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Front Cover: Members of FRETILIN in liberated areas
(Photograph FRETILIN)
EAST TIMOR: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

Edited by Torben Retbøll

Copenhagen October 1984
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East Timor, Indonesia and the Western Democracies (1980).
Greece 1940-82 (in Danish, 1982); and The Conflict over the Western Sahara (in Danish, 1983).

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General Map of the Indonesian Archipelago

Map of the island of Timor

(Maps: Jørgen Ulrich)
PREFACE

This book is a sequel to *East Timor, Indonesia and the Western Democracies* which was published by IWGIA in 1980 as Document No. 40. The earlier report covered the conflict from the Indonesian invasion in 1975 until the end of 1979, whereas this new report concentrates largely on developments since 1980.

It is a sad story. East Timor represents one of the most serious cases of human rights violations that has occurred since World War II and one for which the Western democracies carry a huge and continuing responsibility. Most Western governments allow their strategic and economic interests to override the question of human rights when they are dealing with Third World countries, and in Asia this means having good relations with Indonesia.

The Republic of Indonesia is in many ways a peculiar country. In the first place, it is a democracy, yet the ruling party GOLKAR always wins around 60 per cent of the votes while the two opposition parties share the rest. Secondly, although there is some opposition, it has very limited possibilities for conducting an electoral campaign, and it is forbidden to work for a change of government. Thirdly, there is freedom of the press, but if newspapers publish direct or merely indirect criticism of the government and particularly of President Suharto, they risk being closed down for a shorter or longer period of time. Fourthly, Indonesia claims to favour negotiations and peaceful means in its foreign policy relations, yet it has used military force and coercion in order to take over West Papua in the 1960s and East Timor in the 1970s. Some people even suspect that it is planning to take over Papua New Guinea in a similar way during the 1980s.

This situation is not only tolerated but even aided and abetted by most of the Western democracies. Ever since Presi-
dent Suharto and his anti-Communist military Government seized power in 1965, a steady stream of Western Ministers have travelled to Jakarta in order to provide diplomatic, economic, and military support for the regime - not only from big countries such as the United States and France, but also from smaller ones such as Sweden and Denmark.

Thus, on March 27, 1984, the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen arrived in Jakarta on an official visit to Indonesia, as part of a journey to all the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries in order to promote Danish exports and to offer Danish aid. On April 9, Danish television carried a report on the visit by Danish journalist Tommy Østerlund who spoke about the recent activities of the death squads in Indonesia. After interviewing a representative of the independent Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta about the killings, Østerlund asked the Foreign Minister if he had talked to his Indonesian hosts about the death squads. The Minister said no. He had gone for a different purpose, to promote Danish exports. He had not gone there to teach the Indonesians how to run their own country. "So, does it mean," Tommy Østerlund asked, "that you leave your conscience behind when you travel?" The Foreign Minister, who used to be a journalist, replied: "This is such an objectionable question that I will not answer it", adding that some countries try to "work things out in a reasonable manner", and that in his opinion, "Indonesia is reasonably stable politically".

When Berlingske Tidende, the Danish conservative paper, published a letter criticising the Foreign Minister for his emphasis on Danish exports and for ignoring human rights, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen responded (April 15) by saying that "it is the policy of this Government to condemn violations of human rights no matter where they take place". He also stated that the question of human rights was discussed in the United Nations, insisting that "in this area, no one can question the commitment of the Danish Government".
It so happens that the very day the Danish Foreign Minister arrived in Jakarta, Indonesian military aircraft violated Papua New Guinea territory and flew low over Green River region, intimidating the inhabitants. Reporting this, another Danish daily, *Information* (April 4), pointed out that the Foreign Minister had offered Indonesia an interest-free loan of 120 million Kroner (about 12 million US dollars), yet only a few days before his visit to Jakarta, the Minister announced that Denmark would stop giving economic assistance to Vietnam and close down its embassy in Hanoi because the country maintains troops on foreign soil (Kampuchea).

Like so many other West European countries, Denmark has often condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has never condemned Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. Not even in 1975 did Denmark protest against the invasion; it has abstained on every single UN resolution about East Timor since the very beginning. So much for the Danish Government's concern about human rights.

One of the important sources of economic support for the Indonesian regime is IGGI, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, an organisation of Western countries which has been providing financial assistance for Indonesia since 1969, shortly after the military's seizure of power.

The 1983 meeting of the IGGI was full of praise for the "political courage" shown by the Indonesian military government in adopting firm economic measures to cope with the harmful effects of the world's economic recession and falling oil prices. The general consensus of delegates from IGGI member governments and international financial institutions was that Indonesia is to be congratulated for cutting food and petroleum subsidies, for devaluing the rupiah by 38.5 per cent, for introducing stringent fiscal measures and freezing the salaries of government employees - all of which have worsened living standards of the poor.
The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting commend- ed Indonesia for coping with unfavourable international developments without compromising the principle of free trade or neglecting the needs of long-term development. Indonesia's exemplary style of economy management and the caution it has shown in borrowing internationally will guarantee that the international capital market remains open to Indonesia, the communiqué said.

Manifesting firm confidence in Indonesia's style of economic development, the 1983 IGGI meeting agreed to provide Indonesia with a total of $2,240 million in credit, $20 million more than the amount proposed by the World Bank. At this level, the 1983 IGGI total exceeded the 1982 total by more than $300 million, and it was way above the first aid commitment of $568 million in 1969.

These complimentary remarks about Indonesia's "political courage" were made at a time when Indonesian newspapers were reporting daily the nationwide slaughter of criminals by Army death squads in an attempt to reduce the level of crime against property. (Shortly afterwards, press reporting on this issue was forbidden by the authorities.) But the brutality of this campaign of extra-judicial murder by government, which is the chosen method of the military to cope with crime (itself a consequence of the worsening economic conditions - particularly for millions of unemployed youngsters), was lost on the IGGI delegates. The IGGI chairperson, Dutch Minister for Overseas Development, Mrs. E.M. Schoo, had been told in detail about the activities of these death squads by the Legal Aid Institute when she visited Indonesia just a few weeks before the IGGI meeting, but she made no reference to the killings in her opening address to the IGGI meeting (TAPOL Bulletin, No. 59, September 1983).

One year later, on June 5-6, 1984, the IGGI convened again in the Hague for its annual meeting and approved aid commitments to Indonesia for the next fiscal year of $2,460
million, an increase of around ten per cent above what was pledged in 1983. This is regarded as a seal of approval by the donor countries for Jakarta's revised plans for dealing with the recession and reduced oil prices. Indonesia is proving itself ready to implement strict austerity measures to maintain international confidence in Indonesia's economic stability. Already British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher has singled out Indonesia, together with South Korea, as a country worthy of applause for its willingness to control expenditure, chiefly by slashing subsidies and re-phasing economic projects worth US$14 billion.

Human rights were not raised during IGGI deliberations this year despite pressure from non-government organisations. This pressure which was particularly heavy in Holland, also came from the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group which compiled a 20-page dossier cataloguing violations in East Timor and West Papua as well as the extra-judicial killings by the Indonesian army's death squads. The dossier was sent to all IGGI governments and called upon them to discuss these matters before making aid commitments.

Far from heeding these requests, the IGGI member countries concentrated on congratulating the Indonesian regime for its "decisive and timely measures" to help the economy. Needless to say, the great majority of Indonesian people are affected by the austerity measures, and not by the foreign capital based economic growth rate.

In spite of the praise, however, there were undercurrents of concern over future economic trends. It is generally considered desirable to use Indonesian products and services in the projects funded by IGGI finance, although some of the donor countries prefer to encourage the use of their own products and services. But in open international tenders, Indonesian companies are rarely competitive or suitable for IGGI projects, so that IGGI funded "development" does not help build an efficient domestic economic infrastructure, the
measure of true development. Moreover, the Indonesian State Secretariat has tried to insist on positive discrimination for Indonesian companies, with the result that many projects have been seriously delayed.

The World Bank, of which Indonesia is the second largest client, is also concerned that many planned government projects are not designed to absorb Indonesia's vast pool of surplus labour, increasing by nearly two million every year. There is also concern over Indonesia's rising national debt, which is approaching a dangerously high level in relation to export earnings. But by the standards of most debt-ridden Third World countries, Indonesia is obviously satisfying the IGGI governments with its economic performance, at a time when the balance-sheet mentality dominates international economic thinking. The victims of the death squads, in East Timor and West Papua, do not appear on balance sheets (TAPOL Bulletin, No. 64, July 1984).

Meanwhile, the conflict continues. On July 27, 1984, General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, held a ceremony in Dili, the capital of East Timor, expressing condolences to the widows of Indonesian soldiers killed during the war in East Timor. Many widows were brought to Dili and Baucau for the occasion, when Murdani declared that the graves of troops killed in action would be kept in East Timor as "a monument to their sacrifice". He used the occasion, according to the Armed Forces newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata (July 28, 1984), to declare that the Indonesian army had brought a successful end to the unrest in East Timor. However, according to the news agency Antara, Murdani has recently estimated that "only a few hundred" guerrilla fighters are still holding out against the Indonesian Army.

