The Aripuana Park and the Polonoroeste Programme
Carmen Junqueira & Betty Mindlin
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The Aripuana Park and the Polonoroeste Programme
By Carmen Junqueira and Betty Mindlin

Copenhagen July 1987
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Translated by Sheila Aikman
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Introduction

1. The Aripuana Park

The Aripuana Park is one of the largest indigenous areas in all Brazil. It is located partly in the State of Mato Grosso and partly in Rondonia and covers, according to legal delimitation, approximately 3.5 million hectares (8,658,000 acres). The different peoples living in the Park belong to the Tupi-Mondê language group, one of the branches of the Tupi family which until now has not been found in other parts of Brazil. These peoples are the Surui (also known as Paiter) in the 7th of September Indigenous Area; the Zoro and the Cinta Larga in the Indigenous Areas of Roosevelt, Aripuana, Serra Morena and in what is strictly speaking the Aripuana Indigenous Park. The population is estimated at 16,000 Indians, the majority of whom came into contact with Brazilian society in the 1970s. However there are still some who remain isolated in the forest.

The Gaviao (Ikonei), also Tupi-Mondê, and the Arara (Karo) who speak the Tupi Rama-Rama language, live in the Lourdes Indigenous Park which does not form part of the Aripuana Indigenous Park. This is because of an absurd indigenist policy which threw them off part of their territory and separated them from the rest of the Tupi-Mondê lands.

There are other groups which ought perhaps to be added to those living in the Aripuana Park area: two distinct peoples known as Arara, one Tupi and the other Tupi-Mondê, who are the survivors of massacres and have been torn from their land, and a third remote Tupi group in the Rio Maderinha.
The first international document about the Indians of the Aripuana Park was published by IWGIA in 1975 (Document No.19). The author, Jean Chiappino, visited the area in 1972 not long after the Brazilian government had made contact with the Indians. He denounced the sudden high increase of the death rate amongst the Indians, principally the Suruí, and complained of the inefficiency of FUNAI (the National Indian Foundation), the organisation entrusted with the protection of the Indians.

2. Economic Changes in the Region

More than ten years have passed since the last IWGIA document on Aripuana. The area on the whole has gained legally defined and demarcated lands but we can now also see losses. The territory traditionally occupied by the Indians was much larger and has been devastated: companies have taken over lands for agriculture and rubber extraction, villages have been destroyed, moved or confined within legal limits while measles, tuberculosis and flu have decimated the population.

However, to have held on to the territory they have today represents an important victory in the field of Brazilian economics and politics. The increase in population and the industrial occupation of the mid-west are working so powerfully against the Indians that it is surprising to see the state taking action which produces a minimum of respect for Indian rights (see table 1).

In recent years, the region has experienced a violent economic transformation. This is due since 1982 to the implementation of the Polonoroeste Programme whose main objective is to pave highway BR-364 from Cuiabá to Porto Velho. This programme, costing approximately 1.5 billion
dollars, is partly funded by the World Bank and consists of the highway, colonisation projects, health facilities and a component for the protection of the Indians. Even though the programme is not in itself so big - much smaller than the hydroelectric schemes at Itaupu - the effect it has had on the economy of the mid-west is one of ecological devastation and increased social inequality.

With the building of the asphalt highway, the population of Rondonia is increasing by an average of 20% annually - 200,000 people enter the state each year and the population ought to have already reached 1,200,000 people.

When Chiappino made his study, Cacoal the city nearest to the Park for example, did not exist. Now it has 80,000 inhabitants. Satellite photos verify that the destruction of the forest is terrifying: in Rondonia 2 million hectares have disappeared in 10 years. In recent years the rate has been 600,000 hectares per annum. Lumber companies and saw mill concerns, which for the most part have no rights to the lands, export hundreds of thousands of dollars out of the country, without any social benefit for the population as a whole. The government, with its policy in the 1970s of giving financial incentives through SUDAM (Superintendency of Amazonian Development), encourages this kind of institutionalised robbery of the country's forest resources. The highway has also made access to Rondonia much easier, not only for the lumberers but for mining companies too.

As for the colonists, not even 2% of those who arrive obtain lands within colonisation projects. In spite of this, the official propaganda throughout the country, be it by the radio or the newspapers, continues to promote the lands of Rondonia as a solution to unemployment and as an alternative to the agrarian reform in the south. The truth is that there
is no more land available for colonisation and the best soils have been taken by private companies.

3. Effects on the Indians

i) Pressure on land and health

While in the 60s the forest Indians still lived in relative isolation, the present day consequences of companies in the mid-west are devastating. The invasions of lands by colonists, companies, mining concerns and lumberers; the political pressures impeding demarcation; the reduction of indigenous territory and its division by highways, hydroelectric schemes and mining activities are daily occurrences for the Indians. We can see that the indigenous lands, like those of the Zoró, are split by local traders from the south. There the state governments hand out property titles for lands which are already recognised as Indian. The invading traders then construct factories etc.

The diseases which accompany economic change have also affected the health of the Indians. Given the inefficiency of the public health services and the deflection of resources for political ends, the Polonoroeste Programme has been responsible for the spread of malaria throughout the area as a whole. The mortality rates for the indigenous population are high due to malaria, tuberculosis, influenza and changes in the patterns of nutrition and hygiene.

ii) Economic changes

It is not only external pressures on land that are undermining the survival of the indigenous population but also changes in the economic and social systems of the groups themselves.

The tribal life of warring nomads, hunters and agricul-
turalists such as the Tupi-Monde, has been changed profoundly by the introduction of industrialised products, contact with the city and small scale production for a market economy. Some groups, such as the Surui and the Gaviao, have turned to coffee production and taken over plantations of coffee after the expulsion of invaders from indigenous lands; other groups trade with rubber and cacau.

The groups maintain their traditional social organisation, rites and standards but with the colonists' example and the city on their doorsteps, new values and desires develop: there is the need for money, for consumer goods and then the desire for schools and medical assistance.

iii) Political mobilisation

Today, with a new understanding of Brazilian society and its political mechanisms, the indigenous leaders' are striving for autonomy and the decision-making power over their own destiny. There is a struggle for land, armed conflicts and the deaths of invading colonists; there are political meetings between Indians of the region and with indigenous organisations such as UNI (the Union of Indigenous Nations); leaders travel to Brasilia to defend their claims against the federal government authorities and there are contacts with the press. These are all new developments and date from three or four years ago. Although there are many difficulties and problems in coping with the Brazilian system of decision-making and though FUNAI sometimes takes away its independence, it is a new movement.
4. The Polonoroeste Programme and the Authoritarianism of Indigenist Policy

There is no doubt that the Polonoroeste Programme accelerated pressures and economic conditions which were contrary to the integrity of the territory and tribal life of the Aripuana Park. Nevertheless, to attribute all that is happening to the Programme would be to simplify the analysis. It is true that, through loan agreements between the World Bank and the Brazilian government, special funds were provided for protecting the Indians. According to a contractual clause, the Brazilian government ought to give 26 million dollars over five years to the Indians in the area affected by the highway. Up until 1986, about 13 million dollars had been spent but the Indians had felt little effect. It is quite apparent that the meagre resources which did arrive in the communities were wasted and did not stimulate indigenous autonomy.

However, the Polonoroeste Programme forms part of the whole situation and is embedded in nationwide Brazilian economic policy which is making itself felt in the 80s with new plans for commercial occupation of the Amazon, construction of roads, colonisation of frontiers, hydroelectric schemes etc. It is a programme which, like those carried out before in the Amazon, ignores the protection of ecological areas and is not conducive to a more egalitarian distribution of income and rights to land. Before Polonoroeste the trends of economic development were similar but went at a slower pace.

So, even with financial resources, it is unrealistic to hope for more positive results for the Indians from Polonoroeste. The authoritarianism of indigenist policy continues as it has done in previous decades. Even though there is strong
Cinta Larga - Rio Aripuana (Photo Jesco)
legislation with respect to Indian rights - especially in the Federal Constitution which guarantees Indians the permanent possession of the lands which they occupied since time immemorial (art 198) - time and time again, Brazilian indigenist policies are characterised by unconstitutional and authoritarian decrees which hinder the demarcation and protection of indigenous territory. In its relation with Indians, the New Republic is almost as bad as the worst moments of the Brazilian dictatorship. There are signs of continuing the procedure of Decree 88.188 of December 1983 which complicates the process of demarcation of territories and grants to other state organs than FUNAI, the power to define what lands should be considered indigenous; there is also the approval in 1986 of the 1983 Decree 88.958 which permits the mineral exploitation of indigenous lands; there is the Amazon Development Plan which provides "indigenous colonies" with individual land ownership and promotes roads and capitalist businesses in the Amazon; there is the Calha Norte Project for the colonisation of the frontier regions, the decentralisation of FUNAI which puts indigenous lands at the mercy of local economic groups and further splits and immobilises bureaucratic decisions. In such a bureaucratised FUNAI the decision to defend Indians does not exist, in fact, on the contrary, it impedes and dilutes their claims; it is a FUNAI placed in the hands of people with neither the knowledge of nor involvement in the indigenous cause, who are supposed "efficient administrators" and are always solicitous of the interests of companies and ranchers.

The functioning of Polonoroeeste in the Aripuana area shows that despite some gains, such as the demarcation of lands, the majority of the resources destined for the Indians have been used to strengthen the bureaucracy of FUNAI and quadruplicate the number of officials working to protect health and lands.
5. Source material

This document was written after the authors spent a period of one month in the area during May 1986. It uses not only observations made during this short period but also previous field experience. The conclusions are therefore not transient but refer to a situation as seen over a period of many years.

The lack of assistance to the Indians of the Aripuana Park cannot be put down to a shortage of analyses. There have been innumerable ethnological works and investigative and evaluative field reports on the working of the Polonoroe- ste Programme. FIPE (Foundation Institute of Economic Investigations of the University of Sao Paulo) presented reports to SUDECO (Superintendancy for the Development of the Mid-West - Ministry of the Interior) and to FUNAI in 1983, '84, '85 and '86. Furthermore FIPE and also OPAN (Operation Anchieta) have produced communications and reports of conflicts over land in the region. The ethnological works and reports by various researchers (see bibliography) help in understanding the Indians' desires and show that the groups which worked in the area made close contacts with the indigenous communities. In fact, the papers and reports are always accompanied by claims and messages from the indigenous communities to the authorities. Given the resources of Polonoroeeste and the detailed accounts of measures to be taken, all the deadlocks ought to have been resolved.

Nevertheless, year after year reports come up with the same problems and each time the health and land situation is exacerbated, in spite of certain triumphs such as the demarcation of some areas.
We will move on then, and look again at the historical situation of the lands of the Aripuana Park and find out how the administration of FUNAI has utilised the resources of Polonoroeste in order to confront the difficult problems which affect the Indians of Aripuana.

NOTES

1. Brazilian legislation distinguishes Parks from Indigenous Areas where the former are designated for ecological conservation. For the Cinta Larga, a decree created the Aripuana Indigenous Park in 1968. The other Cinta Larga Indigenous Areas (A.I.) the 7th of September, Roosevelt, Serra Morena, Aripuana and Zoró, were created and legalised shortly after. The term "Aripuana Park", however, means not only the Indigenous Park itself but also the contiguous Indigenous Areas. The territory of these groups should be recognised as a unit with common protection in that they already constitute a cultural complex with communal natural resources. "Aripuana Park" is also an administrative name used by FUNAI to refer to an area which includes the Tupi-Moné villages in the Mequens Indigenous Area, an area quite far away and not a part of this study. This FUNAI named Aripuana Park was formed in October 1986 and comprises the Gaviao and Arara of the Lourdes Indigenous Area.
2. In 1983 a new decree was drawn up (88.188) which regulated the administration of indigenous lands. According to this new decree the demarcation process for indigenous lands is as follows:

**Identification**
FUNAI is responsible for identifying indigenous lands. FUNAI does this by confirming the boundaries of the area that an indigenous group or groups occupy. Once the identification has been carried out FUNAI proposes the physical demarcation of the lands to the Interministerial Work Group. Once the demarcation proposal has been accepted by the Interministerial Work Group, the latter passes it to the President of the Republic for his acceptance. Once the President has signed the demarcation proposal, the lands are considered as delimited.

