitoring body, called
the BTU-BUMN (Biro Tata Usaha/Badan Usaha Milik Negara, or
Administrative Bureau of State Companies), which is a loosely
structured advisory unit to the Minister of Agriculture with no
formal relations to the directorate general of estates.

Other activities after the settlement of transmigrants also
come under different departments, such as input supply, ex-
tension and credit (Agriculture), land titling (Home Affairs)
and irrigation (Public Works).

6. Costs and (External) Funding

Costs

The costs involved in the transfer of such a large number of
people have risen far beyond national financing capability.
Development budget allocations were raised from US $ 5 million
per year in Repelita I to US $ 340 million per year during
Repelita III - equivalent to almost 6 % of the total develop-
ment capital budget (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 November
1984).

Average costs per settled family were estimated (in mid-
1985 values) at US $ 5,720 during Repelita III. For the cur-
rent Repelita, average costs per settled family have been es-
timated at US $ 7,000 (World Bank, 1985b: 35). These are the
minimum costs, for they are based on the traditional food crop
model. Average costs for Repelita IV will certainly be a lot
more if the rehabilitation programme for the older settlements
and the second-stage development for the new settlements are
implemented. They will also be a lot more if settler families
are increasingly transferred to remote areas, such as Kalimantan
and West Papua, which require higher infrastructure invest-
ments and transport costs.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the government is looking for cheaper ways to deal with the transmigration issue. The switch from food crop to export oriented estate models is often mentioned as one of the ways to limit investments made by the government. Initial investment costs for PIR Khusus projects are certainly not less than average costs have been until now, but the difference is that a large part of the initial investments are made by the private sector and these will eventually be paid back by the transmigrants themselves. The decision to switch from fully-sponsored transmigrants to 'spontaneous' settlers has also been mentioned as a means to make transmigrasi cheaper. Here, also, the financial burden is not lifted but simply shifted to the migrants themselves. Even so, if measures necessary to make settlement areas attractive for spontaneous transmigration are taken, this 'self-sponsored' form of transmigration will not be very 'cheap'.

The investments made are not directly aimed at welfare of the transmigrants. Take, for example, the financing of Transmigration V Project (largely financed by the World Bank). This is mainly a mapping, resource evaluation and settlement planning project. About 6.5 million hectares will be surveyed, bringing large areas in Kalimantan, West Papua and East Timor into detailed maps. The amount of survey work is much too extensive for Indonesian agencies to carry out alone.

"BAKOSURTANAL has estimated that without external assistance it would take more than 17 years to complete the national base mapping programme and that before completion many of the existing aerial photographs would become obsolete" (World Bank, 1985b: 12). Thus, international experts have been recruited for the "sound preparation of settlement plans within the time constraints imposed by the transmigration programme" (World Bank, 1985b: 12).

The costs for the aerial photography and base mapping part of Transmigration V Project, consisting of a national mapping programme for the Outer Islands and land resource and land use base maps for Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Papua, are estimated at US $ 22.9 million. Also, there is a large consultant com-
ponent which represents about 80% of total project costs (75% in the Transmigration III Project). The consultant firms are very expensive, contract values ranging from US $ 5 million to US $ 10 million each. This transmigration settlement planning part of the project for 300,000 sponsored and spontaneous transmigrant families in Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Papua, including regional, site screening and settlement feasibility studies, costs US $ 132.9 million. Finally, the programme support (management support to the Ministry at a central level), for DGSP, a 1987 programme review, technical advisory teams, and the training for the project implementing agencies and the national consultant industry, costs US $ 56.9 million (World Bank, 1985b: iv). Total base costs are $212.7 million. With the physical and price contingencies, project costs are estimated at $275.3 million. Indonesia pays $115.3 million while the World Bank contributes $160 million. This has to be repaid through IGGI.

External Funding

Since required investments are very high, implementation of the transmigration programme is heavily dependent on external financial assistance. For Repelita IV alone, external funds are expected to be US $ 750 million (World Bank, 1985b: 10). Among the major contributors are "the World Food Programme, (US $ 66.3 million) in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi; the Asian Development Bank (US $ 34.3 million) in Sulawesi; USAID (US $ 20.8 million) mostly in the Luwu project, Sulawesi; the Federal Republic of Germany (DM 88.5 million) mostly in East Kalimantan TAD Project; and the netherlands (DG 26 million) mostly in Bengkulu. UNDP/FAO, UNDP/OPE, France and the United Kingdom are also providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Transmigration. In addition to this direct assistance other countries such as Australia and Canada have contributed indirectly by providing substantial assistance to BAKOSURTANAL for the mapping of the Outer Islands" (World Bank, ibid.).
### TABLE 2. EXTERNAL FUNDING OF TRANSMIGRASI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Amount (Millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transmigration 2</td>
<td>79.0 US$</td>
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<td>Smallholder Nucleus Estate</td>
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<td><strong>WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME</strong></td>
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<td>Rehabilitation and Development, Sumatra</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Rural Development in Three Provinces of Sumatra</td>
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<td>Regional Development, South Sumatra/South East Sulawesi</td>
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<td>Regional Development, Riau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Development, Kalimantan and Sumatra</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Operational Support</td>
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<td>Transmigration Management Development and Monitoring</td>
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<td>Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, West Kalimantan Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services, Food Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>Norad Study, Assistance to Riau</td>
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Colchester recently wrote in the Ecologist, "nearly US $ 800 million had been provided by June 1985 and a further US $ 750 million of support in the 'pipeline'. Recent calculations indicate that up to one third of the costs of transmigration are being borne by overseas agencies, a figure that will surely rise if (as seems likely) the Indonesian government cuts its revenues" (1986: 62).

Since the beginning of its involvement in transmigration in 1974, the World Bank has contributed some US $ 440 million directly, or about 10% of the total costs of transmigration. (World Bank, 1985b: 7, 13). Within the Transmigration V Project - its fifth major loan - the World Bank will contribute at least another US $ 160 million in the period up to 1989. The Bank also has funded swamp reclamation, nucleus estate and smallholder projects.
PART TWO.
TRANSMIGRASI, 1965–1985:
THE REALITIES.
Minister Martono and his wife are singing with the "Safari Group" in the Bali room of the Hotel Indonesia during the 1973 national campaign for transmigration (Kemcag, 18th March, 1973).
CHAPTER 1. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION IN AREAS OF ORIGIN

1. Methods and Procedures of Recruitment of Transmigrants

The World Bank has described transmigrasi as "the largest voluntary resettlement scheme in the world" (1985b: 3). Analysis of the process of recruiting prospective transmigrant families, however, proves that this is a gross falsehood. Maybe the World Bank is not well informed on the real situation in Indonesia, local authorities certainly are, as can be derived from a remark made by Vice Governor of Yogyakarta, Sri Paku Alam VIII, who stressed that "participation in transmigration should not be based on coercion but rather on an awareness of changing one's lot in life" (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 19 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Given this subtle difference in the context of a military dictatorship such as Indonesia since 1965, non-voluntary participation in transmigrasi has become the rule rather than an exception.

A vehement propaganda war rages in every corner of the country. Continuously, new tricks are being invented to promote the willingness of the population to 'convince' or 'persuade' them that they are 'better off' if they participate in the national programme of transmigrasi. Billboards are put up in every city and village to point at the obligations for 'good Indonesian citizens', and successful transmigrants are being summoned by Minister Martono to tell of their well-being to friends and relatives who remained behind.

Meanwhile, disappointed migrants are not very welcome. It was suggested by the head of West Java's transmigration office that returning transmigrants should be 'localised' in order to prevent them from spreading negative publicity (Indonesia Reports, 8 January 1985).

Simultaneously, 'exemplary' transmigrants are selected and invited to come to Java at the government's expense. They are to attend national day celebrations at the State Palace
and some of them even receive special awards from President Suharto himself. Thereupon, they are taken on tours through the island to promote transmigration. Hormat Meliala, chief of public relations in the Department, announced that December 12th, Hari Bhakti Transmigrasi, or Transmigration Thanksgiving Day, would be used to 'popularise' (memasyarakatkan) transmigration and spread 'understanding and awareness' (pengertian dan pemahaman) about the programme (Surabaya Post, 14 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

The government leaves no stone unturned in the effort to promote 'willingness' to participate among the population. A large part of this propaganda campaign is based on deceit. This has been acknowledged by field workers, who - for obvious reasons - want to remain anonymous. One social scientist, who has worked several years in transmigration projects in Kalimantan, said: "All you hear about transmigration here in Java is exaggerated propaganda. Criticism is not allowed, otherwise quota's won't be filled. In Kalimantan I discovered how all those fine TV films are made. A village head (accompanied by his villagers) told me proudly that he had received money in exchange for a beautiful story he had delivered before a camera. Anyone who joins the propaganda campaign and writes enthusiastic letters home can be sure of getting a leading position in the community" (Onze Wereld, June 1985).

Meanwhile, information which is necessary and useful for prospective transmigrants is not provided. They are unaware of the hardships they are to encounter in the new areas. The Gajah Mada Team concluded in its study of several settlements in South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan that the recruitment period is characterised by a lack of information. They wrote: "Prospective transmigrants were frequently not informed of their destination, the actual conditions there, nor of the exact date of departure. Transmigration field officers were in short supply, and they were able to attend village meetings only on the day of registration. Preliminary recruitment meetings were thus in the hands of village officials who were themselves ignorant of the conditions in the Outer Islands and of the transmigration process" (Guinness et al, 1977: 110).
For instance, one respondent who had left his family in Sumatra to attend to some business in his home village in Java, registered with the transmigration officials in the expectation of being sent to some area of Southern Sumatra from where he could rejoin his family. Only when the train began to carry the transmigrants Surabaya did he realise that he was being sent to Sulawesi. He still hopes to raise the fare to eventually move from Luwu to rejoin his family in Sumatra (Guinness et al, 1977: 49). He was not the only one in the train surprised after realising where he was heading. In the survey, the Team found that some 20% of the settlers had thought that they were going to Sumatra and later found out that they were being sent to Sulawesi (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 100).

These practices have still not stopped. A group of 300 transmigrants from Jember district, East Java, refused to leave because they had learned about another group which was also destined to be settled in Bengkulu but had been taken to Kalimantan instead (Indonesia Reports, 2 November 1984). Another group of 50 households were dumped on the barren part of the island of Buton off the coast of Sulawesi, while they had been promised a fertile plot in Kalimantan. The instant change in destination created quite a stir among the transmigrants because of earlier information from those who had left the area out of desperation due to poor soil conditions and irrigation problems (Indonesia Observer, 4 October 1985).

Lack of information on the exact date of departure had in several cases severe consequences. Registration is officially in response to plans for immediate embarkation, but many families have had to wait a considerable period after registration.

"Some of these (families) registered again because they had received no further word on their original registration". Other families decided against their original registration and withdrew it (Guinness et al, 1977: 48). In many cases, lack of co-ordination and synchronisation caused delays of departure in the sending areas. This is par-
The Myths of Transmigration (Nusantara, June 1985).
particularly unfortunate if transmigrants are given the impression that they will be moved immediately, "for they may already have made preparations such as selling their property or at least not replanting their land in anticipation and then are left high and dry awaiting an uncertain departure date" (Guinness et al, 1977: 49). Some of these families decided to go anyway, for example as spontaneous transmigrants.

After waiting a long time for their departure, 87 families from Kebungbunder village, Cirebon district, West Java received the announcement that their scheduled departure had been cancelled. Thereupon, these "prospective" transmigrants stormed the village hall and wrecked the chairs there (Berita Yudha, 10 June 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

As has been described in the first part of this document, the target for the number of families to be resettled within a specific time space is fixed at the highest level of the central state bureaucracy. Officials at the lower level of this hierarchy have little alternative than to provide the required quota, since failure is not acceptable for higher officials. Since targets are generally high and enthusiasm for resettlement is low, village chiefs and local transmigration officials use all kinds of methods to persuade the population in their region to register. Arndt has noted that when, "with the steep increase in target numbers under Repelita II and III, quotas were allocated to each province and kabupaten, to be filled by transmigration officials from lists of potential migrants prepared by village officials, the need to fill quotas not infrequently led to the use of persuasion, to put it no more strongly" (1983: 63). Pressure on the Javanese and Balinese rural population came from lurahs (village chiefs), local transmigration officials, forestry officers, absentee landowners etc. They all had something to gain from the transfer of these prospective transmigrants. Forestry officers and landlords, for instance, want to gain control over the land for other purposes. The local transmigration officers can only advance in the bureaucratic hierarchy if they succeeded in
The Myths of Transmigration (Nusantara, June 1985)
providing lots of prospective settlers. As for the lurahs, they were pressed to fill the quota and not seldom they used this as a pretext to send villagers away who were considered to be 'less desirable' people: the non-conformists, the trouble-makers or the old and sick. Likewise, some of the transmigrants interviewed by the Gajah Mada Team reported that

"they had been discouraged by their village head from migrating because they were landowners or informal leaders, so that in order to migrate they had to do so as 'voluntary' migrants because the village head had omitted their names from the list" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 90).

Apparently, city authorities also showed a preference for sending unskilled and unprepared people away through transmigration - Martono 'jokingly' said that in future "ex-convicts had better stay in cities and towns in Java where the many security men could be easily called to control them" (Indonesian Observer, 29 October 1983).

It is in the cities of Java that coercion is more visible or at least better documented than in rural areas. In city areas, the gelandangan ('homeless wanderers') are picked up from the streets in raids and are being deported to transit camps where they receive preparatory classes for resettlement.

In the summer of 1985, head of Jakarta's public relations bureau, S. Sudarsin, announced that in order to overcome 'excess urbanisation' raids would be conducted against beggars, vagrants and prostitutes. Those people with no identity cards for the city would especially be 'asked' to return to their home villages or to participate in the national programme of transmigrasi (Suara Karya, 26 July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

One of the first signals that measures like raids against the urban poor were in the minds of the authorities was the news, in the beginning of 1984, that 'die-hard vagrants' would be rounded up and brought to a transit centre on Pulau Tidung Kecil, a small island, five hours by boat from Jakarta. No escape is possible from this island and there the 'vagrants' are given
training in both skills and (state) ideology. The Indonesian press linked this announcement with another law then under preparation: "Coming right on the heels of reports of the existence of an alleged draft law seeking to grant the government with powers to confine individuals in certain restricted areas for vaguely delineated ideological offenses, the Vice Governor's announcement cannot help but bring with it some unpleasant connotations" (Jakarta Post, 27 January 1984). To advocate the raids against the gelandangan, Vice Governor of Jakarta, Anwar Ilmar, speculated in the Jakarta daily that there exists a syndicate which brings in truckloads of beggars because, according to him, beggars are able to earn Rp 90,000 to Rp 120,000 per month (Jakarta Post, 23 September 1985).

The method of rounding up poor people in cities is not confined to Jakarta. According to Kolbeck, in Surabaya 4,000 people are annually arrested by a team consisting of a military person, a policeman, a civil servant and a social worker. These people are also confronted with the 'choice' of returning, to their home villages in rural Java or participating in the transmigration programme (1981: 14). Thus, even before the announcement was made in July 1985, the Department of Social Affairs had already staged 201 raids in Jakarta, netting over 2,000 'tramps and beggars' in the period between April 1984 and April 1985 (Jakarta Post, 11 June 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Afterwards, the head of the social affairs office in Jakarta, Syamsuddin, declared that this 'Operasi Public Order' would continue.

In Topik a mass marriage ceremony held in Trenggalek, East Java, was recently described. "The men and women have reached the canopy after many ups and downs and not a few hair-raising experiences. They were first forcibly rounded up by the authorities and put into barracks, then transported to Trenggalek and put into special training centres for vagrants and given several weeks training in basic skills, plus religious and social education to prevent them from doing things that could be troublesome to the Government". The social services then coupled the
people off, which explains why this 'happy' occasion was marked by an atmosphere of tension (20 December 1983, quoted in: Tapol Bulletin, March 1984). Trenggalek, by the way, is said to be the transit centre for transporting transmigrants to West Papua.

2. Methods and Procedures of Selection of Transmigrants

The Javanese and Balinese men who were convinced that resettlement would bring them a better future have circumvented the selection criteria for as long as kolonisasi and transmigrasi have existed. For instance, "the restriction of selection to married couples caused some unusual marriages among respondents before their registration (...) Some married for the duration of the selection and settlement process, only later to separate in the new area. Another family, a large one, falsified a marriage between two of its children so that the rations would be sufficient. A widow falsified a marriage to her son so that she could register, while a number of young people speedily married in order to transmigrate" (Guinness et al, 1977: 32). Another observer reported that sisters married brothers and aunts married nephews. A widow, for example, married a seventeen-year-old son and a grandmother her teenage grandson (Gondowarsito, 1984: 37). In all these cases, the people were willing to participate in the transmigration process, but they did not meet the marriage requirement, or they 'faked' marriages in order to receive more food rations.

After 1965, when (semi) forced participation became the custom, the marriage criterion led to horrifying scenes, as has been described in Tapol Bulletin (see previous section). Prospective migrants whose husband or wife refused to comply were registered anyway and were forced to marry someone else. These marriages consisted simply of a letter issued by the lurah. Some urban poor, who were picked up from the streets, had to participate in a mass marriage ceremony, organised by the Department of Social Affairs (March 1984).
Martono himself is making selection criteria more lenient than before. He discovered, for instance, that old people had been taken along by their younger transmigrant relatives to start a new life in the settlements. "Psychologically speaking, transmigrant families accompanied by their elders will lead a quiet and peaceful life", the Minister said, "these old folks prefer to die close to their children and relatives instead of staying alone at their ancient homes in Java", and he therefore concluded that "the preferences of these people should not be curbed and prevented". Thus, the age limit for people eligible for transmigration had been made more lenient. People older than 45 (previously the limit) could enroll as resettlers provided they were physically fit and capable of hard work (Jakarta Post, 9 August 1985).

On the part of the officials, regulations and guidelines have also often been neglected in order to fill quotas. Thus, selection criteria may have existed for as long as resettlement programmes in Indonesia, but they have at most played a minor, insignificant role. The emphasis on quantity - numbers to be moved - simply makes a sound selection process impossible. In the past, the main criterium tended to be willingness to move (Hardjono, 1977: 26-7), although this willingness was not very widespread. Gondowarsito, who studied the Wonogiri area in Java, identified an age-old reservation towards kolonisasi and transmigrasi, resulting from the forced relocation of 800 villagers in 1939 by the lurah who considered them to be 'undesirable' residents, and also during the period between 1927 and 1942 when transmigrants were recruited for work on the rubber plantations of Sumatra. Furthermore, the people in Wonogiri had been informed about the lack of education facilities in Sumatra compared with those existing in Java. If they were to have had a free choice, they would have remained in spite of the permanent flooding of part of their homelands. "They argued that a flood is something routine, and that they can practise agriculture during the dry season, and even during times of flood, and if
things are very bad there still remains support from those who feel compassion" (Suara Karya, 6 June 1975, quoted in: Gondowarsito, 1984: 4). Another objection was caused by the fact that some 600 graveyards were located in the area that was to be inundated. The government, though, did meet this objection and has spend Rp 60 million on the 'transmigrasi' of the graveyards (Suara Karya, 5 June 1975, quoted in: Gondowarsito, 1984: 4).

When asked about the problems faced by the city government on transmigration programmes, Lukman Zaini, city hall spokesman in Jakarta said "generally there was an objection among the city population itself to join transmigration because they are not farmers" (Jakarta Post, 25 Oct. 1985) Reservation towards joining transmigrasi was also formulated by reporter McDonald who interviewed people in the Bor Panas neighbourhood in Jakarta; he wrote "to go to a transmigration centre can mean great hardship, quite apart from breaking deep bonds of locality, family and friends. Despite its successes, the transmigration scheme has had a chequered history. The Bor Panas people tended to laugh at suggestions of transmigration. 'They just take you out into the jungle with all the mosquitoes and forget about you', one man said. Another said it would take a farmer's skills, which he did not have, to pioneer a settlement in the wilds" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April 1976).

Apparently, the reservation against transmigration among the city population has not vanished over the years, since it became public that none of the recently dispossessed becak drivers had accepted offers to be transmigrated as 'compensation' for the loss of their jobs (Tempo, 30 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

The transmigrants who were selected were 'the poorest of the poor'. "It is clear", the Gajah Mada Team concluded, "that in terms of land ownership, house ownership, land cultivation and property ownership, these transmigrants came from section of the Javanese/Balinese community that were poorer than the average (...). Being poor as they were, most household heads re-
gistered to migrate in the hope of obtaining land, for land is of prime value to Javanese and Balinese villagers. In their desire for land, they had little idea that the quality of soil in the Outer Islands was different from that at home, nor did they have any clear understanding that these new conditions required different techniques of farming. Basically the land itself was their hope" (Guinness et al, 1977: 38, 109).

3. Recruitment and Selection: Natural Man-Made Disasters

In a recent article Hardjono states that transmigration on the part of the individual family is voluntary and that no coercion is exerted. She says that this is reflected in the fact that 'only' 10,644 families, whose land was submerged when the Saguling Dam was constructed in West Java in 1984, chose to move as umum transmigrants. Similarly, she says, 'only' 40% of the 35,000 persons whose livelihood was destroyed by the Mt Galunggung eruptions in 1982 decided to leave the area under the transmigration programme (1986: 40-1).

This is not, however, how it works. The main criterium, as has been described before, is willingness and it seems that this is not very widespread. Therefore, the government seeks to promote 'willingness' as much as possible. In its propaganda campaign, the authorities in particular aim at the lower strata of society, the urban poor, the landless rural families or victims of natural disasters. These are the favourite target groups because these people are very vulnerable, in fact, they do not have much to lose. The pattern for relocating poor and harrassed people was set in 1963, when over 20,000 families were transferred to other islands after Mount Agung on Bali erupted. The evacuees had been told not to return to their home villages and later they were 'persuaded' to take part in the transmigration programme. They were promised that they would be 'better off' and that fertile plots of land would be waiting for them in tanah sabrang, the land beyond! This pat-
tern of persuading victims of natural and man-made disasters, such as the Wonogiri Dam, has been used at several occasions since 1963.

For instance, from Cilacap in Central Java, victims of malaria were resettled in Jambi (Sumatra) (*Indonesia Reports*, 14 December 1984). From flood-prone and food-short villages in Bojonegoro district in East Java, 164 evacuees were resettled in Nabire (West Papua) (*Angkatan Bersenjata*, 2 May 1985, quoted in: *Indonesia Reports*). Some 400 people who lived in Banjar-negara in Central Java, where the Sileri crater produced poisonous gasses, were resettled in Baturaja (South Sumatra) (*Kompas*, 6 May 1985, quoted in: *Indonesia Reports*). Even lepers have been a favourite target group for transmigration authorities. *Kompas* reported that (former) lepers were resettled from Tangerang Hospital in West Java to the swampy transmigration site Margomulyo I in South Sumatra, where they could not survive. Their feet and hands had been broken, and the local residents expelled them in a land dispute. "We cannot endure being tortured (tersika) like this", one transmigrant said. Desa Margomulyo I, by the way, is a model project from the Department for Social Affairs (2 May 1985, quoted in: *Indonesia Reports*).* More than 2,000 fishermen were permanently evacuated by soldiers from their villages north of Surabaya. Their fishing area had been polluted by a fertiliser and pesticide plant, the PT Petrokimia Gresik (*Indonesia Reports*, 7 January 1985).

* Up to September 1986 Jakarta has sent lepers in three travel groups consisting of 99 people to rehabilitation and resettlement centres in South Sumatra. In October 1986 a new joint agreement will be signed on this issue between the Jakarta government and South Sumatran province (see *Jakarta Post*, 22 August 1986).
But the causes of these problems are never dealt with. For instance, the chemical plant was not closed. But the local population was simply moved away from the area. This happens when their living area is ravaged by pollution, floods or unemployment. These are pretexes used to make them participate in transmigrasi. These are the 'surplus people', the obstacles for development.

One of the better documented cases of transmigrating whole villages for the sake of 'local development' is the Wonogiri case. The Wonogiri area was regularly flooded by the mighty Solo river and for this reason the Directorate General of Water Works conducted a survey of the area in co-operation with the Japanese consultant agency OTCA (Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency). In the final report (1974), the construction of four large and numerous small dams was proposed. The intention was to avert future floods, and furthermore, the project would serve irrigation purposes, electricity needs and it would promote the fishing industry and tourism. Because a large area would become inundated, the transfer of 45 villages was also included in the plan. The population of these villages saw itself confronted with the 'free' choice between local and inter-island migration; transmigration being promoted as the 'better' choice, since only minor compensation was given to those who preferred to remain on Java. The few locally migrating families, who received only a small plot of land elsewhere, faced a decrease in incomes. The majority of the population, consisting of 12,000 families (about 67,500 persons), was resettled at transmigration sites in Bengkulu and Jambi (Sumatra)*

* Afterwards the whole Wonogiri project turned out to be a first-class disaster. This failure was forecasted by experts even before the construction began. Today, many officials agree with these experts and they are now convinced that the transfer of whole villages should never have happened at all. "So far the dam has failed to prevent an ordinary modest overflowing of the river Solo, let alone the flooding of villages in the neighbourhood" (Onze Wereld, June 1985).
East Kalimantan transmigration - the land is not suitable for planting rice. Transmigrant families have to try their luck with kasava. After 8-10 years land planted with kasava will be exhausted. (Photo: Thekla Kolbeck.)
More recent cases of this kind of recruitment of whole villages and regions for transmigration are given by INDOC. "Because transmigration is the best solution", according to the Deputy Governor, some 3,800 families have to depart from their home areas in the Sragen, Purwodadi and Boyolali districts in Central Java for the benefit of a dam project and electricity purposes. Many families have so far refused to leave because there has been unsatisfactory compensation for their losses (1968: 14). Also, the population in the area, described by Hardjono as a case of 'voluntary' migration, has been intimidated in the process of expropriation. Their plots of land are measured to be a smaller size than they actually are and they have to pay illegal taxes. These manipulations and intimidations have played an important role; so far 10,000 people (of the targeted 10,700 families) have been transmigrated out of the Saguling area in West Java (Sinar Harapan, 18 February 1986; Pelita, 12 April 1986, quoted in: INDOC, 1986:15).

The Gajah Mada Team pointed out advantages of the resettlement pattern of 'bedol desa'- relocating whole villages from one place to another - such as the fact that transmigrants could retain their places in the village community, but they also pointed out the "danger that transmigration officials will become more concerned with the number of persons moved than the standard of life created in the new area" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 89; Guinness et al, 1977: 12).

Nowadays, the primary aim of the recruitment and selection process seems to be moving as many people as possible in an effort to fulfill ambitious targets. Whether or not the prospective settler families qualify as 'suitable candidates' is not a matter of serious consideration. With the ambitious targets and the limited willingness among the population, there is not much to select from. In the recruitment and the selection process lies, therefore, one of the causes of the failure of the transmigration programme. The tendency to send the urban poor and rural landless families, with little or no far-
ming experience at all, to agricultural settlements on other islands, is, as Jones & Richter described it, "perhaps helpful for the local administration, but it is unlikely to result in the best potential settlers being chosen for the arduous task of land settlement" (1982: 5).
CHAPTER 2. SITE SELECTION AND LAND/SITE PREPARATION

1. Site Selection

Initially, in order to avoid the more populated regions, transmigrant families were predominantly relocated in cleared forest areas. Indonesia has about 140 million has. of tropical forests, constituting 60% of the total land area. In 1979, however, the clearance of these forests for transmigration purposes was banned by General Suharto who immediately cancelled six proposed projects. At the time, clearing of rainforests was considered to be ecologically unwise and attention shifted to swamp reclamation in the coastal regions of southern Kalimantan and eastern Sumatra and to non-irrigated rainfed land in other provinces of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

Swampland - of which Indonesia possesses about 40 million has. - is said to be ideal for rice cultivation, but because of its complicated hydrology and its influence on soil quality, Caulfield categorises swamps as being one of the less well understood ecosystems for agriculture (1984: 26). Other experts, such as Tjondronegoro, maintain that swamp reclamation will, in the end, be more expensive than settlement on other sites, because of declining soil fertility (1982: 56). The World Bank, however, turned out to be an important advocate of swamp reclamation and settlement on tidal areas. World Bank funded consultants have surveyed over 24 million has. of which 15 million has proved to be suitable for economic exploitation. With the surveys still under way, 68,293 transmigrant families were already resettled on 461,964 has. of reclaimed swampland in Riau, Jambi and South Sumatra and 22,911 families were resettled on 152,892 has. of tidal areas in West, Central and South Kalimantan during the first three Repelitas (Sinar Harapan, 15 July 1985).

The problems in these tidal areas are as serious and as manifold as in the other sites. Officials in West Kalimantan
Map 4: East Kalimantan.

a = SKP Kaliorang
b = SKP Kaubun
c = SKP Rapak
d = Nucleus estate

1 = SKP Pesab
2 = SKP Wahau Timur
3 = SKP Pantun
A = SKP Lembak
have reported that rice yields in reclaimed swampland are less than a quarter of those in Java and it had taken a location at Rasau Jaya near Pontianak 10 years to become self-sufficient in rice (The Economist, 4 August 1984). Expectations regarding the role tidal projects could play for regional development have also been low. Hardjono has noted that "because the nature of tidal irrigation does not permit settlements to be clustered around a focal point, it is difficult for one village to develop into a centre of economic activity."

She said that during the third Repelita, some 16% of the government-sponsored transmigrants were settled in tidal projects located in six provinces in Kalimantan and Sumatra (1986: 33). Even when economic exploitation of swampland becomes a real possibility in the future, it will not offer a solution during Repelita IV, since only 36 of the projected 336 sites are located in swamp areas (Martono, 1984: 31).

Therefore, transmigrant settlement, once again, takes place in Indonesia's tropical rainforests. In an effort to accommodate the growing needs of transmigration, the Forestry Department has already, according to Secrett, altered its classification criteria, which were initially based on environmental considerations.

"Because the Transmigration Department invariably sets over-ambitious settlement targets, insists on clearing extensive areas for settlement (between 15,000 and 20,000 has. per site) and rigidly sticks to a prescribed farm model, there is simply not enough land in the Conversion Forests* either suitable or available, and so the opportunity to use the forests rationally diminishes, while the likelihood of unnecessary degradation increases." (1986: 82).

Land Unavailability

Availability of suitable land in the traditional settlement areas has been increasingly hard to find, according to Arndt, *consisting of roughly 33,000 square kilometers, supposedly areas where the forest can be safely cleared for agriculture and transmigration.
because of the ban on tropical forest clearance, the infestation of cleared and grassland by alang which renders large areas (an estimated 20 million ha.) unusable for agriculture and land claims by local populations on "even sparsely populated land in the Outer Islands" (1984: 40-1).

Notwithstanding the myth of emptiness, there is not enough land. Although there is some good land, most of it is already spoken for, by local people, earlier settlers, small and large landowners, concession holders, the state, the Forestry Department, etc. Former FAO-senior Director Westoby has written that settlement targets are accepted "which, in the light of experience to date, seem unlikely to result in successful and durable settlement. That is to say, the necessary pre-controls will not be in place. Thus the consequences will be similar to those which have attended past schemes, i.e. continuing unregulated excursions into the forest and a further extension of the area of degraded forest in need of rehabilitation." (quoted in: Secrett, 1986: 80).

Also, quality of land for agriculture has often been overrated, resulting in more selection of unsuitable sites. Caulfield reported an official saying that better planning would bring "a big conflict of site availability. Already there is a lot of tension in the system because the consultants are recommending exclusion of more sites. I believe the government will run out of sites before they meet the resettlement goals" (1984: 26).

According to Hardjono, "the basic reality, that large tracts of good land are no longer available, is reflected in the fact that one expatriate firm of consultants carrying out feasibility studies in southern Sumatra had a rejection rate of 80% on all sites proposed by local provincial authorities for transmigration projects during Repelita III" (1986: 34).

However, the comforting and reassuring words spoken by World Bank officials and Minister Martono himself (see Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 3) are castles in the air. It is simply not true that in site selection high agricultural potential is the main criterium; and sites have neither been rejected where sustained agriculture was not ensured, nor where competing land claims were known to exist or where a high social or environ-
mental risk was involved.

Hadjono noted already some years ago that it frequently happened that, when a relatively unpopulated area had been selected for a transmigration project, further investigation showed that it lay within a forest concession area. "So far", she wrote at the time, "no co-ordinated plan of action has been worked out between the transmigration and the forestry agencies, although proposals were made as long ago as 1966 for the establishment of settlements in conjunction with timber felling." (1977: 40).

This striking lack of co-ordination between government agencies involved has not been corrected since. Furthermore, many instances have come to light where consultants have advised against resettlement only to be overruled by the decision of Jakarta to go ahead with the project. British soil mapping expert Richard Bower said that Japanese and other land use consultants have often produced unfavourable feasibility reports regarding the selection of untouched forest land in East Kalimantan, but had learned later that their advice had been over-ridden (PNG Times, 24 February 1985). Sometimes, local transmigration officials are pressed to take a surplus in excess of what had been identified as the maximum carrying capacity of a certain area. This has, for instance, happened in Timika in West Papua, where feasibility studies done by World Bank-funded consultants had found sites suitable for the accommodation of 200 families. But these local officials, in meeting government targets, were forced to accept 500 families (Kabar dari Kampung, No 3/4, 1985). An official review showed that over half a million has. of lowland development projects have been located in forests judged unsuitable for the forms of transmigration development under consideration. Although the review concluded that only about 75,000 has. in Central Kalimantan were suitable as well as available for establishing three appropriately modelled transmigration sites, government targets project the clearance of nearly seventeen times as much forest (Secrett, 1986: 83).
The World Bank earmarked US $ 120 million for working out better ways to select sites. Osborne, however, came up with an anecdote which makes crystal-clear how this money is sometimes spent. The recognition of the problem of poor site selection, he wrote, has resulted in a determined effort, from around 1980, to undertake better surveying in advance. This emphasis, too, has received strong support from international bodies.