He was quoted by Sinar Harapan (July 28, 1984) as saying that "security has been restored in this territory, and we have been able to paralyse the threat to the foundations of the Indonesian people". The team of generals who accompanied
him on this visit to Dili, which was the second visit in a month, included the very top brass: nearly a dozen high-ranking officers from all the armed forces. Such a senior team of officers can only be explained by the importance which General Murdani currently attaches to the military operations now under way in his desperate attempt to put an end to continued resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor.

+ + + +

I would like to thank the following people for invaluable assistance and continuing inspiration: Abilio Araujo, Eva Belfrage, Carmel Budiardjo, Noam Chomsky, Pat Flanagan, Ken Fry, Andrew Gray, Jan Gustafsson, Arnold Kohen, Martin Lund, Martine Pétrod, Hannu Reime, Julie Southwood, Erik M. Sørensen and Diana Vinding.

Torben Retbøll
September 1984

Map of Administrative Regions of Timor (from TAPOL Bulletin)
Chapter 1
THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
MYTH AND IDEOLOGY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY


By Noam Chomsky

I must confess at the beginning that I always feel a slight twinge of falseness when I am given an opportunity (which I very much welcome) to talk about East Timor or the many similar things throughout the world, and there are many, El Salvador being a recent one. The reason for the feeling of falseness is not that I think what I am saying is false, at least I hope it isn't, but rather it is a feeling about the way in which the issue is constructed. Of course, it is perfectly legitimate to learn about East Timor and to know about it, in fact it is obligatory; luckily for me the other members of the panel really do know something about it but I really don't. East Timor is not my subject. I am compelled to learn something about it because of the way in which the propaganda system that we are a part of succeeds in constructing the framework for discussion. But my interest is the U.S., U.S. policy, in particular foreign policy, the U.S. ideological system and the propaganda system, a term that I will use intending to cover the mainstream media and the academic profession. These are things that I study and, I think, know something about and about which we should be concerned.

One crucial commitment of the propaganda system is to structure the terms of debate. This happens in very interesting and compelling ways that one ought to learn about and learn how to extricate oneself from. In fact, any decent propagandist will tell you that if they can set the framework of the debate, they don't care whether they win or lose the debate because they win anyway. There are some striking examples of that. Let us take one that is on the front pages right now.
Everyday, on the front pages, there is a discussion about whether it is true or not that Communist states orchestrated by the Soviet Union have shipped what the State Department claims to be 200 tons of equipment to the guerrillas in El Salvador since September 1980. This is the topic to which attention is to be confined. Of course there are other possible questions. Consider, for example, the question of timing. September 1980 is four months after the coordinated attack by the armed forces of El Salvador and Honduras on refugees fleeing across the Sumpul river, with some 600 killed. It was then, according to the correspondent for *Le Monde Diplomatique* that "the genocide began". This atrocity was immediately reported by church sources and the foreign press, but was concealed by the mainstream media here. Two months earlier, a massive assault against the peasantry began under the guise of "land reform". An Oxfam study points out that the regions affected by the "Land-to-Tiller" program "coincide almost identically with the areas of greatest repression against peasants by government security forces". Church sources in El Salvador estimate that the overwhelming mass of the killings are the responsibility of government security forces, with most of the rest attributed to paramilitary forces and death squads that appear to be under government control. The foreign press reports that the army of El Salvador is extremely well-equipped with weapons from many sources: Israel, France, West Germany, etc. The United States has been offering full support to the military government, with a civilian facade, that is massacring the population. In an article in the current issue of *Harper's* magazine (March 1981) that is a rare exception to the general rule, T.D. Allman quotes a peasant who tells him that he has heard that somewhere over the seas there is a place called Cuba that might be willing to send weapons to peasants who are attempting to defend themselves from the U.S.-supported massacres and who asks Allman whether he could please explain to these Cubans, if they exist, how dire is the need for such means of self-defense. These facts, and numerous other like them, raise some obvious questions.
These questions, however, are not the ones we are supposed to discuss. The only legitimate questions are the ones posed by the government propaganda system. And the press, of course, marches to the beat of the drum as usual.

Therefore, we have elaborate mock-serious discussions as to whether the guerrillas have 200 tons of arms or whether it was really 180 tons of arms, and no discussion at all about the massive assault against the population that the U.S. has been organizing and conducting very successfully, with thousand of people killed. That is not a proper subject for discussion. This is the way in which propaganda systems are constructed. If we enter into that system of delusion and self-delusion, the propaganda system has already won. There are many examples.

I must say incidentally that one striking example which is not so different from this is the Vietnam War. The U.S. attack on South Vietnam began in 1962. That is when the American airforce began its defoliation operations and airstrikes against the rural population of South Vietnam but that is not supposed to be the issue we are to discuss. We are supposed to discuss the question of whether there was Vietnamese aggression against Vietnam, that is, is it true or is it not true that there were Vietnamese troops from the North fighting in the South. And everyone had to become a specialist on technical details about Vietnam so that we could deal with that crucial question. But the fact that the U.S. was attacking South Vietnam and openly doing it since 1962 on a massive scale, that issue is very hard to discuss. In fact, today, 19 years later, you will not find, apart from statistical error, a single reference in the mass-media or U.S. academic scholarship to the fact that the U.S. was engaged in open aggression, open warfare against rural South Vietnam (where 80 per cent of the population lived) from 1962 and with greater and greater intensity after that. That was ruled off the stage of discussion. We are supposed to discuss some other issue.
Now, when we deal with something like the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, then we are able to apply rational standards. Nobody believes that in order to condemn the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, it is necessary to become an expert on Afghanistan, to find out the names of the local officials and so on. No, it is enough that aggression is wrong and massacre is wrong and we know that the problems of Afghanistan lie in Moscow. But when we study Vietnam, we are supposed to believe that the problems of Vietnam are over there and not in Washington. We are forced to become pseudo-specialists on details which had nothing to do with the basic problems of Vietnam, which lay in Washington all along, just as the basic problems of Afghanistan lie in Moscow. And we are told that the situation is very complex and we shouldn't be "emotional" or have simplistic ideas. It is true but it changes nothing about the fact that invasion and massacre are wrong.

Similarly, when we deal with Afghanistan, we are committed to applying rational standards, employing the facts about Afghanistan as evidence about the nature of Soviet power. But when we deal with Vietnam or East Timor or El Salvador, we are not permitted to use the facts as evidence about the nature of American power. If the facts are discussed at all, if the history is permitted to be known at all, which is rare, then it is treated as a curious and inexplicable exception from the pattern of American commitment to freedom and democracy everywhere, a pattern that exists only in the minds of propagandists and their victims, and that will persist as long as we are prevented by our own laziness and the effectiveness of the propaganda system from looking at the systematic behavior of the U.S. in the world, not just this instance or that instance of a bad man (say, Kissinger) doing some terrible thing, but a systematic pattern which exists quite generally, and which is rooted in the institutions of our society and the way they function.

The East Timor issue is a typical example of the actual
role of the U.S. with regard to the Third World. It is atypical in the sense that the disaster reached unusual levels of destructiveness, but typical in its nature. I think we should apply the same rational standards that we would apply to an official enemy: look at the evidence and ask yourself what it means about the nature of the system of power that is responsible for it.

I want to stress, then, three basic respects in which we should try to free ourselves from the prevailing system of propaganda and ideology when we consider East Timor. The first is, simply, that we should try to discover the facts, not an easy matter given the complicity of the press in concealing them until quite recently, and in fact even now, but not impossible by any means. Secondly, while doing so, we should bear in mind that the basic responsibility for the tragedy of Timor lies close at hand, in decisions made in the United States. One does not have to become a specialist on Timor; it is much more important to learn about the way our political and economic institutions function, about the factors that impelled the U.S. government to commit itself to support of massacre and oppression in Timor as a side effect of its relations to Indonesia, a country rich in resources that was welcomed into the free world when a military coup in 1965 led to the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, mostly landless peasants, while throwing the country open to foreign plunder. Thirdly, we should recognize that this is not an isolated incident but forms part of a historical and global pattern. The example of Timor, and many others, should lead us to ask some searching questions about the nature of our society and its institutions, and if we do not like the answer we find, to work to bring about appropriate changes. We are not dealing with laws of physics but with human decisions made in social institutions. We need not blindly accept these decisions, or even the institutional framework within which they are made.

Well, I want to discuss U.S. responsibility in East Timor
at three levels: one is the responsibility of the U.S. government; the second is the responsibility of the press; and the third and the most crucial is the responsibility of the population, that is, you and me. This is a democracy and we are not sent to concentration camps for saying the wrong things. Therefore, we have a degree of responsibility for what the government does that is far beyond that of people living in totalitarian states.