**Demarcation - the physical demarcation of the lands.**
Once the physical demarcation has been carried out, the President signs a decree to the effect that the demarcations are officially registered. The lands are then inscribed in the SPU (Public Records Office) and the process of demarcation is finalised.

**Provisional Delimitation (Interdiction)**
Provisionally delimited lands are those which have been provisionally defined for specific aims, for example for attracting Indians who are classified as isolated by the State.

(editor's note)
### THE PRESENT LEGAL SITUATION OF THE LANDS IN RONDONIA

#### I - Lands which are delimited, demarcated and officially registered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIGENOUS AREA/PARK</th>
<th>AREAS in hectares</th>
<th>INVASIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Igarraré Lage I.A.</td>
<td>107,321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lourdes I.A.</td>
<td>185,534</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riberao I.A.</td>
<td>47,863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Negro Ocaia I.A.</td>
<td>104,064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th of September I.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aripuana Indigenous Park</td>
<td>618,000</td>
<td>996,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karitiana I.A.</td>
<td>89,682</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Branco I.A.</td>
<td>236,147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1498,480</td>
<td>1124,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### II - Lands which are delimited, demarcated but not officially registered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Area</th>
<th>Area in acres</th>
<th>Invasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacaas-Novas I.A.</td>
<td>277,906</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt I.A.</td>
<td>154,056</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubarao Latunde I.A.</td>
<td>116,613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### III - Lands which are under special statute agreement (which recognises the presence of indigenous peoples in ecologically protected national parks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Area</th>
<th>Area in acres</th>
<th>Invasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urueu-Wau-Wau I.A. (IBDF Agreement)</td>
<td>1000,000</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paccaas-Novas National Park</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### IV - Lands not demarcated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Area</th>
<th>Area in acres</th>
<th>Invasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sagarana I.A.</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karipuna I.A.</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazarari I.A.</td>
<td>44,990</td>
<td>82,550 (Amanzon, Acre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaporé I.A.</td>
<td>128,196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mequens I.A.</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is still no demarcation for the lands of isolated groups and their villages.
Map showing the Aripuana Park (Sheila Aikman)
Chapter 1 - Lands

1. The Definition of Indigenous Territory and its Violation

Among the many threats that hang over the indigenous peoples of Brazil, the loss of their territory is, perhaps, the most serious because it affects their immediate survival. Diverse factors contribute to make the struggle to protect the lands harder - an economic model which encourages predators in areas of the advancing colonial frontier, lack of respect for basic human rights and the large concentration of lands, wealth and income in few hands. In this context indigenous peoples are treated as surviving vestiges of ancient and antiquated systems long destroyed who live in areas where the pace of the industrial era has not yet reached. Their place in the national context is seen as transitory, just as with peoples in other continents and in other times, who gave place to western civilisation. Seen in this light, there is no great desire to defend the Indians or their lands. One has become accustomed to thinking of land purely in terms of productivity, merchandise and of preserving its value.

Because of this, tasks which could be relatively simple, such as defining indigenous territory, become problems on a scale of national security. From a legal point of view, it is easy to choose an indigenous area: it is enough to know the territory that the Indians define as their's and make a map without changing anything and the habitat is registered forever. The law states quite clearly that the area inhabited by the Indians is an indigenous area. In accordance with Article 198 of the Federal Constitution, such a definition is indisputable.
Nevertheless, the state and a large part of Brazilian society does not accept that a quantity of land should be defined in relation to the lifestyle and the culture of a people. They ignore that indigenous land is the basis for a way of living and thinking particular to the Indians. In order to be occupied - possessed in the strictest meaning of the word - the land is linked organically to the group and its culture.

The ignorance of this relationship and its consequences in Brazil is shown by an aggressive policy of expropriation of traditional territories and the imposition and legitimation of one particular concept of what land is and how it should be administered. This authoritarian and dominant attitude is well represented in official indigenist policies.

Indigenous peoples and territories become problems for the state when economic advance reaches their environs. Then the lands are diminished and expropriated, groups are moved and other methods are used which progressively disorganise, or what amounts to the same, destroy groups and communities.

From the beginning of the 60s two important events fuelled a new rhythm to the advance of the economic frontier in Rondonia and Mato Grosso: there was a vast wave of mining activity which had previously been carried out by mineral prospectors but was now being increasingly exploited by large companies; and there was the completion of the Cuiabá-Porto Velho highway, uniting the mineral reserves of cassiterite (tinstone) with the tin working companies of the south. These factors accelerated the occupation of area. The invasions of lands and the conflicts with the Indians increased. Armed expeditions set out to exterminate complete communities.
2. The Massacre of Parallel 11

In 1963, a group of Cinta Larga were decimated when constructing their houses on the banks of the river Aripuana. The crime, known as the "massacre of Parallel 11", reached the ears of the public because of its denunciation by one of the members of the expedition. He was infuriated because he walked for 58 days for the kill and in the end did not receive the "50 contos" promised for the job and he resolved to denounce his companions and those who led the massacre. 1

Such crimes are not isolated incidents. They originate in the successive invasions of tribal territories which follow the opening of access roads and which, in turn, make areas rich in selvatic products and minerals immediately accessible. The economic exploitation of these resources involves, as is customary, the eviction or annihilation of complete groups. Worse still is the impunity of the culprits who advocate the institutionalisation of the indigenous massacres which are regularly carried out in pioneering areas.

A commission of enquiry set up to investigate the massacre of Parallel 11 met with many difficulties: witnesses and accused had died or simply disappeared. In the same fashion, the president of the commission concluded his work by attributing the guilt to two members and the leaders of the expedition - Antonio Mascarenhas Junqueira and Sebastiao Palma Arruda. The prosecutor, meanwhile, lodged a case against the members of the expedition but did not denounce the leaders because he was not completely sure about the killing of the Indians, even though the objective of the expedition was an exploration for mineral resources and the expansion of rubber extraction"  (JB 04/08/68 see bibliography for the abbreviations of the diaries).
Otiea, Surui leader, killed by colonists in 1976 (Photo: Jesco)
In 1975, the only person condemned for the massacre, Ramiro Costa, received a national pardon. Condemned to eleven years in prison, he completed only five.

During that time the press published information about other accusations: A.M. Junqueira was pinpointed as the man who contracted pilots for the bombing of villages. One of his associates, Sebastião P. Arruda, was the brother of the ex-prefecture of Ciuabá and ex-president of the Amazon Bank (JB 05/05/68) and another, Amauri Furquim, was prefect of Aripuana (JB 28/04/68). After a few years no one talked of the crime any more nor of those responsible.

Nothing stops armed groups scouring Cinta Larga territory for minerals. The Cinta Larga resist as well as they can. In 1966, they attacked the telegraph office in Vilhene; the newspapers of the time confirmed that it was in reprisal for the invasion of their territories by mineral prospectors (JB 27/05/69). The Prefect of Aripuana came to ask FUNAI for protection against the Cinta Larga who had killed one miner and wounded three others (ESP 24/05/68). Subsequent investigations revealed that the miners were attacked for having invaded the lands of the Cinta Larga. At the same time FUNAI accused the Prefect of having constructed a work camp in the middle of the indigenous area (JB 11/05/69) in the period when it was a provisionally demarcated zone.

Because of increased pressure on land, FUNAI organised an expedition of "pacification", that is, an expedition with the aim of establishing peaceful contact with the Indians and neutralising their resistance. On the 16th of July 1968, a large area was provisionally delimited which extended from 11° to 13°30' latitude south and 58°30' to 60°30' longitude west covering the lands between the rivers Roosevelt and Jurena from east to west, and from the heights of the river
Camararé to Igarapé Jacutinga (an affluent of the Roosevelt) from north to south (Decree No. 62995).

One year later the Aripuana Indigenous Park was created corresponding to the provisionally delimited area (Decree No. 64.860 of the 23rd July, 1969). Even though it embraced several groups, the boundaries left villages situated further north between the rivers Branco (an affluent of the Aripuana) and Guaribá out of the Park and similarly the Suruí groups of Rondonia.

3. Attacks on Indigenous Territory

As a consequence of the Federal Government's National Integration Programme (PIN) in 1970 which aimed to stimulate colonisation of the Amazon, the foundations for the Aripuana Project were launched in the district of the same name in Mato Grosso. The preparation for the development of the Project included making studies for an integrated plan of the district and the creation of the first project centre called Pioneer Humboldt Nucleus. The work would be carried out by CODEMAT (Company for the Development of the State of Mato Grosso). This presented a serious threat for the Indians and their lands. The subsequent conclusions of the CPI (Parliamentary Investigative Commission) about the land are well known – made in 1977, they highlight CODEMAT as an organisation which dealt "in the concession of large areas to powerful interest groups, not to mention the scandal of the sale of granted lands in the district of Aripuana". 3

The district of Aripuana is situated in the north of the state, 800 kms. from Cuiabá and is approximately 140,000 km2. The area is rich in tin, manganese, iron, diamonds and titanium. The Pioneer Humboldt Nucleus was to be located on
A Cinta Larga maloca from the Río Eugenia (Photo: Jesco)
the banks of the river Aripuana, beside two waterfalls with a hydroelectric potential estimated at 600,000 h.p.

In March 1973, in the Symposium on the future of the Cinta Larga Indians at the Federal University of Mato Grosso, the serious problems actually happening to the Indians as a consequence of government projects were debated. The Prefect of Aripuana who was present at the meeting detailed the importance of the work to be developed in the area, especially the integration of the district with the rest of the state. Initially this would take the form of a highway uniting the Pioneer Humboldt Nucleus with the town of Fontanillas on the left bank of the river Juruena. The highway would pass by the Aripuana Park in a stretch 80 kms. long.

In August of the previous year, 1972, the missionary, Father Thomaz Lisboa, had located a Cinta Larga village by the river Vermelho (an affluent of the Juruena) and he begged the authorities responsible for the Project to interrupt work on the highway. In October, after aerial reconnaissance, Father Thomaz confirmed that the roadworks were continuing and putting the existence of the village at risk. In the same period, the newspaper Equipe from Cuiabá, commented sarcastically in its editorial that part of the area where the highway passed would be a donation to the Federation of the State of Mato Grosso "by means of the extinction, reduction and removal of the Indigenous Park" (JB 31/10/72).

4. The Reduction of the Aripuana Park

Pressures to reduce the size of the Park were strong. We shall note a few of them here to show the extent of the interests involved. By 1971, the Prefect of Aripuana, Sebastião Otoni de Carvalho Sobrinho, had already sent a
statement listing reasons for reducing the Park to the Minister of the Interior, General Costa Cavalcante. He sent a petition in the same vein to the Comandante of the 9th Military Region, General Reynaldo Mello de Almeida. Then, one year later, he sent another to the Federal Deputy, General Alípio Ayres de Carvalho. In this last letter the Prefect asked that he join together with him to pledge themselves to the President of FUNAI to liberate the area. In April of the same year, the Deputy sent a letter to the President of FUNAI endorsing the Prefect's petition "adding that the question in hand is also one of interest to some of my friends in Paraná, who are, naturally enough, in a hurry to continue the noble development of the state and are procuring the lands of the Mato Grosso to construct there another great work for the good of the country, like those already carried out in our state." 

This makes it clear that these public men do not recognise the right of Indians to their territory. As always, the indigenous populations are exposed to all manner of aggression, just as their lands had been taken from them and distributed.

In January 1974, the boundaries of the Park were altered (Decree No. 73.563 of the 24/01/74). The original area of approximately 3,600,000 has. was reduced to 1,672,000 has.