"For example, in April, 1982 the Indonesian government signed an aid agreement with the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation covering US $ 29 million worth of foodstuffs. Items such as wheat, milk powder, canned fish and legumes were acquired with the intention of distributing them to transmigrants and, more importantly, people on the ground who were looking for good sites. The food was airdropped in remote places in an operation resembling famine relief - except the recipients were generally a well-fed group of Indonesian and foreign technicians"(ACFOA Briefing, May,1985:9).

**East Kalimantan**

For the near future, East Kalimantan will be an important if not the most important target area of settlement. The population density in this province is only 6 people per square kilometer, but there are good natural reasons for this (see Part 3, Chapter 1, Section 3). Now that older areas around Balikpapan and Samarinda are overcrowded and have become almost integral parts of the urban centers, incoming transmigrant families are increasingly being resettled in the hinterland, far away from markets and off-season employment opportunities, etc. Some 60,000 transmigrants are planned for resettlement in two project sites, Muara Wahau and Sangkulirang, which - according to a foreign consultant - were chosen as the 'least unsuitable' sites for transmigration. The sites are described in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

"The Muara Wahau area has extensive areas of generally flat land (170,000 has.) which are more or less free of swamps and extensive flooding. But it is difficult to reach the area, the easiest and cheapest method being to take the longboat up the Mahakam river and tri-
butaries for 36 hours. The Sangkulirang area is more hilly and swampy but the coastal location of this site is expected to compensate for such disadvantages. An advantage of both sites is that there is practically no indigenous population in them (sic) (...). Consultants have worked out a farm model specifically for the two areas, which they say is a compromise between the need to cultivate food crops and the need to ensure reasonable levels of settlers incomes in the long run (...) because of poor and acidic soil (conditions being) unsuitable for food crop cultivation, a larger plot for food crops is needed, half of which will have to be left 'fallow' for soil recovery at any one time, in order to maintain yield over the years, the consultants say" (7 February 1985).

These 'least unsuitable' sites in Pasir district, East Kalimantan, include a World Bank funded rubber and oil palm project on PIR Khusus basis. Kompas reported some time later that only Rp 1 billion out of Rp 180 billion allocated for this project had been used and that only 5,000 has. had been developed out of the projected 12,000 has. for palm oil and 16,000 has. for rubber, although the project is supposed to be completed within eight years, of which half has passed. The main obstructions for the implementation of the project, according to Kompas, is the issue of land ownership - showing that the area is not as 'unpopulated' as the Far Eastern Economic Review suggested. Colchester reported that four years after the project was launched, it had reached complete stagnation because the local people refused to give up their lands to the project, and were not persuaded that the project would really benefit them.

"The project's managers have complained about the local people's insistence on living near the road or in their original habitats - behaviour which is considered intolerable because the project design has already established which land is to be used for homesteads and which for crops."

Some inhabitants have refused to hand over their land to PTP IV, since the PIR project 'isn't clear to them yet'. Some of the inhabitants refuse because they say the land is rattan forest which till then had provided them with their livelihood. Some 3,500 has. is admitted by the authorities to be rattan forest, but they maintain it is no longer productive, because it
has not been properly cared for. The difficulty is that the local people are not willing to hand over their land even though they have been told that rubber and oil palm plantations will be far more profitable than living in these rattan forests (Kompas, 31 October 1985; Colchester, 1986c: 109).

2. Land/Site Preparation

The preparation of transmigrant settlements had been very insufficient in the past, mostly due to the Jakarta-inspired drive to work fast and keep investments low. Such was the haste with which people were being dispatched into the former forests that transmigrasi came to be described as the 'plan as you proceed' programme. Environment Minister, Emil Salim, compared it to "sailing a boat that is still under construction. Some of the passengers are nailing down the timber, others lading out water while yet others are still trying to decide where the boat is supposed to be going" (Sinar Harapan, 21 February 1984).

The irresponsible manner with which areas were cleared was admitted by Harun Zain, former Minister of Transmigration, who said: "In order to save time we used to employ the heaviest machines to clear the jungle, until examination of the soil proved that extracting the trees damaged the top soil to such an extent that cultivation was slowed down considerably. Now the trees are sawn off right above the roots. Preparation of the site must then be done by hand, which often requires a lot of time" (quoted in: NRC Handelsblad, 9 June 1982).

It is not correct, however, to claim that the methods of using heavy machinery have since been abandoned. The rush to meet targets proved to remain top priority. In 1984, for instance, an agreement was made between the Settlement Planning and Labour Development Employment Directors General to use labour-intensive methods in land clearance and site preparation. In reality, this turned out to be only a minor project, implemented in areas where forests were thin and where some basic infrastructure was already present. Danang D. Yudonagoro, Di-
ector General of Labour Development Employment, explained that "this programme requires good preparation because the use of labour-intensive methods should not affect the completion schedules and should not excessively increase the costs of transmigration projects" (Jakarta Post, 18 April 1984).

Contracting Failure

Among others, this was one of the reasons why private contractor and subcontractor firms have kept their position as land clearers and site preparators in the transmigration programme. This is in spite of critical comments, which even came from Transmigration Minister Martono himself, who recently criticised business contractors "who thought only of commercial gain in opening new sites which were uninhabitable by transmigrants" (Sinar Harapan, 17 January 1986, quoted in: Indonesia reports).

Some of these - in the words of Martono - "partners of the government" are, according to Aditjondro, actually timber concessionaires turned into building construction companies (1986: 11). The only concern for these (sub-)contractor companies is to do the job as quickly and as profitable as possible. The methods used by these companies and the consequences are eloquently described by Caulfield. "Generally the trees are knocked down by bulldozers and then burnt - often even before the commercially valuable species have been taken out. Heavy clearing equipment compacts the soil so that it loses much of its capacity for retaining water. Hard rains can then erode the land, silt up nearby rivers and dams, and lead to flash flooding as the waters 'sheet' along the surface to the ground. The wheels of the clearing machines scrape off much of the topsoil, exposing subsoils that are less capable of receiving and storing nutrients, so that fertilizers become less effective" (1984: 26).

In other cases, contractors considered their job done after exploiting only the commercially attractive trees, leaving the transmigrants landless. This has happened, for instance, in West Kalimantan, where on a location outside Pontia-
nak, settlers had to grow their crops around huge tree stumps (The Economist, 4 August 1984). In Jayapura district in West Papua, some 220 out of 600 transmigrant families had not yet received their plots of land, because the survey work had not yet been completed and the contractor had left the area (Indonesia Reports, 4 January 1985). Jakarta Post also reported that in West Kalimantan during Repelita III, 26,505 of the targeted 29,734 migrant families had not received their second farm plot (11 January 1985).

That this problem has not been solved since Repelita III came to an end can be derived from the remark recently made by Hardjono that "at the end of 1985 the transmigration agency had not yet allocated 10% of the total area that should have been given to transmigrants for use as their first plot of land and 31% of land for the second plot in the 921 village units under guidance in that month" (1986: 37).

She writes that under the contract system observed by Public Works, contractors fulfilled the requirements of their agreements even when it was apparent that serious errors were being made. "There are many instances where land clearing was continued even when removal of vegetation revealed totally unsuitable soils. The contractors responsible for house construction went ahead and placed houses on home-lots that were obviously non-cultivable. Similarly, those employed to sink bores for drinking-water supplies placed them on the sites that were designated, even when the locations were clearly unsuitable" (1986: 36).

On top of their inability to do the job satisfactorily, contractors have also been involved in corruption affairs. Ali Noeroso, head of the North Maluku local transmigration office, announced that his office had decided to cancel the remainder of the contract with CV Daun Mas, since it had proven itself incapable of meeting the requirements and in addition it was embroiled in a corruption scandal involving hundreds of millions of rupiah intended for the construction of an elementary school. CV Daun Mas had managed to complete only 125 of the 625 houses to be built according to the contract (Jakarta Post, 12 September 1985).
In an attempt to hasten the settlement of transmigrants during Repelita III, a ministerial instruction was issued on 4 August 1980, permitting the placement of transmigrants on land that was not fully prepared "provided that it was within the capacity of the transmigrants to clear the land with a proper return for their services".

Contractors who had not finished land preparation as stipulated in their contracts had to pay a cash wage to transmigrants to complete the work. As a consequence of this 'acceleration programme' (program percepatan) targets were met, but new settlers often found that it was impossible to begin cultivation of even the home-lot, because stumps had been left in the ground and branches were scattered over the land, and contractors were reluctant to pay the migrants a proper wage. "Despite a further ministerial instruction in June 1982 concerning this last point", Hardjono writes, "transmigrants have continued to complain of badly prepared land and of inadequate payment by contractors for work that they have had to do" (1986: 37).

Corruption also played its role in these problems. In Semangga site near Merauke in West Papua, for instance, transmigrants were quarreling with the transmigration unit leader about the fee paid to them by the contractor to clear their own land. The fees were channelled by the contractor through the Merauke transmigration office for distribution to the settlers. Kabar dari Kampung reported that "while the transmigrants never had received any money, the unit leader was able to start a cattle beef ranch" (No. 3/4, 1985).

As recently as March 1985, over 1,000 transmigrants in the Koya and Arso sites in West Papua were still complaining that when they arrived there in 1982 and 1983, they had been promised that their plots would be cleared and ready for cultivation. But even a year after their arrival the fields were still full of trunks and stumps. So, after a tripartite negotiation between the Jayapura transmigration office, the PT Hanurata contractor, and the transmigrants, the contractor agreed to pay a fee for the transmigrants to clear their own plots. However, as the Cenderawasih paper reported in the spring of 1985, the
promise of payment of wage had not yet been fulfilled (Kompas, 23 February 1985; Kabar dari Kampung, No. 3/4, 1985).

The incapability of contractors who confuse their business with corruption, leaving transmigrant families without land to cultivate, is not the only obstacle in the preparation stage. Another problem confronting the settlers in the agricultural sector is that irrigation and drainage works have been lacking. Because of co-ordination problems some settlements are like deserts, while others have been water-logged with salt affecting water deep inland from the coast, making even drinking water unobtainable and land unsuitable for agriculture (Kompas, 27 February 1985). In fact, co-ordination problems have resulted mainly from the hasty dispatch of transmigrants (and colonists in the pre-Independence period, for that matter) while the Public Works' Department could not keep up with the speed of settlement. Transmigrants in the Way Seputih location in South Sumatra, for example, have had to wait fourteen years for irrigation and drainage canals to be built (Tjondronegoro, 1982: 54).


Wertheim pointed out at an early stage in the history of resettlement the unsuitability of a large part of the land for irrigation. Alternatives, however, such as the application on a large scale of mixed farming, green manure or artificial fertilizers, and a much more efficient use of tree cultivation, would require an enormous amount of planning, research, pilot surveys and the testing of more promising methods. He forecasted that, if a great effort was not made in the near future, "the soil, which provides high yields during the early years, will soon become exhausted, and the usual alang grass will force settlers to look for new land. The forests of South Sumatra will dwindle and the Land of Promise will soon turn into a Land of Despair" (1964: 195). He compared the situation in Lampung during his visit in December 1956 with what he remembered from the province when he was
there in 1931. "Where there had formerly been an endless growth of bush at either side of the road, now to the right and to the left, wide alang grassfields extended as far as I could see. Mountains and hills, also largely denuded, appeared where the bush had completely hidden them twenty-five years earlier. Even a large rubber plantation I had visited during my first stay had practically disappeared without leaving a trace. It was as if a swarm of locusts had come upon the country and left it barren and forbidding" (1964: 187).

What Wertheim forecasted many years ago has become a reality now not only for South Sumatra; many settlement areas have indeed turned into the Land of Despair. Tropical rainforests are crucial for the conservation of the soil and they are irreplaceable. Once forest land is cleared, the danger of alang grass, a voracious and useless type, looms up, leaving the forest communities without food. Even animal life disappears. The clearance of even relatively small areas of forest, according to Secrett, can swiftly lead to species extinction, because nearly all the available nutrients are locked up in surface vegetation, few nutrients remain after an area has been cleared (1986: 78). Transmigrants regularly complain about elephants and other animals which, confined as they are to patches of remnant forest, damage crops and homes in search of food.

Tragic effects have been recently described by a comprehensive review of Indonesia's forests, carried out jointly by the Departments of Forestry, Population/Environment/Development, and Home Affairs, in co-operation with the International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED). They came to the conclusion that "given the current objectives and operational procedures of the transmigration programme, the Team considers transmigration as the single sectoral activity with the greatest potential to advance forest destruction - often to no constructive result. Whether a 'success' or 'failure' by present standards, transmigration, as currently managed, can only have negative implications for forest resources" (quoted in: Secrett, 1986: 77).

Secrett elaborated further on this point, noting that if as a result of the generally poor soil conditions and the chosen
farm model, the settlement is not successful, the settlers may clear more land to begin afresh, and if agriculture is successful, more transmigrants will be attracted to the area with disastrous results. "Because they do not know from experience how to farm the forests sustainably, newcomers invariably use slash-and-burn methods, which exceed natural constraints, and cropping techniques which the generally poor forest soils of the Outer Islands cannot support. The only course open is to move into new forest zones and repeat the process" (1986: 84).

Therefore, it must be concluded that the transmigration programme provides the basis for a much greater destruction of the tropical forest than the settlement figures indicate. The amount of land converted for farm plots for the government-sponsored transmigrant settlers is, in fact, the minimum amount lost from the forest estate. There are also the so-called 'knock-on effects', such as the building of 12,000 km. roads in the context of the programme. The interdepartmental team was convinced that the planned opening up of the forest by transmigration agencies may lead to the eventual destruction of five times the area of forest initially cleared (1986: 87).

Heavy machinery has destroyed the top soil spoiling drainage and creating pools which have become breeding grounds for malaria carrying mosquitoes - East Kalimantan - Photo Thekla Kolbeck.
CHAPTER 3. TRANSMIGRANT SETTLEMENT

1. Settlement Policy

Transmigrants are frequently brought to their 'new homes' long before site preparation, land clearance or even surveying is completed. On arrival they find that houses are not (yet) built or are of low quality. Lack of co-ordination between the governmental departments and agencies involved, a top down approach and corruption scandals are some of the causes of inadequate settlement policy. For the transmigrants, the circumstances in the settlement areas lead to disappointment. The Gajah Mada Team noted that "transmigrants arrived before homes were completed, or months after the houses were built and had begun to rot or be overgrown with wines and weeds. The number of transmigrant arrivals (in one case) exceeded the number of houses provided. Transmigrants were kept waiting for land, or their house, and often initial high spirits were doused with the reality of the facilities and conditions on the project" (Guinness et al, 1977: 110).

Generally, the houses proved to be badly adjusted to local conditions, since the government insisted on providing standard housing. For instance, the houses provided by the government in Bengkulu "were built of wood, white-painted on the outside, and with tin roofs to shelter from sun and rain. Only one wealthy family managed to have their roof eventually changed to roof tiles gradually transported from Java by lorry during the dry season. When the burning sun shines on the tin roofs, it becomes unbearable for people to remain in the house during the warmest hours of the day" (Gondowarsito, 1984: 35).

Similar reports about low quality of housing were given on settlement sites in West Papua. According to the Kabar dari Kampung several people complained that their walls were already rotting. In March 1983 about 150 houses were flooded due to poor drainage. "At the root of the problem is bad planning", the paper concluded. "In Koya it has been pointed out that the drainage system was planned on a 1:5,000 scale map, far too large for such detailed and precise work".
The paper suggested that indigenous housing had several advantages. "... aside from the risk of flooding there appear to be other advantages in building transmigrant housing on stilts, which after all is the standard pattern for most housing in Eastern Indonesia. Such housing lessens the risk of children getting infections such as worms from the soil; it is easier to keep clean; it reduces the risk of pests; it lessens the effects of flooding. In spite of this, the Transmigration Department persists with its standardised model" (No. 3/4, 1985: 28-9).

The Jakarta Post reported that the walls of 6,000 transmigrant homes in several sites in West Kalimantan had to be dismantled again because of the danger of caving in. Koestarto, the head of the local transmigration office, said non-water resistant particle board walls had been installed to accelerate construction for the incoming transmigrants in 1982 and 1983 (2 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Apart from the housing problem, the settlers find themselves confronted with many other problems. Their plots of land frequently are, resulting from corruption and incapability, not allocated or, if they are, they have to be cleared by the migrants themselves. Irrigation proved to be another huge problem. In Mowila II in South East Sulawesi, 200 transmigrant families have been waiting for irrigation ever since their arrival in 1982 (Kompas, 7 November 1984). Without water works of high quality even tidal swamp areas are either inundated or have no water at all. In Bengkalis district in Riau, 153 families who had been promised dry and fertile plots, asked the authorities to be removed from their frequently flooded location. They threatened (mengancam) to return to Java if the government did not keep its promises (Kompas, 6 May 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). MacAndrews noted that tools, seeds, fertiliser and other inputs were often not available or unduly delayed (1982:17). Also, rice varieties, just like houses, turned out to be impractical under local conditions. This is not surprising, since it was discovered that the
Hercules transports are used for the airlift.

*Inside Asia*, September/October, 1985
'Bimas' packet of fertiliser, seeds and pesticides calculated for Javanese conditions had often been transferred to the Outer Islands without changing their composition (Suratnam & Guinness. 1977: 95).

The first years prove to be the most difficult. Much of the energy in the vital first year, when rations are still supplied, is taken up with clearing land rather than in establishing farms. All members of the household work together to perform a miracle. The obstacles are almost unbridgeable. A report on the conditions in Way Abung in South Sumatra and several locations in South East Sulawesi concluded that after five years of settlement on average less than half of the allotment had been cultivated. The reasons given were that not all the land allotted was cleared by the government, which meant that the transmigrants themselves had been expected to do so. But they did not have adequate labour and capital nor sufficient farm traction (Oey, 1982:42).

Tjondronegoro concluded that after five years or more of settlement, the average family is capable of clearing only the hectare closest to the home lot for food crop cultivation (1982:58). For all the work that has to be done, the transmigrant family usually does not have sufficient labour, and there is no local labour available – even if it were, the transmigrants could not pay them. There is little cattle in the settlement areas and next to no mechanisation. Furthermore, lack of daily food supplies reduces the labour input, because families need much more time to take care of minimal feeding while others look for extra incomes outside the project area.

Another problem is lack of expert guidance. "Transmigration staff are more often concerned and able to deal with administrative than agriculture matters, and have little or no access to agricultural expertise outside the project" the Gajah Mada Team concluded. "Transmigrants, in strange surroundings, require advice on cultivation methods, soil characteristics, suitable crops and proper use of fertiliser, pesticides, etc. To a large extent this advice is not
available. Most frequently transmigrants complain of pest and plant disease, but no co-ordinated governmental plan is in effect to combat these". (Guinness et al, 1977: 64)

Such a plan and efforts are still lacking today. Recently, angry transmigrants surrounded the Minister of Public Works when he toured the South Sulawesi region. For two years running, their harvests had been destroyed by rats, wild boars and insects. When he asked whether there was an agricultural expert around to advice them, Merdeka paper reported the migrants saying that there used to be one but that they had not seem him for ages (23 July 1984, quoted in: The Ecologist, May 1986: 72).

In the dryland areas particularly, where the traditional transmigration model is still maintained, agriculture has proved to be very difficult. " After the first years of good harvests it was found in some projects that earlier crops would no longer grow, and many farmers reverted to cassava as a subsistence crop. In Tapin (South Kalimantan) settlements were planned on the assumption that irrigation would be provided, but no channels have yet been constructed. In Way Abung, North Lampung, soil fertility is expected to fall below even the present low yields after seven years unless water is supplied to the fields, but irrigation is not planned for twenty years. On many new projects farmers are dependent upon maize and cassava. Few farmers have succeeded in becoming more than subsistence cultivators, a situation reminiscent of earlier colonisation and transmigration settlements". (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 94).

Similar situations have occurred in the years after the Gajah Mada Team did its research and publicised its reports. For instance, soil fertility in several settlements in South Sumatra has declined to the point where without emergency irrigation and fertiliser aid, only coconuts and cassava would grow (Indonesia Reports, 2 October 1984). In Solor II location near Merauke in West Papua, there is shortage of water, not only for agriculture but also for drinking. The transmigrants had not produced a single harvest since their arrival two
years before (Kompas, 8 February 1985).

**Food and Health Conditions**

Food shortage has been reported in many of the transmigrant settlements. Almost 5,000 Javanese transmigrants in the Jagong-Jaget site in Central Aceh were said to be in dire straits because their crops have all been devoured by rats and wild boars. On top of that, they live in a state of constant fear because their site is surrounded by tigers and elephants. To add to their troubles, the 29 km road from the site to the nearest town is impassable by motorised vehicles and difficult even to walk along. The lack of food is not due to infertile land but the encroachment of wild animals which had been deprived of their habitat as a result of the scheme. Many families have left the site in search of work in nearby towns.

"If nothing is done to help them, the site will soon be completely deserted", a local Assembly member told the press (Sinar Harapan, 26 June 1984; The Ecologist, May 1986:72).

Likewise, food shortages forced 50 families to leave their Krueng Tado settlement site in West Aceh. They returned to the site after they had occupied a complex where pensioners of the Armed Forces in Banda Aceh were living. This resulted in the promise that their food supply period would be extended (Indonesia Reports, 14 October 1983).(See this Chapter, Section 3.) More than 200 transmigrants in a location west of Kendari in South East Sulawesi have been reported to be surviving on cassava roots (Indonesia Reports, 21 November 1984), and 3,000 transmigrants in Sekayu district in South Sumatra have also been threatened with an acute food shortage due to the destruction of their crops by field mice and wild pigs. They had been eating only cassava and bananas for six months (Indonesia Reports, 12 November 1984). These are only a few of the numerous reports which appeared in the Indonesian press at the end of Repelita III and at the beginning of Repelita IV on food shor-
tage and outright hunger*. Apparently, even a record rice harvest, such as took place in 1981 is inadequate to provide a diet for the country's population.

Head of the regional office of the Health Department in South Kalimantan, Dr. Hadisantoso, has said that movement of people on a large scale as in the transmigration programme could spread contagious diseases. These diseases have been contracted by many transmigrants and since they often look for subsistence supplements by working in the jungle, these diseases easily spread. Surveys in South Kalimantan showed that the dangerous diseases included malaria, filaria (worms), tuberculosis, and vomiting with diarrhea. These often attacked transmigrants and have caused deaths. He added that since South Kalimantan was a large transmigrant receiving area, contagious disease teams were always active in inspecting existing and prospective sites (*Kompas*, 11 June 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). The bad planning and isolated site location, however, often do not permit such an extensive control on health conditions. Even primary facilities are frequently lacking. For instance, in the fiscal year 1984/1985, the transmigration programme has according to Director General Maat Judolaksono, been missing 1,803 school teachers, 1,756 school buildings, 2,288 para-medical personnel and 506 health units (*Kompas*, 16 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). For these reasons, health conditions are often in a serious state. For instance, (according to the provincial transmigration officer, K. Mustapa,) in Rumbia village, Buton, South East Sulawesi, where over 9,000 transmigrants were once hoping to get some health services, the people have to let illnesses take their own course. The village is two hundred kilometers from Bau-Bau, the nearest town, which is accessible only by motorboat (*Surabaya Post*, 14 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

*For a discussion on the consequences of food shortage, see Part 3, Chapter 2, Section 6.*
Aditjondro reports on the appalling state of health affairs in West Papua. He writes that the rapid clear cutting of vast tracts of forests has triggered a malaria boom, with the newly arriving transmigrants as an easy prey for the dangerous mosquitoes, since they are the only mammalian blood sources. In spite of the hard and dedicated work of the provincial and district health personnel, according to Aditjondro, in 1980 seven transmigrants lost their lives due to malaria in Nimbo-krang (Jayapura), in 1981, eight transmigrants died for the same reason in Aimas (Sorong), 18 transmigrants died of malaria in Arso (Jayapura) and Prafi (Manokwari) in 1982, then in the following year three transmigrants died of malaria in Arso again, and finally in April 1985, five villagers died of malaria in the Kebar valley, near the Prafi transmigration and oil palm plantation in Manokwari district (1986: 13).

Many of the problems in transmigration settlements are caused by the top-down approach*, which has been a characteristic feature of the Indonesian resettlement policy from the start. The top-down approach has resulted in bad planning and site selection, because the people involved in the planning and preparation of the sites have not had much knowledge of local conditions.

An example can be found in Air Sugihan's tidal site in South Sumatra, where 70% of the water was carrying cholera bacteria and 80 people have already died. A transmigration official in Jakarta has said that "the study we did in the planning period was not intensive. Part of Air Sugihan was settled under the plan-as-you-proceed system". According to Caulfield, drought of the severity that has affected the water supply and caused the cholera epidemic occurs every five or six years in that part of Sumatra. Nonetheless, the official said that they "didn't expect it. We weren't ready for it".

After 80 casualties, Jakarta is now sending experts on climate, soil and water to make comprehensive studies, whereupon rehabilitation will take place (1984: 26). Secrett also refers to

* See Conclusions
the 80,000 transmigrants who were moved between 1980 and 1982 to the Air Sugihan swamp forests between the rivers Suleh and Sugihan. According to him "poor soil conditions led to crop failures, the settlement sites lacked potable water and the migrants suffered a cholera epidemic. Air Sugihan sites I, II, III, IV and VI are now officially classified as failures by the Transmigration Department. In complete contrast, the local indigenous people had sustainable systems of agriculture, exploiting the peaty soils and forests of the swamps without damaging them. Their model example was ignored by resettlement authorities" (1986: 81-2).

From Poverty to Bare Subsistence

Where land suitable for agriculture is allotted and irrigation and drainage works are provided, other problems loom up. In these exceptional cases, where transmigrants succeed in producing a surplus, they cannot market it, because of the site's isolated location. Transport facilities are often not available and the sites are very far from the markets. In the first Repelitas, there was no infrastructure provided simply because the authorities took it for granted that the communities would not be able to surpass the subsistence level of production. This problem was presented to General Suharto himself when village head Dijosuwarno from Pamenang in Jambi visited him at the State Palace. Accompanied by Minister Martono, the village head told the General that the area at Pamenang had been cultivated by 700 transmigrant families from Central Java over three years. The families had succeeded in transforming the previously dry land into a fertile soil for agriculture. The success story was visualised in a painting the village head gave to the General. The problem was that because of the lack of transportation, the migrants could not market the surplus produce. Three truck loads of sweet potatoes, soyabeans, sugar cane, vegetables and other products piled up almost daily. Thereupon, General Suharto stressed the need to set up
transport co-operative so as to overcome problems of this kind and he gave instructions to Martono to take the matter up with his colleague of Cooperatives Department, Bustanil Arifin (Indonesia Times, 6 March 1984; Jakarta Post, 7 March 1984). In Jayapura, Merauke and Manokwari districts in West Papua transmigrants were said to have a 'bumper' harvest, but that they ran into a blind alley in trying to market the surplus. The costs of transport to the interior markets were far too expensive (Kompas, 13 April 1984).

2. Consequences of Settlement Policy

Outside Incomes

Transmigrants feel obliged to supplement their household needs by working for wages outside the settlement if possible. Especially, if food rations are inadequate or have not arrived at all, many settler families have only been able to survive with the help of outside incomes. Some have worked in the tapioca plants in Sumatra, others for the logging industry in Kalimantan. World Bank sources reveal that up to fifty percent of the farmers' incomes come from off-farm sources which yield higher returns (1985d: 11). The tendency to seek off-farm employment has negative effects on agriculture, where families already suffer from labour shortages. But working for wages is of course far more attractive in the short run than preparing and cultivating land under the conditions usually encountered in transmigration settlements. The Gajah Mada Team reported from South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan that

"nearly a fifth of Luwu respondents have been forced or attracted to work for saw-milling contractors, travelling over 200 kilometers to Malili, where large areas of forest are being cleared. Income from such work can reach Rp. 1,000 a day (...), but the contractors are able to bind these labourers for long periods by providing goods, food, and entertainment on credit at high prices. As a result few of the settlers return from such work with any savings. In August 1976, 85 such workers were recalled by the Transmigration officers to Sukaraya to reopen their neglected blocks".
Government figures at the time suggested that 45% of Sukaraya farmers worked in saw-milling. As a result of interviews with these men, police investigators determined that the debt of these workers to their contractors totalled almost a million rupiahs, and as a result they had to be allowed to return to Malili to work off their debts under police supervision (1)

The Team concluded that

"the effect of this off-farm involvement on farm production is evidenced in the fact that two-thirds of Sukaraya respondents have less than a quarter of an acre* of cultivated land. Work opportunities as labourers for local villagers have opened up since the first difficult years, but many more settlers labour for fellow settlers from other projects (including colonisation projects) and for the government on the road building programme" (Guinness et al, 1977: 69).

In East Kalimantan no ecological considerations were made in selecting sites for housing. (Photo: Thelka Kolbeck.)

* An acre is 0.25 ha.
A more recent example is to be found at Dendang I site in Tanjung Abung district in Jambi, which started in 1980 with 2,000 transmigrants from Solo, Central and East Java. Situated near the mouth of the Batang-hari river, the land is marshy and the settlers can only till the land by what is described as the ebbtide system, which usually provides a single crop a year. Further, the settlers were confronted with recurrent plagues of boars, mice and wereng insects which endangered crops. The farmers usually grow padi and cassava simultaneously - cassava being used as a decoy to keep boars from devouring the padi. Their first target of marauding is always the cassava. Transmigrant Supardi, 36 years old who had been living with his wife in Dendang I for five years and had seven children to feed, saw his rice production decline to three tons per hectare. Therefore, he felt compelled to search for work at the nearby plywood factory, where unskilled workers earn Rp. 1,500 a day. The transmigrants consider the availability of outside income opportunities as a sort of compensation for the declining fertility of their lands. The industry made good business, since it operated 24 hours a day. But local authorities were rather worried about this factory's absorbing of a great deal of the 'productive' workforce in the agricultural sector (Jakarta Post/Suara Karya, 20 December 1984).

Involvement on a large scale in off-farm work leads according to the Gajah Mada Team to "neglect of farms, a decline in farm cultivation and income and an increase in the extent of those abandoned blocks that border cultivated gardens and become natural breeding places of pests to the whole project" (Guinness et al, 1977: 68-9).

The Position of Women

Guinness et al describe that off-farm work causes dissatisfaction among wives and families.
"Some wives dream of returning to Java because of the situation in which they have to take full charge of the family and the farm while the husbands work outside the settlements" (1977: 83).

The traditional division of labour between women and men is interrupted at the earliest stage of transmigrant settlement. Women join their male family members in land clearing and infrastructure building in the first difficult period. At this stage other tasks and responsibilities for women present them with many problems; for instance, feeding the family and taking care of its health is said to be a particular responsibility of women. In addition the lack of facilities and the harsh conditions, make it much more difficult to provide enough food in the transmigration areas than in Java. "Given a prevailing pattern in which after planting male farmers migrate in search of off-farm work leaving women to do the farm work till their return some three months later", a special World Bank report on women noted, "the question should have been asked, whether women were being left behind similarly in the transmigration areas and how this affects agriculture" (1985d: 11).

According to the Gajah Mada Team, however, men sometimes lived away from the farms for up to the whole year (Guinness et al, 1977: 83). Women's work is often underestimated by observers. This becomes obvious from the remark made in the Jakarta Post:

"Dendang I is quiet during the daytime, because a great many settlers work at the plywood plant. Attending the ricefields and gardens are only the members of the family" (20 December 1984; emphasis added).

However, outside work means an important decrease in the available labour for agricultural work, and since "very few of these (settlers, who spent over half the planting season, the most crucial agricultural period, in off-farm work) paid others to farm their land" (Guinness et al, 1977: 68), women settlers have to bear a disproportinate amount of the agricultural work on top of their other duties.

Women cannot classify as 'transmigrants' and therefore, have no rights at all. They are often left behind to cultivate the house garden as well as the allotted plots of land - often infertile, while the men and some of the older children are
out working for wages. This at a time when resettlement has already weakened their position because their traditional networks are being undermined and additional job opportunities open to them in Java have been lost. The World Bank report suggests that this position of women settlers may well be an important factor in promoting 'spontaneous transmigration'.

"The overall welfare of settlers is likely to improve as a result of the package of integrated services provided. However, for women, their removal from their pre-existing kin- and community-support system, presents particular problems which may negate some of the other benefits. This may be one of the factors encouraging spontaneous migration of settlers' relatives" (1985d: 11).

Remigrasi

Where settlements completely fail and families decide to abandon the project, while the "male transmigrant dropouts search for manual jobs in the construction business, the female ones become hawkers, jamu vendors, and even prostitutes. Simultaneously with the influx of transmigrants and spontaneous migrants, Sorong has now an official prostitute population of 400, Jayapura more than 200, and Merauke's unregistered prostitutes are approaching the 100. The side-effect of this phenomenon is the spreading of VD or STD to the villages of the Irianese urban migrants" (Aditjondro, 1986: 15).

Cases of wives and children being forced to become prostitutes because of the living conditions in the settlements are not confined to West Papua (see, for example, The Economist, 4 August 1984).

It is not very surprising that many families after some years of settlement become disappointed or desperate. Recognition of this problem of remigrasi has, however, not resulted in policy improvement. Some ten years ago, it was said that

"there is evidence that one of the crisis points in the transmigrant's development is the transition to self-reliance after rations are halted. A number of transmigrants deserted the settlements at this time to seek their fortunes in nearby towns. However, the
number of desertions rarely exceeded 10 percent of all settlers" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 93).

This percentage is nowadays also given by World Bank officials (see Conclusion, Sec. 2). At the end of Repelita III, Martono admitted that some 2,000 families had abandoned their 'new homes' (see Introduction), but this figure is probably far below reality. Reports on transmigrants abandoning their settlements have filled the newspapers. These cases increased towards the end of the third Five-Year plan, due mostly to ill planning, mismanagement or outright official neglect, but they have continued to fill the columns of the Indonesian papers since the start of Repelita IV.