What I am going to do, instead of giving you a detailed account of U.S. responsibility, is to read a letter, an unpublished letter to the New York Times which by coincidence happens to express precisely my own attitude towards this subject, or to be more accurate, doesn't fully express my attitude, because the author of the letter toned it down significantly, well below what honesty would demand, in the vain hope that the letter would be published:

An editorial of December 8, 1980, describes the "shaming judgment on Indonesia" at the United Nations, as Portugal championed the cause of self-determination in East Timor where "a tenth to a third of 600,000 East Timorese have died" as a result of Indonesian aggression since December 1975, while "like Cambodia, East Timor has become synonymous with starvation and refugees". The editorial adds that "Washington's role has not been glorious" because "successive administrations have 'understood' without endorsing the Indonesian grab".

By ironic coincidence, the same issue reports a speech by Senator Moynihan at a conference condemning the U.N. as "no longer the guardian of social justice, human rights and equality among nations". It is "in danger of becoming a force against peace itself".

Moynihan's U.N. memoirs tell a rather different story. With reference to Timor, he explains that: ".... the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and
worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success". (A Dangerous Place, pp. 245-47).

Moynihan reveals that he was aware of the nature of that "success". He cites a February 1976 estimate by an Indonesian collaborator "that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war" - 2 to 3,000 people had been killed during the civil war - "10 per cent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War". Thus in effect he is claiming credit for "success" in helping to cause a massacre that he compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression, not to speak of the far larger number of victims in the subsequent period. The Times editorial is headlined "The Shaming of Indonesia".

A fuller account is still less glorious. Australian diplomatic cables, long published but not in the U.S. media, reveal that Henry Kissinger ordered the Jakarta embassy to cut back reporting on East Timor when the invasion was imminent and that the U.S. refused to use its influence to block the invasion, which took place the day after President Ford and Kissinger left Jakarta. The Indonesian army was 90 per cent armed by the U.S., and other arms offers, including parts for the Bronco OV-10 aircraft, were made immediately after the invasion, contrary to false claims by administration spokesmen in Congressional Hearings. An official in the State Department, David Kenney, confirmed in the February 1980 Hearings that the U.S. had never placed any constraints on the use of military equipment it dispatched. The Carter administration vastly extended military aid, permitting Indonesia to undertake the devastating offensives of 1977-78
that reduced the country to the state of Cambodia. James Markham reports in the *Times* (July 28, 1980) that recent refugees report that "OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance planes took off regularly from the (Dili) airport loaded with bombs, except when foreign visitors were there". U.S. ambassador Edward Masters visited East Timor in September 1978, learning at first hand of the horrendous situation. But he delayed nine months before recommending humanitarian aid, while the massacre continued. Commenting on this remarkable fact in Congressional Hearings Cornell Professor Benedict Anderson cites a State Department document which records: "It was not until the spring of 1979 that the Government of Indonesia felt East Timor to be secure enough to permit foreign visitors". He then draws the obvious conclusion.

This is only a small part of the ugly story. The fact is plain that the Indonesian aggression and its grim consequences are in significant measure the direct responsibility of the United States. Furthermore, for almost four years, the U.S. media were virtually silent apart from occasional reports echoing State Department fabrications. Is it really accurate to say that it is Indonesia who is "shamed" by these events, and that the U.S. role is only something less than "glorious"? It is important to address this question honestly, not only to understand our actual international role, but also to change it; and not only with respect to Timor, where the brutality continues while the U.S. continues to obstruct U.N. efforts to terminate Indonesian aggression and the man who takes prime responsibility for the obstruction joins in condemning the United Nations for failing to uphold peace and justice.

The contents of this unpublished letter deal - much too briefly - with the first two points I hoped to discuss: the responsibility of the U.S. government for the atrocities in
Timor, and the responsibility of the press and the articulate intelligentsia quite generally in abetting these atrocities by their silence, or sometimes still worse, by repeating the lies of government propaganda. The justifications that are sometimes offered for this disgraceful behavior are themselves worth careful attention.

For example, we read that Timor was an exotic place, far away and remote, that it was just "off the horizon", so that inadvertently the media missed this important story. The actual facts, always ignored, are revealing. Prior to the Indonesian invasion, there was considerable press coverage of Timor - and much of the reporting, particularly during the early stages of Indonesian intervention prior to the outright aggression of December 1975 consisted of very remarkable falsifications, as Edward Herman and I have documented in a recent book *(The Political Economy of Human Rights*, Boston, South End Press 1979). Then reporting fell off markedly. Prior to the invasion, coverage was fairly substantial because there was concern over the general character of Portuguese decolonization. Timor was not too exotic to notice when possible U.S. interests were at stake. When Indonesia began to massacre the population with the crucial aid of the U.S. government, Timor became exotic and coverage ceased, reduced to virtually zero at the height of the massacres, after the Human Rights Administration had vastly increased the flow of armaments in the certain knowledge that they would be used for these ends. Again, this is documented in the book I mentioned. It suffices to check the *New York Times Index* to see the basic facts. There is a good deal more to say, but perhaps this single observation suffices, without exploring its implications any further.

Finally, what about our responsibility, yours and mine? It is an important fact, one that cannot be stressed enough, that a tiny group of young people did devote themselves, throughout this period, to breaking through the curtain of
silence and falsehood. And, much too late, they succeeded. By 1979, four years after the U.S.-backed slaughter began, the basic facts did come to light in the process. Some time before, a number of Congressional representatives, notably Tom Harkin of Iowa, had learned the truth and become much concerned and active. Meanwhile, other channels of communication were used — such as this meeting — to bring some awareness of the situation in Timor, and the U.S. responsibility for it, to parts of the American population that could be reached. Pressures were mounted which played a major role in bringing the U.S. government to support at least some form of humanitarian assistance, which saved many thousands of lives, though it falls far short of guaranteeing the right of self-determination for which the majority of the United Nations votes every year, while the U.S. opposes any such resolution.

There is plainly a great deal more to do, but we can take heart from two lessons. First, people are not gangsters, and will be indignant when they learn that they are being compelled to behave as gangsters, through the actions of their governments. Second, there is much that we can do to mitigate and change horrendous policies, if only we devote ourselves to the task. There is a corollary to these observations. If we do know the truth, and do nothing about it, we share the responsibility for what is happening. The blood is on our hands.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Noam Chomsky is a long time political activist, a writer and a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, USA. he is the author of many books and articles on U.S. foreign policy, international affairs and human rights, including most recently *Towards a New Cold War* (New York; Pantheon Books 1982) and *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (Boston; South End Press 1983).
Chapter 2
THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL
THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

By Andrew Gray

Since the 1975 Indonesian invasion, the people of East Timor have lost about one third of their population - once 650,000; they have been bombed, shot and tortured by the invading army, they have been starved to death by famine and they have had to flee their villages or be "resettled" in camps for "displaced persons". The rural indigenous population (86% of the total) have suffered the brunt of the Indonesian occupation and by now, it is likely that many of the features which have formed the cultural and ethnic identity of the survivors have disappeared. It has sometimes been remarked that population figures of deaths in East Timor are another propaganda weapon, so it is interesting to note that the worst figures of the decimation of the East Timorese come from the Indonesians themselves (cf. Retbøll 1980: 112).

The ethnolinguistic groups scattered throughout East Timor were, before 1975, distributed between Tetum groups of the south and west, the northern and central upland groups such as the Ema and those who cut across the central mountain backbone of the country such as the Mambai and Makassae (see map). Since then, the many shifts in population have mixed up these different groups, some of whom have moved into the central and eastern parts of the mountains and relied on the protection of the independence movement PRETILIN's guerrilla army. Others have moved onto the lower, more accessible parts of the coastal area and the border with West Timor where Indonesian camps gather the "resettled" people into confined artificial communities.

When one looks at the devastating impact of the Indonesian occupation - unprecedented in Timor's history - it is easy to receive the impression that the indigenous peoples of East Timor lived in an ahistorical, pristine condition in the years prior to 1975 with a relatively unsophisticated life-style. However, there exists a considerable background of historical
1. Fataluku  
2. Makassai  
3. Nauhete  
4. Uai Ma'a  
5. Gairui  
6a Eastern Tetum  
6b Southern Tetum  
6c Northern Tetum  
7. Galoli  
8. Mambai  
9. Tokodé  
10. Ema  
11. Buna'  
12. Mainly Atoni  
13. Atauroan  
14. Helong  
15. Idaté

Map of Ethnolinguistic Groups in East Timor

(Jørgen Ulrich from Hicks 1976)
and anthropological literature which demonstrates that this is not the case.

The people of East Timor have a long history of fighting invaders which stretches back to the first incursions of the Portuguese in the 1520s and probably long before then. Throughout this history it is possible to see the same tactics which have been used by the Indonesian army during their occupation. The occupying power either fights the indigenous inhabitants directly or else tries to "Timorise" the war by conscripting indigenous soldiers and exploiting internal conflicts for its own ends. Between 1975 and 1979, the Indonesians fought directly against the Timorese, but their later attempts to "Timorise" the war by use of two Timorese battalions and forcing the civilian population to participate appear to have failed (cf. TA-POL Bulletin, Sept. 1983 and East Timor Report No. 7, June 1984).