By this time the Humboldt Project had already moved away from the scientific methods it was founded on and had assumed a business-like character. When General Ernesto Geisel visited the Federal University of Mato Grosso at the beginning of 1974, the general management of the Project presented him with a study of the ideal orientation for Humboldt: it dealt with the creation of mechanisms to strengthen business in the Amazon. Geisel, for his part, suggested the impor-
tance of re-using native rubber trees in the area to supply the needs of the car industry. The Project's technicians saw the possibility of exploiting an immense rubber area in the valleys of the rivers Aripuana and Branco, with a workcentre for approximately one hundred families which by 1974 would be using modern technology and mechanisation for the harvesting (ESP 24/02/74).

One month before, the residents of Humboldt were surprised by a visit from a group of Cinta Larga Indians who came with the objective of "pacifying" the whites. The visit resulted in a devastating epidemic which killed many Indians (ESP 15/01/74). The Project had moved into indigenous territory.

FUNAI was alerted because many villages had been left outside the boundaries of the Park and they obtained a ban on the areas on the left bank of the river Roosevelt (RO) and the right bank of the river Aripuana (MG) extending this protection to other Cinta Larga villages, though for a limited time because in 1976 part of the ban was declared ineffectual (Decree No.78.108 of the 22/07/76).

The process of expansion continued and in 1976 the Polo Aripuana was initiated. The Polo Aripuana was part of a programme of development called Poloamazonia which included the introduction of colonisation, the construction of highway AR-1 and the building of a city. The project was situated between the rivers Aripuana and Juina Mirim in the heart of indigenous territory and covered approximately 400,000 has. By 1979, almost 3,000 people had settled there and by 1981 the population had increased to almost 15,000 of whom approximately 10,000 lived in the rural area.
It is quite clear that the reduction of the Aripuana Park in 1974 was made in order to open up more space for the construction of highway AR-1 and to make thousands of hectares of land available for business activities.

In January 1978, CODEMAT asked FUNAI for a certificate confirming that there were no Indians in an area chosen for the Juina colonisation project. FUNAI issued the certificate (No.0032 of the 22/06/78) which declared that there nothing to testify to the existence of villages in the area, even though there was abundant documentation to the contrary available to FUNAI in Brasilia, in the 8th D.R. of Porto Velho and in the headquarters of the Aripuana Park. This documentation stated unequivocally that there were Cinta Larga groups in the headwaters of the river Vermelho, inside the area sought after by CODEMAT. On this occasion, FUNAI, instead of fighting against the criminal take-over of the area, barely managed to set aside some resources in order to tempt the Indians of the river Vermelho towards the interior of the Serra Morena reserve and it did nothing to guarantee the inviolability of indigenous land.

At the beginning of 1981, Polonoroeste was established and with it a new wave of increased business activity in Rondonia and Mato Grosso. The Programme's immediate objective was to asphalt the highway that united Cuiabá with Porto Velho (BR-364) and open a permanent corridor for penetrating the area. The boundaries of the Park began to be violated more and more frequently, not only by landless people but, on the contrary, principally by public and private companies.
5. Invasions in Serra Morena and Land Divisions

One of these invasions merits particular attention because it reveals not only the immense disrespect towards the indigenous heritage but also FUNAI's incompetence in protecting indigenous interests. In 1983, with federal authorisation, the national company CEMAT (Central Electric Mato Grosso A/S) began construction work for a hydroelectric plant on the river Aripuana, 20 kms. above Serra Morena, which would inundate the lands of the Park.

By 1985, after the Cinta Larga attack in the region of the hydroelectric plant construction, FUNAI began to look for a way of defending Indian interests. It was declared that in the areas adjacent to the plant the boundary stones of the Serra Morena Indigenous Post (I.P.) were easy to find. An examination of the documents available to FUNAI meanwhile revealed differing data about the demarcation of the post. In 1979, when FUNAI was inspecting the demarcation work being carried out by an independent consultant, FUNAI stated that the eastern and northern boundaries of the post were not correct. Since then these boundaries have remained in the ground even though they do not conform to those described in the initial documentation.

When these so-called errors were corrected and appeared after an enormous delay in 1985, the construction works were demarcated as being outside the area of Serra Morena. Meanwhile, a parcel of land to the north that became part of the indigenous heritage in the correction was occupied by people with a definite property title. The government of Mato Grosso had opened the area to colonisation previously without the knowledge of FUNAI. The Indians, respecting the boundaries laid out in the demarcation, accepted the presence of these neighbours. For the Cinta Larga to re-establish their
rights over the area, the property titles would have to be annulled according to a judicial decision. In the event of the titles being annulled, FUNAI would have to find resources to compensate the owners for their loss. Clearly, the central government could appeal to the government of Mato Grosso over the illegal colonisation of the lands – but the probability of this happening is minimal because of political interests. Under these conditions, the Indians will certainly lose this piece of land (about 20,000 hectares of a total of 148,300 hectares). Moreover, they still have to face the uncertain repercussions of the flooding.

Until now CEMAT has not divulged any information about the consequences of the building of the hydroelectric plant. It does not know the extent of the flooding; they only know that it will affect the indigenous lands where Cinta Larga work rubber. There is no information about what will happen to the course of the river Aripuana or the aquatic flora and fauna. As the whole area is severely affected with malaria, it is very likely that the formation of a still lake will increase the incidents of the illness.

As compensation for these uncertainties, the Cinta Larga of Serra Morena received a lorry and some smaller pieces of equipment. This meant that they had to wait for their compensation until the road which unites the village with the hydroelectric plant was built. But without the resources to maintain the road the Indians saw it turn into a vast swamp in the rainy season.
6 Adjustment of the Park Lands

a) The Aripuana Indigenous Area (Aripuana I.A.)

There was never a moment where a systematic effort was developed to establish the Cinta Larga lands. FUNAI's "pacification" expeditions increased owing to the pressure of companies on the Cinta Larga rather than by any intent of FUNAI's to guarantee the Indians' rights. One need only see the boundaries for provisional delimitation in 1968 to find the reason for preparing "Operation Cinta Larga". All the villages on the right bank of the river Aripuana were excluded from the proposal even though this was certainly reconnoitred by air as was all the territory to the north between 10° and 11° latitude south and 59°30' and 60°15' longitude west. But this is not mentioned despite the fact the indigenous population is dense.

In the same way, Decree No.62.995 (16/07/68), which delimited a larger area, did not include the villages on the rivers Aripuana, Branco and Guariba. FUNAI was certainly not unaware of the indigenous people in the area because earlier the prefect of the city of Aripuana had come running asking for "protection against the Cinta Larga" who were repelling invaders - invaders who had been penetrating their territory since, at least, the beginning of the decade (ESP 24/05/68 and 11/03/75).

In 1975 the President of FUNAI, General Imarht de Araujo Oliveira, authorised a certificate to the company Joao Lunardelli S/A stating that there were no indigenous villages in the area (certificate No. 00026 of the 11/03/75).

The administrator of the Park, Aimoré Cunha da Silva, on a journey to the river Branco, asked to visit the area with a
Cinta Larga who arrived at the Serra Morena IVP, 1970 (Photo: Jesco)
view to delimitation and confirmed that there were indigenous people there. 10 In 1978, the same administrator sent a recommendation for the proposed demarcation of these lands to FUNAI in Brasilia. 11 The area was finally given provisional delimitation (Ministerial Decree 652/N of the 14/03/79) with some alterations from the original proposal on the eastern border. But unfortunately, the delimitation did not cover the whole territory and the villages in the rivers Guariba and Capitao Cardoso were left outside - land included in the certificate to the company.

The Indigenist Pastoral Team of the Prelacy of Rondonia (Ji- Parana) have surveyed the area by land and air and produced drawings with minute detail. In 1981, they sent a proposal to FUNAI for a new delimitation for the proposed area for demarcation which extended to all the registered villages. FUNAI's slowness and neglect left the area exposed to great dangers.

b) Invasions in the Aripuana I.A.

In 1978, for example, more than a hundred mineral prospectors came to look for gold in the region where the Rio Preto I.P. exists today. According to the Prelacy of Rondonia there was an attempt at mechanising gold washing by the company Mineracao Rondon in 1979. In 1981, the deposits were exploited by Ancon Mining, an associate company of Mineracao Rondon, who were in unlawful possession of a certificate for exploration and washing issued by the DNPM (National Department of Mining Production). FUNAI had known about this invasion since August 1978 because the Park administration broadcast over the Park radio to Brasilia that there were Indians in the river Branco area. There was tree felling near the villages and installations for working gold
deposits. Moreover, the Park administration denounced abuses against Indian women by workmen. In 1981 the Prelacy denounced the same acts to FUNAI.

More recently, in 1984, the Ouro Preto deposit closed after having caused a lot of harm to the communities. Nevertheless, the Aripuana I.A. has still not been received its decreed title to this day. All the invaders remain in the area. The ranch of Santa Helena, for example, laid down boundary stones along the right bank of the river Guariba. Between the rivers Aripuana and Branco there are other farms, such as those of Henrique and Libório. In the eastern sector of Aripuana I.A., INTERMAT (Mato Grosso Land Institute) erected the boundaries of the indigenous area and alerted FUNAI to invasions which were taking place by accident and through FUNAI's inactivity. In the Guariba river region, between the right bank and 60° longitude west, INTERMAT also planned to have an illegal plot of land. In 1985 demarcation work was carried out but according to the 1986 information, the invasions are more numerous each time the area is surveyed.

(c) Invasions in Roosevelt I.A. and the Aripuana Indigenous Park

Several farms were set up some years ago in Roosevelt I.A. and among them was one belonging to the brother-in-law of the prefect of Espigão do Oeste, with fields of pasture, an airstrip, cultivation and deforested areas. The construction of a road designed to cut across the Aripuana Park was started in 1984 and has been used to rob wood from the Indians. FUNAI took action against the invaders. In 1985, they were able to get permission to stay in the area but were evicted by the Indians.
Meanwhile, many invaders, and not all completely identified, still occupy indigenous land, particularly in the region of the river Tenente Marques, which is in the Aripuana Indigenous Park.

A group of economic invaders, the Grupo Rosseti, have been taking wood from indigenous lands near the highway AR-1 Vilhena-Juina. In June 1986, FUNAI was able to confiscate company machines and prepared wood. But on the whole these invasions continue unchallenged and by virtue of the obstacles set up in Brasilia, the wood taken is not sold by FUNAI for the benefit of the Indians.

d) Invasions in the 7th of September I.A. (Surui)

Since 1971, and from first contact in 1969, the territory of the Surui (Paiter) has been invaded by a group of people from an illegal company called Itaporanga. In 1976, when the lands of the Surui were demarcated (and the 1974 provisional delimitation was reduced by half) a thousand colonist families had already taken over the forests. The city of Espigão do Oeste is situated in lands taken away from the Surui.

Their remaining legally defined territory was then invaded again by colonists. The Indians fought bravely with the help of FUNAI and in 1981, after several deaths on both sides, eighty invading families were transferred to other colonisation projects.

Today, the Surui take care that there are no invaders and make periodic checks on their territory but given the unreliability of the law, the risk is always there.
e) The invasions in Zorô I.A.

The most resounding case of the invasion of indigenous territory is that of the Zorô. For the period from 1979 to 1984 the available information states that the Zorô have not been invaded.

In 1984 in a FIPE report (ref.9), Robert Gambini denounced what he considered to be the most serious situation in the whole Park area. Zorô territory was divided up into at least forty INTERMAT titles registered in the Property Register in Aripuana although as yet there is no physical occupation. A company called Condominio Lunardelli built a highway which joined the city of Espigao do Oeste with Muiraquita farm (neighbouring the Zorô). The road originated as a throughway for cattle in 1976 but was closed by FUNAI in 1979. The highway was financed by the farm which erected barricades at each end and charged a toll on vehicles. A large number of invaders settled along the length of the highway, opened up fields and cleared forest. Lumberers began to appear too. In the dry season there were reports of forty lorries per day robbing wood from the Indigenous Area. In 1984 FUNAI sent a working group with INCRA (Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform) and INTERMAT which verified that there were around 60 settlers in the area.