In one case, during Repelita III, at least 600 transmigrants were reported to have left the Mamosaloto site near the Central Sulawesi town of Poso. This site was open some time before for the settlement of over 1,000 families, but most had since left. One transmigrant from Ciamis, West Java, told reporters that some 130 families had left the area over the past three months because they could not farm the land. The land was unfit for agriculture; the type of rice seed provided was unsuitable for the local soil conditions; delivery of supplies for the basic needs was only made available after months of waiting; kerosine supplies for cooking and lighting had not been available for the past two months; an irrigation system to carry water to the areas had yet to be built. But local officials denied charges that the settlers had been neglected.

"It is true", they said, "that all the facilities in the Mamosaloto project have not been completed yet. The transmigrants should be patient and work hard, not just sit idle and be spoon-fed".

They criticised the transmigrants who left, calling them unwilling or not strong enough to face the rigours of life in the new areas (Jakarta Post, 20 January 1984).

At the core of the problem of 'remigrasi' (which is used for abandonment of the settlements, not only for return to areas of origin) is the inadequate transmigration policy.
These shortcomings already begin in the sending areas.*

"The provincial officers often encouraged urban people without jobs to move to transmigration settlements, in an attempt to solve immediate employment problems in the cities of Java. Many of those who left the projects shortly after arrival were non-farmers who felt that they had no hope of making a living from agriculture in the geographical conditions of the other islands" (Hardjono, 1977: 27).

In the areas of settlement, land disputes are a regular cause for remigrasi. Spontaneous migrants from Bali have decided to leave their South East Sulawesi locations because of land problems. They had been resettled on 'empty' land, but after they started harvesting crops, locals came along claiming the land was theirs. The village head did not clarify the status of the land nor did he provide the migrants with an alternative, so they left. "You'll find Balinese transmigrants on every flight from Kendari to Den Pasar", the village head told reporters (Kompas, 30 September 1980, translated by The Ecologist).

Because of the propaganda methods used in the recruitment process the prospective migrants have virtually no idea at all of the rigours and hardships that are awaiting them in the land beyond. Therefore, they feel disappointed and deceived. For example, settler families in Lipatkain in Riau have threatened to leave their location if they do not receive suitable farmland and tools as promised by the government. They left their home areas in Purbalingga, Purworejo, Pemalang and Yogyakarta (Central Java) after these promises and settled in Riau on April 14, 1985. But the 0.25 ha around the houses could not be tilled because of huge trunks and stumps that had been left behind, weighing two to three tons! The 2 has of farm land was still untouched forest which they themselves had to clear without suitable equipment. Rations, like cooking oil, rice supplies and salt which they received were of very poor quality and often arrived after long delays. There was also a lack

* see Part 2, Chapter 1
of educational facilities for the children. When they complained to the local transmigration officer, he told them not to come back with such grievances. "If you keep quiet we will give you more rations, whatever your daily requirements".

But the transmigrants refused the offer. Thereupon, the settlers quietly returned to Java. One transmigrant told Kompas that they had slipped out from the settlement at night to report their problems to the local transmigration officials in Java who had made the promises. They carried with them a letter containing over 600 signatures addressed to the Pemalang officials complaining that they had been cheated about the farm land (Kompas, 15.5.1985; Jakarta Post, 17.5.1985).

Sometimes, the unfavourable conditions in the settlement areas force the government to remove the settlers themselves. Excessively peaty land in one eastern Sumatra site made the government uproot the migrants and relocate them elsewhere (The Economist, 4 August 1984). Over 5,000 transmigrants in Kapuas district (Central Kalimantan) have had to be moved because their land was infertile (Suara Karya, 11.5.1985.) Failure of rainfed projects at other locations in Central Kalimantan have caused 2,500 families to be relocated (Secrett, 1986: 83).

But, as has been noted before, the settlers will leave on their own initiative if the government does not relocate them from settlements requiring rehabilitation. Some 20 of 180 transmigrant (umum and lokal) families, who had been settled 50 km west of Kendari (South East Sulawesi) returned quietly to Bali, because they were unable to endure the conditions any longer (Kompas, 7 November 1984, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). In Central and South Tapanuli (North Sumatra) 1,200 out of 9,150 families left their settlements and went looking for jobs outside the project area (Suara Karya, 29 April 1986, quoted in: INDOC, 1986: 27). In Aceh, 83 families asked to be removed from the Alwi Merah rubber plantation. Several transmigrants
were sent back to Lumajan (East Java) to report to the transmigration office. Merdeka published the story these migrants brought with them. "The officials had told them that every transmigrant couple would be given jobs in the rubber estate bringing in a monthly income of Rp 90,000 each besides a house with fresh water supply, a school for their children, health services at a puskesmas (public health centre) as well as food allowances for the first four months. It was this promise that encouraged the 83 families from Mojojari village, a subdistrict of Lumajang, to transmigrate for the sake of a better life and future. Many Mojojari inhabitants had sold their lands and houses and took with them all their schoolgoing children, among them junior highschool students, to move to Aceh. Upon their arrival at the project they were assigned to rubber estates on hilly terrain, while there was no puskesmas; or school or even houses of worship. Their children were deprived of education and only the husbands were given jobs. What has been more disappointing is that their income was not the promised Rp 90,000 but only Rp 30,000 a month" (quoted in: Jakarta Post, 31st July 1985).

Sometimes, it is difficult for the transmigrants to return home if they want to. They do not have much money, and the transport expenses are often extremely high. For example, the trip by boat from Dendang I site to the capital of Jambi alone costs Rp 75,000 per person (Suara Karya, 20 December 1984). Residents in Sorong (West Papua) were reported to have offered their small child for Rp 150,000 in order to pay for transport costs home (Kompas, 12.8.85; Ecologist, May 1986: 73).

There have been other examples of transmigrants being forced to sell their children, not in order to return home but 'only' to survive. Children in the ages between 6 months to two years are being sold for Rp 25,000 to Rp 100,000 in Central Kalimantan (Waspada, 9 April 1986, quoted in: INDOC, 1986: 19).
3. The 'Happy' and 'Spoonyfed' Transmigrants

There are many more cases of misery which lead to the transmigrants leaving their settlements. Because these cases have continued throughout the period of Repelita IV, it seems that the government is taking its own promises of improving transmigration policy implementation too seriously. Fifty families, for example, were settled on the island of Buton after another group had left the area out of desperation due to poor soil conditions and irrigation problems (Indonesian Observer, 4 October 1985). This seems to indicate that Martono was serious when he said that "deserted homes would not become a waste because other migrants would occupy them" (Indonesian Observer, 22 December 1983). The transmigration site Kumpeh in Jambi has also been abandoned, because it had been flooded for six months. Some 450 families have been relocated to other sites in Jambi. But the site will be 'rehabilitated' in order that local and spontaneous transmigrants can be settled there (Kompas, 19 May 1986, quoted in INDOC, 1986: 25). There remains the question how this 'rehabilitation' is to be put into practice. Evidence from Aceh suggests that Jakarta does not listen to complaints, even if they are brought forward in the DPR-RI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Republic Indonesia, or the Council for People's Representatives, Indonesia's equivalent for 'parliament'). During Repelita III, for example, Komisi IV-member Imam Churmen, complained that reports had showed that many transmigrants had left their new settlements because of disappointment. "If the implementation of the presidential decree (26/1980, concerning coordination of activities) had been carried out properly in the field then there would have been more certainty about the fate of some 40 families designated for resettlement at the Subuluussalam resettlement in South Aceh", he said. These migrants found on arrival that most of their land had not been properly prepared (Indonesian Times, 21 January 1983). Some time later, Sinar Harapan reported that 11,000 transmigrants were facing starvation at the Subuluussalam site...
and 58 people had already died in "pathetic circumstances". The transmigrants had been driven to raiding government food stores, while site officials stood by, not daring to intervene.

"Moving transmigrants like this without proper preparations is nothing short of murder", one DPR member said, "surely, as human beings, they deserve to be treated better than this" (28 August 1983, quoted in: *The Ecologist*, May 1986: 72).

This time, a team of the regional assembly had come upon the Subulussalam site. The land of these migrants from Blitar in East Java proved to be too peaty to produce most types of food and anything they did manage to produce was consumed by rats and boars. They had been moved to the location in 1981 and 1982 and had faced nothing but difficulties ever since. Churmen referred to the Subulussalam site and also to similar reports from Rasau Jaya site in West Kalimantan and said that without ignoring the success achieved in transmigration work so far, it should also be recognised there were still shortcomings and failures such as the selection of proper land sites for resettlement purposes. Churmen, therefore, agreed with Martono's view "that transmigration now being carried out, quantitatively has met expectations but qualitatively is cause for concern" (*Indonesian Times*, 21 January 1983).

Transmigrant families are not prepared for what they have encountered in the settlement areas and they are not informed about the hardships they are going to face. The conditions have proved almost unbearable. Land has not been properly prepared, leaving the settlers landless. Housing has not been well organised often leaving the settlers homeless. Food rations are delayed - if they arrive at all, and since rations are calculated on the maximum of five persons, acceptance of larger families has resulted in despair. The tendency to send the gelandangan of the cities and the rural poor has resulted in the recruitment of families which do not possess adequate abilities nor sufficient information. Many of these families have no
farming experience.

The head of Central Kalimantan's transmigration office has said that city dwellers are the most difficult of all to transmigrate, because they are not used to land cultivation and when they arrive at the settlements they "just go fishing and visit cities" (Indonesian Observer, 26 December 1984, quoted in: Osborne 1985a:7). But to refer to these settler families as 'happy' or 'spoon-fed' is rather cynical. From an analysis of resettlement policy over the years, including the first years of Repelita IV, it turns out that transmigrants have not been 'better off'. But where settlement projects fail, the transmigrants are probably the last persons that can be blamed for it.

MacAndrews, who is by no means an adversary of the Indonesian government policy, acknowledged this fact a long time ago, when he noted that although the transmigration projects in Indonesia are "intended to provide good support services, these rarely materialise. If one examines the long history of Indonesian land settlement over 75 years, one is struck by the enormous self-reliance of these Indonesian settlers who so often have been thrown back on to their own resources owing to the breakdown of government support. Repeatedly, one comes across examples of settlers, perhaps finding themselves in different areas from their expected destination, having to clear the land themselves, build their own houses, face disease, death and long-delayed or inadequate provision of services (...) Yet Indonesian settlers and settlements do survive and, to anyone who has worked on land settlements in other countries, they are remarkable examples of the ability of people to cope in sometimes unbelievable difficult circumstances" (1982: 22).

Transmigration does survive, but why?
PART THREE.
GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
OF TRANSMIGRASI.
The picture that says it all: "Pelan-Pelan – Slowly". It summarises the Indonesian attitude towards integrating the indigenous Irian Jayans into the mainstream of the community.

Indonesian propaganda photo advocating indigenous integration along with transmigration. (Nusantara, May 1985.)
CHAPTER 1. TRANSMIGRASI AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

1. Overpopulation in Inner Indonesia

Overpopulation in Java was only partly the logical consequence of geological, climatic and topographical conditions which favoured an intensive system of land use, known as sawah cultivation. "This agricultural system", Wertheim has noted, "requires fairly high population densities, for otherwise there would be an evident shortage of manpower. Under this system areas with a density considerably below 300 persons per square mile may be said to suffer from underpopulation. At the other extreme, densities say in excess of 600 per square mile are likely to show the first signs of overpopulation, which may cause a surplus of available hands expressing itself in a 'shared poverty' system" (1964: 196).

The expansion of sawah cultivation beyond the boundaries of the especially favourable regions in precolonial times, and in fact up to the middle of the past century, was gradual. At the inception of the colonial period, the first object of interest to the Dutch was Maluku, but their attention soon turned toward Java, and it is here that they mainly superimposed their colonial economy, turning back again to the Outer Islands only towards the end of the last century (Geertz, 1963: 42-7). From 1619 to 1942, the Dutch were essentially concerned to prize out of the archipelago, and particularly out of Java, agricultural products which were saleable on world markets without fundamentally changing the structure of the indigenous economy. They never developed a manufacture export economy, but maintained a mercantilist policy to the end. They brought Indonesia's crops into 'the modern world', but not the people (Geertz, 1963: 47-8).

The booming export market tended to compress the subsistence food crop sector beyond realistic limits, causing 'declining native welfare'. More and more people eked out a living on limited land resources in a system that was described as
"shared poverty" by Geertz (1956).

Some years later, Geertz, wrote that "the superimposition of sugar cultivation on the already unequal distribution of sawah and population over Java left the Javanese peasantry with essentially a single choice in coping with their rising numbers: driving their terraces, and in fact all their agricultural resources, harder by working them more carefully. There was no industrial sector into which to move (...). Slowly, steadily, relentlessly, they were forced into a more and more labour-stuffed sawah pattern of the sort the 1920 figures show: tremendous populations absorbed on minuscule rice farms, particularly in areas where sugar cultivation led to improved irrigation; consequent rises in per hectare productivity; and, with the assistance after about 1900 of an expansion in dry-crop cultivation, a probably largely stable, or very gradually rising, standard of living(...). Rather than haves and have-nots, there were, in the delicately muted vernacular of peasant life, only cukupans and kekurangans - 'just enoughs' and 'not quite enoughs'" (1963: 79-80,97).

Although Geertz' publications have been subjected to severe criticisms, it seems justified to conclude that this system of 'shared poverty' developed because the Dutch prevented the emergence of an indigenous industrial sector by transferring the profits from the commercial crops economy to the Netherlands, making it impossible for the industrial urban sector to absorb the 'surplus people' in the countryside.

2. The Myth of Emptiness in Outer Indonesia

In speaking on the topic of transmigration, an Indonesian rural community development worker in West Papua said:

"There is a myth of emptiness of Irian Jaya. Despite its massive land area, most of the province is not suitable for cultivation, and the areas that are, have already been densely settled" (The Times of Papua New Guinea, 1 September 1985). This erroneous assessment of Indonesia's Outer Islands' inexhaustible riches, was the damaging legacy bequeathed by the Dutch when they were eventually pushed out of Indonesia in the fifties. Yet, it would take
over another thirty years before it was officially understood that conditions outside Inner Indonesia were not favourable for food production, especially where this referred to the sawah type of rice cultivation.

Conditions on the Outer Islands did not necessarily preclude wet rice agriculture from the regions, but, in imposing a complex of adverse conditions for sawahs to overcome, these geographic realities did play an important role in discouraging its establishment in favour of the more broadly applicable swidden or ladang cultivation. And the natural advantages of Java’s small, volcano-rimmed river passages strongly encouraged its implantation there (Geertz, 1963: 41). Thus, local populations, adjusting to local conditions, developed an extensive system of shifting/ladang cultivation. Fields were cleared, farmed for one or more years, and then allowed to return to bush for fallowing, usually eventually to be recultivated (Geertz, 1963: 33).

The implications of both agricultural systems on the demographic level are very different for the two areas - Inner and Outer Indonesia. Where wet rice cultivation is characterised by the marked ability to absorb increased numbers of cultivators on one unit of land, this is not possible for the ladangers. If their population increases, they must spread out more widely over the countryside in order to bring more land into cultivation. 'Overpopulation' in ladang areas, therefore, results in deterioration of the habitat.

These facts, however, have not deterred the Suharto regime from persistent colonisation. The primary justification for transmigrasi continues to be the 'population motive'; the program is legitimised on the basis of population density figures - even where these figures show that the carrying capacity of some of the receiving provinces in the Outer Islands has already been exceeded. Even where the unsuitability of transmigrasi in coping with demographic problems is recognised, the
myth of emptiness is once again used to legitimise transmigrasi's role in regional development. It is claimed that the low population density rate in the Outer Islands is an obstacle to 'development', therefore, labourers have to be brought in from elsewhere, i.e. from Java and Bali (see Part 3, Chapter 2, Sections 1-3).

Like the 'population motive', this 'labour market motive' has in the past been criticised. Arndt and Sundrum concluded that "there is little evidence of labour shortage in the Outer Islands now, at their current rates of development" (1977: 83), and the Gajah Mada Team stated that "it is unreasonable to regard the vast areas of the Outer Islands as being short of labour, but this is frequently claimed in justification of the transmigration programme. The Outer Islands have more than enough labour to undertake the sort of tasks currently being accomplished by transmigrants" (Guinness et al, 1977: 114).

The fact is that even in the absence of transmigration, population growth will be rapid in areas such as Sumatra, and - according to Jones -migration flows will accelerate that increase, particularly in southern Sumatra. It could then be argued, he continues, that the labour force needed for regional development will be more than produced through natural increase of the Outer Islands' population, and that the regional development rationale for transmigration is little more than window-dressing. The real reason, he asserts, for transmigration remains overpopulation in Java (1979: 218).

But: what was the impact on Java's demography and what has been the impact of the kolonisasi/transmigrasi and other resettlement schemes for the receiving areas?

3. The Demographic Impact in Inner Indonesia

The demographic effect for Java and the other sending areas has been minor. Not even the military power at General Suharto's disposal has been capable of resettling such huge
numbers that it makes any great difference. Even if official numbers are accepted, which suggest that some 500,000 Javanese/Balinese transmigrants have been moved annually, this would only account for 25% of the natural increase of Java's popula-

tion.

Numbers of Families Moved

Transmigration Minister Martono is clearly very satisfi-
ed with the quantitative results of his transmigration policy. He suggests that he has been far more successful than all his predecessors before him. When he announced the ambitious Repe-

lita IV targets, he wrote in the elucidation: "In the 40 years prior to Indonesia's Independence in 1945, a mere 200,000 people were moved. By contrast, in the current Third, almost completed, Five-Year Plan alone, some two and a half million people have moved"(1984: vii).

Such remarks as well as official data on figures provided by the Transmigration Department or the Biro Statistik Indonesia (Indonesia's Bureau of Statistics) must be taken with a grain of salt.

For the period before 1965, Hardjono has calculated that in the years from 1950 to 1958, 185,768 people were placed in transmigration settlements, which then covered 57,475 has of cultivated land. At the end of December 1958, there were 293,523 people living in these settlements, including local people living within project boundaries, independent migrants who moved into projects entirely of their own accord and children born in project areas. In the years between 1959 and March 1969, another 238,612 people were moved. "Less than half a million people left Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok under transmigration schemes during this nineteen-year period, clearly a long way from the dreams of the early 1950s, when policy-ma-
kers had talked of moving a couple of million each year"* (1977: 25-6).

* See Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 2
Since the New Order started its Five-Year Plan programmes in April 1969, the transmigration programme has, particularly under the third plan (April 1979-April 1984), experienced a significant increase in scale (see Table 3).

| TABLE 3 OFFICIAL FIGURES ON NUMBERS OF FAMILIES MOVED BETWEEN APRIL 1969 AND APRIL 1984 |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                               | Repelita I    | Repelita II   | Repelita III  | TOTAL         |
| Sponsored                     | 46,000        | 83,000        | 366,000       | 495,000       |
| Spontaneous                   | 17,000        | 35,000        | 169,000       | 221,000       |
| Total                         | 63,000        | 118,000       | 535,000       | 716,000       |


Official Indonesian government sources reveal that the Repelita II achievements have—in reality—been somewhat lower: 55,083 umum and 7,281 swakarsa families are claimed to have been resettled between April 1974 and April 1979 (Republik Indonesia, 1985: XII/50, quoted in: Hardjono, 1986: 29).

Hardjono asserts that "to say that the Repelita III target was reached gives a slightly exaggerated picture of the extent to which people were moved from Java and Bali at government expense". In fact, she argues, only 365,977 families were moved by the Transmigration Department as umum (fully supported) transmigrants. Furthermore, this figure includes local people who moved into transmigration projects and families that had to be resettled within the same province "for some reason". She refers to 22,284 umum families, who were "indigenous people in the vicinity of settlements who decided to settle within the project area under the APPDT scheme", and 42,414 families under the 'resettlement' programme, who were almost exclusively transferred families from Gunung
Balak in Central Lampung* to new transmigration projects in North Lampung and a number of families that had to be moved from unsuitable transmigration sites. These categories of 'local settlers' and 'resettlement' (sometimes described as 'local transmigrants') accounted for almost 18% of umum transmigrants during Repelita III. (Hardjono, 1986: 29). Thus, only 273,826 real umum (government-sponsored families) were moved from Java to other areas under Repelita III, according to Hardjono. The remaining 169,497 families, representing 32% of the total, were 'swakarsa' (literally, 'self-initiative') transmigrants who moved with limited, or in many cases, no government assistance.

**Impact of Numbers of Families Moved**

Even if we assume these figures to be slightly correct—and there is no way we can find out what the scale of (trans-) migrant movement is in reality—transmigrasi's role in demographic change has been only minor. Jones noted that—given the fact that reduction of Javanese overpopulation has remained the key objective to this day—the frequent criticisms of the programme are not unwarranted. "During the period since 1931 (until 1974, (M.O.)), 730,000 Javanese have been resettled, assuming that before 1961, none of the migrants originated in Bali or Nusa Tenggara. During the same period, Java's population has increased by some 39 million. This comparison admittedly understates the impact of transmigration on Java's population growth. The natural increase of the migrants since they moved must also be taken into account, and even on the conservative assumption that the rate of increase of transmigrants after their settlement was equal to that of Java's population du-

* Gunung Balak is located within the catchment area of the Way Jepara irrigation system, where forests need to be retained. Since 1982—after several earlier stranded efforts—the Transmigration Department with the active support of the Department of Home Affairs has been resettling people from this area (Hardjono, 1986: 30).
ring each subsequent period*, the transmigrants would have saved Java a population increase of some 991,000". Yet, even Jones concludes that "nevertheless, there is no denying that the demographic impact of the programme in Java has been minor" (1979: 212).

Some observers arrived at the conclusion that the demographic impact of government policy would have been the same if all the efforts and investments had been directed not to transmigration but to regional development instead, thereby slowing down the migration from other islands to Java. In March 1984, Martono announced that some 250,000 people would be moved from Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, Nusa Tenggara and West Papua to Java during Repelita IV; this estimate was based on the assumption that the number of people entering Java is one third of the number of those leaving Java (Indonesia Times, 13 March 1984). Other observers, however, claim that the immigration in Java is about the same size as the outmigration**.

"While we are worrying about weaknesses in the Indonesian migration processes", Sundrum remarked during a seminar, "I have been looking at the statistics on it. I think the 1971 census of Indonesia gives us a very interesting piece of information - that while the government was scratching its head and we were busy criticising the government saying they were not doing enough to move people out of Java, there was going on very quietly this spontaneous migration of about the same magnitude in the opposite direction, all heading for Jakarta" (quoted in: Jones & Richter, 1982: 149), i.e. in the 'undesired direction'.

These insights are still valid today. Lieutenant General (ret.) Sutopo Juwono, Secretary General in the Manpower Department, called the Javanese immigration "a social problem which

* In fact, taking into account the natural increase of migrant families which tend to respond to resettlement with a higher fertility rate (see Oey, 1975), it could then be argued that transmigration even stimulates population growth.

** See Milan Titus, 1986.
needed special handling". According to him, it is difficult to stem the rapid flow of migrants to urban areas in Java - not only from rural Java, but from other islands as well. The number of migrants to Java was about the same as the number of transmigrants shipped out of Java, he said (Angkatan Bersenjata, 24 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

But even in the situation where migration to Java can be limited in the future, Java's natural population growth, which is expected to be 9 million during Repelita IV, is much more impressive than the size of transmigrant movement from Java. Therefore, it came as no surprise that Minister Martono during an IGGI seminar in Jakarta in March 1985, said:

"demonographically, the transmigration of people from Java does not mean very much, because the rate of growth on this island is big.... It is evident", he added, "that demographically the target of transmigration is not important .... that for 150 years the relocation of people from Java has had no effective meaning" (1985: 47, quoted in: Colchester, 1986a: 62).

At the same (confidential) seminar, Dr. Sayitu Hasibuan from the National Development Planning Council Bappedas confirmed that "transmigration is not seen as the solution of the population problem in Java" Van Raay, 1985b:6). Apparently, Bappedas has other objectives in its planning of transmigration policy .......

4. Demographic Impact on Outer Indonesia

While the impact on the size of the population and the level of the living standard in the sending areas has remained minor over the years, transmigration and resettlement programmes have had severe consequences for the receiving areas: ecologically safe limits have been exceeded through the continuous immigration of non-local residents who gradually outnumber the local, indigenous population, robbing them of their ways of sustenance and lands and threatening their cultural identity. That critical limits of population density have been ex-
ceeding some time ago in traditional settlement areas has not
deterred the Suharto regime from persisting in its policy.

Take, for example, Lampung, where in 1905 the first kolon-
nisasi project was established. In spite of the fact that eco-
logically safe boundaries had already been exceeded in several
parts of Sumatra even before Suharto took power in 1965 - the
majority of both government-sponsored and spontaneous trans-
migrants still arrive by boat or ferry to settle in the south-
ern part of Sumatra. The Lampung population has increased to
2,777,085 in 1971 (population density 82), 4,624,800 in 1980
(population density 136) and (a projected) 6,089,700 in 1985
(population density 180) (Biro Statistik Indonesia).

That the central government in Jakarta is aware of the
dangers of a huge increase in population pressure (on the land,
for example) is evident from the warning it gave to governors,
telling them to be vigilant against the possibility that their
provinces would be "overrun" (dilanda) by transmigrants "as
has happened in Lampung and Bengkulu" (Suara Karya, 17
July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). But occasional an-
nouncements that these areas would be closed for transmigra-
tion were only 'talk'. The majority of transmigrants continue
to be resettled in the provinces of Sumatra.

During Repelita III, 62% of the umum transmigrants was
settled in Sumatra; 19% in Kalimantan; and 12% in Sulawesi
(Hardjono, 1986: 31). During the first part of Repelita IV,
57% of umum (and 64% of all) transmigrants was settled in Su-
matra; 25% of umum (24% of all) in Kalimantan; and 10% of umum
(7% of all) in Sulawesi (Hardjono, 1986: 41). She adds that
"some idea of the concentration of settlements in
Sumatra in recent years can be gained from the fact
that 60% of the 444,222 families still under the care
of the transmigration agency in January 1986 were in
projects located in Sumatra" (Hardjono, 1986: 41).

* It must be noted that Hardjono's figures are also derived
from official government sources (Republik Indonesia, 1985;
Department of Transmigration, 1986).
The consequences of the resettlement programme are alarming. Hardjono reports that "in provinces like South Sumatra the overcultivation of fertile slopes by local smallholders is already causing frequent landslides and floods while in Lampung completely uncontrolled spontaneous settlement over the years has similarly created a number of environmental crises" (1986: 50).

Some provinces are getting so overcrowded that they move their transmigrants further to other areas. Starting in 1988, it was announced that Lampung will send part of its transmigrants to Jambi and Bengkulu. In the period of 1979 and 1984 some 50,000 families were already transferred as local transmigrants to North Lampung, where the situation is said to be somewhat better (INDOC, 1986: 35).

Clearly, this long established pattern of colonisation and transmigration has also changed the ratio between autochthonous and immigrant populations. Lampung already has a clearly Javanese majority and a sizeable Sundanese minority (Indonesia Reports, 17 July 1985). Some 80% of the Lampung population is non-local. The results of a ten-day investigation by reporters in Lampung - published in Sinar Harapan (2 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports) - indicated that the native Lampung people had become a minority and that they had called for a halt to transmigration as early as 1957* - however, was old news. The Lampongsters had already become a minority in their own province before the Japanese occupation (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 82). Hardjono noted that the 1930 census indicated that 36% of the total Lampung population of 361,000 consisted of people from different parts of Java." In 1971, however, two thirds of the population placed by the census of that year at 2,777,085 consisted of non-indigenous people. The difference", she says, "is explained by the movement into the province not only of government-sponsored migrants but also of independent settlers who have migrated of their own accord" (1977: 46).

* One Lampung villager was quoted, saying: "They say we are lazy and unresponsive to development. But we have our own ways to make Lampung prosper. What's more, we have a responsibility to preserve Lampung's traditional culture".
There was a sizeable spontaneous migration to the plantations in North Sumatra during the colonial period and after Independence towards East Kalimantan in the 1960s during the 'timber boom' and towards Java in the 1970s and afterwards. All these migrants were attracted by hopes of wage employment. Some observers have maintained that the impact of transmigration on population distribution can only be estimated when this so-called 'chain-migration' (in the desired direction) is included in the calculation. Arndt noted that if chain migrants are directly or indirectly induced by the transmigration programme, the programme should be credited with a larger total effect on the population balance than the official statistics suggest. But if, on the other hand, spontaneous migration is wholly or largely independent, he says, 'it might suggest, on the contrary, that the effort and money that have been expended on transmigration would have been better devoted to facilitating and encouraging spontaneous migration' (1983: 54-5).

Transmigration must, indeed, be credited with a larger total effect not only on the population balance but also on the impact of transmigrasi on the Outer Islands: the transfer of Javanese poverty to the non-Javanese Islands. There has, indeed, taken place a significant chain migration, but to places where this was not very welcome, such as southern Sumatra. These figures, according to Arndt, "do suggest a very effective, though considerably lagged, chain migration process. But if it is true, as Hardjono and others have reported, that already in the mid-1970's Lampung was severely overcrowded, with fragmentation of holdings and increasing landlessness, it is arguable that transmigration to Lampung did not act as a catalyst for spontaneous migration but only by reinforcing the tendency of the official programme to recreate in much of neighbouring Lampung the Malthusian situation of rural Java" (1983: 70).

5. The Politics of Demography

Similar developments are momentarily taking place in other receiving areas, both more traditional and relatively new
areas of settlement. Native inhabitants in Kalimantan and West Papua are being 'swamped' by government-sponsored and in particular by spontaneous (trans-)migrants. Foreign agencies, on whose support the continuation of transmigrasi is dependent, acknowledges the fact that the Kalimantan and West Papuan peoples will in the end become minorities on their own lands. The World Bank stated that "under the intermediate case* migration would account for 32% of Kalimantan's and 55% of Irian Jaya's population by the year 2000" (1985a: 120).

The government, however, "remains firmly committed to the notion of transmigration in the absence of other readily available ways of handling the problems of Java" (1986: 51).

The necessity of the programme even today is justified on the basis of Java's problems. After pointing out how many problems were encountered during Repelita III, which continue to plague the programme in Repelita IV, and realising that these problems may lead one to think that a huge reduction in targets might be the only appropriate course of action, Hardjono notes that

"a mere glance at the complexity of conditions prevailing in Java leads one to endorse efforts to reach transmigration targets (...) the problems of Java show no sign of diminishing. The environment continues to deteriorate as a consequence of pressure of population upon land resources and industrialisation has not so far expanded employment very greatly. If anything, the reverse is happening".

Certain measures that focus around the planning and control of land use in both rural and urban Java can be adopted at least to maintain if not to improve conditions, "though most would require unqualified commitment on the part of the national and provincial authorities to decision-making that favours the poor (...) The introduction of urban land-use policies that recognise the rights and the needs of all members of the community, including those employed in the informal sector, is particularly desirable. It is often forgotten that transmigration has to bear much of the burden of 'development' in Java when urban and rural people alike are removed from land required for 'projects' on the basis of the argument that they have no legal

*meaning this percentage can be lower but it can also be even higher!
title to it or that national interests are at stake. While the construction of dams and roads may be in the long-term interests of the majority, the taking-over of agricultural land and urban 'kampung' for the expansion of capital-intensive industry and 'real-estate' undertakings is not" (Hardjono, 1986: 51).

The problem in Java, as is well understood by Hardjono, is not population size in itself, but land accumulation and conversion of land for industrial purposes. It is difficult to expect from the Suharto regime that it takes measures against neglected plantation land, excessive and absentee ownership of agricultural land, mechanisation of agriculture. The regime has never excelled in decision-making that favours the poor . . . On the contrary, the petani gurem (small farmers), those owning less than 0.5 ha., have increased from 45% to 63% between 1973 and 1980, while the percentage of landless farmers increased from 3.2% to 14% (The Ecologist, 1986: 63). The result is unemployment and semi-unemployment. Sumodiningrat (known from the 1985-Gajah Mada survey in West Papua) was reported by Suara Karya saying that agricultural manpower would still be a problem in the year 2000 because of the unequal ownership of land, limits to agricultural cultivation and the large number of poverty-stricken farmers (6 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Sinar Harapan quoted statistician Adler Haymans Manurung, who confirmed that the petani gurem now form 64.7% of the total farmers. The decline of small farmers between 1980 and 1983 (from 11 to 8.7 million households) was due to several factors, including transmigration, since transmigrants got 1 ha. of agricultural land (6 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports), but also because the prospective transmigrants often sell their land to landlords before leaving to the land beyond (Inside Indonesia, 1985: 26). While the poverty-stricken farmers and landless farmers are being sent away from Java, land ownership is increasingly concentrated in only a few hands. One third of the land in Java is in the hands of only 1% of the landowners (Caulfield, 1984: 25).
CHAPTER 2. TRANSMIGRASI & REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the main goals of the transmigration programme is to promote regional development, in particular in the areas outside Java and Bali, i.e. the transmigrant receiving areas. The resettlement of transmigrant families is claimed to stimulate socio-economic development, for instance, through the exploitation of natural resources and the introduction of more sophisticated agricultural systems. It is said that this process of regional development will result in higher levels of production, national income and living standards for the population both in the sending and the receiving areas.

1. The Politics of Regional Development

In reality, the transmigration/resettlement programme has not resulted in higher levels of production, income and living standards. The policy of transmigration therefore has not only been criticised because it has failed to provide a ready solution for the 'demographic' problems, but also because the economic benefits have been disappointing.

The Indonesian government has done its best to conceal the failure of its policy on the economic field. It has tried to convince observers that at least in subsistence/food crop production, the settlements have answered to their expectations. But as Nicholas Cumming-Bruce concludes, "even at sites reckoned to have achieved self-sufficiency, levels of productivity are often low" and he adds that "just how successful transmigration has proved to be in raising the income levels of settlers is unknown" (Manchester Guardian, 11 June, 1985; Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June, 1985).