During the 16th century, the island of Timor consisted of a series of warring kingdoms made up from clusters of loose village communities. The military alliances between these kingdoms led to the emergence of two rival "empires" - the Servia of West Timor and the Belu of central Timor which in fact stretched into the eastern half of the island. The major trading resource of the island was sandalwood and from the arrival of the Dutch in 1613 there began a prolonged struggle with Portugal over the monopoly on its trade.

The first colonial struggle over Timor was between two different groups of Portuguese. The "Black Portuguese" or Topasses were descendents of mixed Portuguese/local marriages and they fought with the "White Portuguese" for control over Timor for most of the 18th century. These two Portuguese adversaries made full use of local indigenous groups, under their own kings (liurai), to fight for them.

The more protracted fight between the Dutch and the Portuguese lasted right through until the 20th century when the
Luso-Hollandesa treaty was signed in 1904. According to this agreement Portugal held the eastern half of the island, the Dutch the western half with a small Topasse enclave in the west at Oe-Cusse which was under Portuguese control. By the end of the period of conflict between the Dutch and Portuguese many Timorese had fallen either resisting the colonial powers or being used by them for the fighting.

Resistance against Portugal did not stop with the Luso-Hollandesa treaty, however. Between 1910 and 1912, there was a rebellion in the southern part of the island which set up a government and threatened the capital Dili. It was put down after 18 months with the loss of 3000 Timorese lives. There have been other rebellions against Portuguese rule, one as recently as 1958.

However, it was during the Second World War that the people of East Timor suffered the most. In retaliation for the support of the Australian army, an estimated 40,000 Timorese were killed by the occupying Japanese forces. Many towns, including Dili were bombed by the Australians and more people died as a result of the famine brought on by the fighting (cf. Hill, 1976: 2).

Including a brief spell of occupation by the British during the Napoleonic wars, the Timorese have had to contend with colonisation by the Topasses, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, the Japanese and now the Indonesians. The history shows how throughout their past the Timorese have rebelled against the excesses of colonial invasion while at the same time been used as fighting fodder for colonial warfare. The difference with the Indonesian occupation was its speed, severity and the intense persistence of Timorese resistance. In addition, the violation of another country's territorial integrity is nowadays a violation of international law.

When one reads documents such as the 1983 Amnesty International report (see Chapter 5 in this volume), it is possible
to catch a glimpse of the fearful events which are taking place in East Timor. Random detention, torture, extrajudicial executions all add a terrible dimension to the long history of the country's colonisation.

After 1904, with the Dutch as the colonial power over West Timor and the Portuguese as the authority over East Timor the administrative and historical differences between the two halves of the island became even more marked. The Indonesian regime is working to fuse these differences together by force.

The Portuguese mode of colonial rule was indirect. Traditionally, the island was divided into kingdoms ruled by the liurai which were made up of several princedoms, each governed by two indigenous officials corresponding to a dual "male/female" complementary politico-ritual pair (Hicks 1976: 8). Each village or cluster of hamlets had a chief called tumengengs (Dunn, 1983: 5). Before the 1910-12 rebellion, the liurai dominated the political life of the island. This domination could well have stemmed from the Portuguese having treated the position of liurai as a secular ruler and military commander rather than the symbolic centre he had been in the more distant past. In any case, after 1912, the kingdoms of the liurai were broken down into posts (sucos) which broadly corresponded to the previous princedoms. Liurai was the name given to the chiefs of the posts which superceded but did not completely destroy the essential dual structure of the princedoms (Hicks, ibid.). In this respect it appears that the Portuguese, in spite of indirect rule, were quite prepared to overturn the traditional ritual and political organisation of the East Timorese when it suited them.

Whereas the Portuguese supported friendly leaders rather than troublesome ones and kept the indigenous population in their home districts within the influence of an approved chief, the Dutch used a different mode of indirect rule. They forced mountain dwellers in West Timor to move into more accessible places for purely administrative convenience (Ormeling, 1957).
These kampung settlements were set up in the 1920s, initially near military supply roads and later along trunk roads. They were artificially large villages, consisting of between 50 and 100 houses, and usually a tribal chief was appointed head. Occasionally, Malay-speakers who had no traditional tribal office were appointed to head these villages (Nicol, 1977). Another Dutch policy which the Portuguese had no need of was transmigration. The resettlement and transmigration aspects of Dutch rule have continued in an extreme fashion under Indonesian occupation.

It could be said that the Indonesian invasion has led to a fusion of the worst aspects of Portuguese and Dutch colonial policy. The attempts to eradicate the traditional dual structures of chieftainship continue as under the Portuguese, but in addition, the more inaccessible groups are being "resettled" which is disastrous for people whose land, orientation and relationship to a specific place is one of the founding elements of their production and cultural identity. In addition reports from Timor (TAPOL Bulletin Sept. 1983) show that these village settlements are the centres of famine and disease. The Red Cross have had only very limited access to investigate the situation and have been able to do little to relieve the suffering. These camps also function as strategic settlements, aimed at preventing the people fraternising with, or moving over to, FRETILIN guerrilla fighters.

The Portuguese colonisation of East Timor appears clearly woven into the world-view of its indigenous people. In several parts of the country, the Portuguese flag is a standard part of the sacred ritual paraphernalia linking a community to its ancestral past. Elizabeth Traube, in her statement to the United Nations in 1980, shows how the Mambai people, with whom she lived before the invasion, connect political order and cosmic well-being. According to Mambai mythology, the Portuguese are the younger brothers of the Timorese. They were born on the sacred mountain at the centre of Timor and were given the
sacred flag and marching drum, the insignia of jural sovereignty, by Father Heaven. To the elder Timorese brothers, Heaven entrusted the sacred rock and tree of the religious cult, charging them with the ritual custodianship of the cosmos (Traube 1981: 25). In this mythological model, Portuguese and Timorese performed opposed, interdependent jural and ritual functions which correspond precisely to the dual aspects of chieftainship which we saw as traditional to the princedoms before they became sucos.

Elizabeth Traube's testimony continues to say that one of the Mambai's main concerns is to find a successor to fill the role which Portugal had within their world view. She points out that the alien intervention of Indonesia is not likely to constitute a successor. The question now is whether FRETLIN can replace Portugal, not as a colonial power, but by occupying a position in the indigenous world view as a secular sovereign power which should hold political sway. It is possible that after nearly ten years in the mountains, relying on indigenous grass-roots support, FRETLIN could feasibly already be filling the vacuum. Recent photographs of liberated areas under FRETLIN's control show an emphasis on symbols such as FRETLIN's flag, education in indigenous languages, mixed production methods as well as the presence of shrines to the heros of the war. However, there is insufficient information as yet to establish with any precision how the Timorese perceive the war.

So far, we have tried to show that the people of Timor have a long history of colonial control and resistance, that the Portuguese hold over their colony did affect the traditional lives of its inhabitants who themselves incorporated several aspects of Portuguese rule into their culture. When we look at the Indonesian invasion in this context, however, it is possible to see quite how devastating its impact was on a people who had until then, with only a few exceptions, received outside influences on their own terms.

Three statements show that, in spite of a history of res-
istance, colonial rule and indigenous incorporation of occupying powers into their world view, the Indonesian invasion was unprecedented. Elizabeth Traube says on the historical side: "the character of the Portuguese occupation, which unfolded gradually and involved relatively little use of military force, contrasts sharply with the sudden and violent imposition of Indonesian rule" (ibid.: 26). The introduction of the Dutch policy of resettling the population has had a terrible effect on some groups. Shepard Forman, who did fieldwork in 1973-74, tells of the Makassae experience: "The removal of the Makassae from their ancestral lands and the disruption of their social and economic cultural systems is more than a simple matter of the relocation and resettlement of a population. It is the destruction of a significant mode of life, of a way of being, which held the meaning of life for the Makassae as a people, and which should have meaning for all of us" (Forman, 1981: 31). As to the cultural impact of the invasion, Traube tells us: "the administrative unification of East Timor under colonial rule simultaneously lays the foundations for a national identity, and works against indigenous legitimation of Indonesian intervention. For while it is true that the East Timorese once responded to the challenge of an alien civilization by integrating the foreigners into their world, this solution was created under conditions radically different from those which obtain today" (ibid.: 26).

It is therefore important to understand the horrendous effects of the 1975 invasion on the people of East Timor without romanticising them as untouched, isolated, uncontacted, and without a history. By looking briefly at only a few aspects of some of the cultures and societies on East Timor it is possible to gain some insight into the basis not only of a way of living but of an identity the people are fighting to retain.

According to Ormeling (op.cit.: 67), Timor is a transition area where an Indonesian/Malay and a Melanesian population component meet and influence each other. It has been suggested
(Nicol, op.cit.:4) that the Atoni of West Timor have strong Papuan similarities and were pushed to the interior of the island by Belunese people between 3000 and 200 BC. The 15 language groups which break down into 37 dialects also suggest different influences on the ethnic make-up of the groups. The Makassae and the Bunaq have a West Papuan language connection for example and other Papuan traits have been noted for the Northern Tetum, Mambai, and the Ema (see Ormeling, Nicol & Le Bar 1972 & Fox, 1980).