The Polonoroeste Programme planned to install two watch posts, one at the beginning of the road and the other at the end, in order to pre-empt new invasions. But absolutely nothing was done and by May 1986, the situation had deteriorated a great deal. Several different companies were carving up the indigenous lands. One of these, CANORPA, a business cooperative from Paranã, which had already tried to get entry in 1984, began an intense lobbying of governmental authorities and Congress. Other plots of land were the
initiatives of businessmen from Cacoal and Espigao do Oeste who confirm that they have deforested the area, made plantations and have hired labourers. They had immediate plans to built an airstrip. According to their own information there are even two electoral enrollment posts in the area which have as many as 700 voters in one or two schools.

In 1985 the Cinta Larga from Roosevelt made an expedition along the highway to the south towards the 14th of April river in order to throw invaders off Indian lands. In the lower reaches of this river the expedition found a large number of fields, lumber work and settlements within Zoró territory.

In spite of the extent of the problem, FUNAI's neglect continues as before. It does not even make use of the services and information supplied by IBDF who maintain an employee at the entrance to the Indigenous Area.

For a long time now, the Indians have been subjected to brainwashing by the New Tribes Missionaries and have been concentrated at the FUNAI post in the very north of the road in organised agricultural work. In 1985, for the first time, they took their own initiative against the invaders. They travelled to the south of the area, to the region where the invasions were, captured a lorry and threw out two invaders. This task was, in fact, more difficult than they had foreseen and official action, with the help of the Federal Police, was needed to avoid bloodier clashes.

f) The massacre of 1976

As if that were not enough, the violence towards the Indians had its origins in a massacre that was never investigated. When Condominio Lunardelli opened the first road
from Espigão do Oeste to Roosevelt in 1976, 14 bodies were found. As far as is known the murders were the responsibility of the building contractor for the road, a certain Reveria, who worked for Condomínio Lunardelli and the farm, Concisa (where today there would have been an isolated group of Tupi Indians). The farm was infamous in the region for the floggings the workers received.

As FUNAI was in the area carrying out demarcation work on the Roosevelt I.A., it came to hear of the massacre and denounced it to the police (Official Note No. 398/DGO/FUNA of the 06/06/76 and Report No. 003/PQARI/76, PROC. FUNAI/BS- R/4248/76 and note of the 8o D.R./No. 13/77). No one ever began an investigation into the crime and it has been forgotten since then. This is a clear indication that the possession and occupation of indigenous lands is based upon genocide and that the invaders have no legitimate rights, even though some have a property title.

g) The rights of the Zoró

The opinion of lawyer Maria Eunice Paiva (ref.25) confirms that the Zoró have an irrefutable right to the Indigenous Area in spite of the many invasions and the strong opposing political pressures. The moves to reduce the territory of the Zoró also affects Aripuana I.A. and is in the interests of the large companies such as Condomínio Lunardelli, the economic groups of Paraná and Mato Grosso who are interested in the plots that INTERMAT is making out of the lands and the prefects of Espigiao do Oeste and Aripuana. There are no small colonists although there are, perhaps, workers sent by companies to try out the area, and some migrants fooled by businesses of greater reputation such as Canonpa. For a quick solution - and this does not seem to be in mind for the dry months of 1986 - what is needed is the
combined force of the law and a firm government decision to respect it. The material and political cost today of removing the invaders is high but has to be met. The Zoró area is important not only for the Zoró but for preserving the integrity of the Aripuana Park. To permit the invasions is to open the floodgates to the destruction and breakup of the rest of the Park.

h) Mining activities and highways

Other threats are looming over Aripuana. The DNPM (National Department of Mining Production) issued 119 exploration permits affecting the lands of the Tupi-Mondê and which ought to be promptly revoked. As far are roads are concerned, there are projects for a federal highway, BR-174, (which is part of the state road 319 Vilhena-Juína, 85kms from Vilhena and which cuts the Park in the direction of Manaus) and two state highways. One of these, the 311, is already constructed and begins in the outskirts of Espigao do Oeste, crosses the rivers Roosevelt and Capitao Cardoso continuing in the direction of the city of Aripuana. The other, the 208, which is a continuation of the 311, leaves Aripuana in the direction of Ariquemes and cuts the rivers Branco and Guarica, passing through villages in the Aripuana I.A.
NOTES

1. Ministry of Agriculture, SPI-Document sent by the director of 6a. IR, José Baptista Ferreira Filho to the Commander of the 16BC, Cuiabá, 7/12/63.


3. The Commission's report mentions that the governor of Mato Grosso had been authorised by the Federal Senate to transfer to CODEMAT "an area of 2 million hectares to be handed over to a third party according to the conditions specified in the public auction". On the 24th September, 1973, the governor of the state appeared before the Advisory Commission which presented the following successful bidders: Conisa Ltd., 400,000 hectares; Rendanil Empreendimentos, 1,000 hectares; João Carlos de Souza Meirelles, 200,000 hectares and Indeco S/A 400,000 hectares.

   The following irregularities were challenged by the CPI: a) double sale of lands by the state government; b) part of the area auctioned was sub-judice; c) the basic auction principles were not adhered to; e) the technical capaicaity and financing was not bought by the bidders; h) they conferred final signatures before the projects were approved of by competent organisations (INCRA, SUDAM etc.); i) indiscriminate sale of the auctioned area; j) other irregularities.

5. Municipality of Aripuana, No.50/72, Campo Grande 21/07/72.

6. Municipality of Aripuana, Cuiaba 23/02/73.

7. Camara de Diputados, Brasilia, 13/04/73.

8. The Aripuana National Park was demarcated in 1975; the areas of Roosevelt I.P. in 1976; 7th of September I.P. in 1977 and Serra Morena I.P. in 1979.

9. "Operacion Cinta Larga" No. 172, 18/06/68.


13. CEDI/CONAGE bibliography no. 34.
Chapter 2 – Administration

Why is FUNAI so negligent in its task of defending and supervising the boundaries of indigenous territory and assuring that the Indians live in healthy conditions? Are indigenist policies oriented towards finding an economic path for Indian self-determination and the preservation of tribal culture? Should the Indians not have had some benefit from the resources available in the Polonoroeste Programme?

These questions are posed in all the reports and anthropological investigations of the area since 1979 and in the evaluative reports since 1983. Unfortunately, they have had depressing answers.

1. The Regional Structure of FUNAI and the Indigenous Posts

The Aripuana Park region has its headquarters in Riozinho, 12 kms. from Cacoal, near to the highway BR-364 (Cuiabá-Porto Velho). Until 1986, the administration came under the authority of the Regional Delegation of FUNAI in Porto Velho, and the latter was answerable to Brasilia. In 1986, the hierarchical restructuring of FUNAI left the Park unsure for several months whether it was answerable to the United Administration in Manaus, Cuiabá, Porto Velho or Brasilia. The administrative chaos was so great that resources arrived without any budget guidelines as to how they should be used. In July 1986, it was decided that the Park Administration came under the authority of Cuiabá. The areas of the Zoró and Gaviao/Arara were also included in the Park Administration as from October 1986, though the effects of this have not yet been analysed.
munities of Lineas 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 sprung up (in addition to the old posts of 7th of September and Linea 14). Today, each one demands medical facilities, radio contact, officials and general facilities due to the posts where possible. All these things have been acquired already by Linea 11, and will also be acquired shortly by Linea 9.

In addition to the Suruí (Paiter) and Cinta Larga, there are signs of isolated groups in the Park – Cinta Larga or perhaps Nambiguara – and in the Aripuana I.A. there is a non-identified group near Tenente Marques. If the FUNAI medical service and vaccination programme were competent, these groups should be contacted, because they run the risk of being decimated by measles and other diseases.

Another post under the authority of the Aripuana Park is that of Mequens, though not officially. It has been functioning since 1985 with very few visits and almost no attention from FUNAI.

2. The Work of the Posts

The posts exist to give help to the indigenous way of life - to stop invaders and to provide medical assistance - and, in this capacity, are well justified. Without FUNAI, the Indians would have been swept off their lands. Nevertheless, the work of the posts has in reality, taken on another character.

After the posts are opened, the indigenous population come to live nearby because of their novelty and the medical services. The post directors are anxious to start cultivating the land and often put the Indians to work under the misconception that they were there to gather economically and produce the local resources (plantations, rubber, Brazil
Indian woman spinning (Photo: the authors)
Nuts and coffee). Moreover, they ignore the fact that the Indians have their own social and economic organisation, and often their blind interference in tribal life brings not only profound changes, accelerating the consumption and sale of industrial goods and market commodities, but also concentrating all the Indians in one single area. The number of scattered villages has decreased and these were precisely the best means of watching over the area. The travelling and hunting involved in the traditional way of life are important both for protecting the land and providing food, but now the Indians are becoming very busy with economic tasks dedicated to commercialisation.

This is a very serious problem but it has never been discussed or documented by FUNAI.

3. The Bureaucratic Picture

In 1979, there were 20 Park officials. By the end of 1982, there were 40, 17 of whom worked in headquarters at Riozinho and the remainder in the indigenous areas. In 1986, the total number of Park officials (excluding areas Zoró and Gaviao/Arara) was 104, five times more than it was in 1979. Of these, 66 were from Polonoroeste and 40 had been employed between January and June of 1986. More than 50 officials worked in the Park headquarters and in the Indian House in Riozinho.

The data shows for itself a strengthening of the bureaucracy of FUNAI due to Polonoroeste. The results of such a large apparatus do not reach the Indians - they are swallowed up in its own bureaucratic machinery. The truth is, that apart from the appointment of officials, the volume of resources which actually arrived at the Aripuana Park during the Polonoroeste Programme has not been very large.
What do these resources amount to? It is almost impossible to say. One can scarcely estimate because there are always reformulations being made, prices calculated at a very low rate because of inflation and needs badly planned for. The funds, which were programmed to cover one year from March to March, only managed to get there in August. In 1986, up until July, the programming had not even been approved. With inflation in Brazil running as it was before the Plan Cruzado in February 1986, completing any programme was an impossibility. The quotas are insufficient for vehicles, fuel, equipment, etc. And so the Programme has foundered in its own attempts to put it into practice.

As far as implementing the programme and its expenditure are concerned, they have always been a mystery. With data provided by FUNAI and SUDECO, and some very rough calculations, we can estimate that a maximum of two million dollars were spent on Aripuana between 1981 and 1985 - that is to say that a large part of these resources (perhaps a third) went on demarcation of lands. (see table 2) The effective information, which ought to be available in any rational organisation, is not known. Up until the middle of 1986, the administration of the Park came under the authority of the 8a D.R. and alleged that, for this reason, it did not have a clear picture of its own incurred expenses. Neither this nor previous administrations ever produced a report on, for example, how much it had spent on health, protecting lands, fuel, transport, etc. As funds were provided by several sources (Polonoroeste, FUNAI, Polamazonia, PIN and other unusual funds) a comprehensive analysis is what is needed here.

Polonoroeste, in all its aspects, represented a substantial increase in resources and personnel which should have permitted exemplary work in health and defence of the
Indians. Sadly, this was not the case and the situation in Aripuana today is more dramatic than it was a few years ago. It is necessary to identify a few explanatory key points.

There is no team of indigenist administrators and officials prepared to understand the world of the Indians and who are committed to supporting them. Within FUNAI, as an organisation, and in Brazil, as a whole, officials are part of a co-operative hierarchy, strengthened to a large extent during the peak of the military government - a hierarchy directed more to the defence of their own bureaucracy than to the defence of the Indians. There are, of course, many dedicated officials, imbued with humanitarian ideals and a few rare experts on the indigenous world.