Failure to provide for surplus food production during the Third Repelita has been officially acknowledged, since Ir. Wardoyo, Junior Minister for the Promotion of Food Production at the time, concluded that "the contribution of transmigration areas to national as well as regional supply of food
has not appeared in Repelita III". He added, however, that "the production of foodstuffs in those areas has been able to meet the local need for food" (Indonesian Observer, 16 February 1984). He thus claims that subsistence levels of production were achieved. This is hard to believe, because one reads in the Indonesian press regularly of cases of hunger among the transmigrants (see Part 2, Chapter 3).

The World Bank has, in the meantime, admitted that the traditional food crop transmigration model was a failure and that this model should be avoided in the future, unless followed by what is called 'second-stage development'. By this is meant that further financial injections are needed before a settlement can 'take off'. Even in settlements with a particular positive reputation such as Kuro Tidur in Bengkulu, 're-settlers who have been living in new areas for a year or two are usually self-sufficient, but they are still unable to step up their families' welfare', according to Ayib Rughby, former Director General for Resettlement Development & Guidance in the Indonesian Observer, 25 May 1984.

The Kuro Tidur project existed for a much longer period than was suggested by Rughby. Besides - as has been described in Part Two of this document - transmigrant settlements rarely attain subsistence food production levels, let alone that the transmigrants are able to exceed them! It could even be suggested that in some (perhaps very many) cases, the transmigration/resettlement has resulted in a fall of living standards.

This, for instance, was the case in a PIR project in Cimerak, West Java. In one respect, this is a rather odd example, since the 'transmigrants' involved had been resettled there long before the PIR project was started. But nonetheless it is important for several reasons. In the first place, the PIR type of settlement is recently being promoted as the most promising new settlement model (replacing the traditional food crop model). In the second place, this specific case has been accurately documented by LBH Bandung. In the third place, during the
first phase of the PIR project transmigrants were deprived of the plots of land they had received after their arrival at the request of the government. This gives perhaps an indication how uncertain transmigrant families must be regarding titles of land ownership. Anyway, the deprivation of previously provided plots of land was not the only factor in the reduction of family welfare.

LBH Bandung writes: "According to their own statements, the villagers changed their basic diet from cassava to rice only five years ago. The rise in their standard of living was achieved by planting clove trees, bananas, cassava, petai and jengkol. Besides this, there are two tapioca factories near the villages which have bought the cassava from the peasants". In 1981, the villagers' land was declared part of the PIR project, on the grounds that it was 'state owned'. Thereupon, the clearance began, evicting people from their residential areas and clearing horticultural areas where jengkol, petai, clove trees and cassava had been grown. "These land clearances were carried out without compensation payments to the peasants" (see Part 3, Chapter 3, Section 6). Successively, all the peasants in the area will lose their sources of income, because "the local authorities will soon close these two (tapioca) factories".

These peasants - both the native population and the transmigrants - "are economically better off" by planting the crops they always used to plant. Instead of receiving plots of land - as the government promised - they lost it. No compensation was paid. In this way, they were forced to become "participants" in the PIR project. LBH Bandung concludes that "some of the participants in the PIR project will have a status that does not much differ from that of a plantation worker earning Rp 700 a day. This makes them raise serious objections against the project" (Human Rights Forum 1, Newsletter on Development and Human Rights in Asia, January 1985: 4-9).

The Cimerak case is not the only example of how transmigrants are down graded from being independent farmers to agri-
cultural labourers. Indeed, this is an integral part of the PIR policy, and since PIR has been advocated as the transmigrant settlement model for the future, this is also a clear intention of the Indonesian government.

2. The Concept of Regional Development

It will be clear by now that traditional transmigrasi has not been a significant promoter of regional development. Therefore, it seems a bit strange that the government has introduced the concept of regional development to replace the 'population motive', which has lost much of its power.

This apparent contradiction can be explained by replacing the concept of regional development with what I would call the "labour market motive" in resettlement policy. With the introduction of the PIR Khusus scheme, this motive has returned to the core of Indonesian transmigrasi policy. Returned - because it has been an important motive ever since the Dutch colonial administration started its kolonisasi programme.

It is no coincidence that kolonisasi started at the time when (foreign) companies were setting up plantations in the Outer Islands and were in need of cheap ("coolie") labour. Boeke wrote a long time ago that "the tobacco and rubber estates in Sumatra found it difficult to fulfil their labour demands because the indigenous people were enjoying a relatively high standard of living due to rather low population densities prevailing at the time and did not gain sufficiently by hiring themselves out as wage labourers to compensate for relinquishing their independence" (1953: 143, quoted in: Oey, 1982:27).

Since it was difficult to turn the indigenous population into some sort of proletariat that was easy to manipulate, people were relocated from Java. Instead of providing these settler families with enough land to start a new life as independent farmers in 'the land beyond', the Dutch were eager to use
their labour for the accumulation of surplus profit. Cynical observers have even suggested that this 'labour market motive' provides the explanation for the contradictory fact that the settlers were given only small plots of land, insufficient for subsistence, compelling them to supplement their meagre output by working elsewhere, for instance on the land of the estate companies.

This is exactly what can be observed in the resettlement policy pursued by the New Order government. Like the Dutch, the Suharto regime initially did not have a well-thought out policy of labour migration. They focussed on what they considered to be top priority problems, such as the 'overpopulation' of the Inner Islands. Therefore, their efforts in the beginning were limited to the transfer of as many families as possible. The process of settlement itself was neglected. Later, maybe also as a reaction to what was happening already in the reality of the transmigrants' lives, the 'outside incomes' were integrated in resettlement policy as an aim in itself. The migrants were no longer considered to be the Javanese 'surplus people' that had to be relocated and provided with plots of land to start anew, but they were turned into 'human resources', 'workers from the central region' and 'rural labourers'. The traditional food crop model aiming at the creation of a whole new force of independent farming families in Outer Indonesia and the 'population motive', on which the whole policy was based, were pushed to the background. In the words of Minister Martono, the new focus was "to exploit more fully the natural resources of the peripheral regions and in doing so open up new fields of employment which will attract workers from the central region" (1984:vii).

Some observers tried hard to explain how successful transmigration/resettlement could be if one accepted this miraculous concept of development more seriously than before. For instance, Hardjono has written that "in so far as most migrants who have left the various projects have remained in the province, one of the aims of the transmi-
migration programme—the provision of labour for development of natural resources—is being attained" (1977: 71). This provides a very weak basis for justifying a hopeless government policy. Migrants left the project areas not because in doing so they wanted to fulfil this 'second aim' of the transmigration programme, but out of sheer desperation, and it must be considered very cynical to describe them as 'successful transmigrants'. Hardjono was not the only one. The 1977-Gajah Mada Team made similar remarks, suggesting that "even those who desert a transmigration project and settle elsewhere in the Outer Islands may prosper, and at the same time fulfil two of the objectives of the transmigration programme, the movement of people from Java and the provision of labour resources for the outer provinces" (Guinness et al., 1977: 57). At the same time, these observers acknowledged that "the settlements have contributed only minimally to regional development. At most they have opened up areas of land, but only to be settled by subsistence farmers who are proving such a drain on Transmigration Department resources of planning and personnel that the local government in some cases is unwilling to take the projects over" (1977:113).

3. Transmigration's Contribution to Regional Development

Arndt provided an even more pessimistic judgement on the regional development part of transmigrasi. "If by regional development is meant the promotion of industry and trade, the exploitation and processing of the islands' mineral, forest and other natural resources and the improvement of transport and communications necessary to integrate them more effectively into the national and world economy", he wrote, "the contribution of transmigration has so far been quite marginal. Members of transmigrant families, and spontaneous migrants initially attracted to transmigration settlements, have at times eased labour supply problems for timber concessionaries and for smallholder and plantation producers of cash crops. The roads built in association with transmigration have incidentally improved market access for timber, cash crops and processing industries. But the major industrial developments of the last decade in the Outer Islands, chiefly based on oil and natural gas, mineral processing and plywood production, have occurred entirely independently" (1983: 59).
Transmigration's role in the promotion of regional development has been minor. The possibilities were limited since the government insisted on choosing isolated areas for settlement. This resulted in transport and communication problems. Where migrants succeeded in producing a surplus they could not market it. The government hoped these new large settlement areas would develop as growth poles, attracting new migrants and new activities. Suggestions to change this policy, which was doomed to fail, were made by the Gajah Mada Team. "In determining suitable new areas of settlement, the government will need to revise its present policy of selecting areas large enough to accommodate five adjacent villages since this causes communication problems, isolating the transmigration settlements from markets and indigenous residents and putting severe strain on the provincial government to provide services" (Suratnam & Guinness, 1977: 97).

But the government's settlement policy has not changed significantly and therefore, similar suggestions were made at the March 1985 IGGI Transmigration Seminar in Jakarta. Since market proximity was found to be a major determinant of the economic viability of colonisation schemes, new settlements could best be located near centres of economic activity and government, in order to benefit from existing infrastructure, and to ensure ready access to internal and outside markets.

"Conversely, dispersed agricultural settlement or transmigration aiming at remote enclaves is comparatively more difficult and costly, and is less likely to succeed". The transportation costs would press upon the farmers' in-and outputs and the infrastructure for transportation and marketing would have to be subsidised for many years after its construction (Van Raay, 1985a:2).

If, the government were to change its settlement policy, perspectives for regional development would be better. But whether a sound policy of regional development should be connected with transmigrasi is still under debate. Hardjono asked herself "Whether workers will be attracted from Java by high wages alone " Is it not precisely because these families are
landless that they are willing to move? " To these people
the offer of even two hectares of arable land with
full ownership rights after a number of years is much
more attractive than the offer of high wages". And she
adds that "unless immediate wage employment were available,
labourers would have no alternative but to drift
back to Java" (1978: 108-9).

The switch recently announced from subsistence/food crop
to export-oriented cash crop settlement models is induced by
the recognition that traditional transmigrasi failed to promo-
te any kind of development in the receiving areas. The provi-
on of land in the PIR Khusus/Nucleus Estate and Smallholder pro-
jects is replaced by the provision of regular (wage) employment.
Population-land resettlement is increasingly turned into labour
migration, either government sponsored or 'spontaneous' (see
Conclusions, Section 7).


Observers have been very optimistic regarding the perspec-
tives of PIR Khusus, the combination of nucleus estate and
smallholder projects with transmigration/resettlement. It has
even been suggested that the introduction of this new settle-
ment model will pull the transmigration programme out of its
blind alley.

Officially, PIR Khusus started in April 1984 as a succes-
sor to the NES schemes which had been implemented under strong
pressure from the World Bank since 1974. The targets in the PIR
Khusus sector are once again very ambitious. During 1985 some
60,000 families were targeted to resettle in PIR Khusus pro-
jects, implying that 240,000 hectares had to be developed and
prepared (Kompas, 2nd February, 1985; Sinar Harapan, 27th
February, 1985). Meanwhile, realisation percentages dur-
ing Repelita III have been the lowest for PIR Khusus (in
comparison with other NES schemes), namely 1,569 fa-
milies (only 2%! of 103,100 targeted families, whereas 23,315
hectares (30%) of a targeted total of 78,100 hectares were
developed (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1985).

This trend continued in the first part of Repelita IV: relatively large areas were prepared, but there were no smallholders to work them. The quantitative results, however, are somewhat better than before: 23,247 of the targeted total of 110,555 families were relocated in the PIR Khusus schemes (21%) and 79% of the targeted hectares were developed and prepared (Kompas, 11 December, 1984, quoted in Kompas 2 February, 1985). A large part of these transmigrant families turned out to have no farming experience at all. Participation was further discouraged because of uncertain land titles. In the first place, the estate company 'owns' the land, with the 'smallholders' merely cultivating it. The smallholders will even be compelled to reimburse the state banks, which will reimburse the investment made by the private sector - all this after years of having been forced to sell their produce to the company at a fixed price. Afterwards, the estates have to sell a large part of their land, but instead of having the estates sell directly to the smallholders, the government is expected to buy the land from the estates (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 February 1985).

Thus, land that was dispossessed in the first place will, after a few years of exploitation, become state land. It is very doubtful whether it will ever become the property of the relocated families - but this is for the future to decide.

Private businessmen were said to be not very enthusiastic about PIR Khusus because it was 'not profitable' (Kompas, 18 June 1985). In reality, the private sector prefers to wait until the government loosens the conditions and terms. The arrangement is already profitable and among the private investors who are benefitting from it are the powerful Liem Sioe Liong and Astra groups, both closely linked to the Suharto family. Astra has begun investing in quicker-yielding annual crops such as cassava and newly hybridised coconut in South Sumatra. Now it is making preparations to go into the more tra-
ditional perennial crops such as palm oil. The Lien group has invested in downstream processing industries and is trying to secure a steady rawmaterial supply (via investments in estates).

Apparently, the government tries to use a 'professional' approach in implementing the PIR Khusus scheme. There is no longer room for unexperienced, non-farming families. "Any use of the word participant in relation to PIR must be carefully qualified", Aditjondro wrote, "For those wishing to take part, don't think it is enough just to apply. All participants are trained and given extension, including education about the credit system and farming techniques over a period of between one and three years. During that period the suitability of the candidate is evaluated. Suitability includes farming ability and suitability as a member of community, and the evaluation is the responsibility of the Plantations Office". Aditjondro asks himself where the applicants that are rejected will go "Any people from outside the province who fail will be sent back to their villages, but what happens to the indigenous population who are rejected is unclear because it is their land that has been used to set up the project" (Kabar dari Kampung, no. 3/4, 1985: 15). One shudders at the thought of thousands of transmigrant families being put on the boat back to Java and furthermore thousands of local, indigenous people pushed off their islands.....

Although the PIR Khusus scheme was mentioned at the March 1985 IGGI Transmigration Seminar as the one ray of hope for the future, Martono confided to those present in Jakarta that participation (or rather the shortage of participants) was not the only problem encountered in implementing the scheme. He also mentioned rivalry between the departments involved in the implementation, lack of co-ordination between the departments and agencies, and lack of credit facilities (Van Raay, 1985b:40).

Inter-departmental co-ordination has proved to be vital to the success of programmes such as PIR. It is lack of co-ordination that has already caused delays in budget preparation and fund disbursements. National Planning Minister J.B. Sumarlin
told the press last year that delays in oil palm, rubber and sugar cane projects had been caused by the lack of construction of basic facilities by contractors (Kompas, 8 November 1985).

The financial issue will, in the near future, become even more crucial. Huge initial investments are needed but given the less promising outlook of oil earnings, the budget for both NES and PIR will not be easy to come by.

Even if difficulties remain limited and the PIR Khusus scheme turns out to be a success, yet other problems will loom up. The production capacity of specific cash crops will increase enormously, perhaps even faster than the processing capacity of the estates' plants. The privately owned (as well as the commercially operated PTPs, for that matter) will not 'dump' the smallholders' produce on the (world) market at a time when prices are low and supplies large.

It is possible that eventually the role of the transmigration department will decrease and that resettlement in all its variations will be more closely linked with labour migration. Other programmes such as AKAD (Antar Kerja Antar Daerah, the Inter-Regional Labour Distribution Programme) will probably disappear, because according to this scheme, labourers return home after their contract expires.

"By expanding the existing oil palm and rubber plantations in Prafi and Arso, opening up a new sugarcane plantation in Okaba (Merauke), and a modern sago-processing factory in Sarmi (Jayapura) and Inanwatan (Sorong), there would be opportunities to bring in landless agricultural workers from Java", Aditjondro writes, referring to West Papua, "But the Transmigration Department would not have to pay the plane tickets of those migrant workers, which would be paid instead by the respective plantation companies" (1986: 16-7).

The provision of 'labour' from 'overpopulated' parts to the relatively 'underpopulated' and 'underexploited' Outer Islands in fact is a mixture of the 'population', 'labour market', 'integration' and 'security' motives. Tapol explained this
mechanism as follows: "Obviously, it is in the interests of the government to populate the 'secure' areas of Kalimantan, as it has always been difficult to supply the labour and service requirements of the concessionaires. At first it was necessary that the labour force is subdued and easy to control so that there can be no redress against the notoriously exploitative, working conditions in the concession area" (Tapol Bulletin, March 1980: 11).

Commenting on the already impressive export values of West Papuan resources - in 1982, US$ 691 million for crude oil, US$ 128 million for copper, US$ 3.4 million for tuna -, the World Bank stated that "Timber and coal deposits are barely exploited, owing mainly to marketing difficulties, and there are undetermined reserves of important minerals such as gold and uranium. Rattan and copra are also produced on a small scale" (1985b:69).

It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the main targets of transmigrasi is West Papua - even more remote than the largest receiving area of the moment: Kalimantan.

5. Transmigrasi: Forced Acceptance of 'Development'

In West Papua and Kalimantan and the other areas, many 'not yet optimally' exploited natural resources lie there waiting, not for the native population to exploit them but for the small business elite, using the poor transmigrant families to accumulate their profits. The local population and government are forced to accept the central state policy; the methods that are being used to force acceptance from the regions are very diversified. Apparently, the Jakarta regime does not consider concern for the life and living standards of the majority of Indonesia's population as its duty and responsibility, nor is this concern considered to be a necessarily integral part of its regional development policy. The local population and government have to do something first before they can 'earn' their chances of development.
One example is given by Sinar Harapan, describing the visit which BKKBN (Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, National Family Planning Co-ordinating Body) head, Dr. Haryono Suyono, made to Kalimantan in 1985. Under the heading, "If South Kalimantan Doesn't Support The Family Planning Programme, It Will In Time Be Closed To Transmigration", the newspaper reports that on May 16, "the younger generation of the whole of South Kalimantan made a pledge to implement the National Family Planning programme successfully. 'Are you willing to restrain yourselves by not marrying early?', Dr. Haryono asked the younger generation of South Kalimantan. They all replied in unison: 'Willing.' " At first glance, Sinar Harapan continues, the occasion might look a bit strange. "This huge, fertile region has a population of only 2.2 million and is capable of sustaining many more, yet the younger generation has been obliged to proclaim this pledge. Isn't this vast territory, with its many different plantations, more than capable of having a population in excess of 2.2 million? The Governor of South Kalimantan, Ir. H.M. Said, said that South Kalimantan is a transmigration region and there is therefore no alternative - it must reduce the rate of population growth....". Between the lines, the paper notes that "now that South Kalimantan has been opened up as a transmigration area, it is truly felt that it is no longer the property of the natives of South Kalimantan. And the transmigration programme greatly broadens the scope for development". The Governor understood the message Haryono Suyono was bringing to the region very well: "If South Kalimantan doesn't support the Family Planning programme, the time will come when it will be closed to transmigration. This means we will be no help in saving other regions which probably can't support their populations. This is why South Kalimantan must have a successful Family Planning programme" (30 May 1985).

The local population has to show its loyalty towards the Suharto/Jakarta régime by consciously diminishing their fertility rate. If the population size remains stable, the region is rewarded with the introduction of 'development'. On the other hand, regional development, it is said, is not possible without immigration.... because the regions are too thinly populated!
Infrastructural and other investments are not remunerative because of the small size of the population. Therefore, the transmigration programme "aims at providing the necessary manpower to make exploitation of natural resources in the Outer Islands more feasible, because the regional uneven distribution (of population) clearly indicates that both the human and the nonhuman resources have not been optimally utilised" (Martono, 1984: vii, 3).

To complete the myth that has been spun around the concept of regional development, the local or 'native' population is said to benefit from transmigration. Exactly because development is not feasible without immigration, it is thanks to the transmigrants that the Outer Islands are developed. Thus, Martono claims, the huge amount of funds and investments in the transmigration sector gives an indication of the importance Jakarta attaches to the spreading of wealth and welfare over the entire archipelago. The degree of government commitment to transmigration can be derived from the fact that in recent years this programme has received fully a quarter or more of centrally allocated provincial development funds (1984: viii).

The percentages have been high indeed: around 45% in West Papua, 35% in Kalimantan, 25% in Sulawesi and 24 in Sumatra. (Inside Asia, September / October 1985: 8) According to the World Bank, development expenditures in West Papua were among the highest in Indonesia: about US$ 42 per capita compared with an average of US$ 20 (1985b:69).

The per capita figure in itself does not mean much. It all depends on how the money is spent. Some say the money does not benefit the local population at all. In an interview with Tapol, Yacob Patippi, Merauke's former district head, said that he had tried to convince the people in the kampungs that the central government is trying to develop their region.

"I explain that a new airport has been built for Garuda to land its Fokker F-28s, that a Palapa satellite has been set up, that there is a new harbour, a new Pertamina terminal for petroleum and that the Trans
Irian Highway is under construction". The Papuan people no longer seem impressed by these 'promises of development' and say: "all those things can only be enjoyed by people like you and all those other gentlemen. We don't have any money. The only ones who have money are those newcomers with straight hair. We native inhabitants with curly hair have not got the money to travel by plane, ship or taxi" (Tapol Bulletin, January 1984:3).

It is logical that the local population is not very enthusiastic concerning Jakarta's resettlement policy. The development funds that should be spent on the welfare of the local population are absorbed by the transmigration projects. To the natives, the investments are merely advantageous to the 'newcomers', and not to the satisfaction of their own needs. If, however, the transmigration projects fail, it is the local population and government who are left with responsibilities and financial burdens. Martono made this perfectly clear when he said that "where projects do not reach a stage of economic health, regional development is not materially strengthened, and the provinces are left with the burden of maintaining an expanded infrastructure and providing support services" (1984: viii). The provincial government in most cases "is reluctant to take over the administration of the settlements, especially where poor agricultural production or disputes over land ownership affect the stability of the community" (Guinness et al, 1977:89).

6. The Clash between Hungry Transmigrants and Dispossessed Natives

An 'incident' in Central Sulawesi in 1985 presented the Transmigration Department as well as the Indonesian government with an embarrassment of heretofore unknown scale, since it made perfectly clear what the resettlement policy could lead to. In this case, undernourishment and outright hunger had dramatic consequences, which were widely covered in the Indonesian press. The Jakarta Post reported that the clash between transmigrants and local people was not exactly the result of inter-ethnic tensions, but was caused by inadequacies in the trans-
migration programme itself. "Some matters which often cause a conflict between the natives and the newcomers", the paper wrote, "concern lack of understanding of local customs. Also envy about the land problem. But the land in Taopa Lambunu, as the area is popularly called, is not worth fighting about. The 11,000 has. area opened in 1981 depends on rain water. Only sweet potatoes and corn grow out there. And they are not worth much when sold. This situation pushes the transmigrants to earn a living as construction coolies far from the location. For example, Achmad who works as a daily worker at the Parigi-Poso irrigation project".

One of the problems in the transmigration project was lack of irrigation works; another problem was co-ordination.

"Some of the 17,000 transmigrants - now in their fourth year in the area when government supplies were stopped while they were not yet settled - are really threatened by a food shortage. 'We are hungry sir,' said a transmigrant who was considered exemplary, crying and catching the legs of the commander of the subprovince military command Colonel Z. B. Palaguna. A woman said, 'I swear, sir, we eat only sago and dried cassava and nothing else.' In such a situation, anything no matter how insignificant was felt to be painful. Let alone the murder of a friend."

When Soenarto, a 50-year old transmigrant, did not return home, his fellow transmigrants were suspicious, especially when there was a report that Narto was killed by a gang. Coconuts were the cause. On the fateful day, Narto climbed a coconut tree to pick some fruits owned by a local inhabitant. Four men who saw him attacked when he climbed down. It often happened, according to the local population, that the transmigrants stole coconuts. Also they often demanded timber or corrugated iron from the local people.

That day the transmigrants called in groups on the Bolano village chief, expressing their suspicion. "The transmigrants even threatened to burn down the people's homes", said a source. The burning did occur, but it looked as if the village was being attacked by robbers. "Like a flame the anger spread over the wooden homes of the transmigrants. Thousands of transmigrants from the 'E' unit of the Wonomukti, Moutong Subdistrict, Donggala settlement flocked together and then stormed nearby Bolano village. Houses were levelled to the
ground and smoke rose from the ruins of 26 houses. Fights were unavoidable. Having dug up the dead body of Narto, the transmigrants' temper rose again. A policeman who appeared on the scene was caught, tied and used as a hostage. only after the Muspida from the kabupaten of Donggala and Central Sulawesi and security officers arrived from Palu - after having travelled more than 300 kms - was the situation brought under control. Four men who killed Narto and the two others who joined in burying the dead were arrested" (20 July 1985).

Minister Martono promised to send an investigation team and told the press that he did not quite understand why this clash had occurred. He denied that the migrants were short of food and said that they had been told that government supplies would be stopped after a year, so they had had to prepare themselves for this. The press suggested that the real source of the problem was the (lack of) irrigation for the land.

When journalists used the incident to delve deeper into the transmigration programme in the area, it emerged that a few weeks earlier, a transmigration official had been killed by transmigrants in another part of the region, and elsewhere, transmigrants had plundered food shops in the subdistrict of Eunta because government supplies were held up for months (Indonesia Reports, quoting from Sinar Harapan, 2 July, 1985, 3 July, 1985, 15 July, 1985, 18 July, 1985, 20 July, 1985; Jakarta Post, 5 July, 1985, 20 July, 1985).

After the incident, K. Chaeruddin, Head of the Transmigration Department office in Central Sulawesi, said that the burning of 27 local residents' homes in retaliation for the murder had been instigated by former members of the G30S/PKI. These transmigrant former Tapols originated from Subang (West Java) and Blitar (East Java) (Sinar Harapan, 11 July 1985). The
'communist threat' is being used here to cover up for the failures of the transmigration policy.*

*Recently, Jakarta announced that ex-PKI-ers would henceforth be banned from the transmigration programme (Jakarta Post, 2 October 1985). In fact, membership of the PKI and other associated organisations or involvement in the G30S/PKI 'affair' has been a criterion for non-acceptance of applicants for transmigration since 1965. At the end of the 1970s, however, 'transmigrasi' was used as a solution for the problem of the political prisoners. Under strong international pressure, many thousands of tapols (tahanan politik, or political prisoners), against whom no evidence existed and who had been detained for an indefinite period of time without trial, had to be released. Instead of really releasing them, these tapols were resettled in so-called transmigration settlements in Maluku, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Sumatra. For the implementation of this policy the same myths and motives were used as in the regular transmigration programme, such as overpopulation and restricted employment opportunities in Java and regional development of the Outer Islands. See: Tapol, Treatment of Indonesian Political Prisoners. Forced Labour and Transmigration. London, February 1978, and Amnesty International, Indonesia - An Amnesty International Report. London, 1977.

In East Kalimantan, houses of transmigrants are built in straight rows, neglecting the socio-cultural living patterns of the Javanese (Thelka Kolbeck).
7. Resistance from the Transmigrants

The clash in Donggala could also be described in terms of inter-ethnic conflict (see Chapter 3 in this part), but the Indonesian press is Java-biased. The problems of the transmigrants attracts more attention than the threat transmigrasi presents to the local or 'native' population. Many of the problems in transmigration settlement areas lead to dissatisfaction and disappointment. The transmigrants try to show their needs and problems in all sorts of ways. These signs of resistance towards government policy can be found in every stage of the resettlement process. Some 87 families, from Kebungbunder, Cirebon, West Java, for example, had to wait such a long time for their departure that when the announcement came that it had been cancelled, the prospective migrants stormed the village council hall and wrecked the chairs there (Berita Yudha, 10 June 1985). Another group of 300 transmigrants refused to depart from Jember district, East Java, because they had learned from a group who was also destined to be resettled in Bengkulu that they had been taken to Kalimantan instead (Indonesia Reports, 2 November 1984). The fact that many families leave the settlements after some years of hardships and return to their home villages in Java and Bali could also be seen as a token of resistance. But very often the transmigrants are not capable of paying for their return trip. The fact that they try to survive in the project areas does not mean that these settlements are successful as can be understood from the letter published in the Jakarta Post of 11 July 1985:

"We, 100 families consisting of 432 people, transmigrants settled in Kota Baru, South Kalimantan", the letter goes, "would like to call on authorities concerned to help us by paying more attention to our complaints about our resettlement. We left our villages in East Java on February 20th and arrived at the location on the 26th. Our complaints are as follows: there has been something wrong with the supply of our daily needs, like rice, sugar, salted fish and oil. They are always late or short. For two months we haven't received farm land, but what we have received
is untouched land that we have to convert by ourselves. This brought difficulties for us to produce anything from the land. The food supply will be sent for one year more, during which time we cannot produce our own food. Furthermore, the newly opened land was not appropriate for agriculture since it has too much oxygen content. The seeds we received were not of good quality. Some of them were damaged and could not be grown. There is no family planning service in the area, although some of us agree to it. Health service is still insufficient here. In fact, there are many other problems I should write about. We only hope that our problems can be overcome soon in order that we can live securely and love staying here. We'd like to be active in the national development, especially in the transmigration programme.

In Jonggon B location, East Kalimantan, 40 transmigrant families refused to till their plot of land since it was located too far from the village - which is forbidden by law. Instead of receiving adequate assistance, they were deprived from their rights to a second plot of land (Sinar Harapan, 12 December 1983). And in Krueng Tado location, West Aceh, it was food shortages that forced 50 families to leave their site. They fled to Banda Aceh, where they occupied a building complex for retired army personnel. Some time later they were reported as having returned to the settlement (Indonesia Reports, 14 October 1983).

Many cases like these are not covered in the press at all, and so these examples are only the tip of the iceberg. In South East and North Sulawesi, two 'incidents' were covered by the press in 1982-83. In 1982, angry settlers expressed their frustration by beating a transmigration official to death (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1985). He had been head of Marisa II project in North Sulawesi. They had complained several times about the fact that they had not received their promised plots of land. Also, there had been lack of drinking water. During a meeting, one of the transmigrants had yelled 'serbu' (attack!) and they attacked the officials, including some policemen. The project leader could not escape in time and was killed. Martono, junior minister of transmigrasi, at
the time explained to the press that these transmigrants, who had arrived at the site in 1980-81, would receive their land during the second year after arrival (INDOC, 1986:24).

In 1983, angry transmigrants in Mowila II site in South East Sulawesi attacked a transmigration official and threw stones through the windows of a transmigration building. The project had started in October 1982, when 180 Balinese families arrived. After government food supplies were stopped one year later, they expressed their disappointment by attacking the official and the building. The main problem was lack of irrigation works. After the incident, the provision of government supplies was continued for another year - but the main problem was not solved. Afterwards, at least twenty families escaped the site during the night and returned to Bali (Kompas, 7 November 1984).

These incidents are an indication of the suffering and hardships of the transmigrant population all over Indonesia. The examples do not end with Repelita III, so, the improvements promised by the Indonesian government were not put into practice. There is, therefore, enough reason to say that the transmigration/resettlement programme is not bringing economic development or any other kind of development, as is claimed by the authorities. The problems in the settlements themselves are serious enough and they are not confined to the 'traditional' settlement model, which in fact has not been abandoned! Similar problems occur in newly created settlements, including the so-called PIR projects, and stagnation is also taking place on those projects where the so-called "second-stage development" has been implemented. There seems no reason at all to attach trust or belief in the claim that transmigration promotes regional development. And, what is more, the implementation of the transmigration programme proves to have had a disrupting effect on the lives and economy of the local population, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3. TRANSMIGRASI & NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNITY

Included in the list of goals of the transmigration programme is the promotion of national integration and security, a goal which from the start of resettlement appeared difficult to achieve. The enclave pattern of settlement which took place during the pre-Independence period was not conducive to integration. Tensions and potential conflict situations became even more critical after Independence because it became increasingly hard to find relatively 'empty' areas, where migrants could be located without direct contact with the local or 'native' population. Furthermore, the enclave pattern of settlement was abolished when Sukarno introduced the ideal of One Indonesian Nation. All ethnic groups belonged to One Indonesian Family, and in the long run internal differences had to disappear. The Javanese were the model for the New Indonesian.

1. Inter-Ethnic Relations before 1965

Werthem says that "whereas in pre-war conditions they (the Sumatrans) could live side by side and now and then profit from the cheap labour force available in the settlements to tend their coffee or pepper gardens, the post-war migratory movement made much greater inroads on their way of life, by seriously reducing the available reserve of forest-lands and thus endangering their future. And as commercial crops grown by the new settlers competed with those cultivated by Sumatrans in their own gardens, competition for land became sharpened with the market competition" (1964: 200).

It was not very realistic to expect the Javanese to be willing to assimilate with the Sumatrans or integrate themselves into Sumatran society. "The migration situation", Werthem continues, "in which the invading culture was more dynamic and forceful than the receiving one, excluded such a possibility, the more so as the pre-war enclave policy had already created a focus towards which the new settlers would tend to orient themselves. Assimilation of Javanese migrants was not
taking place either to Sumatran area or to a general Indonesian society somewhat modified by a Sumatran environment" (1964: 202).

The relatively isolated location and the size of the settlements made in-group identification sufficient and, according to Oey, there was no need for the Javanese to go outside. "In addition, aid was given to the transmigrants and not to the locals, a factor which at the time accentuated differences between the two groups. Different opportunities combined with diverse cultural patterns of behaviour and religion sometimes led to resentments of one group towards another, and ultimately conflict. The settlement of a large number of people of one ethnic group into the land of another group in a segregated area is not conducive to integration. Instead, majority-minority relations flourish, underscoring the differences between the cultural attributes of each group" (1982: 47-8).

The 1977-Gajah Mada team remarked that although the settlement projects after 1945 were no longer 'enclaves' in a geographical sense, they certainly remained so from a cultural and administrative point of view. It is, I think, illuminating to discover that in studying 'inter-ethnic conflict and tensions', the team focussed on the relations between the Javaneses and the Balinese, both immigrant groups, and not between the immigrants and the autochthonous population. The fact that the team observed many ethnic tensions and potential conflict situations indicates the seriousness of this issue when the local or 'native' population is included in the analysis.

The team concluded that "the Balinese seem intent on developing their own traditions in the new land, and Javanese and Sundanese are doing much the same, although less conspicuously as the Javanese village traditions are in many cases considered the model for all Indonesia. In fact a number of sub-ethnic traditions are developing under this guise of a Javanese society" (Guinness et al, 1977: 76).