Subsistence economy for the rural Timorese consists mainly of the swidden cultivation of rice, maize, and root crops. Some highland groups such as the Makassae have well irrigated mountain terraces for wet rice, but this is not so common. Animal husbandry centres on the herding of buffalo, pigs, and goats. Land can be owned individually in some areas, although on the whole it belongs to the clan and is available for families in accordance with their needs. Some land is available for the growing of crops used in ceremonial feasts such as dry rice. The animals are slaughtered as sacrifices at these feasts or kept for their part in the elaborate exchanges during marriage and mortuary rituals.

Production varies throughout East Timor as a result of ecological and cultural factors. According to Hicks (1976, Chapter 3), the river basin on the southern coast near Viqueque has fertile soil and a relatively high population density. Most of the communities there have been converted to Christianity and monogamous families are the norm. The result of smaller families has been the increase in individually owned land and an emphasis on pig keeping which does not involve intensive labour. Maize is found in the area more than rice which predominates among the upland Mambai groups. There the clan organisation and polygamous households can cooperate to tend the grazing of large herds of buffalo. Where different ecological zones and cultural practices have led to different production methods, markets
have sprung up for the exchange of produce. In addition, coffee which is a standard cash crop in East Timor is sold as a means of supplementing the subsistence economy.

The basic settlement is the hamlet which consists of about three to twelve houses. The style of dwelling varies across the country from the intricately designed houses in the east, to the round houses of the central mountain regions (such as among the Ema) or the rectangular stilted houses of the Tetum. But among the indigenous groups of East Timor, the house has more significance than superficial design - it has great conceptual importance. Among the Tetum, for example, the house corresponds to a being with a face at the front, side walls which are "legs" and front "male" and back "female" doors connected by a "backbone" and "body" beams. The house is divided into two sexual and two cosmic halves: female/sacred as opposed to male/secular. The largest room is the female one which is called the "womb" and contains both the hearth and the shelf on which lies the paraphernalia associated with rites (cf. Hicks, 1976: Chapter 4). The Ema make the same distinctions in their houses but with a different interpretation. There the "male" room is the larger room and is the ritual centre whereas the "female" room is where the hearth lies (cf. Renard-Clamagirand, 1982: Chapter 1).

Throughout East Timor the distinction between older and younger brother is very important. The relationship is not necessarily a biological distinction but covers many aspects of their life. We saw earlier, for example, how the Mambai saw the Timorese as an "older brother" and the Portuguese as a "younger brother". For the Mambai, the older brother is passive, "feminine" and in touch with the sacred world whereas the younger brother is seen as secular, political, and a "masculine" worldly force in their society (cf. Traube, 1980). The Tetum, on the other hand, consider that the younger brother should inherit the house as he is considered more "feminine" and sacred and can take care of the ritual paraphernalia kept in the "feminine" room.
Whereas the Mambai and the Tetum interpret the older/younger brother relationship in opposite ways, the Ema, according to Renard-Chamagirand (op.cit.) have another combination. Mythologically, the first inhabitants of the area were two brothers. The older was "hot" and "male" and was responsible for sacred matters while the younger was "cold" and "feminine" and was responsible for political matters (ibid.: 290). However, in practice this changes according to the context because in private rituals relating to the house, the brothers will act as united descendents of the same patrilineal ancestors, whereas in public rites and activities the older brother, through his access to the sacred, controls or administrates the younger brother's productive power over the fertility of the crops and herds. This is essentially a "male"/"female" relationship and corresponds to the duality between sacred and secular we saw earlier in the discussion of the dual rulers of the princedoms.

The Timorese have several types of relationship terminology and marriage exchange practices. The Atoni in the west have a two-line prescriptive terminology (which logically implies the direct exchange of sisters). The Ema, Mambai, and Makassae all have an asymmetric prescriptive terminology with asymmetric alliance operating in practice. This means that instead of the direct exchange of women, men marry a woman in the category Mother's Brother's Daughter. The consequence of this is a unidirectional flow of women where a woman is not offered in return. The balance for the exchange is made by means of a complex series of bridewealth prestations. The Buna' and Tetum do not have a prescriptive terminology; however, the latter do have a system of lineal descent. In spite of the Atoni, Buna', and Tetum not having an asymmetric prescriptive terminology, they share with the other groups a preference in practice for organising their marriages by means of varying degrees of asymmetric alliance. (For further discussion, see Needham, 1980, and Barnes, 1980b.)

If the relative emphases on asymmetric alliance are pla-
ced alongside other social features of the peoples of Timor, it is possible to see a variety of ways in which groups are formed and perpetuated. The principal features are the alliances between groups which are forged and renewed by marriage and adoption, descent rules such as patri- or matrilineality and residence with the wife's or husband's family (uxori- or virilocal residence). Not all these features need co-exist and usually some are stressed at the expense of others.

Among the Ema there are patrilineages which relate to each other by asymmetric alliances. According to the amount of marriage payment, a woman and her children will be more or less strongly integrated into the patrilineage of her husband. However, a child receives the name of the lineage it depends on. This means that where there is an adoption or an occasional case where a husband has to live with his wife's family, then the child will not be filiated to the father's line.

The Buna' have a different arrangement. Although for them asymmetric alliance is also clearly defined, they have no patrilineal ideology. A woman can either become a member of her husband's lineage for a large payment, or else, for a reduced bridewealth, the husband will live with his wife's family (more common in practice). In spite of the predominance of asymmetric alliance among the Buna' there are exceptions and the lower bride price can even allow for a change in the unidirectional flow of women.

Among the Eastern Tetum, the asymmetric aspect of marriage exchange is even less pronounced. There is a patrilineal ideology where all men are potential members of their fathers's clan until marriage. If the woman goes and lives with her husband, it is the responsibility of the man's family and clan to pay bridewealth to the wife's family and clan. In this case, the husband becomes a full member of his father's clan and his children will probably join his. However, if there are no means for the husband to pay the bridewealth, then he will have to live with his wife's family in a subordinate position in the
Irrigation System built by the Resistance Movement (Photograph FRETIILIN)
community and his children will be affiliated to their mother's clan. For a detailed account of these comparisons in relation to the rest of Eastern Indonesia (see Barnes, 1980b).

As we have seen in other aspects of Timorese life, there are sets of variations around certain basic principles or features. The most significant principle is the relationship between wife-givers and wife-takers which is a fundamental distinction between allies throughout the area and constitutes the basis for the continuation of social life. Exchanges begin at marriage and continue at the birth of children and other major feasts right through to the mortuary rites. The reason for this is because the wife-givers are not simply providers of women, they provide life and continuity. They are considered superior and have to receive ritual payments at all major rites in the life cycle. Marriage is central because women are so important as the vehicles for spreading fertility and life through society. Although details of rituals vary among the different Timorese groups and in certain contexts the relationship between givers and takers changes for the purposes of certain rites (cf. Hicks, 1976, Chapter 6), the opposition provides the primary link between different houses, hamlets, and villages.

The peoples of East Timor make an important distinction in their cosmos between Father Heaven and Mother Earth. The Makassae and Mambai (Forman, 1980; Traube, 1980) see the perpetuation of life over the generations as stemming from this pair. Dew and rain are the semen and blood of Father Heaven which in conjunction with Mother Earth gives rise to crops and meat. The transformation of this food into the semen and blood of humans provides the means for human procreation. After death the human body decomposes and returns to the sky after a year, where it forms the dew and rain once again to continue the cycle.

Among the Ema, the distinction is between the Great Father who is associated with the sun (hot) and the Great Mother who
is linked to the rain (cold). After death, the souls go to the sun where they join the other ancestors. The ancestors administer or control fertility (mythologically the relationship between sun and rain) and it is through rites aimed at them that the Ema ensure the flow of life, whether as the growth of crops and animals or of mankind in the birth, marriage, and death ceremonies. The relationship between the sun and rain parallels the dual earthly chieftainship, the relationship between older and younger brother as well as male and female, in that the former half in each case administers or controls the power over fertility exercised by the latter.

The Tetum, as in other examples we have seen, have a different system which makes use of the same imagery. For them, the ancestors appear almost exclusively as female. They live in a sacred womb under the ground but control the fertility of the soil and mankind when propitiated by sending "nature spirits" called Lords of the Earth up to the secular world. After death, the soul of a person goes to the sacred underworld of the womb and joins the ancestors.

In all the examples mentioned here, life appears at birth and leaves at death in a unidirectional flow which corresponds with the asymmetric marriage flow of women through society. We can see that the societies of East Timor share many elements but vary in how they are combined. The complementary oppositions between male/female, elder/younger, sacred/secular, giver/taker, and control/fertility, crop up repeatedly comprising what could be termed "concordance and variation" (see Barnes, 1980a).

Many of the cultures and life-styles of the indigenous people of East Timor have more than a passing resemblance to those of indigenous groups living in Eastern Indonesia. Robert Barnes' book Kédang (1974) shows several similarities such as the cosmological significance of the house and the flow of women as constituting the flow of life. Indeed, this concept is so common throughout the area that a book called The Flow of Life (Fox, 1980) has collected together articles about groups
throughout the region of East Timor and Eastern Indonesia to illustrate this and other similar features.