Nevertheless, there is no discussion whatsoever of the indigenous world, neither in the upper levels of the bureaucracy nor even concerning the most simple duties: how is it possible, through indigenist policies, to choose between different paths the best way to confront the capitalist economy with tribal society? In the Aripuana Park, as in other areas, the officials are sent to the field with no knowledge of the group they are to work with, nor do they know anything about the organisation of an indigenous community, or the way they ought to behave. Primary school teachers, medical auxiliaries, post directors - people whose level of education and experience is not reflected by the society in which they live nor by indigenous society - are found, time and time again, in isolated areas improvising their own work and receiving orders.

Between 1984-5 there was a period of hope for the democratisation of the country as a whole after the frustrations of the past. During this period FUNAI in Brasilia
became more open and anthropologists and distinguished indigenists who had been made destitute during the period of military repression returned to FUNAI. Public archives were opened up and information indispensable for protecting the lands became available. The conditions developed for the growth of Indian political expression. In a matter of months a large number of indigenous lands throughout the country were demarcated. Within the Aripuana Park the Indigenous Areas of Zoro and Aripuana were demarcated and moreover, the Park as a whole was re-demarcated. This also stimulated a move towards removing the invaders, such as the lumberers in Mequens and Roosevelt.

And, in an important attempt to break the rigidity of the bureaucracy, an indigenous course was set up in Brasilia for training officials. It was partly financed by Polonoroeste, and catered for about 80 students, many of whom were already highly qualified in other fields.

This caused a huge reaction in the FUNAI bureaucracy especially in Aripuana and Rondonia. One reason for this was that the old jungle experts had recently taken up positions as senior directors on the strength of being in a particular area, irrespective of whether or not they knew anything about indigenous problems.

FUNAI's tradition is to incorporate the indigenous population into "productive labour". FUNAI opens a post, earmarks land to be worked to produce food for the officials and the Indians who move to the post, attracts the population of the villages towards the post, ignores indigenous organisation and acts as if it were dealing with a small farm. There is much mistrust of new officials with a wider understanding of how to defend indigenous territories and
Cinta Larga chief "Velho Machao" returning from the hunt
(Photo: Jesco, Serra Morena, 1974)
with a different kind of relationship with the Indians - for example, these officials might have contact with other government institutions, INCRA, IBDF and state governments; they might have the ability to mobilise the Indians and the press; or to gain access to information and maps and have respect for indigenous history and make contact with other tribal groups or even find money for cultural, health and other projects.

Not one of the students from the new course was nominated for Aripuana or Polonoroeste, and only three or four for the area as a whole, even though in this area there are vacant positions and a shortage of personnel (post directors are needed in Serra Morena, Rio Preto etc.). Many of these positions are filled by officials who already have other duties, for example, medical auxiliaries, drivers and manual workers.

4. Work Conditions for the Officials

It is essential to realise that many of the officials in the field at present are people dedicated to the Indians and live in extremely difficult conditions. Life in the posts is one of sacrifice, especially in Aripuana. Posts such as Tenente Marques, Capitao Cardoso, Rio Preto and, until recently, Serra Morena, are only accessible by plane, and remain isolated for months at a stretch. Radio communication frequently breaks down. The officials live without their families, with a limited diet, in modest houses and contract malaria which costs months of salary to cure.

The salaries are very low (less than three minimum salaries for a teacher or medical auxiliary and five for a
post director). The delays in the payments are appalling. At the end of May, the Polonoroeste officials had still not received their pay for April. Often the rights of the workers are not respected and there are some employees without a contract, etc.

Besides a difficult life personally, the means of carrying out good work with the Indians are few. Officials are unable to resolve the problems of the Indians' health, the invasions or the demarcations. There are numerous conflicts between Indians, with invaders or with FUNAI - there is tension and permanent threats. Hardly any of the post directors in the Park have maps of the area to hand or the laws and decrees which concern them. They have no ammunition, arms or food supplies in order to carry out patrolling expeditions (and there is good need for them) and the majority of administrators do not give them instructions for such tasks. As for health, the situation is more difficult - how will it continue? The most determined officials are limited to making large gardens and building houses for the Indians, generally without much interest in maintaining the traditional communal houses (malocas).

A few simple methods could improve the situation. Many of the officials, especially those working in health, should take part in training courses and they should all receive more information about the indigenous situation in the country as a whole and about what is happening in FUNAI. The political and material isolation in which they live - not to mention the shallowness of their understanding of the indigenous world - have been the cause of considerable mental depression within the Aripuana Park.
5. Lack of Priorities

The improvisation of administrative work in the Aripuana Park can be felt at all levels. No matter how much the resources increase, they will always be considered insufficient.

The number of officials grew very large in a matter of months and then the administration turned against itself. In a climate of intrigue and treachery, small conspiratorial groups are forming, following the example of Brasilia. This will lead to small centres receiving attention and increasing their claims for their own bureaucracy, ignoring the fact that the basic needs of the Indians are not being seen to.

One of the characteristics of the lack of orientation of the work is that the administration transforms all the resources it receives into building materials and personnel, without any idea of how to resolve the problems themselves.

Therefore, at a time when the invaders are multiplying in all areas and it is necessary to oversee and patrol the territory, the response is to build guard posts. There is no doubt that these are impressive but only when they function and with teams which patrol the area all the time and which do not spend their time in these new posts repeating all the old indigenist errors. Vigilence posts are already planned for several places in the Indigenous Park and most of the equipment, such as radios, has already been bought. Nevertheless, no posts have been built yet.

In the area of health too, buildings and instalations receive priority. Clinics are built in most posts by a chief architect. Many of them are in disuse because of a
lack of staff or else serve as houses for the Indians together with the stores of medicines (as in Linea 11). While millions have been wasted in these buildings, vaccinating has been interrupted for months because of the lack of transport and fuel.

With education, the same is happening and money is being wasted. In one indigenous area, Rio Preto I.P., numerous plane journeys have been made in order to transport cement for building a school. It seems that 80 sacks of cement were needed and one plane could transport five at a time. Considering that each return journey must have cost at least 400 dollars by FUNAI plane, and much more in a private plane, there are innumerable alternative uses one could imagine for the money.

The school was made to minimum dimensions with the result that the Indians barely fit inside. There is no teacher (and if there were a teacher he would be badly paid and would not bother with the Indians or their indigenous language). Nor is there a special curriculum or any move towards developing one. Why isn't the school started in a traditional building with more thought and why are the planes flights not used for medical assistance, vaccinations and spraying the houses to get rid of malaria?

A look at FUNAI's work in the Park in the principal fields of land, health and education provides more examples of this indigenist chaos.
TABLE 2 Data On the Polonoroeste Programme

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<th></th>
<th>POLONOROESTE</th>
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*estimate

USED (Thousands of cruzeiros) 1981/2 1982/3
1. Rondônia (Aripuaná Park & 8a DR) 25,212 68,650
2. Total for Polonoroeste 110,352 232,612

% of Total Polonoroeste money used in Rondônia 23% 29%
Surui carrying a "tatu" (Photo: Jesco, 1969)
Chapter 3 – Ways of defending, demarcating and patrolling the lands

1. Demarcation

During the period of Polonoroeste, demarcations have been made in the areas of Zoró and Aripuana in 1985 and there was a re-demarcation of all the boundaries of the Park (see Chapter 1 – LANDS) The demarcations were carried out by the army wherever possible because, though it cost more, greater respect would be given to the law. Nevertheless, FUNAI in Brasilia delayed months in accepting the demarcations and the Park administration does not know exactly where the demarcated boundaries are.

The lands were demarcated according to artificial boundary marks which lend themselves to invasion unlike natural boundaries. This is exactly what happened to the land of the Zoró between the rivers Tiroteiro and the 14th of April – precisely the area which has been most invaded. It is said that neither the Zoró area nor the Aripuana I.A. have been completely demarcated. As for the rest of the Park the Indians have hardly ever been present during the demarcation – particularly the Surui in the Serra Morena and Roosevelt-when they ought to have been involved in the work all the time.

Another predictable shortcoming of the demarcations was that a path three metres wide was made which was overgrown by vegetation only a few months later. FUNAI recommended that to maintain clear boundaries a gap of ten metres should be left and "capim" laid down (boundary stones of sand and cement). The Department of Lands of FUNAI in Brasilia took responsibility for the demarcation and not the Park administration.
conjunction with aerial reconnaissance of important boundaries.

Over two consecutive years, the Polonoroeste Programme planned roads for the posts of Roosevelt, Capitao Cardoso, Tenente Marques, Serra Morena, Linea 14 and Zoro but they were not built. In Roosevelt I.P. the Indians themselves, in conjunction with FUNAI, built a provisional and unreliable road.

The costs of making roads are high but they would save enormous expenses in flights. Similarly, the cost of buying a plane would, with time, work out cheaper than chartered flights.

The Indians' demand for roads was one of the reasons for their conflict with FUNAI in 1986 which resulted in their occupation of the Park headquarters.
Various medical reports confirm that FUNAI has been at its most negligent and disorganised in the field of health (ref. 11,20,26,56,59,60 & 26).

FUNAI has planned to have one doctor, one dentist, two nurses and nursing auxiliaries in every village in the Park and at its headquarters. There is an Indian House in Riozinho, nurses in all the villages, supplies for bi-monthly vaccinations and funds for fuel. There are 13 vehicles in the Park and there is an agreement with the hospital in Cacoal which is stocked with medicines etc. These are large resources and are not available to the general public. And nothing works.

1. Vaccinations

Vaccinations are given every two months for four consecutive months according to the programme set out at the beginning of 1986. Several posts have been without vaccinations for many months, such as those of Capitao Cardoso and Mequens, and others have very incomplete vaccination programmes. The Indians do not know in advance when flying health teams (EVS) will visit and records of visits, in one form or another, are not kept. Similarly, amongst the Suruí, where access is very easy, the vaccination programme has been very tenuous. In Mequens, where three years ago FUNAI let 25 people of a population of 100 die of measles, the last and only visit of the EVS was made a year ago.

Disinfecting houses against malaria, which was carried
out by SUCAM on a recommended basis of once every six months, has come to a halt in many areas due to lack of transport which ought to have been paid by FUNAI. In 1985, Lines 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 in Serra Morena were fumigated twice, Roosevelt once but in the other three Cinta Larga posts and Mequens, not at all.

2. The Indian House

The Indian House is situated on the highway Cuiabá-Porto Velho, near to the urban areas and attracts the Indian population away from the indigenous area. This arrangement has been criticised and recommendations made that medical assistance be relocated within indigenous areas and not the opposite. A radical change in the services is becoming necessary where qualified personnel are based in indigenous areas for longer periods and city units are used only for emergency hospitalisation only. The Indian House is located on highway BR-364 which has been the cause of several road accidents. Since it was asphalted there have been seven accidents, the most recent resulting in the instant death of a Cinta Larga woman and child.

It is difficult to believe that a mere change of location would be the solution. The Indian House of Riozinho is one of the worst examples of unwholesomeness in all aspects of Indian care. It serves not only the sick, but also Indians in transit who arrive to sell their produce or to talk with the authorities, and "Indian students" (youths who have decided to study in the city) - all of whom take up the lodgings and beds of the sick.

In spite of there being twenty officials at the Indian House it could not be dirtier. No one ever sweeps it. The
two large unsegregated lodging houses separate not the sick from the sound but the Cinta Larga from the Surui. There are also some small houses for other Indians who live in Riozinho. There are no "malocas" which would be healthier and easy to build.

There are two toilets - one for the officials and one for the Indians who sometimes number 200 in Riozinho. The jungle path between the houses and the river is putrid and impassible - in traditional villages this filth is unthinkable.

The water from the well is good quality but no one cleans it; there are old shoes thrown in it. Anyone who arrives healthy at Riozinho runs the risk of leaving ill because of the water. Eating conditions are disgraceful and there is no incentive to maintain traditional Indian eating habits. The stores are subject to an amazing bureaucratic control on the one hand and a total lack of control on the other. In order to get some fruit and food for Indians with TB, typewritten instructions have to be sent by the nurses across the highway to the headquarters at the other side, some 300 metres away. The medicines, however, are very badly controlled and apparently inadequately used.