They observed a deepening of traditions, which older generations of settlers may well try to pass on to their children. The living habits of the Balinese, such as their herding of pigs, could prove offensive to other settlers and they were
therefore designated distinct areas. Like Wertheim had done before them, the 1977-Gajah Mada team came to the main conclusion that it is competition for resources that affects community relations both within the settlements and outside. Frequent disputes in the Luwu projects, for instance, have centered around land and land use, where "density of population has made people far more aware of the value* of these things(...). Competition over land and its resources has generated an atmosphere of suspicion between the two populations which can only be relieved by firm government action that takes both sides into consideration" (1977: 95).

2. Inter-Ethnic Tensions and Conflict

As has been described at the end of the last chapter, inter-ethnic tensions have not disappeared, although firm government action has been undertaken. This action consists of more sophisticated and/or aggressive methods of land deprivation. West Papua has proved to be some sort of 'killing field' for transmigration authorities. It is the best documented case but not the only place where land deprivation has led to violent clashes. Kees Lagerberg, for example, mentions that bloody clashes have occurred in Kalimantan between Dayaks and Madurese migrants, resulting in the death of twenty migrants (Nederlands Dagblad, 20 April 1984).

Sometimes, efforts are undertaken to create ethnic conflict where it did not exist before. This has been the case in the Cimerak PIR project in West Java (see also chapter 2 in this part). In the village, where the PIR project was planned, an indigenous group of Sundanese and an immigrant group of Central Javanese lived peacefully together. The migrants had settled in the area in 1961 at the request of local authorities.

* With "value" the team probably refers to the economic value of land, since it is well known that the autochthonous populations in the receiving areas have a deep, although not exclusively material, sense of value for the land.
"Given these two different cultural backgrounds", LBH Bandung noted, "they have so far been able to live peacefully together. Social life can be called harmonious. A number of migrants even speak Sundanese more fluently than Indonesian. The Javanese migrants have also been able to gain a number of positions within the apparatus of village administration, such as village head, head of a neighbourhood association and so on".

When the land of the villagers was needed for the PIR project and the population refused to co-operate voluntarily, the rumour was spread that those who were involved in the protests were migrants who hoped to take over the land of the indigenous population (Human Rights Forum 1, January 1985). In this way, the different interests between the indigenous and the migrant population can be exploited.

Whereas clashes such as occurred in Kalimantan have been reported from all corners of the Suharto empire, the clashes in West Papua have received international attention. This was particularly the case after thousands of Papuans fled from the country into neighbouring Papua New Guinea. But even before this, tensions had exploded at several times resulting in many deaths. According to a report in Inside Asia, the spate of deaths began in March 1983, when six men were killed in the Paniai highlands: two Sulawesi migrant pitsawyers and four Eka- ri tribal peasants. After a silence of five months, an Indonesian worker from the US Continental Oil Company (Conoco) was killed by arrows shot by tribal Papuans defending their sago stands. In the early months of 1984, Inside Asia continues, there were frequent clashes between the military and 'separatist' guerilla fighters around Jayapura and along the 600 miles border, and many civilians lost their lives.

The most impressive clash took place in Jayapura itself in February 1984. Three Serui fishermen were killed by Sulawesi migrants in revenge for the murder of a Sulawesi migrant fish vendor some days earlier.
Transmigration Myth of close co-operation (Nusantra, May, 1985)
They "had lost their advantageous positions in the Hamadi market following the influx of South and South East Sulawesi migrants who were brought to Irian as part of Indonesia's transmigration policy" (February/March 1985:25-6), reprinted from Asian Bureau Australian Newsletter 1984). The Buginese and Butonese "papalele" (middlemen) had made their first appearance in 1967 and had gradually taken over the whole fish market. In November 1984 only one local middleman, a man from Serui, was left over from what had once been a locally controlled market.

"A Survey of the Jayapura Fishing Industry", written by the Cenderawasih University Anthropology Department and quoted in Kabar dari Kampung, reports that the local fishermen "are very bitter towards the papalele. They complain that the prices are too low and at times they are cheated... in dealing with the fishermen the papalele are even more assertive than when inducing new-comers to buy".

Kabar dari Kampung adds that killings such as occurred on the Hamadi market have also been reported from Sorong. Furthermore, the killings did not stop. Seven Makassar men were killed near the border in March 1984; five workers from a firm of contractors were kidnapped in Kumopa, Paniai in April 1985. Three of them, all Bugis-Makassar, were released after intervention by a priest in the area, but the other two people, both from Menado in North Sulawesi, were killed before contact could be made. This most recent case was brought about by contractors not paying local people for their labour on the highly profitable government contracts in the interior.

"The local people had already complained to the authorities but with no success, so they resorted to taking Sulawesi labourers as hostages, perhaps not realising that these people themselves had not received their pay for six months" (no 3/4, 1985: 55-6).

3. Resistance against Indonesian Resettlement

Rights and properties of the local population in Indonesia are not being protected by the Suharto regime. If people
protest against the abuse by Indonesian officials or deprivation by concession holders, they are accused of being OPM-members (Free Papua Movement) and their life is at stake. Reading the Indonesian press, it becomes clear that the legal position of the local population is very weak. For example, 400 to 700 Papuans were arrested and sent to prison between October and November 1983, because they showed resistance to the transformation of their land into transmigration property. The arrests took place after the population around the Nimbo-krang sites were forced to attend the public execution of one of the villagers (Nederlands Dagblad, 20 April 1984; NRC Handelsblad, 31 March 1984). Another example refers to people in Prafi, who had sent several letters regarding wages, rights and other matters connected to their welfare. "Frustrated by the company's refusal to answer, the people started to protest to the guests who often come to see the site. But this has proved no more successful because now if there is a guest due the workers are rounded up and taken to an isolated area under the watchful eye of PTP II's assistants" (Kabar dari Kampung no. 3/4, 1985: 20).

Resistance on the part of the population in the receiving areas has been publicly known to exist from the 1950s. In that period, the Sukarno regime reacted by sending even more transmigrants to these areas. Arndt admitted that "it is fair to say that the indigenous people have not generally welcomed settlement of Javanese transmigrants among them, especially where the Javanese have threatened to become a majority" (1983: 64).

The resistance against resettlement concentrated on what has been called the Jawanisasi (Javanisation) aspect of transmigration. This can, for instance, be derived from a remark made by a Lampung villager, who said, "they say we are lazy and unresponsive to development, but we have our own ways to make Lampung prosper. What's more, we have a mission to preserve Lampung's traditional culture" (Sinar Harapan, 2 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Generally, the protests did not have much influence on decision-making in Jakarta, although some observers believe
that Sumatran resistance led to a scaling-down of targets for this. In Robin Osborne's words: "From the late 1970s local resentment came to a head in Lampung, South Sumatra, where villagers protested to Jakarta about the transmigrant flood. So strong were the complaints that the government agreed to cut back the quota drastically. Significantly, the feelings of fellow-Asians were taken into account, while similar complaints from the Melanesians of Irian Jaya, the area chosen to accept the unwanted surplus, were ignored until 1984. Then, the government showed signs of recognising that transmigration was angering Papuans and in turn swelling the ranks of the OPM". (1986: 128).

It is hard to accept the idea that the Suharto regime give in to protests of local people wherever in Indonesia. Perhaps it is exactly because the government wanted to increase transmigration to West Papua that they announced a scaling down of efforts towards Sumatra. Also, the sharp rise in population density in Sumatra made it difficult for them to justify a prolonged resettlement in these areas. In reality, (spontaneous) transmigration continued to take place on a large scale in the 'traditional' areas.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that protests and resistance on the part of the Sumatran provinces also continue to exist, for example in Aceh, where transmigrants obviously have not been very welcome. This can be derived from the words of Zakaria R. Alwi, Chairman of the Aceh Besar District DPR, who stressed that it was untrue that transmigrants from Java had been rejected. "We are not a closed society", he said (Suara Karya, 2 October 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

At the time, housing facilities had been built for 100 transmigrant families, where the district was planned to accept 350 families. Later, it was said that the small number of transmigrant families who left Java had to be attributed to the fact that recipient areas were not ready to receive them. Aceh was, once again, mentioned as an example. "Some 50 families are scheduled to leave for Aceh this year", Lukman Zaini,
Jakarta's City Hall spokesman said, "but the local government is not yet ready to accommodate the transmigrants" (Jakarta Post, 25 October 1985).

4. 'Integration' of Locals in Resettlement Areas

Even Arndt, who cannot be called an adversary of the Suharto regime and has therefore been criticised by others, has said that "there is no escaping the fact that a sustained large-scale movement of people from Java, whether by government-sponsored transmigration or spontaneous migration, implies increasing Javanisation of the Outer Islands" (1983: 64). Catherine Caulfield said that "many islanders depreciate transmigration as a move to swamp them with people who share an ethnic and religious identity with Indonesia's military rulers" (The New Scientist, 17 May 1984: 27).

It was obvious that the Indonesian government had to find ways to overcome this issue which threatened to become international. The initial 'solution' to the problem was the introduction of the 'translokal' concept, referring to a specific quota of local inhabitants required to be resettled within settlement sites. According to Robin Osborne, this was decided upon when the durability of local opposition became clear in the 1970s.

"In an attempt to overcome some of the conflicts, the government, in accordance with a presidential decree, has ruled that up to 25% of places in transmigrant settlements should be reserved for local people - 'translocals' they are called" (Inside Asia, September/October 1985: 21).

The same connection between inter-ethnic conflict, through resettlement, and the translokasi scheme has been made by Jones, who said: "A perception that local people are being moved from their rightful areas, and furthermore, financial assistance is available for the Javanese migrants, but not for the poor indigenous farmer, exacerbates the conflict. While antagonisms between different Indonesian ethnic groups cannot be officially acknowledged, there is nevertheless a recognition that these problems must be tackled and that they will become much more serious if the transmigration programme reaches the scale aimed for in the plan. One new attempt to tackle the problem of perceived injustice is to allocate ten percent of the land prepared for settlement in some new schemes to local landseekers" (1979: 217).
The quota has been raised from 10% to 25% and even 50% in East Timor (see Chapter 4 in this part). Furthermore, it is rather cynical to write about 'local landseekers', since these people were pushed off their land for the sake of transmigration. Osborne notes this, saying, "there was a cruel irony in becoming a part of the quota to be 'resettled' on land which they had earlier vacated. Many reported quietly - that they felt discriminated against by their neighbours. 'It is our land', one clan leader told an Australian visitor in 1982, 'and we are treated like second-class citizens on it'" (ACFOA Briefing, May 1985: 5).

How can one expect people to be enthusiastic about such a scheme when they are forcibly removed from their clan land and then faced with the double insult of being told to move back again? Osborne asks (Inside Asia, September/October 1985: 21).

It has, indeed, been acknowledged that the translokasi or APPDT (Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi, - Resettlement Allocation for Inhabitants of a Transmigration Region) scheme, arranged in Inpres 1976/1, has been designed to compensate local people for the loss of their lands by being incorporated into the projects. Transmigration areas would be located increasingly in the vicinity of indigenous settlements, in fact, on their lands.

The West Papuan Observer reports that "at first the division was several rows of houses for Javanese transmigrants, then one row of Papuan cottages. But that was not yet integrated enough and now it became in several transmigration areas as follows: nine Javanese families, one Papuan family. This system has already been applied in Kalimantan to surround each Dayak family with many Javanese families and the consequences have been really destructive" (July/August 1983).

Therefore, the Indonesian press subsequently reported that there were signs of dissatisfaction among the local people, who were pressed to participate. There has been a feeling, for instance, that the Nimbokrang sites are 'transplanted Javanese desas', despite the translocal quota. One Papuan was quoted,
saying, "we feel like strangers here, and we do not get enough guidance" (Kompas, 10 October 1985). The policy was not meant to integrate newcomers into the receiving community, but to force locals to give up their land and be satisfied with a tiny corner on the huge settlements. It was here that the local people could 'benefit' from schools, health services, etc. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that there was no enthusiasm. Hormat Meliala, Public Relations Head of the Transmigration Department, said that people returned to their villages in the woods where they live from sago trees. He mentioned the Koya site as an example, where fifty houses had been built for translocals, but all but a few were left empty again (Kompas, 10 October 1985). Maybe these houses were as inadequate as the plots of land allocated to translocals in another Jayapura settlement. Sastrosuwarno, Director General of Preparation of Transmigration Settlements, referred to Nimbokrang and was satisfied with the achievements. The prosperity of the settlers showed itself in the radios, tvs, refrigerators, motorcycles and other goods available. The only problem with these sites was that they were 'not successful' from the integration point of view. All the translocals had left "because they had been given poor land" (Indonesia Reports, 22 October 1984).

Tapol asked former district's head in Merauke, Yacob Patippi, why the Papuan population showed no enthusiasm for the APPDT scheme. He answered, "First of all, they aren't given any motivation for the future once they settle in a transmigration location. Then, the native inhabitants are afraid their land will be taken over by the government once they quit their kampungs. Thirdly, they can get plenty of water from the wells in their kampungs even during the dry season. Water supply is generally far better in the kampungs than in the locations. Then there is the fact that these local communities must adapt to new things if they go and live with the transmigrants. They must construct ricefields and grow crops that are quite new to them. In their kampungs they have plenty of sago, fruit, and so on. It's difficult for them to change their traditions and follow the new ways quickly" (Tapol Bulletin, January 1984: 3).
The general expectation is that the quota of translocals will not be filled. Martono recently explained to ex-IGGI Chairwoman Schoo that "whether or not those targets could be achieved, depends among other things on the reality in the field", and he added that these local transmigrants are already Irian Jaya residents (Kompas, 2 April 1986). This seems to confirm that 'translocals' are not always local or 'native' people, but also Javanese and other non-indigenous transmigrants originating from other (failed?) settlements. The Dutch parliamentary commission visiting West Papua at the end of 1984, suggested that 'non-local indigenous migrants', meaning anyone who had been living in the territory for five years or longer, could be included in the APPDT scheme in an effort to fulfill its quota (Verslag Missie Irian Jaya, 1985: 12). In fact, this has been done for several years. An example is 36-year old Mansur, born in South Sulawesi, now settled in Koya Timur. "Actually", he told reporters, "there are many local transmigrants here, but their original land was not Irian Jaya, like me". According to him, there were only four Papuan families living in Koya Timur. He himself had been a driver in Nabire before joining transmigration in 1969. Another resident, Komari, had lived in Abepura before participating in transmigrasi (Jakarta Post, 8 February 1986).

The discrepancy between myth and reality here can be explained from the fact that it is not the government's intention to take care of the indigenous population, only to suggest to the outside world that they are willing to take care of them. This myth is taken over by the World Bank, whose officials claim that the APPDT's land allocation to local applicants will have beneficial results. "While it is unlikely that such a large number of places will be taken up by local people, the policy is indicative of the government's concern that conflicts should not arise between newcomers and the local population as a result of unfavourable comparisons between the living conditions of the transmigrants and the circumstances of the local population" (1985b:17).
The real intention of the Suharto regime was explained by Tapol, saying, "The Papuans are now being referred to as 'translocals'. This is a new form of pacification, a scheme with a security objective, aimed at settling and dispersing tribal people whose natural style of life is semi-nomadic. It is a way of assimilating the 'locals', of ensuring that they become a minority within each locality, even in each street, swamped by Javanese migrants" (1984: 62).

5. The Necessity of Transmigration for Local Peoples

The Indonesian government claims that the transmigration/resettlement programme will be beneficial to the local or 'native' populations in the Outer Islands. Because the non-Javanese have, in the official view, not reached high enough levels of civilisation and development, Javanese migrants and financial investments are imported in order to raise the living standards. "Government policy is to provide facilities that can be used by both settlers and the local population", the 1977-Gajah Mada Team wrote in its report, "schools, mosques and health clinics should be equally accessible to both populations. However these facilities are generally sited in a central position in the settlement and are consequently a much greater distance from the local villages. The number of villages which use these facilities is thus small. Only a handful of indigenous children are to be found in any transmigration school. Where Banjarese traders live in the outskirts of settlements, their children attend the local school, but in some schools Javanese is a language of instruction which severely disadvantages both Balinese and Banjarese children" (Guinness et al, 1977: 89).

These observations from Sulawesi and Kalimantan are also valid for other receiving islands such as West Papua.

As asked by Tapol what his opinion was on the Indonesian argument that the Papuans are 'backward' and 'uncivilised' and that the Javanese are bringing civilisation and development to West Papua, Eliezer Bonay, West Papua's first Governor, answered: "What they are doing is forcing their religion on our people. They are building mosques everywhere though these are not part of our culture. There are very few Papuans left in the towns. Most people in the towns are
newcomers, and just a handful of Papuans. It's like that in government offices. Papuans have only very low, clerical jobs. It's very difficult for Papuans to find jobs in the towns. When they apply they're almost always turned down" (Tapol Bulletin, May 1982).

Reporter Hamilton has written that what are known as 'the straight hairs' effectively run everything and that the Papuans find themselves shut out of economic life and looked down upon in their own homes. "There is a Javanese conviction of superiority in the face of the Irianese and their disdain for what they consider to be an uncivilised and backward people". Hamilton foresaw that even if transmigration were to be 'moderately' successful, the Papuans would become a minority in their own land and that, already, in the towns "there is hardly a Melanesian face to be seen. What was once a Dutch colonial outpost (Jayapura) has become a distinctly Asian town. Food stalls sell satay and nasi goreng. New mosques are going up. A Melanesian people converted to Christianity by foreign missionaries now find 151,000 Moslems already in their midst" (The Courier Mail, 14 April 1984).

West Papua's Governor, Isaac Hindom, who was appointed early 1983, did not share the fear that through migration West Papua would be islamised. A protestant himself, Hindom said the Indonesian Constitution permitted freedom of religion. "I am proud", he said,"because we can offer Javanese a place where they can live and develop. Java needs us as we need Java, and we can work together to build the country (...). If with transmigration the whole of Irian becomes Moslem, that is up to God. Just the same, if they all become Christian, it will be God's will" (Jakar-Western Australian, 13 April, 1984). Richard Pascoe has quoted Hindom saying that "transmigration will allow the province to exploit its great economic potential faster and more effectively". According to Pascoe, Hindom denied that outsiders would dominate the Irianese and that their presence would lead to the ultimate destruction of Irianese culture (Jakarta Post, 24 May 1984). But, as has been described by Tapol, Hindom had already for some time been actively promoting the idea that Papuans must assimilate themselves as quickly as possible with the settler-Javanese. "In a statement late 1982, Hindom claimed that since "Irianese"
food producers are so 'backward', it is essential to bring in as many transmigrants from Java as possible to ensure development. The policy of 'mixed transmigration' according to which every transmigration site should include 25% of 'locals' is completely justified, said Hindom, because local farmers are so lacking in technical skills. He went even further, advocating mixed marriages between Papuans and Javanese. 'This will give birth to a new generation of people without curly hair, sowing the seeds for greater beauty'. Not content with these racist remarks, he also blamed the Papuans for 'being so neglectful of their surroundings and thinking only of themselves and their group'. He also rounded on the 'separatists' for whom 'the government and the people of Indonesia will show no mercy'" (Tapol Bulletin, November 1983: 6, quoting from Kompas, 26 October 1982). Peltata reported that Hindom has said that "in order to change those left behind in the interior, Irian Jaya was prepared to accept 30 million transmigrants from Java" (24 May 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Similar statements were made by top military and top government figures, such as Admiral Sudomo and Foreign Affairs Minister Mochtar Kusamaatmadja. Sudomo told De Telegraaf:

"We try to pull these primitive people towards civilisation. But even attempts to clothe them encountered the greatest difficulties. We want to stop their wandering existence, we want them to settle permanently, to practise agriculture and cattle-breeding and to go to church. But this takes time, for primitive people are suspicious" (3 May 1978, quoted in: The West Papuan Observer, July/August 1983). In another interview on the Australian TV, Kusamaatmadja explained that "culture is a changing thing, and I think it's a mistake to want to preserve a certain culture and freeze it at a certain time. Apart from the question whether it is worth retaining. We are evolving whether you like it or not into what we would like to be a common Indonesian culture. What we are doing in Irian Jaya is to introduce the Irianese, who are admittedly of a different cultural level, into the mainstream of Indonesian life and I don't think there is anything wrong with that.... They will be part of the Indonesian nation" (May 1984, quoted in: Osborne, 1986: 137).

AAP correspondent, Craig Skehan quoted Mochtar saying to an official PNG delegation that "it was probably the only way of getting stone age, primitive and backward people into the mainstream of Indonesian development" (Northern Territory News, 16 November, 1985).
Colchester said that the Indonesian government engages in "ethnocentric propaganda campaigns, which include the posting of large cartoons portraying unclothed, environmentally destructive swidden agriculturalists, making a transition to clothed rice cultivators, living in unit dwellings and honouring the Indonesian flag" (The Ecologist, May 1986: 96). This was also observed by Alexander Papanberg, a German aid administrator based in PNG, who visited the Transmigration Department in 1984. He was alarmed by a film entitled "Follow Our Steps".

"The scenes of the film portraying the Indonesian policy and attitudes towards the Melanesian inhabitants of Irian Jaya are mostly awkward and sometimes downright appalling", he wrote in the PNG Times (5 July 1984). Papanberg described a scene where a Melanesian farmer in a transmigration station was asked whether he liked his new life. "The facial expression of the official speaking is one of a benevolent, at times stern father talking down to a rather backward, distant member of the family. The farmer answers all questions in the affirmative and is then advised in the same patronising manner to tell all his relatives about this beautiful new life and to ask them to come to the settlement too" (quoted in: ACFOA Briefing, May 1985: 6).

The view Indonesians display regarding 'Papuans' was already present when they went out to 'civilise' and 'develop' the other 'Outer Islands' although it was less extreme and some would say, less racist. It was taken over by development workers such as Narinder Aggarwala from a UN organisation working in Sumatra. He wrote that "in Indonesia's Outer Islands, billowing smoke, charred tree stumps and scattered logs no longer signal the restless presence of slash-and-burn shifting cultivators; now they are signposts indicating people at work - settlers clearing their own parcels of land" (The Courier, March/April 1984).

Michael Dove was one of the observers who attacked these views. He wrote that contemporary Javanese uniformly speak of the agricultural system of irrigated rice cultivation as more productive, more rational, and in general better for the nation and national development than swidden agriculture.

"The swidden-based system of agriculture is regarded not merely as less good than the system of irrigated rice cultivation but explicitly as something bad, irr-

6. The Impact of Transmigration on Local Peoples

It is clear, that the view Indonesians display regarding the ways of living of non-Javanese peoples in the Outer Islands has had an important influence on the implementation of the transmigration and resettlement programmes. The Indonesian government - like the Dutch before them - looked for economic exploitation and profits, but they also provided themselves with the task of 'civilising' the 'backward' peoples. The local or 'native' population have suffered a lot in the process, with the loss of land and employment as the most obvious consequences. They were pushed off their lands and pushed out of their skilled as well as unskilled jobs.

A. The Land Issue

Mulya Lubis from the LBH has described some of the effects of transmigrasi after visiting West Papua, saying that "one of the most harmful effects of development is the expropriation of land for transmigration projects in complete disregard of the traditional land rights of the local population. Many local inhabitants are losing land that is absolutely vital to their well-being, and are receiving no compensation at all. The state grants formal land rights to foreign investors even though the land in question is subject to traditional usufruct by local people (who have no formal documents to prove it)" (Sinar Harapan, 20 & 31 October, 1983, quoted in: Tapol Bulletin).

Journalist Peter Hastings noted that "land tenure problems are explosive. Indonesians give no sign of understanding, or caring about in many instances, the realities of Melanesian land concepts. They tend to believe that having paid for compulsorily acquired or negotiated land, they have bought it in perpetuity. The Melanesian view is that the land has been rented for use only, that it is inalienable, belongs to the clan and is held in trust for future generations" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 October 1983).
Melanesian or any other 'traditional' land concepts have only a secondary role in central state affairs. According to the Basic Forestry Act (of 1967) the rights of traditional-law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of the establishment of transmigration settlement, since this is in the National Interest. Thus, 'traditional' law is considered to be opposed to 'national' law, and dispossession of communally held land is legalised in the context of 'national interest'.

Sometimes compensation is paid for land or for the trees, but more often this is not the case. Since transmigration is a matter of 'national interest' and land disputes has become a significant factor in delaying the transmigration programme, the methods of land expropriation have become more harsh. Soegiyono, West Papua's Deputy Governor, explained that there was no compensation given for any communal lands taken, since new schools or churches were considered as a 'symbolic exchange' (Indonesia Reports, 22 October 1984). The development transmigration is bringing to the receiving areas is considered to be a compensation in itself.

Aditjondro recently confirmed that land disputes and reluctance of villagers to give up their land for transmigration have been obstacles in the implementation and speed of the transmigration programme and he added that "although this has only been a minor factor in some isolated areas (...) it has caused some sites to be cancelled, reduced or shifted" (1986: 12). It is, of course, more easy to expropriate land in isolated areas, where the international press is not allowed to observe the actions of the officials and the military. Afterwards, international observers were invited to attend ceremonies, where tribal heads transferred land voluntarily for transmigration purposes. On one occasion, with Minister Martono, Governor Hindom and Kakanwil Sarwoko as well as the Indonesian press present, some of the local people carried a banner " which said 'in primitive Indonesian reading': "Minister, we from the Komoro and Amungwe
Mrs. Schoo from IGGI visits West Papua (Tempo 16 April, 1986).
tribes, we are ready to accept our transmigration brothers in Mimika""(Kompas/Sinar Harapan, 2 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

The Mimika area was scheduled to resettle some 9,000 transmigrants by 1989 and Hindom suggested that this example should be followed by other tribal groups in West Papua. Later, the Indonesian papers reported that Martono had accepted transfers of customary land from four tribal heads who hailed from Fakfak (212,000 has), Paniai (28,000 has) and Yapen Waropen (50,000 has) districts. They even reported that some 3,000 has of land had been transferred from Bobonaro district in East Timor (Kompas/Sinar Harapan, 8 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). The Jakarta Post reported that Martono had opened a new site in Timika, Fakfak district, which covered 54,000 has of tribal land given to the government by the Komoro and Amungwe tribes (22 November 1985). Indonesian Observer added to this item that these locations were all "very strategic since the projects are near the seaport and airport so that it is easy for the transmigrants to market their agricultural products to town" (13 January 1986). Again, in April 1986, Antara reported that the Ayamura tribe in the Bird Head's region had recently donated 14,740 has of land along the Teminabuan-Ayamura valley for transmigration (19 April 1986).

For observers who know the ways the New Order takes no notice of (human) rights of the population, it is not difficult to understand that the 'voluntary' side of these transfers have to be questioned. Apparently, this has happened now and then, since Minister Martono felt the need to explain himself and the methods used by his Department to gain control over the land. During Schoo's visit, he said that "the government will only use state land for the transmigrants" and added: "this does not exclude the possibility for the traditional landowners to contribute their customary land to the government in order to resettle the transmigrants". He pointed out that tribal chiefs in Eastern Mimika, Fakfak, had already donated 300,000 has(!) around the
Benyum, Head Paulus speaking with Komisi IV Chairman Warnohardjo in the meeting centre of Nimbokrang II (Kompas, 10 October 1985).
Timika airport for transmigration (Kompas, 2 April 1986).

The 'voluntary' transfers of land have to be related to the fact that land (un-)availability has become a serious obstacle for transmigration. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the transfers were not meant to be without compensation - for instance, Paulus, head of the Benyum tribe, which attracted national attention when it 'gave' 500 has away for transmigration. Berita Buana reported that Paulus said that they had not yet received financial compensation for the transferred land and furthermore, they were annoyed that the site had been named Nimbokrang and not Benyum as they had suggested (12 August 1985). Kompas reported that the 'native inhabitants', "local transmigrants, as they are called, feel they have been driven out. Such feelings need to be eliminated", the paper warned, "because if they persist, things could develop further into a political issue by groups that disagree with the government's programme" (10 October 1985).

Apparently, 'customary' land has been used in the past by the local people and they have been pushed to participate in the resettlement scheme as 'translocals'. The aspect of land expropriation is a necessary part of the transmigration scheme, because all the land is owned and used, although this is perhaps not recognised by the Indonesian authorities. Even translocals are the former 'owners' of the land and they should be grateful that they are allowed to settle next to the newcomers. According to a World Bank report, in selecting local participants "priority is given to those families who live near the project or whose land has been used as part of the site" (World Bank 1985b:68).* The same method of expropriation and selection is used in the PIR Khusus scheme, where a large number of smallholders will be migrants from 'overpopulated' Java and Bali and where "local people without land rights will be allowed to participate" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 October 1984). Later, it was said that "participating farmers would have to surrender their land to a state-owned plantation in return for requ-

*"Families who lead a nomadic life and who practice shifting agriculture, and those who live on mountains or have very limited land and are poor are also given priority" (World Bank ibid).
lar employment by the estate and a small plot for their own cultivation" (Indonesia Reports, 12 December 1984). Of course, PIR is there to benefit the people and therefore, PIR is compensation in itself for the land and crops lost.

In the Cimerak PIR project, the local population rejected the proposals because a) the status of the land involved was not clear (it was not certain whether the land really belonged to the government or to the local population), b) by planting the crops they always used to plant, the people were economically better off, c) the distribution of 2 has of land for all people in the age group of 18-45 years was considered to be a loss to those who had had more than 2 has before, d) some of the participants would have a status that did not much differ from a plantation worker, which made them raise serious objections against the project, and e) there had been no compensation paid for the plants which had been destroyed as an initial step in putting into effect the PIR project.

The conflict escalated here when on an area of 500 has of land, still belonging to the local population, traditional crops were destroyed and the planting of hybrid coconut trees (the crop determined by the government) was enforced. Hereupon, inhabitants of the village put forward their complaints to LBH. They told LBH that in late 1979, the district authorities had conducted an information programme on PIR and they had been told that participation would be optional, that they would be provided with credit to buy seeds. At that time, about one third of the 200 families agreed to join in the project. But in 1981 all the land was declared part of the project, because allegedly all the land was state owned. And the clearance began, without any compensation given, evicting people from their residential areas and destroying the crops. At the end of 1983, 30 people were arrested and 12 were held for 20 days, because they had protested about PIR's way of operating. Afterwards, seven more people were arrested, among other things they were accused of killing a plantation guard.
The people had certificates of property rights to the land. In order to fix the sum of taxes they had to pay, the Fiscal Directorate of the Ministry of Finance had carried out two surveys (in 1964 and 1974) and in 1978, the families were given a Petuk/C-Letter (land certificate).

Now, the certificates have partly been confiscated by the state attorney, allegedly because there had been cases of falsification. Afterwards, the Deputy Governor of West Java came to Ciamis to talk to the people and to persuade them to surrender their lands. Since then, PIR personnel have put in more poles to define the area where the hybrid coconut trees are to be planted, but these poles have been pulled out by the people (Human Rights Forum, 1, January 1985: 4-9).

The situation of loss of land is particularly difficult when the land is given to 'strangers'. "Without compensation or a sign of thanks to the native populace, there is no difference between locally recruited farmers and those who come as transmigrants. This in effect means that without any sacrifice the newcomers receive the same rights. The newcomers profit while the Irianese lose out because they no longer have sago and their land has been taken away" (Kabar dari Kampung, no. 3/4, 1985: 25-6). And, again, it must be said that the population is not allowed to protest against the methods used to acquire the land; in West Java they were arrested, in West Papua they will be accused of being OPM 'rebels' or worse.

B. The Employment Issue

Transmigration, it is claimed, opens up employment, and the local population can benefit from these new job opportunities as well as the immigrant population. This has proved to be yet another myth. In the first place, there is no place for local or 'native' people on the transmigration settlements, although labour is scarce, especially in the first few years. Inter-ethnic tensions and the closed character of the settle-
ments prevent such an input of native labour in the projects. In the realities of transmigrasi, it is more likely - as has been described before - that migrants cultivate only part of their plots and search outside jobs, thereby diminishing the jobs available to the locals.

From the point of view of the local population competition for jobs is not so much due to the general transmigrant flow as to the flow of spontaneous (trans-)migrants. This has been a known fact since the early days of transmigration. Wertenheim, for example, reported that "a Lampung shopkeeper complained to me that though the government sponsored official transmigration was acceptable to his people, as the movement was kept within bounds, it was spontaneous transmigration which spoiled everything. It was clear that the real cause of these frictions was competition over land" (1964: 193). The 1985 Gajah Mada Team made it clear that these frictions not only concerned competition for the land but also for the skilled and unskilled jobs. The team reported that there were no tensions between natives and regular transmigrants, since the latter were not 'aggressive', but the spontaneous (trans-)migrants occupied all positions in trade and small business and did have an aggressive attitude (Sinar Harapan, 19 February 1985). For instance, Sulawesi fishermen operated illegally in traditional fishing areas; Sulawesi lumbermen felled trees without authorisation etc. (Kabar dari Kampung, no. 3/4, 1985).

The problem here is that the concept of regional development through transmigration implies that non-indigenous labour is being used for the exploitation of the region's resources. This intention was, for example, mentioned in the Dutch parliamentary commission's report saying, "the development of an area requires people to open it up (...), the increase of export groups is possible with the work of industrious, disciplined transmigrants" (Verslag Missie Irian Jaya, 1985). The local or 'native' population is in no position to compete with the newcomers, not because they are 'backward' or 'uncivilised', but because they are discrimi-
nated against.