From the book it is possible to point out the following elements which we can see in East Timor:

the house reflects social and cosmic order;

clan segment or house made up of classificatory kin who organise alliances (older and younger brothers' families);

the use of relative age (older/younger) and gender to assert status differentiation;

marriage alliance as the asymmetric transmission of life;

relationships with ancestors and the invisible spirit world linked to the continuation of fertility.

The question as to whether the peoples of East Timor have cultures and life-styles with similar traits to those of Eastern Indonesia has become politically highly charged. The reason for this is the argument that if such similarities were found, they could somehow provide Indonesia with a valid justification for the occupation. There would appear to be no grounds for this fear.

Variation is a fundamental element in social and cultural identity. We have seen that there are many differences and contrasting features which distinguish the peoples of East Timor from each other. To point out the similarities between these and Eastern Indonesian groups is simply to postulate the existence of a culture area. It has nothing to do with the right of a nation state to invade another country in the culture area, particularly when that state's own culture is alien to the region. There is another reason why it would not be in Indonesia's interests to use the notion of culture area to define its claim to East Timor. If culture were to be the determining factor in the formation of nation states, then by rights Indonesia would have to cede its eastern islands rather than annex East Timor.

An interesting development has taken place in this context
which puts forward another aspect of the political relevance of culture areas for indigenous peoples. In recent years, people resisting Indonesia in East Timor have looked for support from the Pacific region. For example, there was an East Timorese representative at the Vanuatu Conference for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific. There Timor was seen as a Pacific issue, linked to other occupied countries such as West Papua and New Caledonia (see Pétrod & Vinding, 1983). In spite of the linguistic, ethnic, and also cultural connections with indigenous populations of Indonesia (the eastern islands specifically), the East Timorese nevertheless have a Melanesian component in their make-up. The extent of this has yet to be described in detail, but it is in this component that the Timorese could be looking for ideological justification for the political expediency of "thinking east" to the Pacific.

Apart from cultural features lies the overriding factor of history. We saw earlier the different colonial strategies employed by the Dutch and the Portuguese. These differences led to distinct expectations for the two colonies when independence became a possibility. From being the majority in their own country, the East Timorese are being forced into a minority position. The right to self-determination, which has been exercised tribally for centuries, has been denied them by the Indonesians at a time when they needed it the most.

An eye-witness account of indigenous Timorese self-determination was given by Shepard Forman in his statement to the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (1977). He says (p. 19): "On July 15, 1974, just three months after the Portuguese revolution and before any organized political activity in East Timor had reached beyond the coastal towns, 475 out of a total of 500 household heads in the village involved trekked from their mountain homes down to the administrative post at Quelicai to record with signatures when possible or the mark of X their deliberate and reasoned choice on a petition ... In a matter of only five days, 95% of the rel-
event population had been mobilized to freely express their political will."

Whether East Timor is viewed as a Portuguese colony or as an independent FRETILIN state, the Indonesian regime has violated the territorial integrity of another nation. Territorial integrity is regarded as sacrosanct throughout most of the decolonising world (often to the detriment of the indigenous peoples living on borders between two arbitrarily bounded state-entities). It is tragic then that at the one time when groups of indigenous peoples would like it respected it has been violated with no effective international response.

This brief survey of some of the peoples and culture of East Timor has been written mainly in the ethnographic present tense, but as yet it is practically impossible to ascertain the extent to which everything has changed with the loss of life, relocations, famine, and changes in production methods. In the past, the Timorese have adapted themselves to new circumstances, but this unprecedented upheaval in East Timor would threaten the existence of even the most resilient people and their culture.

In their recent book "The War against East Timor", Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soer Liong tell in detail of the effect of the war of resistance on the general Timorese population. Since 1975 and 1976, thousands of indigenous people have been herded into camps. According to a FRETILIN report (pp. 83-95), conditions in many of these camps are terrible, production is very limited which leads to a shortage of food, disease is rife and there is evidence of forced labour.

Those who fled to the hills in 1975 and 1976 held out against the Indonesian army until the offensive of 1978 which trapped thousands around the area between Baucau and Viqueque. During this assault, chemical weapons and napalm were used (pp. 35/36). Stricken by starvation and disease, many people surrendered to the Indonesian army and went to the camps while
others moved to the east of the island where FRETILIN were re-building its forces.

In 1981, the Indonesian army carried out a new offensive to destroy the re-constituted FRETILIN. Once again there was much fighting in the area between Baucau and Viqueque. Many thousands of commandeered Timorese men and boys were forced to walk in front of the army to hem in the FRETILIN fighters. Although many guerrillas escaped, the civilians suffered at the hands of the Indonesian army. In Lakuuta, near Viqueque, several hundred people were massacred where a reported 20 trucks were needed to take away the bodies (ibid.: 128).

The book talks also of the Indonesianisation of the people of Timor. Indigenous languages are forbidden in schools and education takes place only in Indonesian. The only Timorese participation in the running of East Timor is by certain "puppet" bureaucrats who are completely controlled by a parallel military structure. The economy is dominated by an Indonesian monopoly over coffee and sandalwood held by a company called Denok.

With regard to the fate of specific peoples, information is scanty, however, we do know that since 1975 the Makassae have been relocated to encampments on the coast and the Ema, too, have been right in the path of the war. The Tetum area of Viqueque was reported as the scene of the 1983 offensive, where a reported 300 villagers were massacred (IWGIA Newsletters No. 35 & 36). The International Red Cross have been allowed only limited access to the country. The latest information appears to indicate that in the face of continuing FRETILIN resistance to the 1983 offensive the operation was intensified and tightened in May 1984 with the result that more Timorese are fleeing to the mountains away from the Indonesian army (East Timor Report, June, 1984).

Some say that the traditional cultures of East Timor have gone beyond the point of no return and that the future will
consist of discovering a new identity. Others say, on the contrary, that, should peace ever emerge from the troubles, the people will go back to their lands, pick up the pieces and continue where they left off. In fact, a national consciousness was already present among the indigenous peoples of East Timor before 1975 (Traube, 1981: 26) and so the future—whether under Indonesia or FRETILIN—is bound to reflect this. At the same time, the variation of culture found throughout the country, whether significantly changed or not, will have to compete with the demand for wider loyalties to the state (for a discussion of this in a Melanesian context, see Ghai, 1983). It is apparent that the East Timorese are not willing to give Indonesia their loyalty and the longer FRETILIN resists, the more they will represent this national consciousness.

The relationship of indigenous cultures to the rise of national consciousness is a historical and political problem. In the present situation in East Timor, for example, it would appear irrelevant whether or not there were cultural similarities with Eastern Indonesia. However, the connection should not be seen as the imputation of political ideology under the guise of anthropological observation, but as aiding the understanding of social and cultural factors which the Timorese value as important and are prepared to fight for. Whether cultural similarities are politically significant or not is a question which lies exclusively with the indigenous people who are creating their own ideology.

This paper has tried to dispel two notions about the East Timorese people: first, that somehow before 1975 they lived in a pristine, ahistorical vacuum and secondly that they are unrelated to other indigenous groups in the area. These notions are often covered over for fear of appearing to justify Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. On the contrary, they present a context for seeing the tragic scope of the occupation which has prevented a people, ready for and capable of self-determination, from deciding their own future. This may also go some
way to explain why resistance to Indonesia is still so strong after nearly ten years.

REFERENCES


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Chapter 3
A SECRET REPORT FROM EAST TIMOR


A. THE COVERING LETTER:

Respectfully,

Permit us to bring to your attention certain matters which, disappointingly, have occurred in this province, on the initiative of a group of people who always place their personal interests above the interest of the Nation and State.

Because of the difficulties in communications, as well as the extremely difficult and complicated methods and procedures which make it difficult for us to have contact with, or regularly exchange ideas with, the Central Government, it often happens that our reports do not reach your hands until too late, which obstructs implementation of the high-minded provisions laid down by the Central Government regarding this province which is still young in years.

Whilst apologising for any shortcomings on our part, we do not forget at the same time to express our gratitude for all your attention.

FIRST-LEVEL REGIONAL PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE FIRST-LEVEL REGION/PROVINCE OF EAST TIMOR.

On behalf of our chairman:
Leandro Isaac (signed)
Sousa Soares (signed)
B. THE REPORT:

I. Introduction

The people of East Timor have expressed their innermost, immeasurable feelings of joy, and throughout the centuries this people will be forever indebted and grateful for the achievement of integration of East Timor into the fold of the motherland, the great Republic of Indonesia. It is for this reason that we wish to take an active part and enjoy together with other fraternal provinces, through national development, all the fruits of peace, freedom and justice, in accordance with the Panca Sila and the 1945 constitution.

The integration of East Timor is the consequence of the desire that exploded within the breasts of the sons and daughters of the region of East Timor, which was accepted at the right moment by the president of the Republic of Indonesia, Bapak Suharto, on July 17, 1976. Even so, some individuals who have come to this province have introduced behaviour that can only be described as being the behaviour of conquerors towards a conquered people. With great brutality, the aforementioned individuals do not respect, they even ignore the customs of the people of East Timor, and make use of this opportunity to abuse the powers vested in their positions whilst displaying indisciplinary attitudes that are totally in contravention of both the policy of the Central Government as well as the aspirations of the people of East Timor.