Though there are 13 vehicles in the Park, none is used specifically for health purposes. There are never cars ready to take the sick from Riozinho to Cacoal, and far less for EVS trips to the areas. In as much as at least three vehicles and 30% of available flying time ought to be reserved for medical attention, the cars are earmarked and used for other, forbidden, purposes thus totally reversing their intended use. As there is an emphasis on the commercialisation of Indian products, priorities are put on the transport of the produce and of officials. There is no
Cinta Larga mother and child who visited Serra Morena I.P. in 1976 (Photo: Jesco)
recommendation that any major priority should be set for reserving resources for at least bi-monthly trips to each area, apart from some emergency trips.

The same is happening with flights. In the past few years, the administration has alleged that it does not have resources to charter planes, and for this reason has curtailed house fumigation with SUCAM. But at times it authorises ten emergency flights one after the other to collect people sick with malaria - which would have been avoided if the initial expense had been made.

The major outlays on roads and drainage (wells) are a similar case. It ought to be noted, however, that some wells have been sunk in villages and that communication radios have been bought for all the villages.

3. Health Personnel and the Indian House

Personnel are paid very low salaries which are quite inferior to those in the public sector. Nor do they receive daily allowances in the field. It is therefore difficult to find qualified staff such as auxiliary nurses.

When dedicated and active officials do take up employment they never stay long because of the administrative confusion. They complain with good reason that the vaccination programmes are not carried out to schedule, that the indigenous population is not forewarned, that the vaccination team is prevented from travelling and have to take the consequences of the Indian's irritation. They are called by the Indians to attend the seriously sick who, for cultural reasons, will not leave their villages or called to unattended births and what's more, the administration does not
consider these priorities. When a team goes out it is often obliged to cut short the trip or interrupt the vaccinations because the pilots have decided that they would rather go somewhere else or because FUNAI commandeers the plane (though it should be at the exclusive use of the Park, or at least Polonoroeste) and sends it to another region such as Acre or Maranhao. Because the planes have little flying time the bureaucracy always has pretexts for taking them away from the place they are operating in.

To keep vaccinations refrigerated and always at the ready for unforeseen journeys is another drama, and not because the vaccines are difficult to get - they are always provided by the Secretary for Health - but because of the obstacles the Administration puts in the way of merely buying monthly cylinders of gas for the fridge.

There is an enormous lack of communication between the villages and the Indian House and there is neither exchange of information nor continuity in the treatment of the Indians. Up until a few months ago there were many deaths in the villages because the radio did not work on Saturdays and Sundays or because the messages were not passed on.

Because of the lack of incentives, FUNAI ends up with personnel who have minimum qualifications, who know little of the indigenous population and who do not take the necessary interest in individuals. Only very few dedicated local officials endure it and stay.

Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that, from within this chaos, certain measures are taken in spite of the improvisation and the disappearance of resources. The doctor, for example, and the dentist too, attends to a good number of cases even without travelling. Some sick people use the
medical services in the Indian House at Porto Velho and the treatment for TB has been reasonable. A leg amputation has been carried out with great care and there have been some trips to São Paulo for sterilisation and TB treatment. But these are only a few cases and the cost is high.

4. The Health Situation and economic conditions for survival

The health situation is aggravated by deficiencies in other sectors of administrative indigenist work.

In truth, no one is carrying out indigenist work - what is happening is an almost deliberate destruction of tribal economic life, with no attention given to the social disorganisation provoked by FUNAI. Thus in the Aripuana Park (as happened in other areas of Rondonia) the economics of post and tribe were completely mixed. FUNAI would open a post, encourage the Indians to come and make a huge "collective" garden and very often provide food for those who worked there but not for others. Traditional economic co-operation was damaged: indigenous autonomy was uprooted, economic activities subject to FUNAI's paternalism while consumption and the use of money were stimulated. This system has been amply described and criticised in ethnological studies and investigative reports of the area.

The most dramatic case is, perhaps, that of the Zoró, where the post cleared an enormous garden and caused unnecessary deforestation but could not get rid of the produce because the only transport available was by air. At the post the Indians had to work from sunrise to sunset which left them no time for hunting or watching over their own territory. This is undoubtedly one of the causes of the present invasions. However, one cannot blame the post director
exclusively. To a greater or lesser extent this must be borne by the policies of FUNAI in all areas.

The origin of the present economic situation among the Indians - one almost impossible to handle - is due to FUNAI's lack of understanding of what 'tribal' is and of having, on the contrary, an implicit policy which is eating away at communal life.

Today, indigenous communities appear to be moving towards an urban life to satisfy their consumption and the need for money. This can be seen in their coffee production, rubber extraction etc. and the sale of invaders' confiscated wood. By consumption we mean not only clothes and objects but also the desire to build houses like the colonists, to have electric lights, vehicles - all that the officials and their friends in the city want.

FUNAI tries to attend to their claims using the resources from Polonoroeste. Bringing and fetching produce or transporting Indians for their supplies are top priority for the Park vehicles. A typical example of this is the case of an excellent auxiliary nurse who, by virtue of the low salary, is answerable to the post director and at present works virtually as a driver taking indigenous produce to market while the health of the village deteriorates.

There is nothing to tie the Indians to the area. Health treatment in the villages is so awful that cases are transferred to the city where, in turn, equally disastrous treatment is received. Produce has to be taken to the city and purchases made there. More and more industrialised food and money are needed and the tribal pattern of hunting, the time spent on crops and the rituals have changed a lot because of work dedicated to market production. The young Indians want to go to the schools in the cities and FUNAI's schools are not in working order. Everyone is leaving the
forest.

The appalling medical attention has created a vicious circle which can been seen clearly in the births and deaths of young children. There is a great influx of women to give birth in the hospitals in Cacoal, a situation which has developed over the last two or three years. There is no help for them in the villages where mortality is high and the changes in health and nutrition generate more illnesses. Nowadays, mothers and babies who go to the city contract new illnesses; in the hospitals just as in the Indian House, the food is worse, cultural patterns are broken and tribal rules for confinement during births and illnesses are not adhered to. Dissatisfied and desperate, many choose to avoid all city medical treatment. However, the risks are also enormous in the village.

That the value of the culture be recognised amidst the process of change is a mere anthropologists' desire and the task of an educational system that does not exist. Today FUNAI is taking the situation it created in tow but intends to satisfy the Indians without discussing their innumerable aspirations. In many cases the officials make the Indians into workers and servants: they carry loads of coffee or rubber, obey orders, build houses, clear gardens (as e.g. in the 7th of September I.P. where four Polonoroeste officials had a garden made for the Indians when there was no justification for it). They never deny the Indians a lorry for transporting merchandise when it could be much more useful for health services; they do not discuss the patterns of diet or the absence of gardens. Coffee production, for example, is well subsidised by FUNAI. Because of prejudices, perhaps no one really cares to make just calculations with the Indians. Another urgent problem is the sale of wood in some areas in order to make highways (Roosevelt) or to finance the
the food supply of the workers in the gardens (Linea 14).

As for the Indians who are actually experiencing poverty and hardship, the benefits they get from these commercial activities are small. In 1986, a group of Surui earned a reasonable amount from coffee, at a time when prices were high. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that expenses are run up indiscriminately, for a whole year the earnings amount to very little and they lacked funds for food for most of the period. The most lamentable aspect of all this is that the Indians do not have the stimulation to preserve tribal ways of survival, ways in which they are rich and free people. The Cinta Larga groups, with fewer resources, have tended to take the same road.

To combine tribal life with expanding capitalism is not easy, neither is it easy to waken a need for change in the Indians. The present path is certainly not one which is conducive to autonomy nor central to Indian traditional life.

The ultimate lamentable administrative confusion is the appointment of innumerable Indian officials for Polonoreste. It is true that the salaries are very low and that most of the appointed Indians become part of the breed of FUNAI employees (at the protest of most of the officials who are afraid they might lose their jobs) and do not do anything. This creates divisions and jealousies within a community. Some Indians are beginning to keep strict hours, interrupting indigenous ritual complexes such as the Mapimai Paiyer of 86 in order hurrildly to complete their bureaucratic hours. The Indians, nevertheless, look favourably at these duties as a means of money and power—without considering that in the near future, they themselves will be a curb on a more independent indigenous movement.
Chapter 5 – Education

Indigenist work, as opposed to the "laissez faire" approach of FUNAI, ought to be associated with an imaginative education programme. For such a programme it would be essential to know the group, its traditions, the indigenous language; to make full use the tribe's history, including music, myths, the story of the violent sufferings, the reminiscences of the old, former migrations and territory; to teach about other Indians and about the area; to make a study of Indian rights, of Brasilian society, industry, labour relations, the government, the institutions, the economic plans and policies which threaten the Indians and forms of defence and life in the cities; to provide information on technology, machinery and especially the machinery they themselves use; furthermore there ought to be the study of mathematics, law, how to follow the accounts of FUNAI and other such themes and discussions of interest to the Indians which will help make them more permanent in the area. At the same time, the teaching should attempt to explain the problems associated with the changes they are experiencing and also specific problems such as diet patterns and how to sell artesan work at high prices without losing its quality or how to make clothes with tribal designs etc.

The basic educational objective ought to be to take the lid off and demystify our world as much as possible, by using visual material and starting from the interests of the Indians themselves. The school should to be of a high quality, insisting upon staff trained by educationalists and anthropologists, something not impossible in Brazil today given the universities and educational work which exists, but utopian in relation to FUNAI because any arrangement distinct from the traditional religious missions encounters insuperable barriers.
1. The Polonoroeste Schools

The Polonoroeste Programme implanted a system of education together with promises and staff but without a single theory about what an Indian curriculum should include. So, schools were built and teachers appointed in nearly all the posts. The teachers earn very little and live badly in uncertain conditions. In May 1986, an educational advisor was appointed which could have made an improvement but he always had to deal with bureaucratic obstacles and the teachers already there.

The vast majority of the teachers do not have a clue about what teaching is and they are subject to continual changes of post. Given the dissatisfaction of the Indians, they manage, at most, to teach a little arithmetic. After two or three years no one has lasted more than three months in the Park. The Indians ended up believing neither in themselves nor the school.

The teachers never had the opportunity of attending a training college, not least to know how it worked, and even less an initial preparation course. They do not know anything about the indigenous world and do not have any great interest in how to learn the indigenous language.

2. The Missionaries

The failings of FUNAI open gaps for missionary work. In the Park, the Zoró were a group which was left almost destroyed by the presence of missionaries. The Indians lived for a time with the Gaviao where there were members of the New Tribes Mission. They were converted and abandoned many of their tribal practices. The missionaries were thrown out by Apoena Meirelles in 1981. Since then the traditional
culture of the Gaviao and their fight for their land has continued whilst amongst the Zoró, the marks of religious submission were profound and the sacred rituals are still dormant to this day.

In the rest of the Park, especially amongst the Surui there is the threat of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL). Three missionaries intend to translate the bible. One of them has known the Indians for years. They have never taken any action to defend the territory of the Surui but their intermittent medical services are sufficient to win over at least a few people. They have never lodged any complaints about the many murders they witnessed and when measles killed 300 Surui. They are there without FUNAI's authority since the agreement with SIL expired at the end of 1985 and has not been renewed. If FUNAI does not take any steps, their presence may be disastrous for Surui culture, which up till now is very much alive, and might attract other missionaries such as some Indian Terena believers.

The deceitful schooling that the missionaries offer attracts some members of a community because they do not have any choice of a better education. Furthermore, the school looks to the Indians like a solution to their problems of becoming increasingly inferior in the world that surrounds them.

3. Indian Students

Another consequence of promises of schooling that flow freely in the existing sham is a serious social drama: that of the young adolescents, all Surui, who live in the Indian House at Rionzinho and go to study in the public schools in Cacoal. They do not get on well at a school, which is not
geared towards what they know - such as their vision of the world and their language - and is even worse than for Brazilians in general. They feel inferior, begin to drink, detach themselves from the community and it is difficult to foresee how things will be for them in the future.