In the second place, there is not much new employment created in the process of the resettlement programme. Again, West Papua can serve as a good example. Robin Osborne describes that in accordance with its free enterprise beliefs, the New Order government sought the participation of private capital and since this was lacking in Indonesia, it looked to overseas sources, offering generous incentives, including tax concessions and the right to repatriate profits. "The whole strategy was formulated in the first of the country's Five-Year Development plans, Repelita I (....) The main revenue prospect lay in the exploitation of Indonesia's resources, its rich oilfields, mineral deposits, timber reserves, plantation crops and marine products. Irian Jaya had great potential in most of these areas" (1986: 118). In describing the operation procedures of the companies in West Papua, Osborne notes that "the timber industry has provided little employment in the processing area. Much of the timber exported leaves as raw logs. The processing camps that do exist are usually staffed by Indonesians from outside Irian". Also, foreign companies were licensed to fish the traditional waters and the local Papuans received no, or only slight, compensation. As in the timber industry, few jobs resulted for local people, despite undertakings to the contrary. "For example, Japanese companies engaged in tuna fishing agreed to train locals in that industry's techniques so that at a future time they could engage in business for themselves. No such training was given. The few Papuans in employment have been restricted to unskilled tasks. This parallels the situation in other resource areas, including the largest earner of all, the oil industry" (1986: 124-5).

Osborne said that this situation has surprised only a few observers, since it was forecasted several years ago by Ross Garnaut who predicted that "within a decade Irian Jaya is likely to be a very large net contributor to central government revenues. Yet only a very small proportion of the indigenous population will benefit directly from these developments (....) The new industries based on natural resources will generate much employment (....) but most of these opportunities will be utilised by immigrants from other parts of Indonesia" (Garnaut and Manning, 1974: 81, quoted in: Osborne, 1986: 125).
C. General Impact on the Local Peoples

The fact that the local population is deprived of their land and working opportunities is one thing, but transmigration/resettlement has many more consequences for autochthonous people.

_Kabar dari Kampung_ summarised the impact of transmigrasi on local people: "increased land alienation, covering up tens of thousands of hectares of customary tribal land; depletion of native food stocks, especially the sago swamps in the northern coastal lowlands and the grazing grounds for deer and kangaroo in the Merauke coastal plain; radical change of life style from hunters-gatherers, fishermen-farmers or horticulturalists to sedentary farmers due to resettlement into the sites as 'local transmigrants', as well as due to the narrowing of the indigenous 'Lebensraum'; unfair barter economy between transmigrants and indigenous villagers, such as rice or tobacco versus coconuts; increased influx of entrepreneurial newcomers from Sulawesi and Maluku, who usually enjoy up to 20% of the construction boom; the increase of social, economic and ethnic tensions and conflicts caused by the accelerated rate of transmigration usually steps up the amount of armed guards thus creating new problems" (No. 3/4, 1985).

In Merauke, for instance, the land that was taken from the Marind for transmigration purposes, separated the coastal area from their hunting-and-sago area. This meant that they could not reach a part of their means of support. Thus, according to the _West Papuan Observer_, the fishermen and hunters were forced to become farmers and to settle down in one place, a way of life totally unfamiliar to them. And when they do so and stay in one place, that means: 'there is not enough food' (July/August 1983).
Also, transmigration/resettlement has resulted in some cases in the further weakening of the position of women. This has been described in a World Bank report on "Women and Development". The report notes that the Uma Jalah Kenyah peoples of East Kalimantan had traditionally displayed more or less complete equality between men and women, but that modernisation introduced changes with a negative impact on women.

"While in their shifting cultivation, women had an important role, now the policy of sedentarisation is encouraging a change toward male decision-making and power. Agricultural inputs are distributed to the male; training in agriculture and related economic activities are given to males; whereas women previously used all the tools available to the Kenjah, only men use the newly introduced chain-saws and out-board motors. Female autonomy and importance in the economic affairs of the family are being eroded" (1985d:11).

Finally, there are the severe consequences of the environmental degradation, including the local elimination of species basic to the traditional economy and diet, as described by Colchester. "Many resettled communities have experienced a marked decline in nutritional standards. Ill-health has also been exacerbated by the introduction into previously isolated communities of non-indigenous diseases. In addition, some resettlement projects have moved people from relatively disease-free areas into malarial zones. Alarming rises in intestinal disorders due to the infestation of soils with parasitic eggs and larvae in the vicinity of the new settlement further contribute to the decline in health" (The Ecologist, May 1986b:94).

7. Social Envy and Political Commotion

Several Indonesian and international commissions and scientists have warned the Transmigration Department of the possible consequences of its transmigration programme. The Dutch parliamentary commission, after visits to locations in West Papua at the end of 1984, with the Repelita IV already on its way, wrote in their report that it had identified sources of social, economic and cultural tensions, which could easily develop into political problems.
"The process of modernisation has also created socioeconomic contradictions and cultural tensions between original inhabitants and newcomers causing unrest. This in itself is not politically engendered, but may find a political outlet. A too rapid and unprepared development can add to this unrest, if the necessary socioeconomic integration of autochthonous inhabitants and new settlers is not implemented at short notice. The need for this is increasingly recognised by the Indonesian government." (Verslag Missie Irian Jaya, 1985: 13).

The 1985-Gajah Mada Team pointed at the same danger. Its advice to the government was to be careful with the implementation of the programme and perhaps to slow down its pace "so that it didn't create jealousies on the part of the original inhabitants" (Sinar Harapan, 8 February 1985). Several months later, the Komisi IV (a DPR-komisi dealing with social and public welfare) reported that it had heard complaints from inhabitants in the vicinity of the Nimbokrang sites.

They had told the commission that they had the feeling they were driven out and the Komisi noted that "such feelings need to be eliminated because if they persist, things could develop further and could even be turned into a political issue by groups that disagree with the government's programme. Therefore it would be wise not to open new locations" (Kompas, 10 October 1985).

Again, the Dutch delegation to the IGGI March 1985 Seminar explained that "transmigration will only contribute to development if attention to the newcomers to be settled in the years to come is matched by concern for the indigenous population and the 'cultural shock' that is likely to occur. If the former category were to absorb the greater part of resources, the present low level of development might be replaced by another equally critical problem, i.e. disparity of development along ethnic lines. Such lack of integration would be most serious" (Van Raay, 1985a:3).

The similarities between these suggestions and proposals and the conclusions the 1977-Gajah Mada Team made almost ten years ago are striking. The team said that "any further land development needs to be linked with village interests, utilising both indigenous knowledge of local
conditions and their experimentation with various crops. Indigenous villages and migrant colonies would be given the same facilities, preferably shared facilities, thus avoiding the envy and suspicion that have developed between the two groups in many transmigration areas. In particular, participation of indigenous people is necessary at all stages of planning that will affect their living conditions. They are the original owners of the land, and their acceptance of land development schemes is on the basis of certain expectations of the advantages they will gain from such changes, like roads, markets, education and health facilities. It is important to recognise these expectations and work towards the integration of both indigenous and transmigrants' communities' interests in development" (Guinness et al., 1977:114).

The fact that there have been no changes of any significance in the period between the Team's study of Kalimantan and Sulawesi settlements and the Gajah Mada 1985's study of West Papua can only be explained if one considers the fourth and last goal of transmigrasi: the strengthening of what is called 'National Security'.

CHAPTER 4. TRANSMIGRASI AND NATIONAL SECURITY

1. A 'Shock and Horror' Aim

Mick Blowfield has written that "frequently the last point (strengthening the nation's security and defence) is mentioned shock and horror tones, and even the Executive Director of the Jakarta centre for Strategic and International Studies, Yusuf Wanandi, made the mistake of denying the truth of this aim. 'If the Transmigration area is located near the border between the two countries (Indonesia and PNG), the only reason is that this area is suitable for agriculture.' (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 16, 1984)" (Kabar dari Kampung, No. 3/4, 1985: 6).

Robin Osborne also quoted Wanandi. "When asked on ABC's 'Indian-Pacific' radio programme (21 July) to explain why so much transmigration was focused along the border, he replied: 'The World Bank, actually, advised us on this you know . . . the only arable land available for transmigration is on the border . . . It's just for practical reasons, it might create a misunderstanding in a way. . . .'" (ACPOA Briefing, May 1985: 6).

The 'shock and horror' tones were closely related at the time with the plans the Indonesian régime had developed for 'integrating' and 'securing' Indonesia's 26th province of Irian Jaya, West Papua. At the end of 1983, George Aditjondro had written several articles in Mutiara magazine, describing the impact of Jakarta's policy on the indigenous population. Tapol Bulletin translated parts of these articles. "Aditjondro says Merauke which was left in sleepy neglect during the first two five-year plans has sprung to life since 1980. It is now inundated with 'survey teams, consultants, Inpres*-project construction agents, journalists, doctors, and goodness knows who else. In just two weeks, Asmat Hotel has seen no fewer than seven teams come and go - a 'land team', a 'water team', a 'bird team', a 'topography team', a 'doctors team', a 'tifa-tifa (drums) team' and an 'Inpres-projects construction team.' Whilst the visiting outsiders revel in the attractive facilities provided for their comfort and enjoyment, the local Mayu, Mandobo and Kimaan farmers who eke out a living in poor kampungs on the

*Projects funded by special presidential instructions.
outskirts of the town, bemoan their worsening fate, unable to keep up with rising costs which affect the price of goods they need to purchase, the cost of education for their children and so on" (Tapol Bulletin, January 1984: 2).

Peter Schumacher, a Dutch journalist, has reflected on the Mutiara-articles, writing, "Such articles, critical of government policy, seldom appear in the Indonesian press. Sinar Harapan, the daily associated with Mutiara, has occasionally published news about tensions between the Papua population and the authori-
ties in Jakarta" (NRC Handelsblad, 31 March 1984).

Reports on public executions, mass arrests and also on the murder of Arnold Ap, reached the outside world exactly at the time Jakarta announced that millions of Javanese transmigrant families were to be resettled in West Papua during Repelita IV.

According to a report of the Irian Jaya Directorate for Transmigration to the Minister for Transmigration and Manpower in October 1982, the number of families to be transported from Java to West Papua during Repelita III would exceed 200,000 (203,250 to be exact), a total of roughly one million people (Tapol Bulletin, March 1984: 4). One of the "largest set-
tlement block areas is in the Merauke district of sou-
thern Irian Jaya", Gerard Docetay wrote, "It's from Merauke that the infringing border road sets out. Maps of the eventual transmigration settlements alle-
gedly indicate that more than 3.5 million people could be resettled in the Merauke district - the in-
digenous population of which is though to be about 60,000" (Islands Business, July 1983: 20).

Observers have connected the transmigration plans for West Papua to the national security aim. Many sites appeared to be located near the border between West Papua and PNG and according to the plans (ex-) military personnel would also settle in these locations, apparently with the intention of sealing the region of Jayapura where the OPM was known to be particularly strong. Palm-oil nucleus estates were to be es-
tablished near the Arso river, replacing forest areas and sago stands, "thus making the local population dependent for the first time on outside food supplies and depriving guerilla fighters of the source of sustenance" (Tapol Bulletin, March 1984: 4).
The various transmigration settlements along the border would be interlinked with a 'Trans-Irian Highway'. Gerard Joceray quotes Chris Pash of the Australian Associated Press, as forecasting that the Papuan population would be dispossessed through transmigrasi and that there would be nowhere else for them to go other than across the border to PNG. Pash said "the border road didn't serve the transmigration settlement blocks. They were back on the other side of the Merauke river. Therefore the road's purpose was strategic and military. It would protect the settlement blocks further west from the 'inevitable' hostilities of the dispossessed Melanesians. And it could be the launching pad for forays into PNG" (Islands Business, July 1983: 20).

Peter Hastings, another journalist, wrote that "the so-called Trans-Irian Highway, if ever it is completed, will link southern and northern Irian Jaya parallel with the border. It has already cost a bomb and will cost millions of dollars to complete. One of its problems in the south, for example, is that it is made entirely of compacted earth in a region without stones. One of its functions is to link established and proposed transmigration camps in the border region. So far about 70,000 transmigrants, mainly poor, landless Javanese peasants, have been shipped and airlifted to transmigration camps in Irian Jaya (...) The Irianese view the land as theirs and the Javanese as foreigners. An undoubted Indonesian policy aim is to create a road-linked network of Javanese villages along the border which would make it very difficult for the OPM to operate" (Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Transmigration and infrastructure plans for West Papua were associated with expansionist tendencies of the New Order regime. Indonesia's small neighbour PNG and also Australia were not very pleased with the Javanese transmigration and military presence at the border, its doorstep. Head of the Transmigration Office in Jayapura, Budoyo, tried to reassure Australia asserting that no Javanese or Balinese settlements were planned near the border in 1984/85, "but they might be built later in border areas with good soil or along the Trans-Irian Highway"
He also told Australia's Deputy Ambassador and Assistant Defence Attaché that "while there are ex-ABRI transmigration sites in Sumatra, there are not yet such plans for Irian Jaya" (Indonesia Reports, 18 October 1984).

2. Transmigration's Role in National Security

In March 1985, Army Chief General Murdani declared officially that the transmigration programme was very important in raising national resilience. The site selection and site/land preparation had yet to be perfected and "because location (site selection) involved territorial management, it was important that ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and the area governments get involved as early as possible in deciding on sites of transmigration agricultural fields".

Murdani asserted that ABRI had an obligation to support the implementation of transmigration and to participate actively in the programme (Kompas, 8 March 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports, 8 March 1985).

In fact, Murdani has been reported making similar remarks on other occasions. Indonesia Times has quoted Murdani saying that "Transmigration, which structurally is part of the economic development sector, has a close link with national defence and security interests".

He also has said that "on the whole, the movement of people in the framework of the transmigration programme has helped to disseminate knowledge and understanding of state ideology, political attitudes and cultural values to the relatively 'naive' local residents" (23 May 1984).

The transmigration programme had been used before to spread Japanese influence and control over the islands. Wertheim has noted that many ex-guerilla fighters from the War of Independence against Holland participated in transmigrasi in the 1950s. These "dynamic and sophisticated ex-guerilla fighters were envisaged as the prototypes of the new Indonesian, who would ferment the life in the new settlement, bridge the cleavage and bring the two population groups (local and newcomers) together" (1964: 199-200). Sometimes, it was also used as a method to re-integrate these
soldiers into the new society. Wertheim often heard complaints from these ex-soldiers; for example, they were not told that they were expected to become agriculturalists. "They had to give up their arms in Java, as they were told they would receive new arms at their destination, whither they were being sent on a new, honourable mission. As the boxes of new arms, when unloaded at their arrival in Southern Sumatra, proved to contain agricultural implements, it is not surprising that the boxes, implements and all, were flung in fury into the river" (1964: 190).

Afterwards, under the New Order regime, military transmigrants received more support than civilian transmigrants.

"The army veteran transmigrant families had each been assigned 2.5 has. and although they were unable to farm all of the area, the good harvests they obtained from the land provided them with the means to extend their cultivation by employing labourers from among the new settlers" (Guinness et al, 1977: 103).

They also received financial assistance in addition to the plots of land with which they were provided. The notion of ex-guerrilla fighters as being the prototypes of the New Indonesian was later extended to all Javanese transmigrants - Java being the ideal for New Indonesia.

In reality, the Jawanisasi or Javanisation (sometimes called Indonesianisation) of the non-Javanese populations did not really succeed with the large-scale resettlement programme. Therefore, many other measures were taken in addition to the migration process. These measures helped the regime to bring out-lying areas under control. Vast distances and often unknown territories make 'administrative' control difficult. Roads, such as the Trans-Irian Highway, served other - security - purposes as well as developmental aims. Roads and other infrastructural works were allegedly undertaken to assist settlement. Many transmigrant settlements suffered from lack of communications and the roads that existed were in very bad shape, making trespassing impossible for many months per year. Highways, such as the Trans-Sumatra Highway, a 2,700 km road connecting the south of Sumatra with Banda Aceh, made 'territorial manage-
ment' and control much easier for the Armed Forces. The same purpose is now being served by extensive site surveying and air radar mapping techniques, funded by the World Bank, and used for gaining detailed knowledge of previously unknown areas in West Papua, East Timor, and also the vast forest areas of Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Later, military personnel is regularly flown in on the same planes which bring the transmigrants to their destinations. The 'transmigration' programme is not exclusively the resettlement of population from 'overpopulated' to 'underpopulated' parts of Indonesia, but also local resettlement of populations believed to be less loyal to the Jakarta regime and more difficult to bring under strict government/Armed Forces control.

The people from Sarmi, Waren and Pakfak in West Papua were a few years ago driven from their lands and brought together in areas with insufficient land for their survival. Their deserted lands were destined to become transmigration areas (Tapol, 1984: 111, 114). The Secretary General of the Social Affairs Department once linked the resettlement of local groups to the government's intentions of "deploying the people as 'security belts' supporting social defence in Indonesia's border territories" (Jakarta Post, 21 September 1985, quoted in The Ecologist, May 1986:117).

Carmel Budiardjo describes these activities in the context of the transmigration programme as "carpeting the entire province of West Papua and other 'underpopulated' regions with Javanese transmigration sites, local transmigration sites and community development centres", making it clearly far easier for the Armed Forces to practice 'territorial management' through its network of military command posts (The Ecologist, May 1986:113).

The military interests in this endeavour often coincides with the interests of big business; the 'border area' between Kalimantan and Sarawak serves as an example. The local Dayaks have had to move out of this area, where they had lived for centuries. They were not considered to be reliable and therefore, they had to make room for Javanese migrants, who produced
food for the labourers in the logging industry and who them- selves formed a reserve labour force for local companies.

David Jenkins reports that Javanese transmigrants were moved into the border region of West Kalimantan, as a result of which local Dayaks were required to move from their traditional habitats. The Javanese head of the local Transmigration Office explained, once again, that transmigrasi would be beneficial to the Dayaks because they would be able 'to learn from the Javanese'. The land that was being used for the resettlement of the Javanese was said to be not used by the Dayaks. But the authorities' justification for the seizure of the land was that longhouses had to be destroyed because they were cradles of 'communism'. Also, housing so many people under one roof would encourage promiscuity, low morals and sex orgies (Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 June 1978; Tapol Bulletin, March 1980; The Ecologist, May 1986).

Robin Osborne came to the conclusion that "it is now clear that in Irian Jaya the prime aim of the programme is to quell local separatist feelings by sheer force of numbers" (The Guardian, 13 April 1984).

But the aim of replacing indigenous populations by more loyal Javanese migrants might have an adverse effect. In West Papua, the resettlement of Javanese/Balinese transmigrant families has created the problem of refugees. Papuans left their country in large numbers in 1984 as a direct consequence of the land deprivation methods and military repression acts. This refugee problem attracted world wide attention, but in fact, the problem of 'internal refugees' had existed there for a long time: Papuans wandering through woods and mountain areas after having been driven from their living areas. An example are Papuans from Wanima and Memberano, who fled their home villages in 1977 after Indonesian troops destroyed their food gardens and killed those who had not fled or had been detected by Indonesian helicopters. Some of these 'internal refugees', hiding in the bush, arrived in a very bad physical condition at the Bewane station in PNG in October 1985 (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 Octo-
ber 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Later, it was acknowledged that "if the refugees were to stay where they are, they would undoubtedly become a focus of activities against the Indonesian military and transmigrants" (Times of PNG, 21 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia reports).

3. ABRI Enters the Transmigration Programme

Because of the resistance towards Javanese resettlement on the part of the local populations, not only in West Papua but in all transmigrant receiving areas, it became necessary for the Indonesian government to send military troops to accompany the Javanese settlers to their destination areas. Martono had already admitted this at the beginning of the Fourth Repelita, saying that "security personnel accompany transmigrants to their destination area" (1984: 43) and this was, recently, confirmed by Suharto himself who emphasized "the need for cooperation between the Transmigration Ministry and the Armed Forces in transporting migrants to their new homes". Suharto referred to the possibility of using river vessels owned by the Armed Forces to transport the migrants (Jakarta Post, 4 July 1986). Also, Army Hercules transport planes are known to bring transmigrants to Kalimantan and other islands (Jakarta Post, 5 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Robin Osborne explains this co-operation between Martono's Department and the Armed Forces on the ground that local opposition makes such a step unavoidable. "Not surprisingly, most transmigrants report that they are happy with their new situation. But they are less pleased by the necessity to exist in a siege environment on a hostile frontier. The army is ever present and access roads through the jungle are subject to strict security. After dark the surrounding bush looms with menace. Most of Irian Jaya's 40 transmigration sites have experienced attacks or suspected infiltrations by OPM guerrillas since the scheme began in the mid-1960's. As a result, relations between transmigrants and the 'hostile natives' tend to be strained. This even applies to the few Papuans who have been
Murdani opens officially the ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi programme in Mamuju, South Sulawesi. In the picture Murdani is accompanied by General Rudini, Prof. Achmad Amiruddin, General Nara Narundana and others in the site Desa Tomo III (Kompas, 6th January 1986).
offered places in the new locations" (The National Times, 16-22 March 1985).

The military are present at practically every stage in the resettlement process. They have participated in the land/site preparation stage from October 1983, when it was decided that "because the peace-time work of the Armed Forces could contribute to the National Development (...) they were to be entrusted with the task of project managers".

In the past, military officers were already employed in handling transmigration projects (Indonesia Reports, 7 October 1983). Martono also invited ABRI to help fight ... rats attacking the crops in Koya Timur (Angkatan Bersenjata, 26 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). 'Healthy' ABRI retirees were invited by Suharto to take part in the NES/PIR projects (Suara Karya, 15 April 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). With Repelita IV two years in running and the (inter-)national critique still increasing, Martono announced that it was decided to give top priority to moving people, including ABRI families, towards 'trouble spots' (daerah rawan) and/or border areas (daerah perbatasan), regularly 'un(der)populated'. He mentioned islands off the coast from Sumatra and also East Timor, West Kalimantan and West Papua. He mistakenly referred to ABRI-sites as 'saptamarga' model sites in preparation, but in fact the 'saptamarga' model, consisting of the resettlement of (ex-)ABRI personnel with their families, had been going on for a long time, for example in Muku-Muko (Bengkulu) and Sintang (West Kalimantan) (Kompas, 6 September 1985).

Osborne refers to the "strong presence of Indonesian military families, many of them retired personnel, amongst transmigrants in the border areas (in West Papua). Reports from Jakarta have spoken of army families being the 'foundation' of many new settlements. Said OPM's northern area commander James Nyaro: 'Don't think of these settlers as ordinary civilians. They are trained military personnel disguised as civilian settlers' (Pacific Island Monthly July 1984)" (ACFOA Briefing, May 1985: 6).
According to Tapol, the ABRI Masuk Desa, (ABRI Enters the Villages) campaign began in 1980. The programme has in 1986 become a regular feature for troops to go into the villages several times a year to perform special duties, such as road and bridge building or village improvement, such as erecting village halls, civil defence posts and public lavatories. Officers can also join in the programme for so-called 'non-physical' activities, giving lectures on citizenship, fighting in defence of the state, the meaning of social welfare and the importance of national security and order. Osborne's mentioning of Jakarta's idea that army families are the 'foundation' of many transmigrant settlements, is further explored by Tapol, writing that "a number of statements by military leaders have made it clear that the programme is aimed at providing the newer generation of soldiers with justification for their claim to being the country's elite, the pre-destined leaders of the nation. The earlier generation of troops rested their claims to elite status as the '1945 generation' who fought for independence. General Suharto and General Moh. Yusuf (originator of the AMD programme) wanted to make sure that the missionary zeal and vanguard role of the Armed Forces would be sustained as a new generation of soldiers with no claim to the '1945 spirit' took over" (Tapol Bulletin, March 1986: 17).

Army Chief of Staff, General Rudini, reported that AMD programmes had already covered 3,000 villages, spread over 27 provinces. Total personnel involved were 1,117 units or 167,550 persons. In the beginning of March 1985, coinciding with the IGGI Transmigration Seminar, General Murdani announced that the ABRI Masuk Desa programme would be extended "because of its positive impact on preserving ABRI's motivation as fighters and on national development" (Sinar Harapan, 14 March 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

This was only a sign of a much bigger operation that was on its way to 'enter' the transmigration villages.
Murdani talks with General Rudini and other officials at the opening ceremony of ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi (Merdeka, 7th January, 1986).
4. ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi

The clash between the hungry transmigrants and angry locals in Taopa Lambunu in Donggala district, Central Sulawesi (see Chapter 2 in this Part) called the military to action.

Jakarta Post reported that "only after the Maspida from the kabupaten of Donggala and Central Sulawesi and security officers arrived from Palu - after having travelled more than 300 kms - was the situation under control" (20 July 1985).

This 'incident' was used as a pretext for the introduction of a new programme, ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi, or ABRI Unites with Transmigration.

On 28 October 1985, Suharto decided that ABRI personnel were to enter transmigration villages. In consequence of the ABRI Masuk Desa projects, the military were invited to perform all sorts of activities. The first site to be entered was, not surprisingly, the Tapao Lambunu site. Sinar Harapan covered the ceremony at the site which was attended by the main characters in the play: General Murdani, Army Chief of Staff Rudini; KODAM VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi) Commander, Major General Nana Narundana and Military Sub-Area 132/Tadulako (Donggala) Commander, Colonel Z. B. Paluguna. According to Paluguna, the transmigrants in the settlement had to be "vigilant that transmigration did not just result in the spreading of poverty to the regions".

Blaming the transmigrants for the failure of the project, the military were entering to build 30 km of road, four bridges and a mosque. They were to stay in the settlement for the duration of two months (31 October 1985).

Kompas quoted K. Chaeruddin, head of Central Sulawesi's Transmigration Office saying that ABRI's role at the Taopa-Lambunu transmigration site was not just to build connecting roads and bridges but to "create closer relations among ABRI, the transmigrants and local residents" (1 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

When the second ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi project started in Mamuju District, South Sulawesi, General Murdani explained that
"the success or failure of a transmigration site is mostly decided by the government preparing the fields and other infrastructure. That is why ABRI was now being used for field preparation. These guidelines", Murdani added, "came from President Suharto himself" (6 January 1986, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Tapol noted that "there is no doubt that AMD and Manunggal projects have caused considerable disquiet in the business sector because the kind of work undertaken is normally given out to contractors. General Rudini has responded to the criticism by asserting that ABRI projects are located in remote areas not suitable or attractive to private contractors. Such claims," Tapol continues, "must soundparticularly hollow today when budget retrenchments seriously threatens the business projects of some 13,000 contractor firms in Indonesia who depend almost entirely on government contracts. With so many industries sacking their workers and unemployment increasing in the countryside, these ABRI projects are also robbing the unemployed of job opportunities. At the same time, when troops descend on a village, the villagers have no alternative but to join in the work as 'gotong-royong' (mutual aid) support brigades ... without pay, of course" (Tapol Bulletin, March 1986: 17).

The growing influence of the Armed Forces in the transmigration programme also threatens the position of Minister Martono, himself a civilian. The developments are reflected in the new appointments at the top of the Transmigration Department. From the first group of officials appointed at the highest echelons in 1983, when the Department was formed, only Brigadier General (ret.) Bambang Soemantri, Inspector General, is left. Apparently, Martono was kept at some distance from the spot where the decisions regarding 'promotions' were taken. Asked whether changes of personnel were to be expected at the echelon I level, Martono had answered: "That, even I don't know" (Sinar Harapan, 21 January 1985). Some time later, both directors general in the department were replaced. M. Maat Judolaksono replaced H. Ayib Rughby on the post of Transmigration Guidance and Mobilisation, and Hartono Padmowirjono became director general of Transmigration Settlement Preparation instead of Soentoro Sastrosuwarno (Sinar Harapan, 22 April 1985).
Minister Martono (r) is signing the assignment papers for Secretary General Santosa (m) who takes over from Widarto (l) (Sinar Harapan, 31 July, 1985).
Later, Major General Chalim Imam Santosa took the post of Secretary General of the Transmigration Department over from Brigadier General (ret.) Widarto (Sinar Harapan, 31 July 1985). In 1982, Santosa was Karyawan Assistant of ABRI, in charge of military appointments in social and political affairs, and in 1983 he became head of ABRI's Karyawan Guidance Body which maintains control over all military men assigned to 'non-military posts' (Tapol Bulletin, September 1985). Indonesia Reports commented that Santosa ran all counter-insurgency operations against the OPM and that his latest appointment afforded him ultimate knowledge of where military officers were assigned to civilian positions in the government, thereby likely facilitating somewhat more efficient interdepartmental cooperation and coordination in the transmigration effort (quoted in: Tapol Bulletin, September 1985).

Santosa's position as Secretary General is crucial in the Transmigration Department and has recently grown in influence as the Secretary General was appointed as the one to intermediate between the Indonesian government and the World Bank concerning all Bank-supported projects (World Bank, 1985c:7,27).

Major General Sembiring Meliala, previously Brigadier General and Commander of the Cenderawasih/XVII Regional Military Command in West Papua, joined the General Staff of ABRI, being appointed Inspector-General for Territorial People's Resistance.

Finally, Major General Nana Narundana was appointed late in 1985 military commander of Sulawesi. He is the one who was put in charge of the ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi programme. Carmel Budiardjo commented that Narundana "was a classmate of Sembiring's at the National Military Academy and produced a document several years ago during his tour of duty in Aceh on 'territorial management in support of regional development'. Narundana is widely acknowledged to have directed the Army's pacification efforts against a movement in Aceh proclaiming the right to Acehnese independence. The Santosa-Sembiring-Narundana appointments point to a
move at the highest level of the Army to use experienced practitioners of 'territorial management' to consolidate control over those who live in the 'territories of the periphery'" (The Ecologist, May 1986: 114).

5. Transmigrasi and Territorial Management

Budiardjo also referred to the National Security aim of transmigration as this is the one officially-proclaimed objective that is never discussed. "The reason for this blindspot is not hard to find: The strategic designs of the regime are matters for military leaders alone to publicise and explain in as far as it is in their interest to do so. Yet it is the objective above all which explains why the programme is not likely to be abandoned, however damaging it may be. Transmigration is integral to the goal of nation-building, which involves not only the assimilation of all ethnic groups into a single Indonesian identity but the imposition of Java's hegemony over the entire archipelago" (The Ecologist, May 1986: 111).

In explaining how "a programme ostensibly designed for the attainment of economic and social objectives is also required to promote national defence", Budiardjo states that, "'defence' policy in Indonesia has little to do with defending the state against foreign invaders. It is fundamentally a policy designed to ensure that the local population supports whatever national or local programmes the Army has decided to pursue 'in the name of the people'" (ibid: 112).

She further writes that "the Army defines the regional task of its vast network of territorial units as 'territorial management' (pembinaan teritorial). This is inseparably linked with 'area (i.e. territorial) management' (pembinaan wilayah), which is the responsibility of the civil administration where many posts are also held by active or retired military officers (ibid.: 112).

In the words of Sembiring Meliala, the main objective of this territorial management, is to manage the potentials of the area including the geographical and demographic factors and the ideological-political-social-cultural-military conditions, in order to create regional strength as the invincible area, instrument, and condition of struggle for implementing the defence-security task by means of the security approach.
East Kalimantan has a high rate of urbanisation (over 50% of the population lives in cities. Unsuccessful transmigration is one of the reasons. Here a Javanese family sell Tempe in Samarinda. (Photo: Thelka Kolbeck.)
This means, for instance in the case of West Papua, that the government must first prepare the local population for use of the physical infrastructure, before it can set about constructing this infrastructure. This process of preparation involves, according to Budiardjo, primarily the colonisation of the territory by transmigrants from Java and the relocation of the native inhabitants into a network of 'centres for community development' (ibid.: 112).

According to Budiardjo, Meliala does not believe that the Papuans should be allowed to mingle with the Javanese transmigrants. Rather, in contrast with official transmigration guidelines, Meliala advocates a two-pronged resettlement policy for West Papua. "In areas where local inhabitants have been robbed of their ancestral lands and are therefore 'compensated' by becoming part of the APPDT resettlement quota, they should not be allowed to live on the sites for newcomers but should be settled in sites of their own nearby or left in their own villages, which would then be treated as 'local transmigration sites' " (ibid.: 113).

In more remote and inaccessible areas, the population is relocated into community development centres, where they will be more easily accessible to administrative control. Finally, Budiardjo refers to the appointments at the top of the Transmigration's Department. Will new sites preparation become largely the responsibility of the Armed Forces, not the Transmigration Department, she wonders, since Martono had talked about halting the establishment of new sites (Kompas, 27 January, 1986) within days of Murdani's demonstrative participation in site clearance (Kompas, 6 January 1986). "It is hardly likely to be a coincidence", she adds, "that at a time when the Armed Forces have begun to be directly involved in site location decisions, the World Bank's fifth loan to the programme should be concentrated almost entirely on aerial mapping and the location of new sites" (ibid.: 116).

6. East Timor: War is Development

After the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975, the
Timorese population has been subjected to several policies, which have had catastrophic consequences. On top of the brutal war, the Timorese peoples are further threatened by local resettlement, transmigration and birth control programmes, implemented in Indonesia's so-called '27th province' with particular strength and emphasis.

In a statement to the Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations, Liem Soei Liong noted that while the '27th province' has a high-profile governor (Mario Carrascalao), "it is in effect run by a bureaucracy composed of senior civil servants brought in from outside". The normal provincial structure down to village level is almost non-existent, as local administration and other social activities such as education, the information service, the offices of religion, and so on, are run largely by the army. At the provincial level, most economic and social programmes, in particular, the development activities now being undertaken to 'upgrade' East Timor's economy, are in the hands of a bureaucracy controlled vertically by government departments in Jakarta (New York, 15 August 1986: 5).

The military intervention, annexation of East Timor and the brutal war against Fretilin* were 'explained' by Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja on the basis of strategic considerations regarding East Timor. Liem quoted Kusumaatmadja saying: "The idea of a leftist enclave at the eastern tip of the Nusa Tenggara archipelago which Jakarta was certain Fretilin would establish, called for intervention. On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian Army landed at Dili. The guerilla war that followed involved 30,000 soldiers. Thousands of lives were lost on both sides" (Indonesian Observer, 17 July 1986, quoted in: Liem, 15 August 1986: 1).

The consequences of a decade of Indonesian colonisation of East Timor have been severe. In the cities of Dili and Bacau where most of the 50,000 Indonesians now in East Timor are to

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*Fretelin = Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, or Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.
be found, Liem noted, a drastic transformation is taking place. They are becoming Javanese towns, inhabited primarily by Indonesian military personnel and bureaucrats, together with their families (ibid: 15 August 1986: 2). Bahasa Indonesia has been made compulsory in schools and offices, while native languages like Tetum, Mambai or Tokodede are being marginalised and eliminated (ibid: 15 August 1986: 7). Timorese farming traditions are consistently disparaged as being backward and in need of 'improvement' by the adoption of Javanese farming methods (ibid: 15 August 1986: 7).