II. Questions in the Realm of Breaches of Law and Discipline

Although five years of integration have passed, although security has been restored by stages and in a variety of ways, although the masses of people have constantly made endless sacrifices, it is not yet possible to experience the implementation of law and discipline in this young province of East Timor.
The Regional People's Representative Assembly of the province of East Timor is continually, with deep sorrow, receiving verbal as well as written reports or complaints from the people about torture, maltreatment, murders and other unimaginable cases. The basic laws in this province of East Timor are controlled by certain individuals or groups who place their personal interests above the interests of the people as a whole, even to the extent that their unlawful actions result in death for the people. But these irresponsible people or groups commit murders without due process of the laws concerning investigation. Feelings of fear are widespread among the people with the result that the living conditions of the people have worsened.

After five years of integration, the people of East Timor do not yet enjoy the freedom that humanity needs to feel. The people of East Timor see their living conditions as a dangerous threat to their own beings. If not (sic), the evidence we shall produce in this report will prove that this is true:

1. In the district of Lospalos, some people were murdered by Batallion 745 because they practised black magic.

2. In the district of Viqueque, tens of inhabitants were murdered after being tortured by having their sex organs slashed because they did not obey orders serving the interests of certain individuals or groups and also because of black magic practices.

3. In the district of Likisa, tens of people were murdered by the Sub-district Military Command after having been tortured with electricity and other forms of burning, without adequate reason.

4. In the district of Kovalima, tens of inhabitants were murdered by Batallion 745 after being accused of practising black magic.

These murders and acts of torture committed by these ir-
Photograph of atrocities which have been carried out by the Indonesian Army in East Timor (from FRETILIN publication).
responsible persons or groups have resulted in a situation of instability throughout the region of East Timor where there have been many reactions, fears and a variety of other feelings. Yet, integration which took place five years ago should have brought the results that the people of East Timor really want to enjoy.

Furthermore, in a situation where there are no legal restraints and no discipline, problems relating to matters of morality occur, such as for instance in Dili where several women in a prison were tortured with electricity and burnt with cigarettes by some elements of the Armed Forces who also inflicted immoral sexual acts upon them.

In addition, among officials working for the regional Government there is an engineer by the name of Azis Hasyim, a person with considerable influence in Regional Government, who describes himself as being a mandated person inseparably connected with the development aspect in East Timor.

The afore-mentioned engineer says that he is the trusted mandatory of several officials in positions of power in Central Government. Yet, the said Engineer Azis Hasyim has pronounced publicly several sentences aimed at blackening and insulting the reputation and good name of the Governor/Head of Region of the First-Level Province of East Timor, Bapak Guilherme Maria Goncalves, the wording of which is as follows: "The Governor is shit. He is soon going to be replaced. Tell him that.". The Regional People's Representative Assembly cannot tolerate the behaviour of Engineer Azis Hasyim, added to which are his immoral deeds which include forcing some women to have sexual relations with him, beating some women while threatening to shoot them with a pistol, as well as other unwarranted deeds.

The Regional People's Representative Assembly of the First-Level Province of East Timor therefore request, Bapak president, with all due modesty, that Engineer Azis Hasyim be
dismissed from all his positions and that he be transferred from East Timor as speedily as possible.

III. Problems in the Realm of the Economy

The economic situation of the people of East Timor is now passing through the most tragic phase since the beginning of the civil war in this region. After integration, however, with the setting up of the Regional Government in East Timor which set up the 27th province of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, efforts were begun by the Regional Government, with instructions and financial assistance from the Central Government, to reconstruct all remaining vestiges of the economic riches of East Timor. Although quite a lot of financial assistance for the purposes of building up the economy has been received, the people of East Timor have not yet felt any real benefits from the results they have themselves achieved (in the production of) various agricultural products such as coffee, sandalwood, kaset, candlenut, timber, copra, and other produce.

Peasants, owners of coffee plantations, feel that they have failed in their efforts to produce coffee because the price is very low and they are not able to go anywhere to seek favourable prices in other areas such as the town of Dili where coffee prices would comply with their interests. In East Timor, there is only one enterprise that may purchase coffee in the regions through its representatives at a very low price per kilo. This enterprise is P.T. Denok. P.T. Denok is able to monopolise coffee, sandalwood and other produce. It was said that P.T. Denok is a special enterprise located in East Timor in order to absorb all the main economic products of the province for its services to the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

With regard to sandalwood which suffers the same fate as coffee, a further comment is necessary regarding something we
find quite intolerable because of its great impact, its very high price and the absence of any conservation of this product. Sandalwood as a source of wealth of historic significance for the region of East Timor has become extinct. In all places throughout the region of East Timor where sandalwood has been growing, certain individuals have arrived, bringing people and forcing them to cut down the timber; dead sandalwood trees as well as young sandalwood trees have been cut down and even their roots pulled out. The timber has then been sold in Dili to P.T. Denok at a very low price even though it should fetch a high price.

The same thing is happening to other agricultural products produced by the people in their efforts to secure a livelihood in conformity with their needs. After five years integration and ceaseless efforts by both the Central Government and the Regional Government, the vast majority of the people are not yet able to enjoy stable living conditions.

IV. Matters that are of a Dangerous Nature and that Cause Unrest among the People and the Native Officials of East Timor, (by Means of which) Certain Elements Create Discord and Arouse Feelings of Hatred in Order to Seek Benefits and Positions for Themselves or their Groups

A. Recently, the group of Captain Engineer A. Azis Hasyim and Colonel Kalangi, secretary of the Territorial Region (SEKWILDA) have disseminated an "issue" to the effect that the Governor of East Timor will very soon be replaced.

B. Many of the decisions taken by the SEKWILDA, and which exceed his competence as SEKWILDA, are never reported or made known to the Governor who is his superior, as a result of which they are deeply disturbing to officials who receive these decisions or are affected by them.

C. The SEKWILDA of East Timor frequently sends to the centre native East Timorese officials who have been influen-
ced to make or submit resolutions or present matters for the purpose of discrediting the Governor of East Timor, it being perfectly clear that these actions are aimed at causing discord and destroying the discipline of native East Timorese officials, whereas the opinions being expressed are opinions that represent personal interests.

D. The SEKWILDA often belittles or ignores instructions from the Governor, and disobeys orders or summonses. He does not want to submit reports about the use of funds for the development budget and so on.

E. In a demonstrative fashion, both during office hours and outside office hours, the SEKWILDA of East Timor frequently holds meetings or project-tenders at his own home, although according to instructions from the centre and the regulations, this is wrong and is forbidden in accordance with the rules. Yet, the office facilities made available to the SEKWILDA at the office of the Governor of East Timor are more than adequate.

F. There is close, well-coordinated collaboration between Colonel Kalangi and Captain A. Azis Hasyim for the squandering of project funds provided by the Central Government in the interests of development for the people of East Timor; these funds are simply used up by the afore-said two officials. After hearing a radio broadcast by these two officials over RRI-Dili (on the regional development programme), some members of the First-Level East Timor People's Representative Assembly made on-the-spot investigations to check the validity of these reports but were extremely disappointed to discover that they were totally fictitious, even though tens of millions, or when all added up, hundreds of millions of rupiahs are involved in the programme, including among others, schemes such as the fresh water fish projects in the Second-Level Districts of Monotuto, Baucau, Oequisie, Maliana and elsewhere. These projects are purely imaginary and there is no evidence of any work going on at these places.
They also reported the construction of some offices for agricultural services which were said to have been newly built whereas all that had been done was that buildings that have been standing since Portuguese times were re-painted; the tragic thing too is that this work was done by a brother or a relative of the SEKWILDA himself, a most shameful practice here in East Timor which is still free from such filthy, irresponsible abuses.

Furthermore, where are all those medicines that have been sent here for the people of East Timor by the Central Government and from abroad in such large quantities? There is a severe shortage of medicines in the hospitals of East Timor whose needs are being neglected although in the shops of Chinese merchants medicines identical to those provided with government assistance are available in huge quantities, in chemist shops as well as in general stores. Where have these medicines come from?

G. In addition, lieutenant-colonel Syaprogi, the territorial region inspector (IRWILDA) for the First-Level Region of East Timor, is not performing his duties because he is afraid that his precious misdeeds will be discovered, namely the misuse of funds provided as compensation for the homes and land of people affected by the PLN/PLTD project. The money was taken by the IRWILDA and the people were left with nothing. (Evidence is available at the PNL/PLTD and the First-Level East Timor Regional People's Representative Assembly in the form of receipts for money and rice intended for people who had to move, but all these were used by the IRWILDA himself.)

H. We also request that the status of Dili as an administrative town (a municipality) be reviewed as this is clearly unlawful and only uses up budgetary funds; this structure was imposed by force without going through the proper procedures. We also request that action be taken against those responsible for falsifying or using the force of their positions towards the First-Level East Timor Regional People's Representative
Assembly as a legislative institution so that decision no. 4 was born which makes the chairman of that body powerless. All of this has been done in order to arouse feelings of dissatisfaction and unrest among the people of East Timor and among native East Timorese officials, and to create splits, in the interests and for the personal power of individuals who seek private gain.