4. Education and Indigenism

An administration which is more enlightened about the indigenous world should face the present confrontation between the two systems in a different way. And this confrontational situation exists today for the population of the Aripuana Park.

It is certainly not easy in an authoritarian institution to defend territory, preserve good health and to continue unveiling contemporary society to the Indians. The administrators would have to have very special personalities, to be united with the Indians, and as apprentices and masters rally together for their defence and there would have to be a permanent school which would also be, for us, a university for all that the Indians have to teach.

These ideas appear utopian but do not have to be so, and would not be if FUNAI was a more open organisation in an era of political democracy.
Chapter 6 – The indigenous movement

The recent history of the conflicts over land in Aripuana is amazing but even more amazing if one considers that since the 70s FUNAI has tried to keep a strong enough control over the Indians in this region to stop them moving to the cities, talking with the press and developing their own organisation.

In spite of all this, the Park became famous for the Suruí (Paiter) land rights movement, a movement which had full backing from FUNAI. Several events concerning the Suruí have been reported in the national newspapers: the assassina- tion of Oreia, the brother of Anine the Suruí leader in 1976; the seizing of posts by the Indians and the deaths of several colonists culminating in the expulsion of forty invaders in 1980; the deaths of two colonists in 1981 by the Suruí and the final withdrawal of eighty colonist families who had been living on Suruí lands since 1976.

Over the last two or three years the Indians have shown that they are on the look out for aggression against their territory.

In 1984, the Cinta Larga were intent on recovering - and party succeeded - invaded territory next to Roosevelt I.P. where FUNAI made the erroneous demarcation. They burnt the colonists' houses and threw them out. In 1984, FUNAI confiscated 400 "toras" of wood following claims of wood being robbed in Roosevelt I.A. near the rivers 14th of April and Taquari. There, inside the indigenous area, the brother-in-law of the Prefect of Espiga do Oeste had a highway built. The confiscation of the wood encouraged the Cinta Larga in their struggle so that at the end of 1985 they
recovered part of the area occupied by farms and attacked them one by one. They decided to return most of the invaders' cattle but kept 150 head.

In 1985 the Surui recovered most of their territory and succeeded in removing an invader in the north. They confirmed that there were lumberers' tracks leading in the direction of Espiga do Oeste.

In the same year, FUNAI threw nine lumberers out of the Mequens' area and confiscated 500,000 dollars in wood together with the IBDF. A little later the Mequens (Sakirabiar) had to mobilise friends in Brasilia to work through the General Procurator of the Republic in order to prevent FUNAI (which was affected at the same time by administrative changes) making the confiscated wood available again to the invaders (ref. 5 & 17). In 1984, the Cinta Larga from Capita Cardoso killed a notorious criminal known as Sapectado, who had for many years mined on indigenous land and, had more recently, killed an Indian.

In 1985 the Cinta Larga from Serra Morena mobilised themselves against the hydroelectric plant at Juina where, from one day to the next, the company was found building on their lands. Since the end of 1982 they had made organised expeditions to check invasions on their land but the work of the hydroelectric plant carried out by the governor of the State of Mato Grosso took them by surprise. They managed to reach an agreement with CEMAT whereby the company agreed to several of the Indians' claims such as to construct a highway to unite Serra Morena with the Aripuana-Juina highway (ref.15). In August 1985, because the agreement had not been completed and the highway not been built, the Indians camped out at the plant together with their wives and children. They offered CBS (the North American television
company) an interview and threatened implicitly to kill and burn if they did not get what they wanted. The highway was built but not of the desired quality.

It was also in 1985 that the Zoró captured an invading lorry and seized one person.

Between 1984 and 1985, in order to defend their lands, the Gaviao and Arara movement took ten colonists hostage and demanded the removal of fifty invader families from their lands, which in the end they managed to do despite opposition from the Prefect of Ji-Paraná and the Government of Rondonia who had been helping local initiatives for new invasions. This done, Lourdes was being invaded yet again in July 1986, and the Indian families had to flee in panic (ref. 28 & 29).

At the beginning of 1986, the Cinta Larga from Capita Cardoso rebelled because for months they had not received any attention from FUNAI and demanded a visit from the administration.

In March 1986, the Cinta Larga of Guariba, in the Aripuana I.A. killed two mineral prospectors and drove away an employee from one of the invaders' haciendas in their area in reprisal for the death threats and ambushes they had been subjected to. These intimidations came from economic groups in the area -neighbouring farms not complying with the 1985 demarcation of the area (ref.38,39 & 40).

And latterly, in May 1986, the Cinta Larga Indians initially, and afterwards the Surui (Paiter), Sakirabiar and Makurap (from Mequens I.A.) with the help of the Gaviao, occupied the headquarters of the Aripuana Park for about fifteen days. They offered numerous interviews to the television and the press and controlled all the activities in
Surui ritual of Mapimai - preparing to process into the village (Photo Betty Mindlin)
the Park, occupying rooms, determining the use of vehicles, radios etc. Tension was high and there were moments when officials and installations could have been affected by acts of violence. In the Indian House large groups danced and sang at night. Those who knew the Paiter and the Cinta Larga were well aware that this was no hollow threat. (They remembered, for example, the death of a post director and a telegraph operator in Roosevelt I.P. in 1971 during a rite reminiscent of the ceremony of "bebe-aka" - jawbone killing - of the Cinta Larga.) It is fair to say that the administration of FUNAI behaved well on this occasion and did not call the police which would have escalated the violence.

The Indians' claims were: the construction of highways, primarily the one which would unite Roosevelt with the Espiga do Oeste highway and its continuation, if possible, towards the posts of Capitao Cardoso and Tenente Marques; the demarcation of lands still not demarcated such as Mequens and boundaries still not made in the Park; the complete legalisation of the lands; the withdrawal of invaders and the confiscation of wood. They also demanded that the President of FUNAI come, which he had not done so far. (It is interesting to note that in more or less the same period, the Yanomami Indians, while fighting for the demarcation of their lands, also demanded a visit from the President of FUNAI. They gave up waiting after over a month and only went to Roraima at the call of the Commercial Association of Roraima, which tried to reduce the Yanomami delimited area.)

While some Indians wanted to wage war with FUNAI and keep hostages until the President arrived, others, whose judgement prevailed in the end, suggested that they ought to make themselves heard in the National Congress as soon as possible. They wanted to organise a delegation to Brasilia with the help of members of parliament. Nothing came of
their demands because of a lack of permanent facilities and food in Riozinho and because of hope placed in future meetings.

Indian Organisation and Values

The formation of an Indian autonomous movement in Aripuana was weakened by the changes which had been happening there. At the moment it is difficult for the Indians to know exactly which world they belong to. They are always suspended between two systems, like an indecisive pendulum.

In matters of health, for example, they still cannot escape the doctors or hospitals or the lack of help from FUNAI. Nevertheless, it is common for the oldest people to fight to keep the babies in the villages and to take them away from medical treatment in the urban hospitals. The old people and the most traditional people have, even in Porto Velho itself, spoken publicly against the young leaders who waste time in political meetings like the "iara" (colonists) do while the children die like mosquitoes. They appeal to the ancient treatment of the Pajes (shamans) and to selvatic medicines, blaming the new illnesses on the fact that contact has been allowed.

The rejection of the coloniser, nevertheless, has not resulted in an Indian self-confidence and neither side is strong or sufficient. In the village, the new eating habits, consumption, dress, type of dwelling and new and more regular hours, such as the colonisers keep, have resulted in filth and a lack of hygiene which did not exist three or four years ago. Who sees the ragged and dirty clothes? Imagine how important it could be if today these people could promote their own fashions with new colouring, blouses and skirts
using tribal motives from body paint models, which they could exhibit in the city like the landed gentlemen and artists they always have been.

Health and cleanliness are affected by the changes in subsistence pattern. Now they do not hunt, fish or gather as they did before; food has become expensive, deficient in proteins and loaded with starch especially amongst the Surui. The continual malaria epidemics accentuate their bad physical condition.

With regard to schooling, one can see the two contradictory spheres here too. There is the idea that some of the youths ought to attend city schools and be separate from the others with the "iara": already it is clear that they run the risk of breaking away and rejecting the community, of learning how not to be Indians. But in any case, amongst the present generation aged ten to fifteen years, the traditions are taking on a very different and changed form.

In politics, elections are difficult and there are wide differences between the many groups in the Aripuana Park (for example, the Cinta Larga in one way or other, constitute a tribe or homogenous group). There are many leaders of admirable integrity who showed insight during the conflict with the lumbering and mining companies, and have turned down agreements and schemes. They are finding out what FUNAI is, the power games, its capabilities and limitations. (Recently a Surui leader accompanied Senator Severo Gomes on a visit to the Yanomami Park and returned convinced that there, FUNAI was, in fact, working at the service of the companies, pushing out the Indians from their own lands and not even accomplishing the smallest tasks just as in the Aripuana Park). It is possible that other leaders, because of lesser experience, understand less about the prevailing social relations in Brazil.
In order for the leaders to increase their political awareness, contact with UNI (the Union of Indigenous Nations) has been very important and, as in the city, the example of Indians and workers organisations. There have been several indigenous assemblies which have proved an important political channel. FUNAI's act is therefore beginning to become more transparent. The policies of the jungle fighters in the city are going to adopt the word as their means of struggle.

Group of Cinta Larga Morena P.I. with FUNAI in 1975/6 near Serra Jesco
EPILOGUE – THE ARIPUANA PARK AND ANTI-INDIAN POLICIES

The solution to the problems of the Aripuana Park demands much more than financial resources, which in theory exist, for there remain ten million dollars provided by the Polonoroeste Programme, part of which was to be used for this area. For the defence of the territory (demarcation and removal of invaders) however, it would be good to have a firm decision from the Brazilian government in favour of the Indians.

Today, FUNAI is debilitated and devoid of proposals to deal with landed interests, mining companies, lumberers and those preparing the path for development in the Amazon. The Indians and their defenders still do not know to whom they should address their claims for the indigenous right to land.

FUNAI does not have the power to make decisions, subject as it is to an authoritarian legislation, and is without financial resources because of its own inefficiency (up until the end of July it had not presented the accounts for its spending in the previous financial year). It does not have personnel who are competent or experienced in indigenous matters; it does not consult those who do know and for the past year has been dismissing the few who are capable and keeping officials with a notorious anti-Indian past instead. These FUNAI officials are then part of a Ministry of the Interior, whose objectives are to install business concerns in national territory and are opposed to those of the Indians; a Ministry which is vacuous under the present government.
Group of Cinta Larga making contact at Serra Morena I.P. 1975. (Photo: Jesco)
As for fundamental decisions on the indigenous question, those paths are the most tortuous and bureaucratic. In order to recuperate the complete territory of the Zoró, for example, (where the invasions began in 1976 with a massacre never investigated or explained and where responsible companies are today still taking plots from the indigenous lands) it is useless to appeal to the President of FUNAI, as has been shown many times. Nor is it enough that the Indians accompanied by the largest number of members of Parliament possible visit three or four ministries (Ministries of the Interior, Agrarian Reform and Development, Justice, Planning etc.) because the most they have ever achieved is a few lines in the newspapers and a small clearly anti-Indian response full of lies about the demarcation of the lands of Rondonia, as was published in the state of Sao Paulo. It is important to recover the proper workings of democracy and prevent governmental economic decisions being dictated by purely business groups.