The resettlement programme has contributed highly to the artificial creation of the situation of hunger. The Timorese have been driven from their lands and were resettled in what they consider to be concentration camps. Donald Weatherbee, an American professor who visited East Timor in 1980 and has subsequently published reports wholly favourable to Indonesian annexation, nevertheless warned of the consequences of land shortages for the population: "Flying over East Timor by helicopter, one is impressed by the thousands of acres of fields - for corn, dry rice, wet rice, and pasture - now going back to waste: land whose utilisation was absolutely essential to support the population at a minimal subsistence level of existence" (Tapol Bulletin, July 1983: 14).

From a report in Kompas saying that Endeh, Sikka, Flores Timur and Alor districts in Nusa Tenggara Timur are threatened by a food shortage equivalent to 30,000 - 50,000 tons of rice, (7 June 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports) one could conclude that even the populations of the islands closest to East Timor are kept below subsistence food level.

It is obvious that keeping the East Timorese alive is not one of the main priorities within the Suharto administration. While an estimated 200,000 people of a population size of 650,000 in 1975 have died during the war with Indonesia, Jakarta has introduced a birth control programme in the 'province'. BKKBN* head Suyono denied charges that the Jakarta government

*BKKBN = Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, or National Family Planning Coordinating Body.
had compelled the population to participate in birth control.

"Demographically," he said, "family planning is not urgent for East Timor".

But at the same time, he announced that 6,165 of the 78,000 fertile couples in East Timor had already become 'acceptors', which he called 'a low rate', and that the target for East Timor is 15% of fertile couples by 1989 (Indonesia Reports, 18 January 1985). To give an idea of the priorities set by the Indonesian government, Jan Muter in his statement to the UN Committee of Decolonisation compared the birth control programme with the attention given to health care: "At this moment there are no less than 250 centres for birth control, which amounts to one centre for 325 fertile couples; using the official Indonesian figures for the number of fertile couples. The highest figure ever given for 'health centres' is 129, and that usually means poor hovels, as often as not abandoned by the medical staff, because Javanese doctors prefer to stay in Dili rather than lead a 'country life'. Moreover, available medical facilities are scarce and extensively used for wounded Indonesian soldiers. From the foregoing facts no other conclusion can be drawn than that an almost all-including ethnocide is being systematically perpetrated according to plan" (New York, 15 August 1986: 6).

His conclusions were confirmed by Carrascalao, who used the 'population' motive or myth, in spite of Suyono's remark that birth control in East Timor is not urgent in a demographical sense, to justify 'family planning'. "Various problems have their origin in the population problem in East Timor such as the imbalance of the number of children and the schools available, the supply of labour and jobs available, the unsuitability of housing and the inadequate number of hospitals compared to the needs of the population. The economic and social conditions of the vast majority of the people of East Timor are a cause of great concern", Governor Carrascalao said, "and therefore the regional government must actively give people directions and guidance for them to live a better life. Development activities have resulted in various improvements in the standard of living, but much more is needed in keeping with the aspirations of the people whose quality should be improved rather than their (the people's) number" (Berita Tanpa Sensor, 26 April 1985, translated by Tapol).
As has been described before in this document, the size of the (autochthonous) population is said to be an obstacle to 'development'. Instead of providing sufficient schools, health clinics, employment, proper housing facilities etc, the government introduces and intensifies its birth control programme, thereby diminishing the Timorese population, while at the same time, Javanese and Balinese transmigrant families are flown in from outside!

Transmigration and Resettlement in East Timor

In September/October 1976, the policy of herding population groups into 'guarded camps' started. Hundreds of thousands of Timorese were forced to leave the mountain dwellings and were resettled in what were called 'daerah pemukiman', or resettlement areas. The methods used in this campaign were similar to the American policy of the 'strategic villages' in Vietnam; the population refer to these 'daerah pemukiman' as "concentration camps". Because of land shortage and extreme limitations on freedom of movement, the population in these camps suffer from food shortages, undernourishment and outright hunger.*

Aswiswarmo, the Secretary General of the Department of the Interior, described the campaign as a gigantic project ('pro-yek raksasa') aimed at the reinforcement of stability and security and to facilitate all aspects of development activity (Topik, 18 July 1984, quoted in: Tapol Bulletin, September 1984). Later, the programme of 'guided villages as basis for resistance' (desa binaan pangkal perlawanan) was explained as a method "to encourage greatly people's participation in the Universal People's Defence and Security System (Hankamrata)."**

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**The Hankamrata strategy aims at the mobilisation of villagers to fight against anyone who opposes the government or resists Indonesian rule.
According to this DPR-member, there was no war situation in East Timor, only "operations to restore security to protect the smoothness of development". The only problem signalled was that "there was a need to speed up the uniting of members of ABRI with their families. This required additional housing. Living standards were low" (Surabaya Post/Angkatan Bersenjata, 11 September 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Myths and realities: if what goes on in East Timor is not war, but should be termed 'development', this sheds further light on what goes on behind the scenes of "transmigrasi" and 'resettlement'. Once again, the 'development' aim is used to cover up the real intentions of the Suharto regime. The whole range of myths and justifications, described in this document, is used in East Timor to legitimise the colonisation of the Timorese population. According to officials in the province, the resettlement programmes are intended to make population control more easy, to provide food, medical aid, education and other amenities: "It is the new Indonesian civilization we are bringing, and it is not easy to civilise the backwards peoples" (IWGIA Document No. 50, 1984).

The first transmigrants were resettled in two model villages (desa teladan), Tunubibi in Bobonaro district, and Beco, Kovalima district, in 1982. It is very difficult to discover how many transmigrant families have been sent since that year. Some 6,000 transmigrants were reported to be resettled by December 1984. According to Kieran Cooke, the government planned to send another 6,000 families (about 30,000 persons) during Repelita IV (Times of PNG, 1 September 1985, reprinted from: Financial Times, 15 August 1985). The official announcement that East Timor had become a transmigrant receiving area was given two years after the beginning of the programme in August 1984. The statement said that the decision was based on the consideration that the transmigrants, comprising model farmers, would serve as a workforce promoting the development of the province. The myth of the Balinese model farmer (petani teladan) was introduced by former Transmigration Minister, Harun Zain, who made a brief speech at the departure ceremony of the first
group of 214 Balinese. The "Bali migrants (had) shown their skill and experience and were known for their success at their new settlements in the outer regions (...). For this reason (...) the government specially had selected the model Balinese migrants to start a new life in East Timor aiming at bringing progress to the area. The Balinese migrants apart from being successful in development and improving their living standards were also making progress in giving education to their children including those who had become ranking military officers" (Indonesian Observer, 10 December 1982).

The myth of the Balinese model farmer was shattered by reality in 1985, when young Balinese transmigrants told journalists that they were not farmers at all, but senior high school graduates who thought they would get jobs as business men or civil servants in East Timor. This group of 'model farmers' was complaining to governor Carrascalao that the agricultural inputs they were receiving were of poor quality and that their corn and rice plants had all died. Furthermore, they were engaged in a conflict with a contractor over the construction of a primary school (Sinar Harapan/Suara Karya, 28 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Apparently, these transmigrants share similar problems with transmigrants in other settlement areas. Later, Minister Martono conceded that if it were true that the Balinese transmigrants in East Timor were not model farmers, then they had been mistakenly selected (Sinar Harapan, 5 September 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

The 'development' process in East Timor is producing two quite distinct types of new settlements. Tapol commented that "there are the settlements where the vast majority of the population live, under tight control of the military and constantly restricted in their movements. These villagers have been completely side-tracked by Indonesian-style development. But there are also a small number of settlements being set up in conjunction with new irrigated-rice projects and plantation sites which are getting a great deal of attention and capital investment from local and central government. These are known as 'desa potensial' or 'villages of potential'" (Tapol Bulletin, November 1985: 11).
In these 'desa potensials', such as Tunubibi and Beco, which are promoted by Ir. Hadiono, the head of the East Timor office of the Department of Agriculture in Jakarta, "Javanese with ambitious plans for a colonial-style development of East Timor as a plantation economy", and transmigrants from Java and Bali are resettled as well as so-called 'translocals', i.e. Timorese from other parts of the islands (Liem, New York, 15 August 1986: 5-6).

Liem added that military strategists are interested in molding a very different type of village, suited specifically to the requirements of territorial management. These are the 'desa pembangunan' or 'development villages' which will function as 'titik-titik kuat perlawanan rakyat' or 'fortresses of people's resistance', conform the Hankamrata strategy. In implementation of the strategy of 'development villages', all district military commanders are ordered down to village level to set up 'model gardens' to 'teach' the Timorese how to cultivate the soil. So far, 500 military-run 'model gardens' have already been created 'to help improve the living conditions of the people' (New York, 15 August 1986: 6). As an example, Liem pointed at Lospalos, the capital of Lautem district, and simultaneously an important area of Indonesian military and economic activity (see Map 5).

Map 5 of Lospalos is part of an Indonesian military map Fretilin guerillas captured on 20 December 1985 during an ambush in Hirino Alapupulo. The map was issued by the Jawatan Topografi TNI-AD (Topographical Department of the Indonesian Army). Army Headquarters in Jakarta issued the map on 29 October 1984 for use by the commander of the Udayana Regional Military Command based in Bali, under which the East Timor Sub-Regional Military Command falls. It shows Lospalos and its environs, where battalions 327, 312 and 417 are stationed, as well as a marine unit and a unit of the notorious para-commando troops, the red-berets known to the Timorese as 'nanggala' troops ('knife-carrying killers'). Battalion 745
LOS PALOS

Section of a military map sent abroad by Fretilin. The original is an Indonesian map captured on 20 December 1985 at Hizino Alapupulo. The details were added by Fretilin. [The map was received in Lisbon in late June 1986.]

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**LEGEND**

- **A** | Sugar plantation run by District Military Command (Kadim).
- **B** | Vegetable garden run by Txai Para military post.
- ▲ | Fretilin actions against inner Los Palos.
- ▲ | Fretilin actions against camps.
- ⚺ | Artillery positions.
- ▼ | Tank positions.

- △ | Battalion positions.
- ▲ | Army posts, company strength.
- △ | Army posts, platoon strength.
- ⬤ | Camps, numbered 1 to 12.
- ⬤ | Agricultural sites surrounding concentration camps.
- ⬤ | Inner part of Los Palos.
is stationed in the centre of the town of Lospalos. There are altogether eight concentration camps in the area, inhabited by Timorese from various parts of the island. In addition to restricted agricultural sites around the camps for use by the camp inhabitants, the Lospalos military command runs a sugar plantation while the army post at Txai Para runs a vegetable garden on land unlawfully confiscated from an East Timorese Chinese vegetable grower. An eight-metre wide, asphalted road, 50 kilometres long, has recently been built by army engineers, to provide an outlet for sugar and other cash crops that are being produced for export. A sugar factory is planned and a hydro-electric plant is also under construction, or may already have been completed. Lospalos is also known to be a region where constant clashes have occurred between Fretilin guerillas and the Indonesian military for many years (Liem, New York, 15 August 1986: annex).

Liem commented that "these pemukin conform with the army's basic doctrine of territorial management, which requires people to live in communities that lend themselves to effective military and bureaucratic control, and denies them the right to preserve their traditional lifestyles in mountainous, remote communities, or wherever else they wish to live. Resettlement is a feature of social control in many parts of Indonesia. In East Timor, it has been enforced in a particularly vicious and brutal fashion, preceded by years of war that decimated the population and compelled mountain dwellers to abandon the interior, stricken by hunger and disease that resulted from Indonesian military operations in the 1970s. The rigid control over freedom of movement and travel in East Timor far exceeds anything anywhere in Indonesia. This is Indonesia's particular brand of apartheid, where the original inhabitants have been resettled in areas of separate development" (New York, 15 August 1986: 5).
CONCLUSIONS: PAST ERRORS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

In April 1984, at the end of Repelita III, the transmigration programme certainly did not have the reputation of being an overwhelming success. On the contrary, many observers were very disappointed by what had been achieved in the context of this expensive and highly controversial government policy. Among the main shortcomings - which "have been admitted with unusual frankness by the government" - Hardjono mentions inadequate site selection, inadequate site planning and inadequate site preparation, "In fact, an inadequate implementation of transmigration policy at all significant stages of the transmigration programme" (1986: 32). But improvements (and growth)* were promised concerning the implementation of the programme during the Fourth Repelita. Shortly after the start of the plan, Martono had to admit that on top of the 67 settlements already in need of rehabilitation (see: Introduction), another 16 sites had to be closed down because they were "not fit for human habitation" (Jakarta Post, 16 December 1985, quoted in: The Ecologist, May 1986: 116). With the Fourth Repelita two years on its way, the generally negative opinion has not faded. Growth may have taken place, but it is less clear whether improvements were being made. Quantity and quality remained goals which are opposed and difficult to combine.

1. Repelita IV: Improvement and Growth

The targets of families to be moved was raised to 750,000 families in the period up to April 1989. This seemed very ambitious at the time, taking into considerations the problems already encountered in the previous Repelita. Osborne calculated that with the target of 750,000 families, the annual cost to the national budget would amount to US $2,000 million or US $10 billion in the five years. "Even with the World Bank loans ______
* the title of Martono's plan for 1984-1989 was "Transmigration Improvement and Growth".
and other support", he noted that "it is unlikely that the country could afford such an outlay—assuming it were even possible to find and develop adequate sites and efficiently move the settlers" (ACFOA briefing, May 1985:10).

Even supporters of the programme, such as Heinz Arndt and the World Bank officials, had their doubts regarding the feasibility of the plan's implementation. The problems had so far already been huge and manifold and "as the scale of the programme increases in Repelita IV", the World Bank wrote, "more and more problems will arise in the implementation process". These problems include the choice of proper land, the complexities associated with reserving land, policies connected with selection and recruitment of migrants, the issues and policies concerned with the further development of settlement areas as part of the overall development of the receiving regions, the institutional capacity and the effectiveness of the administration to undertake an enlarged programme more efficiently (1985b: 67-8).

Arndt predicted that "the programme is now running into two constraints which may require serious reconsideration of the more ambitious plans for the future. One is shortage of land. The other is shortage of money" (1983:67).

2. Past Errors

Environmental degradation is but one of the disastrous consequences of the transmigration programme, a process which is further accelerated as settlement targets are raised. Furthermore, it has been calculated that "a policy of population stabilisation through transmigration requires that resettlement continues at current projected levels into the indefinite future! With suitable sites already in short supply, the only places for these people to go to are the rainforests" (Secrett, 1986: 87). New settlements can only surely succeed where survey, method of the land clearance, agricultural system and later management are all appropriate and continuance is assured, but, as Secrett concluded
on the basis of official reviews, these conditions are rarely met. Therefore, it is to be expected that the tropical rainforests will disappear. "Instead of solving the problem of environmental degradation in Java, the Bank is merely helping to export it elsewhere" (1986: 87).

On top of exporting environmental degradation from Java to the Outer Islands, Javanese poverty is also transferred to the settlement areas, disrupting the lives of local peoples who have existed there in relative prosperity for ages. The quality of life in the settlement areas is such that Sumodiningrat, a member of the Indonesian 'parliament', exclaimed after visiting West Papua: "It is better to reconsider the target. Transporting people is easy, also to Irian. If they all fit in the plane, it can be done. But is this how the transmigration programme is to be carried out?" He tried to convince the authorities that it is not sufficient to move a specific number of families and that the programme also aims at improvement of the standard of living - both of the newcomers and the local population. The least requirement "is that they will be sure of a livelihood, but even that is not the case" (Kompas, 27 February 1985).

This became evident when the 'incident' at the Wonomukti settlement in Sulawesi was reported in the Indonesian press (see Part 3, Chapter 2, section 6). Apparently, the fate of landless people and the quality of life in the new settlements do not score high on the list of priorities in Jakarta. Where things go wrong, improvements are not introduced and the shocking reality is concealed for the outside world. The 'incident' at Wonomukti was only the tip of the iceberg and the wide coverage the clash received in the press did not contribute to the programme's reputation. The way Jakarta responded was typical: the authorities showed hardly any sign of trying to change the situation of hunger which led to the clash, but the Armed Forces were invited to restore order. The government did not take responsibility, instead the blame was put on so-called 'ex-PKI people'. This 'new' myth provided the justification for a
further militarisation of the programme.

But even where transmigrasi is supposed to be a vehicle for the promotion of national unity and security, it has failed to do so. Osborne noted that the programme had adverse effects and that "transmigration has exacerbated local dissent: a number of Melanesian refugees who fled across the border to neighbouring PNG last year complained about the threat that land acquisition for transmigration had caused to local culture" Inside Asia, Sept/Oct, 1985). The same concern was expressed by the Dutch delegation the March 1985 IGGI Transmigration Seminar in Jakarta. Its report pointed out that "in case tensions arise, prospects for development may be jeopardised for many years to come. This may be true to an extent that even the attainment of national goals and aspirations may be complicated, and 'trouble spots' might be created quite incompatible with the geostrategic considerations which may have co-determined the decision to select such border areas for transmigration" (Van Raay, 1985a:3).

3. Top Down Approach

Hardjono recently asked herself why such serious errors have occurred in transmigration policy. "The answer", she wrote, "lies in the constant pressure to reach targets in a situation where fertile land is hard to obtain (...) Results of studies are usually highly generalised, particularly since those responsible have often been guided by superficial similarities between locations and have not investigated each proposed site" (1986: 33, 34). Many of the problems in the transmigration programme have resulted from the lack of trained or committed personnel and officials. The transmigration staff is overly anxious to meet the (ambitious) settlement targets. "Government land schemes run by government departments usually suffer from a top-down approach which views settlement as an administrative process", Jones & Richter have noted. "As such, departments lack the type of commitment needed in settlement work in which the staff are personally involved in each project's development. At the same time few settlement programmes have adequate staff either in quantity or in quality, reflecting in many cases the weak po-
sition in the government structure of the responsible department as well as the place of land settlement in a government's overall priorities. One essential but often overlooked aspect of staffing is the provision of training directly relevant to settlement work" (1982: 17). In the Indonesian case, staff were not settlement people, but government bureaucrats posted there. They were, according to Mac Andrews, not really interested in the settlers, who were merely seen as people down there who come in and report to you and must be successful and you provide certain services to them (1982: 144). In The Financial Times it was noted that the Javanese officials and other field workers were known to have a bias towards the non-Javanese peoples. They "look down on the outer regions. They come to trans-migration sites and don't want to get their shoes dirty" (15 August 1985).

On several occasions, the government was urged to abandon the top-down approach. Sugyono, Deputy Governor of West Papua, accused project officers of not supervising the projects well and spending too much of their time and government funds to shuttle between Jayapura and Jakarta (Kompas, 14 December 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Ir. Risman Maris, an expert on peripheral development, thereupon, called on the authorities in Jakarta to give the project officers their own responsibility. He said that site preparation was not done professionally enough because project managers spent most of their time travelling to and from Jakarta. They should be able to work on their own behalf. The crucial question, according to Maris, was what kind of work should remain to be done in Jakarta and what part of the work could be done in the field, i.e. in West Papua itself (Kompas/Pedoman Rakyat, 17 December 1985).

But the government is hesitating. Decentralisation of decision-making does not comply with the top-down approach which has become a principle since the start of the New Order regime. Meanwhile, the top-down approach has been criticised even before Sukarno came to power. Instead of making use of the self-initiative and the entrepreneurial role smallholders and peasants
traditionally possess, the government has made it very difficult for independent smallholders to survive. A new category of smallholders has been created, heavily dependent on outside inputs and government assistance.

4. Corruption

Corruption has been another cause of shortcomings in the implementation of transmigration policy. Now and then cases are reported in the Indonesian press. *Kabar dari Kampung*, for example, has noted that in Jayapura, Merauke and Manokwari over Rp 400 million had been manipulated by project officers who exaggerated the prices of rice and other basic needs for their areas. This manipulation affected the transmigrants, of course, because, for instance, in Merauke they did not receive their support. After fruitless complaints to the regional transmigration head, some settlers in Salor II site had chased the KUPT (Kelapa Unit Pemukiman Transmigrasi - Transmigration Settlement Area Head) who was suspected of manipulating food shares (No.3/4,1985:10). In another case, 800 school teachers did not receive their salaries. Some of them had not been paid for five years (*Kompas*, 28 August 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). In Aimas I site in Sorong transmigrants had to pay all sorts of illegal taxes to the KUPT, for example, for marriage ceremonies, for the setting up of shops, etc. The KUPT justified these taxes - after migrants had complained to the local transmigration officer - saying they helped the transmigrants to live independently of government assistance in order to be self-reliant after the transfer of the project from the Transmigration to the provincial authorities (*Pedoman Rakyat*, 9 October 1985). In Koya site in Jayapura district Rp 40 million was 'lost'. The money had been provided together with some radios by the Ministry of Co-operatives, but while the radios had been given out, the money had 'not been used for the general good'. The same thing happened with a donation of equipment by the Ministry of Information, comprising sewing machines, a generator, radios, televisions and loudspeakers. The latter had been taken by the
local mosque; the radios and tvs had been sold to officials on the site; the generator had been 'borrowed' by a group of transmigrants; what happened to the sewing machine is not known (Kabar dari Kampung, No. 3/4, 1985).

Settlements could succeed if - among other requirements - outside support and government assistance were provided in time, but this is often not the case. Indonesia Reports, quoting from Pelita, notes that Brigadier-General (ret.) Widarto had taken measures against 35 contractors, who had been unable to carry out their work in accordance with contractual obligations (2 July 1985). Some time later, the Minster for Development Planning, Sumarlin, said that PIR Khusus was behind schedule and would be stopped because of lack of construction of basic facilities by contractors (Kompas, 8 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Corruption was at the core of this problem. "In order to make their business still profitable", Aditjondro noted, "many of the contractor companies have relied upon their good contacts with transmigration authorities, who allegedly received up to 17% pay-offs so that they would close their eyes to the bad quality houses and roads in the transmigration projects" (1986: 12).

In November 1985, Martono was forced to negotiate with Attorney-General Hari Suharto in order to settle financial irregularities occurring in transmigration projects. Among several measures taken there was a ban on project leaders doubling as field supervisors and project treasurers. Some of the irregularities have been settled administratively, but others have been taken to court (Sinar Harapan, 27 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). Suara Karya criticised transmigration policy in an editorial, writing that "it was about time to put the transmigration sector in order. If irregularities were not ironed out, this would create a negative image of the government in international circles. These irregularities have existed since the start of the transmigration programme" (27 November 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

Afterwards, Minister Martono conceded that during 1985, his Department had settled 818 cases of 'irregularities' involving
state funds (Berita Yudha, 11 January 1986, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

5. Undisbursed Development Funds

As the main reason for the failure to meet the 1974/1975 transmigration targets, issuance of the DIP (Daftar Isian Proyek) or the permission to implement the year's project together with its allocated budget, was given (Jones, 1979: 216). Corruption and the top-down approach were responsible for undisbursed development funds, the so-called SIAP (Sisa Anggaran Pembangunan). In his "Report on Transmigration Budgetary and Accounting Procedures", Beddoes noted that in the first year of Repelita II, 24% of the budget was not spent, in the second year 34% and by the second half of the third year 96% of the budget still remained. As an explanation, Beddoes referred to the case of Pematang Panggang, where in February 1976 fertilisers and pesticides were not available, almost half of the number of houses planned for 1975 had yet to be completed, only 36% of the 2,500 transmigrants planned for the same year had arrived and a planned 37 hectare seedbed was not yet established (quoted in: Guinness et al, 1977: 11-12).

When Minister Martono was asked about the amount of SIAP ten years later, he answered that it amounted to more than 50%, but he explicitly denied that it was 70%. He explained SIAP on the basis that a transmigration project is not completed within one year, but stretches over a much longer period (Sinar Harapan, 21 January 1985). Later, 'an informed source' said that the large amount of unspent funds for transmigration was due to Repelita IV's increase in households for relocation which was overwhelming the government apparatus. That so many families were destined to settle in distant areas such as West Papua was also a factor. According to this source, Minister Martono was not correct in blaming SIAP on lack of land/site preparation, since 'that was a usual thing' (Kompas, 1 November
1985). Nevertheless, Kompas reported in March 1985 that SIAP - already amounting to Rp 17 million - had occurred because of land problems. Co-operation between several departments and governors had reduced the amount of undisbursed development funds to Rp 7 billion (15 March 1985).

Problems with SIAP continued to hamper the transmigration process. Sumarlin, Minister for Development Planning, announced early 1986 that the system of SIAP would be eliminated. Uncompleted development projects would simply be included in the subsequent year's budget instead of being added on to it. Development expenditures are being reduced in this way - a necessary reduction because of financial losses due to oil price decreases. For the transmigration sector, this means that the budget is thoroughly reduced. At the time, the SIAP amount for transmigration had been Rp 498 billion from an allocation of Rp 1,300 billion, with 90% of the SIAP in the Transmigration Department itself. This money is now lost for Martono (Kompas/Surabaya Post, 8 January 1986, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

6. The Interest Lobby

The huge and manifold problems in the transmigration programme could lead to the question as to why the programme is not halted. In fact, there is too much at stake for several groups and institutions which have a big interest in the programme's continuation. Therefore, the decision to continue transmigration policy is not entirely due to the unrealistic assumption that sooner or later the programme will put an end to Java's problems, but is also due to the interests of profit-making companies both inside and outside Indonesia. There are many groups which benefit from the continuation of transmigrasi. In Kabar dari Kampung it was concluded that "the transmigration programme has developed a momentum of its own. The logistical requirements of the programme have given birth to a large interest group consisting of aircraft companies, logging concerns, building contractors, civil engineers, consultants and
civil servants whose livelihood depends on transmi-
gration. This powerful lobby would be unwilling to
see any real decrease in numbers or changes in the
program detrimental to their own activities" (No. 3/4,
1985: 7).

Osborne also pointed at the role, influence and interests
of the Lockheed Hercules company, whose local agency is owned
by a relative of General Suharto (Inside Asia Sept/Oct,1985:21). "In Indo-
nesia and overseas", he writes, "transmigration is
touted by interested parties as a grandiose experi-
ment that is succeeding. For instance the Lockheed
company, whose Hercules aircrafts provide most of
the transport for the settlers and their meagre
baggage, boasts in its corporate ads about the
'spacious, comfortable room' for passengers. 'Be-
cause of Hercules,' one ad says, 'Indonesians can be
settled in their new homes the same day they leave
Java.' It adds that because the programme has been
'so successful . . . the Indonesian government has
doubled its fleet' " (Osborne, 1984).

And indeed, during Repelita III, six Hercules and three
Transall airplanes, each with a capacity to airlift 100 to 150
persons, have been purchased, merely to serve the transmigra-
tion programme. But when the programme needed rehabilitation
and the number of transmigrant families to be moved was reduc-
ted towards the end of the plan period, the company ran into
problems. Usually, the nine airplanes fly the transmigrants
for a total of 1,260 hours. Flying hours decreased signifi-
cantly in the period between April 1982 and March 1983. Mean-
while, the company had to pay for the costs of maintenance, in-
surance, crew, parking and overheads, although the planes were
not operated. This implied considerable financial losses and
according to the company's director, Mulyono, who is also an
Armed Forces Marshall, "the company will suffer bigger
losses unless the Department of Transmigration im-
mediately intensifies transmigrants' airlift".

This intensification took place and constituted one of the
reasons why the Repelita III target has, in fact, been estab-
lished. It came as no surprise that Marshall Mulyono was one
of the first officials to announce the even more ambitious tar-
get of families to be moved during Repelita IV (Indonesia Times,
7 May 1984). Perhaps, the choice of transmigration sites in more remote areas, such as West Papua, has also been influenced by the company. Its influence on decision-making in Jakarta cannot be underestimated, although it is not easy to find proof for this. Aditjondro does come up with an example. He said the proposed site of Bintuni, an ex-petroleum mining area in the Bird's Head region, was unofficially scraped off the list of settlements, because the airport could only accommodate small Twin Otter airplanes, and not the huge Hercules or Transall planes (1986: 11).

The promotion by the government of involvement from private companies, in, for instance, the NES and PIR programmes, will further increase the role and influence of interest groups in the decision-making process in Jakarta. For example, the British-financed Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) has provided 'soft loans' for a transmigration-associated cocoa estate at Ransiki, on West Papua's north west coast, which will supply the raw product to the CDC-initiated chocolate factory, PT Ransiki, nearby (Osborne, Inside Asia op.cit:21).

Instead of being a 'humanitarian' programme, transmigration increasingly serves the benefits and interests of commercially run companies instead of providing a new living to the settler families. It is obvious that the interests of the transmigrants and the companies do not always - to put it not too strongly - coincide or overlap.

Another interest group, which has already been mentioned as not having an interest in the well-being of the people involved, is the Indonesian bureaucracy. In the Department of Transmigration alone, over 11,000 people have found a job. They also have some influence on whether or not changes are being introduced in the programme. Officials have, for example, acted against the decision to promote spontaneous migration because they wanted to maintain control over funds (see below) (Jones & Richter, 1982: 157, 161).
7. Future Perspectives

The top-down approach, corruption, SIAP, the interest lobby are all factors which hamper the improvement of the transmigration programme. Part of the explanation for the insistence on existing and less successful policies is the fact that poverty and 'overpopulation' are seen as 'technical' problems, which need a 'technical' solution. Another part of the explanation is the resoluteness of the Jakarta regime to keep a tight grip on what goes on in Indonesia. This resoluteness, for example, plays a crucial role in the issue of 'spontaneous transmigration'.

The Indonesian government claims that it wants to promote 'spontaneous (trans-)migration'. In doing so, they answer recommendations made by several observers and institutions like the World Bank, since surveys of land settlement programmes outside Indonesia have showed that it is (central) government intrusion which contributes to the likelihood of failure of settlement. It seems to be a general rule that spontaneous settlers are more successful than government-sponsored settlers.

It remains unclear, however, what kind of settlement the Indonesian government has in mind when they talk about 'spontaneous (trans-) migration'. It is, in my view, only partly the so-called 'family-encouraged movement' of settlers, comparable to spontaneous settlement of Javanese and Balinese colonists in the pre-Independence period. Hardjono, who has been an advocate for the family-linked transmigration, refers to this category as 'transmigran swakarsa family', "that is, unassisted family transmigrants who join relatives in existing projects, an approach that suggests that transmigration planners are at last recognising the value of family ties as a means to move people at lower cost and with less responsibility on the transmigration agency". She anticipates that at least 150,000 families of this category of migrants will be moved
during Repelita IV (1986: 43). I think it is difficult to differentiate between the family-encouraged spontaneous migrants and the other categories of spontaneous migrants, called 'swakarsa murni' (truly independent and with no government help of any kind) and 'swakarsa berbantuan' (partly assisted). It is the 'swakarsa murni' category, the Indonesian government favours the most and this is also acknowledged by Hardjono, who writes that "the government has always spoken of expanding the number of swakarsa murni transmigrants since their movement costs the state budget nothing. It has at the same time viewed umum (general, government sponsored) transmigration as a means to encourage such migration" (1986: 43). Although I agree with Hardjono that spontaneous migration reduces government funding for the movement itself, the programme will not be cheaper because to attract spontaneous settlers the government will have to create successful settlements first.

Recent studies reveal that spontaneous migration is not, in fact, as is widely believed, promoted by the success but rather by the failure of settlements. According to the World Bank, relatives move to the settlement areas to support their female kin - this 'spontaneous settlement' is, therefore, due to the weak position of women and the harsh conditions under which they have to try to make a living on the infertile plots of land (1985d: 11).

However, I think the family-linked migration is not the most important type of migration in terms of number. This will become clear when the issue of 'spontaneous (trans-) migration' is not only discussed in terms of government assistance but also in terms of government control. Spontaneous transmigration in the Indonesian context is not at all what the name suggests it to be, namely 'spontaneous', but it is just another form of government-controlled, though only partially assisted, migration. A new agency for the co-ordination of the movement of these transmigrant families is being formed (Sinar Harapan, 27 April 1985) and the apparatus for resettling the
spontaneous transmigrants is being improved (Kompas, 6 September 1985). This can be explained by the regime's desire to keep the migration movement strictly under control - an effort in which they sometimes fail.

Kartomo Wirosuhardjo, one time Director of the Demographic Institute of the University of Indonesia, gave a clue on the issue of Indonesian 'spontaneous transmigration', saying that there is a distinction between transmigration and migration. "In Indonesia, people tend to think that what we term migration means transmigration. Transmigration is a special kind of migration. Then what they call general transmigrants are those supported fully by the government, whereas 'spontaneous transmigrants' are not just people who move by themselves but rather those who move within the framework of the law and are provided land by the government but nothing more. Migrants from Java to the Outer Islands who just come to buy land there are not termed transmigrants .... What observers term 'spontaneous transmigrants' are not transmigrants as normally understood in Indonesia. They are 'uncontrolled migrants'" (quoted in: Jones & Richter, 1982: 163).

Thus, the government wants to promote 'spontaneous transmigration', because it reduces government funding, while keeping control over the process itself. Martono defined the transmigran spontan or swakarsa as "a transmigrant who travels at his own expense and initiative to a settlement area and once arrived he receives the same amount of assistance as the general or umum transmigrant" (Kompas, 18 March 1985). Therefore, it must be concluded that the factors which contribute to the success of spontaneous settlement do not apply to the Indonesian situation and the 'new initiative' to promote spontaneous transmigration cannot be seen as a promising future perspective in the transmigration programme.