Anti-Indian legislation today takes the following forms: i) the decree of 1983, which permits mining activities by state companies and at times private enterprises in indigenous areas, regulated in 1986 by the Ministry of Energy and Mines Decree (Ministerial Decree No. 692/0/6/86) and enforced by Decree 88.188 of 1983. This is considered unconstitutional by lawyers and because public organisations such as MEAF (Ministry for Land Affairs, later MIRAD) and others can decide which lands are inhabited by the Indians, a task which was previously given to FUNAI (which is possibly not the best institution to take on this duty and should really be done by Indians, anthropologists, Indians support organisations, lawyers etc.), ii) by threats of Indian "emancipation" and the transformation of indigenous lands into small individual plots, iii) by the absurd
practice of carrying out demarcations after the retreat of invaders. Moreover several of the government's plans are genocidal: i) the Amazon Development Plan which will pave and build highways, ii) the Hydroelectric Plan with predictions of more than sixty dams in indigenous areas by the year 2000 (and which shows clearly how the interests of the construction companies, the largest in the country, determine public policies), iii) SUDAM's incentives to lumberers and other companies, iv) the Polonoroeste Programme, v) the state plans for highways and energy such as those of the state of Rondonia, vi) the plans for colonisation, vii) the Calha Norte Project to colonise the stretches of frontier lands; etc. Of course, it is not only the Indians that are affected by the authoritarian direction that Brazil is taking.

For the Indians, the problems related to those of lands - problems of health, economic survival, the elucidation of the non indigenous world - are difficult to cope with and in the meantime FUNAI continues with its present inoperative bureaucracy. The gigantic, rigid structure that has been created not only by programmes such as Polonoroeste in Aripuana but by others in different parts of the country, is difficult to thwart. The indigenous movement will have to be very strong and ally itself with others in order to be able to oppose so many public officials who are controlling their destiny, many of whom are inclined to defend opposing interests. They will also have to resort to the legal defence of their lands and to the help of lawyers as quickly as possible because the invasions are being consolidated at present.

Finally, the Indians are left with the help of public opinion and the international press, and with ecological and Indians defence associations. These are strongly founded
on the desire to question the multi-national banks and bodies financing development programmes, such as the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, about the genocidal effects of such programmes. In fact, any economic programme ought only to be financed if it is democratically agreed upon by the population affected and has effective conditions for delineating or changing it. What the banks ought to do, in all cases, is to finance specific programmes for ecological protection and defending indigenous territory, and always to demand their effective implementation from the national institutions prior to economic programmes.

It is interesting that world public opinion is dissatisfied with, and questioning, governments which implement anti-social programmes and remember that, once the programmes have started, in such a situation it is up to the same institutions, such as the World Bank, to face an authoritarian government in defence of minorities and provide the easiest and most rational solutions from a sound point of view.

Therefore, in the case of Polonoroeste, the clause protecting the Indians (won because of the mobilisation of developed countries) greatly reinforced the indigenous cause vis-a-vis the Brazilian government. Furthermore, it resulted in the interruption of World Bank financing for several months (from February to July 1985) because of the halt in demarcating the indigenous lands. The funding was resumed only when the government took some fundamental measures. This is not to say that the Programme has still not had a destructive effect on the indigenous peoples of the region but that the implementation initiative itself ought to have been much more thoroughly discussed and perhaps thrown out.
Cinta Larga Indians visiting Serra Morena in 1979
Aripuana Park - Urgent measures and recommendations

CHAPTER - LANDS

1. Approval by G.T. of Decree No. 88.188/83 for the demarcation of Aripuana I.A.

2. Equivaluation of the demarcations of Zoró, Serra Morena, Roosevelt and Aripuana.

3. Official registration of the areas Zoró, Serra Morena, Roosevelt, Aripuana and registration in the SPU (Public Records Office) of the Aripuana Park.

4. Eviction of all the invaders from the areas of Zoró, Serra Morena, Roosevelt, Aripuana and the Aripuana Park (see the discussion of the invasions in the text).

5. Closure of the highway which cuts the Zoró area, in the region between the rivers Tiroteio and the 14th of April.

6. Closure of the electoral posts, municipal schools and all the other services existing in the invaded Zoró area, with the help of the Federal Police.

7. Immediate patrolling by FUNAI of the two extremes of the illegal highway which cuts through the Zoró area.

8. Wide distribution and production of a pamphlet documenting massacre of the Zoró in 1976 by the company, Lunardelli, when human remains were found in exactly the region where the highway was constructed on the site of the present invasions.

9. Eviction of all the invaders, colonists and farmers in the Zoró I.A. verifying the right to remove only the 66 colonists recruited in 1981.

10. Provision of maps, decrees, Landsat photos to all local administrative personnel of POARI and to the Indians.

11. Inspection and patrol expeditions (permanent flying teams) with definite dates for all the areas.

12. To reserve a minimum of three vehicles in good condition for defending the areas and painted with a mark to show that they are for this end only.
13. To reserve 20% of flying hours as indispensible for land inspection.

14. Agreement with the IBDF (Brazilian Institute for the Development of the Rain Forest) and with the Military Batallion to inspect the area giving dates and chronology.

15. Agreement with the Federal Police for inspection, determining a chronology and expenses.

16. Investigation in INCRA (MT & RO) and Intermat into the titles that are given for indigenous land using the services of a lawyer from the 15th D.R. because the Park has not appointed a lawyer.

17. Checking the demarcations made in 1985 and the report of the Army and the programme to extend the boundary marks by 10 metres in length and to plant permanent boundary stones to mark the limits.

18. Demarcating and laying down boundary stones along natural boundaries, especially for the Zorô.

19. Confiscation of wood where there have been invasions and sale of goods, the benefits to go to the community.

20. "Revision of the proposal for vigilance posts and the hiring of officials to man them (number and position). Patrolling ought to be carried out by mobile teams working in all the areas. Eventually a strategic post ought to be established with the help of the Military Police, IBDF, Indians and administration officials" (Polonoroeste Project Coordinating Report. Cuiabá-Vilhena - FUNAI, July 1986).

21. Land regulating of all the areas.

22. Annulment of all the exploration permits given by the National Department of Mining Production on indigenous lands.

23. Included here are the recommendations from the Indigenous Pastoral Team:
   1) Annulment of certificate 025-A/74 in favour of Sr. Oscavo Santos (lawsuit FUNAI 559/74) to effect all the area inhabited by and of interest to indigenous people, that is to say, the Aripuana Indigenous Area.

   2) Annulment of Certificate 026/75, given to Cia João Lunardelli in an area which has been indigenous since
time immemorial, between 60° latitude and the river Guariba and from the headwaters of the river Roosevelt (Igarapé Flor de Prado) - partly, therefore, in Aripuana I.A. and Zoró I.A. (decree 81.587/78) and Roosevelt I.A. decree 73.562/74).

iii) The express annulment of the Declaration which authorises the construction and the route of highways through indigenous land, prohibiting at the same time, the invasion and presence of foreigners. Concerning giving access routes to Condominio Lunardelli and other agricultural businesses; there ought to be solutions found which do not attack the interests of the indigenous communities, something already seen in other areas which were dissected by highways - the Park of Xingu, Transamazônica, Krenakorore, Nambiquara, etc. - and which incur incalculable dangers for the indigenous groups that are affected. The measures set out above are put forward by the Judicial Prosecutor of FUNAI in Parecer on 10/4/85 but up until now there have been no definite measures taken.

iv) Annulment of all the Mineral Exploration Titles given by DNPM in recognised lands where Indians are thought to live, with the aim of protecting their heritage and assuring at the same time their physical and cultural integrity.

v) Final confirmation of the demarcation of the territories of the Zoró and Cinta Larga carried out by the Military Department of Geographical Services at the end of 1985, which is fundamental for solving the problem.

vi) Removing obstacles from the procedures for finalising the Aripuana I.A. and the Zoró I.A. which are waiting waiting for attention by the Inter-Ministerial Group (Decree 88.188./83) in spite of the fact that the lands are demarcated and the antiquity of possession and the rights of the indigenous communities over these lands are recognised. The above-mentioned processes for land titling have been complied with and all the documents and reports necessary for a final decision.
LEGISLATION ON THE ARIPUANA PARK

1. Decree No. 62.995 of the 16th July 1968
Provisional Delimitation of the area of the Aripuana Park.

2. Decree No. 64.860 of the 23 July 1969
Creation of the Aripuana Indigenous Park within the limits of the previous Decree.

3. Decree No. 73.562 of the 24 January 1974
Provisional Delimitation of the lands of the Gaviao, Cinta Larga, Surui (area I) and the Cinta Larga (area II).

4. Decree No. 73.563 of the 24 January 1974
Reduction by half of the area of the Aripuana Indigenous Park.

5. Decree No. 77.033 of the 15 January 1976
Alteration of Decree No. 73.562 maintaining the areas described in this decree for administrative demarcation purposes.

6. Decree No. 78.109 of the 22 July 1976
Declaring ineffectual the Provisional Delimitation of area II of Decree 73.562, thus reducing the area of the Cinta Larga of the Vermelho river.

7. Decree No. 80.169 of the 16 August 1977
Declaring ineffectual the Provisional Delimitation of area I of Decree 73.562, thus reducing the area of the Surui and Cinta Larga.

8. Decree No. 80.422 of the 28 September 1977
Declaring ineffectual the Provisional Delimitation of area I of Decree 73.562, repeating, surprisingly, the same reduction Decree No. 80.169 of one month earlier.

9. Decree No. 81.587 of the 19 April 1978
Provisional Delimitation of Zoró territory.

10. Decree No. 82.064 of the 3 August 1978
Declaring ineffectual the Provisional Delimitation of part I of the Decree 73.562, reducing above all, the territory of the Gaviao and Zoró.

11. Ministerial Decree No. 562/N of the 14 March 1979
Provisional Delimitation of the Aripuana I.A. leaving important Guariba villages outside, however.
12. Delimitation of the Aripuana I.A. in 1985 following the anthropological study of Carmen Junqueira and proposed by the Team of Pastoral Indigenists (Equipo de Pastoral Indigenista).

13. Decree No. 88.609 of the 9 August 1983
    Confirmation of the demarcation of Lourdes I.A.

14. Decree No. 88.867 of the 17 October 1983
    Confirmation of the 7th September I.A.
GLOSSARY

CEMAT   Central Electric Mato Grosso A/S - Centrais Elétricas Matogrossenses S/A.

CODEMAT Mato Grosso State Development Company - Companhia de Desenvolvimento do Estado de Mato Grosso.

CPI Parliamentary Investigative Committee - Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito.

DNPM National Department of Mining Production-Departamento Nacional de Pesquisas Minerais.

FIPE/USP Sao Paulo University Foundation Institute of Economic Investigation - Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas da Universidade de São Paulo.

FUÑAI Indian National Foundation - Fundação Nacional do Índio.

IBDF Brazilian Institute of Forestry Development-Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento Florestal.

INCRA National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform - Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária.

INTERMAT Mato Grosso Land Institute - Instituto de Terras de Mato Grosso.

MEAF Extraordinary Ministry of Agrarian Affairs-Ministério Extraordinário de Assuntos Fundiários.

MIRAD Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Development-Ministerio de Reforma e Desenvolvimento Agrário.

OPAN Operation Anchieta - Operação Anchieta.

SPU Public Records Office - Servicio de Patrimonio da União.


SUDAM Superintendency for Amazon Development-Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento da Amazonia.

SUDECO Superintendency for the Development of the Mid West, Ministry of the Interior - Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento do Centro Oeste, Ministério do Interior.

UNI The Union of Indigenous Nations - União das Nações Indígenas.
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JB = Jornal do Brasil - Rio de Janeiro
ESP = O Estado de Sao Paulo - Sao Paulo
FSP = Folha de Sao Paulo - Sao Paulo
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The Polonoroeste programme is a World Bank-funded colonisation project in central Brazil. This document looks at the indigenous peoples of the Aripuana Park which lies in the path of the development plan. The authors, anthropologists who have lived with the Cinta Larga and Surui Indians of the Park for many years, argue that the Programme is contributing to and exacerbating a situation which already exists in Brazil as a whole. The inefficient bureaucratic state machinery together with a society riddled with injustice to indigenous peoples, is working through the World Bank to further demoralise and destroy the Indians.

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