8. Local Resettlement

Another relatively 'new trend' in the Repelita IV-transmigration programme is the introduction of the so-called parallel development-scheme aimed at the relocation of local communities and villages, particularly in West Papua, where it is
presented as an alternative to the not very successful translokasi system. The announcement of this new aspect in transmigrasi has followed on proposals to replace the APPDT-programme of integrating native people in transmigration settlement areas by a community development programme aimed at the 'rehabilitation' of the local communities themselves. To prevent 'social envy' leading to political commotion, transmigration efforts should be 'balanced' by 'rural community development taking into consideration the various tribal cultures and their aspirations', Professor Mubyarto of the 1985-Gajah Mada Team explained in Sinar Harapan (19 February 1985, quoted in Indonesian Reports). When the programme of 'restoring' (memugar) the Papuan villages was announced, some time later, it was said that this pattern of village restoration would be applied throughout eastern Indonesia. According to Transmigration Minister Martono, it was aimed, in particular, at people living in groups of only twenty to thirty families, with the intention of raising their standards of living (Kompas, 29 July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).

In fact, comparable schemes have already run for some time under the responsibility of the Department for Social Affairs in, for example, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The main aim of these schemes is to transform nomadic and semi-nomadic communities of people living in small groups in forest and/or relatively isolated areas into permanent villages with a much larger population. For their own benefit, these people will be resettled at locations where 'administrative' control is better organised and where labour is needed for the exploitation of natural resources.

In South East Sulawesi, for instance, some 5,600 people have already been relocated since 1975 and another 28,400 people have been scheduled to follow in their footsteps. The relocation of these so-called 'suku suku terasing' (isolated and alien peoples) was implemented because "it will raise
their standard of living" (Jakarta Post, 11 June 1985). In West Kalimantan, some 4,600 villages were scheduled to be 'regrouped' into a mere 2,000 villages. West Kalimantan's Governor, Major General (ret) Soedjiman explained that the villages contained less than a hundred families each and "they were not enjoying development" (Kompas, 18 May 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). After the people have arrived at their new locations, they receive a house, 3 has of land, foodstuffs for one year and guidance for five years before they are left on their own (again).

Local resettlement programmes have already existed for a long time in addition to the transmigration programme. In West Papua, it seems that obstacles to transmigrasi (such as land unavailability, lagging transmigrants' transfers, the failure of the translokasi system and local resistance towards Indonesian rule) have urged the government partially to replace the 'traditional' transmigration programme by local resettlement or transmigration programmes. Elsewhere, other forms of local resettlement have been developed, such as the relocation of the so-called 'suku suku terasing' and resettlement of people whose land is needed for other purposes.

Examples of the latter form of local resettlement are to be found in Aceh. Jakarta Post has reported under the heading "Cheated Migrants Abandon Settlements" that in 1976 and 1981 two resettlement areas were created in Krueng Guekueh district in North Aceh in exchange for land needed for the setting up of a natural gas plant and two fertiliser factories. Some 1,400 people were moved from their original villages, but the projects "have apparently failed to come up to the 'expectations' of people who had given up their houses, ricefields and gardens for the sake of those industries". The two hectares promised them for ricefields and gardens at the time they came to settle were never provided. For nearly four years the migrants, many of whom used to be fishermen, had to rely on subsistence crops from the 0.25 ha assigned to each
house. There was an agricultural information officer assigned to the village, "but he is unable to do anything due to limited facilities" including lack of irrigation and seeds. The majority of migrants had to abandon the settlements and return to their original villages. Jakarta Post reported that a lot of money had been spent on these projects, however, "the two villages provide an example of how bad the resettlement programme has been carried out. The inhabitants used to live in peace even under poor conditions in their original places. Attracted by the prospect of a better life they were ready to give up their rice-fields and houses for the benefit of the industries. But now they again were made to lead uncertain lives with bleak futures". (2 May 1985).

The transmigration 'solution' and methods have been used for the removal of people here and there in Indonesia, where land was necessary for other uses. The necessity for this transfer of 'surplus people' was not so much 'overpopulation' as the need for the concentration of land ownership or conversion of populated areas for development purposes. In North Jakarta, for instance, hundreds of people were pressed to move from their houses and neighbourhoods 'because these areas are considered unfit for habitation'. In fact, 410 has of land in Marunda was needed for the construction of the biggest log harbour in South East Asia, 160 has in Plumpang for the construction of a market, 40 has in Ancol Timur for the construction of the Jakarta fair ground and 16 has in Papanggo for the construction of a car assembly plant by PT Prospect Motor. Some 367 families have been relocated in Sarang Bango, about 3 km from their original home area. The government has provided facilities like clean water, a health centre, a primary school and a mosque, and the construction of a public cemetery was promised to them. Some residents claimed to lead a miserable life in Sarang Bango, others still refused to leave Marunda because they have not received compensation for their land, while yet others refused because the compensation offered was considered to be insufficient (Jakarta Post, 18 February 1986).
The importance of such cases of local resettlement - whether they take place in Aceh or in Jakarta - is that they all contribute to the idea that 'population' is seen as an obstacle to development, that 'development' and that people are pushed out of their home areas "for reasons considered necessary by the Indonesian Government" (formulation from the 1972 Basic Transmigration Act). Many people - particularly in the traditional sending areas such as Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok - have been moved to other islands; in other cases - especially in the other areas - people have been moved within the province or within the island. Maybe announcements like the transfer of over 10,000 families displaced by the Saguling hydropower project in West Java to transmigration settlement areas in Sumatra, Sulawesi or Kalimantan (Kompas, 7 November 1985 quoted; in Indonesian Reports will disappear from Indonesian newspapers). Perhaps, local resettlement will become the 'transmigration solution' of the future. In that case, the wishes of Central Java's Chairman of the provincial 'parliament', Ir. Soekorahardjo, would be fulfilled. He suggests that local transmigration within the province should be encouraged in order to overcome the problems of unemployment and vagrancy in the cities.

"Permanent workers are needed in tea estates around Pekalongan and Banjarneagara as well as in the prawn and fish ponds on the Central Javanese coast", he said and he added that

"Javanese who have been transmigrated off the island have found their fields were not ready. It would be better if they put their skills to work in Central Java itself".

Apparently, the authorities did not think this was a highly unrealistic idea. Transmigration Office's head in Central Java, D. Soetopo, was quoted saying that the potentials of local transmigration within Java had to be seriously considered, but that up till now local transmigration had
only been for ABRI members (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 10 September 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports).


Jakarta Post, November 5, 1985, reported that 339,630 families had been resettled so far, including 146,775 families scheduled for resettlement during Repelita III, thereby indicating that the target of families to be moved between April 1979 and April 1984 had not been realised. Martono later announced that the transmigration programme has been successful in terms of quantity during the first part of Repelita IV. During the first year 100,000 of the targeted 125,000 families had been moved, but in the second year 160,000 families, exceeding the target of 135,000. Until July 1986, some 44,742 families have been moved, suggesting the targets have not been reduced (Jakarta Post, 4 July 1986). Hardjono, however, calculated for the first year of Repelita IV, just as she has done for Repelita III (see Part 3, Chapter 1, Section 3), that only 51,558 umum transmigrant families have been moved (1986: 42– see for recent figures table 4).

Today, it is said that targets are reduced because of the financial problems due to the reduction of oil prices. The 1986/87 budget announced a cut of over 40% in the (manpower and) transmigration sector compared with the previous fiscal year (Hardjono, 1986: 51). Where the 1985/86 budget for transmigration was Rp 578 billion, the budget for 1986/87 is only Rp 325 billion (INDOC, 1986: 10).

Apart from the financial problems, land unavailability has remained a crucial issue. Whereas in the latter part of the 1970s it was evident that 'only marginal land' was available for transmigration projects, "today, much of the land allocated to transmigrants cannot even be described as marginal. Settlers in unsuccessful projects distributed from Sabang to Merauke have encoun-
tered problems that stem basically from bad site selection" (Hardjono, 186: 32). "The basic reality", she continues, "that large tracts of good land are no longer available, is reflected in the fact that one expatriate firm of consultants carrying out feasibility studies in southern Sumatra had a rejection rate of 80% of all sites proposed by local provincial authorities for transmigration projects during Repelita III" (ibid, 1986: 34).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Umum</th>
<th>Swakarsa Berbantuan</th>
<th>Swakarsa Murni</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>70,799</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>117,129</td>
<td>190,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali and NTB</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>3,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local settlers</td>
<td>12,371</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>13,573</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>17,995</td>
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<td>17,995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relocation</td>
<td>5,407</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>109,443</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>119,082</td>
<td>231,197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hardjono, 1986:40.)

The result is that "transmigration planners during Repelita III abandoned the idea of giving larger holdings and of planting cash crops for settlers because of the difficulty of obtaining large tracts of land and the high cost of these undertakings" (ibid, 1986: 35). This happened in spite of the fact that these larger holdings and plantings of cash crops had proved to be successful in South Sumatra (the Batumarta settlement financed by the World Bank) and Jambi (ibid, 1986: 35).

Because of failure of settlement policy, government authorities have tried to invent new perspectives, since abolishment of the programme is not under consideration. Martono, for example, proposed to Balinese transmigrants in Sulawesi to exploit their artistic talents in wood carving and sculpture, and to stimulate them, he granted them special permission to get wood freely from the forests. He said that similar tradi-
tional occupations could be useful for Javanese settlers, such as the famous plaiting work from Tasikmalaya in West Java. "In this way", he said, "the farmer-transmigrant will be able to eke out extra income from their handicraft products" (Jakarta Post, 18 May 1985).

Perhaps this is the way the government is intending to realise a diversification of transmigration settlement models. Models such as have been proposed in mining and industry, but also in fishing, have so far not been implemented on a large scale. The only models found in transmigrant settlement are the upland food crop and wetland food crop model (and the tree crop model, known from the PIR Khusus projects). The traditional food crop model, which according to the World Bank has had mixed results in traditional transmigration areas in Sumatra, would be even more dubious in remote areas such as West Papua, given higher mobilisation and transport costs, the remoteness of potential markets, and particularly the higher infrastructure costs required in the new settlement areas." For example, the full costs of implementation in Irian Jaya, including infrastructure, have been estimated at US$ 7,000 - US$ 10,000 per family depending on the location and farm model assumed. This is significantly higher than the Repelita III national average of US$ 5,700 (in 1985 values)" (World Bank, 1985b: 73).

The traditional food crop has been termed 'the first phase cultivation of 1 ha of dryland food crops', suggesting that it is followed by some sort of secondary development (such as the introduction of cattle; expansion of the dryland food crop area to 2 has; the planting of 2 has of rubber; expansion of the wetland area etc). Resulting from tests financed by the World Bank, two farm models have been chosen: the upland model of 2 to 3.5 has and the lowland (swamp reclamation) model of 2.25 has (World Bank, 1985b: 74). The chosen farm models do not, however, guarantee a better future for the settlers, as can be derived from the Bank's own calculations. "It should be noted that the tested models involving second stage development may require more labour than is available in the 'standard' five-member transmigrant
family. While the inflow of spontaneous transmigrants (especially family members) can and do make up some of the labour deficit, the average transmigrant family may be unable, especially in the early years, to develop the targeted amount of land, and/or the estimated per capita income within a family could remain lower than targeted because of the outside labour input required. In addition, field observations show that when the two basic models are unaccompanied by sufficient levels of investment and technical assistance the results can be subsistence agriculture or possibly below in the case of inexperienced farmers. Furthermore, the lack of cash income can block the development process and settlements may stagnate at the poverty level" (World Bank, 1985b: 75)

It is obvious that the chosen farm models are in no way solutions to the basic problems encountered by the migrants in the reality of settlement, such as labour shortages, necessity of outside incomes, lack of cash to hire outside labour etc (see Part 2, Chapter 3).

The introduction of the PIR Khusus programme as well as the promotion of spontaneous (trans-)migration have not provided solutions for the problems which were encountered and past errors. Even Hardjono concluded that " on the whole, partly assisted transmigrants have not done as well as others over the years, primarily because this form of transmigration has always tended to be based solely on cost-cutting objectives. As a consequence, projects involving partly assisted transmigrants on the one hand have not had the inputs made available to sumum projects yet, on the other, have lacked the resourcefulness found among genuinely spontaneous settlers. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to settle larger numbers of partly assisted transmigrants yet at the same time attain the improvements in quality that are stressed in Repelita IV and all subsequent statements from the Department of Transmigration as a major goal during the current Five-Year period" (1986: 44).

Regarding PIR Khusus, she notes that " the programme has inevitably become entangled in many of the problems that confront transmigration planners such as the difficulty of identifying large tracts of unoccupied land to which there are no prior claims, the complexity of coordinating activities and, above all, the question of per-family cost, which has been estimated
at four times the cost of settlement of an umum transmigrant family (...). Nevertheless, from the point of view of utilisation of marginal land, the concepts offers good long-term prospects, if the ulterior motives of the agencies involved can be reconciled in a way that promotes the interests of the smallholder, whether he be a local farmer or a transmigrant" (1986: 48).

Even if the interests of smallholders instead of big business would be promoted by the Indonesian government, PIR Khusus cannot be the final solution for transmigrasi. PIR absorbs only 10,000 of the total of 150,000 families to be moved in the period between April 1986 and April 1987 (Hardjono, 1986: 45). With 78,000 families to be settled in tidal areas during Repelita IV, "this leaves a large number who will have to be settled in the traditional manner on 2 has holdings in areas of poor quality soils" (Hardjono, 1986: 48). The traditional food crop model will continue to be Jakarta's favourite.

Land unavailability and/or unsuitability have not led to the reduction of targets. Even though these targets are seldom realised, for instance in West Papua*, the Indonesian government continues to press for mass resettlement in this area. If political and ideological reasons are insufficient to oppose the implementation of transmigration in West Papua, Hardjono argues that "the wisdom of attempting to settle large numbers of transmigrants in Irian Jaya can be questioned on the score of geographical conditions. The nature of the topography and soils suggests that this province is by no means as suitable for agricultural settlements as transmigration policy makers and the agencies providing funds seem to believe" (1986: 46).

As has been described in this document, the interests of local people count for little in the process and the protection of the environment is also considered not very important. On the basis of the conclusions of the government's own Department and agencies, Secrett said that it would be a far better

* Hardjono has calculated that since April 1984, only 8,416 families, representing 3.6% of all transmigrants moved during the first two years of Repelita IV, have gone to West Papua (1986: 47).
solution to forget about trying to establish communities in the rainforests, and instead turn to the vast areas of already degraded land that exists throughout Indonesia. "Problems caused by shifting agriculture would be partially solved", he argues, "if 'wild settlers' were adequately supported, thereby leaving the traditional shifting cultivators with sufficient land" since "indigenous people understand the natural tolerances of forest ecosystems (...) Unlike the newcomers, they avoid soil erosion, extensive and permanent forest clearance and failed crops" (1986: 88, 84). But the problem is that the Indonesian government has other priorities which override environmental concerns. This is confirmed by the continuation of planned colonisation of West Papua's rainforests, for these are the least developed or studied of all the major Outer Islands' forests. Ecologists, working in West Papua, have (privately) said that it will take at least a decade before comprehensive surveys can be completed, but in the meantime transmigration into the area continues. According to Secrett, it is the "political dogma and arbitrary settlement targets which have blinded Indonesian and foreign aid agency planners, causing them to sow the seeds of their own programme's failure" (1986: 81). On top of this, a powerful transmigration interest lobby is working behind the scenes against the reduction of transmigration targets and plans. Transmigration and other forms of (land) resettlement are in fact rational ways to make certain that the interests of the big landowners and estate managers remain intact. Therefore, migrants are moved from one place to another, preferably to 'empty' areas, where 'land rights' are said to be a minor issue. In the process, much of the good agricultural land is withdrawn from the subsistence food production sector and used for cash crop export production. Transmigration, as has been suggested in this document, is rather worsening the problem of 'landlessness' than providing a solution for this problem, or any other problem for that matter.

"The tragic reality", according to Colchester, "is that, within the present global economic and political framework, it is hard for the West not to support
Indonesian nationalism, of which transmigration has become a central part, despite its undemocratic and repressive nature. The tribal peoples of the archipelago, and the forests they inhabit, are pawns in a game where the knights and castles of international economic interests are arm sales to Suharto's Armed Forces, the gold and copper of Mount Ertsberg in West Papua and the oil reserves under the East Timor Straits. With such glittering prizes, the fate of a few hundred thousand tribal people counts for little" (1986a: 69).

I would add, as the main conclusion from this document, that there is no perspective in the transmigration programme as long as the policy and decision making is the sole responsibility of the Jakarta Suharto regime.

In East Kalimantan, no ecological considerations are given in the allocation of land to transmigrant families (Photo: Thelka Kolbeck).
DISCUSSION: MORE MYTHS AND REALITIES

"Although press reports are not necessarily true, the information they have carried has brought problems to the surface which Transmigration Department officials have been unable to identify". When Minister Martono spoke these words of appreciation to the national press for their contribution in uncovering shortcomings of the transmigration programme (Indonesian Observer, 22 December 1983), he could not have known yet how crucial the role of the Indonesian press was to become during his Repelita IV resettlement programme. The press had played a significant role in portraying transmigrasi as a policy with a lop-sided emphasis on quantity and negligence of the quality aspect during Repelita III. It has continued to uncover the realities of transmigrasi by printing, almost daily, stories on the conditions of the settlements and the consequences for the transmigrants. Their reports have been, in this respect, one-sided because they concentrate on Javanese problems: overpopulation, unemployment and poverty in Java itself and overpopulation, unemployment and poverty in the Javanese settlements outside Java.

But there were exceptions, such as the coverage of the findings of the Gajah Mada Team, which was sent to investigate the transmigration programme in West Papua by Martono himself. Perhaps encouraged by Martono’s words of appreciation, but more likely in spite of regular warnings not to print anything that is contrary to the national interest, i.e. contrary to the government's intentions, the Indonesian press has made full use of the publication of the special issue of the Ecologist on transmigration in May 1986. Survial International, Tapol, Friends of the Earth and Komitee Indonésie, all contributors to this issue, which was an integral part of an international campaign against support for transmigrasi, were called 'tenaga bayaran' (hired workers) (Pedoman Rakyat, 20 July 1986, quoted in: INDOC, 1986: 9), but between the lines
the criticisms made by these organisations were quoted in ex-
tension.

The leaders of the nation reacted with anger and frustra-
tion. Minister Martono said "the campaign has been launch-
ed by people who do not understand the problems faced
by the Indonesian people. At the very least, they
are making an 'issue' for political reasons so as to
discredit the Indonesian government" (Kompas, 12 May 1986).

General Murdani, agreeing with Martono, "angrily rejected
criticism, saying that calls for an end to foreign
funding for the scheme were part of moves to dis-
credit the government in the run-up to general elec-
tions next April" (Reuter, 18 July 1986). The series of
articles and official reactions of the World Bank following
the publication of The Ecologist made it crystal-clear that
neither the government nor the World Bank have any intentions
whatsoever of changing their disastrous policy for the bene-
fit of the people and forests involved. General Suharto him-
self joined in the discussion; he "firmly backed the plan
when he told Javanese migrants in Central Sumatra this
month that they were pioneers in the country's deve-
lopment" (Reuter, 18 July 1986). With the exception of
Aditjondro, who more or less recognised that transmigrasi is
something to be concerned about (asking Survival why it focu-
sed on West Papua and not on Kalimantan where "the impact of
transmigration is much greater" in Sinar Harapan, 28 May 1986),
government authorities and officials involved in the implemen-
tation of the programme vehemently denied that there was any
truth in the accusations publicised in The Ecologist. "Were
it true that transmigration destroys minority tribes
and tropical forests", Martono exclaimed, "countries
like the USA, West Germany and the Netherlands would
not support it" (Kompas, 12 May 1986).

"IT IS QUITE NORMAL TO CUT FORESTS DOWN"

Sinar Harapan emphasised that The Ecologist did not act
against transmigration itself, but "what is being criticised
is the method used, to see whether this destroys local
inhabitants, the local environment, and whether it leads
to land seizures". Touching upon the topic of forest de-
struction, the newspaper wrote that

"the criticisms are directed only at Indonesia and Brazil who both have extensive areas of forest. If the forests, which are like the lungs of humankind, are used for transmigration resettlement, humankind will lose its lungs, the critics claim" (5 June 1986). Earlier, Martono had said that forests are cut down because the transmigration programme needs huge tracts of land. "It is quite normal for people to cut forests down if they want to develop the regions", he said. "Just tell me where forests are not being cut down in this present day and age?" Besides, he added, there is no need to get upset and worried because Indonesia also has a Minister for Environment; thus, both environment and conservation are given adequate attention (Kompas, 12 May 1986; Medeka, 27 May 1986).

But Dr. Judistira Garna, senior lecturer at the Pajajaran University in Bandung, said: "Previously, the native inhabitants were able to live in harmony and peace with their habitat. The destruction of nature occurs because the method of agriculture or riceland cultivation practised is precisely the same as the system practised in Java". Therefore, he said, it was indeed true that clearing land for transmigration purposes damages the environment (Sinar Harapan, 23 May 1986).

"TRANSMIGRATION IS THE LARGEST HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE CENTURY"

Martono explicitly denied that the transmigration programme could be seen as a colonisation policy. "The idea that transmigration is a large-scale programme of colonisation is quite false. The real fact is that the transmigration programme is the largest humanitarian programme of the century, because it aims to solve many humanitarian problems". Transmigrasi improves peasant incomes and also raises the national food production level, he said (Merdeka, 27 May 1986; Kompas, 12 May 1986). Referring to the accusation that transmigration is a threat to the survival of many ethnic groups, including the native inhabitants
of West Papua*, Martono said that "the transmigration programme highlights social integration so that racial differences and differences between ethnic groups will no longer exist. There is no such thing as one ethnic group colonising another" (*Merdeka*, 27 May 1986). Therefore, the 'groups in Irian' will disappear, not because of the transmigration programme, but because of "the psychological and political will of the people to become one nation". Their disappearance is not due to 'colonisation' but to 'integration' (*Jakarta Post*, 22 May 1986). Besides, "the minority ethnic groups are not the only ones that will disappear; ethnic groups like the Javane-se, the Bataks, the Sundanese and so on will also disappear in the process of forming one nation" (*Kompas*, 12 May 1986).

The fact that at the end of the century the majority of the population in West Papua will consist of non-Papuans (a fact which has even been acknowledged by the World Bank and IGGI countries). That these immigrants are being resettled on lands owned and/or used by the native inhabitants and that Javanese is the dominant culture, pushing aside the cultures of the non-Javanese peoples, are facts not mentioned by Martono. In fact, reading through the articles, all these three facts are explicitly or implicitly recognised by both scientists and government authorities (see below). Mulya Lubis, in stressing the need to improve the quality of the transmigration programme, said: "Excesses must be prevented, particularly those that result in local cultures being marginalised or destroyed, for these cultures are part of the national heritage" (*Sinar Harapan*, 29 May 1986).

* The word 'Papuan' is banned, so Papuans may only be referred to as 'putera putera daerah' (sons of the region) or Irianese (*Tapol Bulletin, November 1983: 6*). East Timor Governor Carrascalao has suggested that the terms 'putera daerah' and 'pendatang' (newcomer) should be eliminated because "things like this could create intergroup conflict which was contrary to the noble values of Pancasila" (*Sinar Harapan*, 6 May 1985; quoted in, Indonesia Reports).
"THOSE WHO WISH TO DO SO CAN CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE"

Although conversion of (communal) land for transmigration purposes does take place, Martono denied that land was being seized by the government: "Land used for transmigration is acquired by proper procedures (...) Inhabitants whose land is used for transmigration projects still continue to own land, and moreover, they are brought into the transmigration resettlement location" (Sinar Harapan, 5 June 1986). His colleague, Emil Salim, Minister for Population and Environment, put it more precisely in an interview with Die Zeit. He said that hunters and gatherers will have to disappear from their lands for the introduction of agriculture and new methods. Out of hundred newcomers, only 70 or 80 are Javanese farmers, Salim emphasised, the others are autochthonous. The Javanese bring the knowhow with them and the others learn how to imitate the Javanese (quoted in: De Waarheid, 29 May 1986).

But senior lecturer in Bandung, Garna, pointed out that this so-called integration process is retarded due to several factors. In the first place, he said, "the transmigrants, particularly the Javanese, consider themselves superior to the local people, because of their culture or civilisation, as well as because of their method of farming or earning a living". In the second place, they bring their own social structures (including their land ownership system "which differs enormously from the land ownership system of the local people") and apply them unmodified in their new settlements. In the third place, they live in their own communities and keep very much to themselves. "In their new settlements, they just live according to the social system they brought from Java, retaining their customs and traditions". Considering all these factors, Garna concluded that "the government must make serious efforts to integrate the transmigrants with the local inhabitants by treating them in the same way, and respecting the existence of the local people. Unless this is done", he said, "the things these foreigners accuse us of will, in time, indeed come to pass" (Sinar Harapan, 23 May 1986).
The most nonsensical reaction came from the World Bank in their letter of 11 June 1986; apparently they do not possess either the subtlety or the self-censorship which characterise the Indonesian reactions. Referring to anthropologists who are working with site selection and evaluation teams, Clausen wrote that "measures have been introduced to identify the local people and their land needs in order that those who wish to do so can continue to pursue their traditional way of life. Their views on benefits and/or compensation are being ascertained. If they do not wish to be included in the resettlement area, the planning requirement calls for benefit through parallel development". Clausen further writes that in the period between 1979 and 1989 only 45,000 families are being moved into West Papua and that there are no plans to settle migrants in the densely settled highlands, where the majority of Papuans live. These statements cannot be categorised as anything other than lies. This is obvious from the term the World Bank itself uses, namely 'the less-assimilated people'. They will have to assimilate a little more, be it in the transmigration settlements or through parallel development. Survival International points to the fact that the target for West Papua is 135,000 and not 25,000, such as is suggested by the World Bank, who must know this, since it finances the settlement of 55,000 transmigrant families in West Papua through the Transmigration V Project (15 June 1986).

Martono himself was quoted in Jakarta Post saying that 130,000 families or about 750,000 persons are to be resettled in West Papua during Repelita IV. So far, 200,000 Javanese are resettled alongside 1.2 million Papuans (22 May 1986).

But the World Bank proves to be a loyal partner in "Indonesian development". It assists the Jakarta regime in its play with myths and realities, concealing what really goes on from the outside world. The Bank states, for example, that there has been "no large resettlement effort in modern times (...) carried out with so little communal tension". There have been 'some conflicts' during the first part of Repelita III, due to rapid land clearance with-
out adequate planning, but this has - according to the Bank - not occurred since. This, while the most violent clash between autochthonous and immigrants was taking place halfway into Repelita IV! (11 June 1986).

THE POPULATION MOTIVE. QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY AND OTHER MYTHS

Kompas has reported that "a World Bank official has defended the programme, saying that it aims to overcome population density in Java, Bali and Lombok" (12 May 1986). Quantitatively, it claims, transmigration was a success, since 1.5% of the Javanese population was moved. The fact that so many people moved voluntarily to participate as pioneers and the low return rate among them (according to the Bank this is 10%) "attest to the economic pressures the rural poor feel and also to the opportunities in the Outer Islands" (World Bank, 11 June 1986). It is indeed true that the Javanese are desperate enough to do anything to improve their living conditions. According to the Bank, 40 million Javanese belong to households with incomes below the poverty level (about US$ 100 per capita/year). In spite of the Bank's claim that 'poverty alleviation' and 'employment generation' are the 'key objectives' of the Indonesian government policy anno 1986, the Suharto regime apparently fails to put an end to this 'Javanese poverty'. Instead, it promotes the transfer of this poverty.

The expectation of a better life outside Java is not based on the reality in the settlement areas, but is artificially created by the aggressive propaganda campaign, which - by the way - is not only aimed at the rural poor, but also at the urban poor. The misery of the Javanese population is used as a pretext for the programme's continuation, resulting in more and more misery for the Javanese as well as the local populations in the receiving areas. The 'population motive' is a myth belonging to the past, but "politicians have been slower to accept a new emphasis on regional development, for the idea of transmigration as a ready solution to some of its worst consequences of rural Java's
high population density is deeply rooted", Suratnam & Guinness wrote almost a decade ago (1977: 78).

Another myth that belongs to the past is that it is population pressure which contributes highly to the ecological damage done in Java. Although one-third of the land in Java is in the hands of only 1% of the landowners (Caulfield, 1984), the Bank writes that "inequitable land distribution is not a major problem; rather it is the very high ratio of people to land that forces poor families to farm steep slopes in upland watersheds and causes soil erosion and damage to irrigation infrastructure (...) on which a major portion of agricultural production depends. Many rural families, unable to find land or work, are forced to move to cities, exacerbating urban poverty and unemployment" (World Bank, 11 June 1986). Survival International in their response to this letter accused the Bank of being Java-centric and wrote: "We share your concern for the alleviation of the poverty and landlessness of those on the central islands of Java, Madura and Bali, but the existence of these problems in one part of the archipelago does not legitimise the abuse of human rights in another or justify the promotion of an unsustainable model of development, which only stores up even greater problems for the future" (15 June 1986).

THE TRANSMIGRANTS ARE BETTER OFF AFTER TRANSMISSION

The World Bank persists in its claims that transmigration brings a better future for the transmigrants. Sponsored transmigration during Repelita III created 500,000 - 600,000 full-time jobs and an equal number of temporary jobs in site development. Moreover, 15% of the incremental labour force was absorbed under the programme; incomes were raised, "increasing the assets of many settlers whose prospects would have been worse had they remained in the overcrowded islands" (11 June 1986).

But recent reports suggests that some things never change. One group of migrants in southwestern Sumatra complained that their settlement was under attack from wild pigs and that they had to form special squads to hunt them down. Other villages have been terrorised by elephants and tigers. Some
migrants could not stand the hardships and returned home (Reuters, 18 July 1986). But the authorities remain deaf and they are not using the "breathing space at a time when the ambitious scheme is under attack from both domestic and foreign critics" (Reuters, 18 July 1986). According to this and other sources, transmigration authorities have reduced the target because of the financial situation of Indonesia after the decline of the oil price.

The government claims that it will not build new settlement sites and that it will focus on improving the quality of existing projects. With these promises we are back where we started, namely at the end of Repelita III, when Martono reacted to criticisms by promising that quality would count during Repelita IV and not quantity. However, this has not happened, and it is not yet clear why it should happen now. He said that "notwithstanding the many criticisms of transmigration being made overseas, the programme will go ahead. Transmigration is essential if Indonesia is to solve the problems of population, food and the unity of the nation" (Sinar Harapan, 5 June 1986). Earlier, he had conceded that "it is true that the government plans to move 65 million people away from Java in the next twenty years. In fact, we hope to move even more than 65 million, if we possibly can" (Kompas, 12 May 1986).
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Glossary and Abbreviations

ABRI
ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi
ABRI Masuk Desa
alan
AKAD
APPDT
BAKOP-TRANS
BAKOSURTANAL
BAPPEDAS
bawon scheme
bedol desa
BINA PROGRAM PANKIM
BKKBN
BTU-BUMN
CDC
daerah perbatasan
daerah pemukiman
daerah rawah
desa pembangunan
desa potensials
desa teladan
DGMD
DGSP
DGT

Indonesian Armed Forces
ABRI unites with transmigration
ABRI enters the villages (1980 campaign)
grassland
Inter-regional Labour Distribution Programme
Resettlement allocation for In-habitants of A transmigration scheme (incorporation of local inhabitants into transmigration projects)
Transmigration Implementation Co-ordinating Board
National Co-ordination Agency for Surveying and Mapping
Regional development planning Council
Javanese system of employing labourers in return for a share in the harvest
relocating a whole village
Settlement preparation office
National Family Planning Co-ordinating Board
Administrative Bureau of State Companies
Commonwealth Development Corpora-
border areas
trouble areas
military run development villages
plantation site development villages
model villages
Directorate General for Mobilisation and Development
Directorate General for Settlement Preparation
Directorate General for Transmis-

DIP

Permission to implement a year's project and budget

DPR

Indonesia's 'Parliament'

Fretillen

Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor

Hankamrata Strategy

strategy to mobilise villagers to fight all opponents of the Indonesian regime

Hari Bhakti Transmigrasi

December 12th, Transmigration Thanksgiving Day

IGGI

Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia - group of countries who sponsor development in Indonesia

Inpres

Project funded by special presidential decree

Jawanisasi

Javanisation

kabupaten

regency

kakanwil

provincial transmigration head

kampung

village/community

kepres

presidential decree

ketahanan nasional

national security

kawadan

district

kolonisasi

transmigration under the Dutch

KUPT

transmigration settlement area head

ladang

swidden

Lahan

stage in transmigration process

LBH

Legal Council for Juridical Assistance

lurah

village chief

nanggala

red-beret Indonesian troops

NES scheme

nucleus estate small holder scheme

OPM

Free Papua Movement

Pancasila

philosophical basis of the Indonesian state

parmukin

hamlet

peladang nomades

shifting cultivation

pembignan teritorial

territorial management

Peluta/C-letter

land certificate
PIR Khusus
assistance for second stage in transmigration process oriented to estate production
PLP
Directorate of Land Preparation and Physical Infrastructure
PKI
Indonesian Communist Party
PNG
Papua New Guinea
PTP
acceleration programme
Puskesmas
public health sector
remigrasi
return of transmigrations to their place of origin
Repelita
5 year Government plan
sawah
wet rice agriculture
septamaga
ex-ABRI personnel
sertipikat hak milik
land ownership certificate
sertipikat hak pakai
land use certificate
SIAP
undispursed development funds
spatamarga
military transmigrants
suku suku terasing
isolated and aliened people
swakarsa bantuan
partly assisted transmigrants
swakarsa famili
unassisted transmigrants moving to join family members
swakarsa muni
transmigrants with no government assistance
tapol
political prisoner
Topografi THI-AD
Topographical Department of the Indonesian Army
translokasi
moving of people in the same area
transmigrasi
transmigration
transmigrasi lokal
local transmigrant
transmigrasi spontan
spontaneous transmigrant
transmigrasi umum
government assisted transmigrant
IWGIA LOCAL GROUPS:
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             DK 1171 Copenhagen K
             Denmark

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             Fredensgade 34,
             8000 Århus C
             Denmark

Oslo:      pb 20, Blindern 0313
            Oslo 3
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