V. Conclusion

This is the report we wish to submit to you in the hope that you will be gracious enough to rectify these distortions which can lead to unrest and anxieties among the people and native officials of East Timor who have only just emerged from the fears that resulted from past disturbances. And we should in the first place explain to you that it is our purpose in submitting this report to help create a good name and respect for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in the eyes of the people of East Timor.

It is deeply to be regretted if, as a result of the indisciplinary deeds of certain elements and personally-motivated groups, there developed among the people prejudices towards and fears for the good name of our beloved ABRI. We are convinced that this report will be an input from the people of East Timor for you and for the leaders of ABRI in the interest of upholding the fine, high ideals of ABRI against the damage being caused by a mere handful of individuals.

For the people of East Timor, the present Governor, Bapak Guilherme Maria Goncalves, is a symbol of their pride and of their independence from colonialism. It is very sad indeed if this symbol of pride for our community is being shrugged aside and undermined by elements who ought in fact to be helping him in conformity with that which has been laid down and stipulated by the Central Government, namely that the ABRI support teams on duty in East Timor have the task of helping, guiding, teaching, and directing the people of East Timor and
the native East Timorese officials in their work if, in the course of their duties, they encounter any difficulties in all fields of activity connected with the transition from the practices and administrative structures of colonialism to the system of our state, our beloved Republic of Indonesia. It should not be the reverse which is what is happening in East Timor at the present time.

Should there be any errors or anything inappropriate in the way of presentation, we ask for your forgiveness because we are submitting this to you in order to remove feelings of unrest and fear among the people of East Timor who still need guidance and direction from you. We are convinced that the Central Government still has thousands of other qualified personnel and technocrats who are dedicated to the cause of developing East Timor which you succeeded in liberating. With great pride, many sons, volunteers/members of ABRI made whatever sacrifices were necessary and even sacrificed their lives on the battlefield in order to liberate us, the people of East Timor, from Portuguese colonialism, and so it is fitting that the people of East Timor should not be prepared for East Timor to become a place where certain individuals/elements can damage the people of East Timor.

That is all. Thank you, and freedom together with Indonesia.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The authenticity of this document as well as the fate of the people who signed it is discussed in Chapter 4: A Visit to East Timor.
Chapter 4
A VISIT TO EAST TIMOR
HUNGER: UNDER INDONESIA, TIMOR REMAINS A LAND OF MISERY

By Rod Nordland

Dili, East Timor - East Timor, the former Portuguese colony that was forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1976, is a land beset by widespread malnutrition and hunger. This year's grain harvest was a dismal failure; now, even as many Timorese suffer through longstanding food shortages, they face a new wave of famine, the second in five years.

Adding to the misery of East Timor, the incidence of disease is essentially unchallenged by the province's inadequate medical care: a six year guerrilla war continues to disrupt the populace, and anti-insurgency measures imposed by a military government have stripped Timorese of their civil rights.

Thousands of people are political prisoners - most of them simply because they are related, often distantly, to a fighter with the guerrilla group known as FRETILIN - the Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor. Hundreds of thousands have been relocated in a policy to depopulate the countryside and deprive the guerrillas of civilian support.

These are some of the conclusions reached during an 11-day tour of the province of East Timor, the first visit by an American journalist in two years and one of the few allowed to an independent outside observer in the six years of Indonesian rule. They are conclusions that are supported by a number of clergymen, civilian officials and aid organizations.

Nevertheless, Indonesian officials hotly contest them all. According to these officials, there was no poor harvest this year, only isolated food shortages; there is no famine, only isolated cases of malnutrition; there are no political prisoners, just a rehabilitation center where the relatives of guerrillas are kept for their own good; the countryside has not been depopulated, it has been "resettled".

"We have nothing to hide in East Timor," admiral Sudomo
of Indonesia's Command for Restoration of Peace and Order said recently when he issued the invitation to visit the province, which has been a source of international concern since the mid-1970s.

Year after year, the United Nations has condemned as illegal Indonesia's forcible takeover of East Timor and has demanded that it withdraw its troops and allow for self-determination. Portugal itself has refused to acknowledge the annexation, insisting that FRETILIN is the appropriate governing power of a free East Timor.

The recent visit included tours by helicopter and jeep of 15 towns and villages in eight of the province's 13 districts. Despite almost perpetual close monitoring by Indonesian military and civilian officials, it was still possible to see obvious signs of large-scale malnutrition and disease, as well as overt oppression.

It also was sometimes possible to meet independently with Timorese in and out of government, with clergy of the Roman Catholic Church in the mostly Catholic province and with average Timorese from many walks of life.

While many of the scores of Timorese interviewed were frankly fearful about talking, dozens did so nonetheless, saying, as one did, "Please tell the world so they can help the Timorese people". At least six of those interviewed, it was learned, were summoned afterward to military intelligence headquarters and interrogated about what they had said, often for many hours.

The picture that emerged was one of a population that widely regards the Indonesians as a foreign occupying force. Even many leaders who once favored annexation by Indonesia, have become disenchanted - in some cases openly - with Indonesian rule, or at least with the military officials that represent it here.

The behavior of those military authorities "can only be
described as being the behavior of conquerors toward a conquered people," said a petition signed by a pro-Indonesian member of the provincial assembly, Joao Pedro Soares, and sent last year to the central government in Jakarta, Indonesia's capital, appealing for relief. A short time later, Soares and three other East Timorese members of parliament whose names appeared on the petition disappeared, reemerging after a month to swear that it was a fake.

The Indonesian rule has been characterized by fear and marred by accusations of torture and widespread abuse of civilians by soldiers. There are virtually no civil liberties. Peasants are told to whom they may sell their coffee and at what price. No one may leave his village or home town without permission. Telephone calls and telegrams to places outside East Timor are forbidden. No one may leave the province without special — and rarely granted — permission. That applies as well to the more than 4,000 citizens of other countries who live in the province. According to military police statistics, there are 916 Portuguese nationals and 3,158 Taiwanese nationals on East Timor; many of them have requested and been refused permission to return to their own countries.

The Timorese have already suffered a great deal since the 1974 revolution in Portugal brought to power leftists who initiated a precipitous decolonization of Portuguese holdings around the world. One of those holdings was the eastern half of the island of Timor. (West Timor had been a Dutch colony until joining Indonesia when that country won independence from the Dutch on December 27, 1949.)

In East Timor, the initial struggle for power after decolonization ended when the leftist, pro-independence FRETILIN wrested control from two other parties, UDT, or Unity, which wanted to remain a colony of Portugal, and APODETI, a small minority party that favored integration with Indonesia.

FRETILIN declared the short-lived Democratic Republic of
East Timor on November 28, 1975. A week later, Indonesian para-
troopers and marines invaded Dili, and within a few months,
they had taken over most of East Timor. In July 1976, it was
proclaimed Indonesia's 27th province.

But serious fighting with the FRETILIN guerrillas did not
end, and the years-long disruption interfered with planting.
The ultimate result was a major famine that devastated the
province between 1978 and 1980, with great loss of life.

Word of conditions in East Timor leaked out and, although
Indonesia initially denied reports of the famine, in 1980 and
1981 the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Ca-
tholic Relief Services of the United States were allowed to
begin a relief program in the province. It was terminated
last year by the Indonesian government, which said it was no
longer necessary.

How many people died in the fighting and famine before
the relief program began may never be known for sure, but based
on Indonesia's census figures, there were only 550,000 persons
in East Timor in 1980; in 1974, the Portuguese had counted
650,000.

The conclusion that may be drawn from these figures is
not as obvious as it appears, because the Portuguese census
was a voluntary one: People were asked to go to their local
administrative centers to be counted, but many lived far in
the mountains and did not make the trip. Under the Indonesian
regime, on the other hand, people have been concentrated in
towns and resettlement centers, and the 1980 census was a thor-
ough, door-to-door affair.

Nevertheless, Catholic authorities doubt the Indonesian
results, and the church's own census puts the current popula-
tion at 425,000, a loss of 225,000 people from the Portuguese
figure.

While still recovering from the terrible famine of the
late 1970s, Timorese agriculture was dealt another blow last
year, when, just as the planting season was beginning and only a few months after the government had ordered the relief program ended, the Indonesian army launched Operation Security.

Every male in the province age 13 or older was ordered into the mountains to help the army to conduct a giant sweep designed to finish the FREtilin once and for all. The civilians, mostly armed with sticks and farm implements, formed human chains and encircled the rugged mountain fastnesses where the guerrillas were believed to be hiding. Army troops moved ahead of them, theoretically to beat their quarry into this human net.

Many of those caught in the net, however, were civilians who themselves had resisted government attempts to make them leave their homes in the mountains - the traditional dwelling place for Timorese - and move to resettlement centers.

According to the top church authority here, apostolic administrator Msgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes, who is widely known as "the bishop", at least 1,000 civilians perished in the operation, which lasted from two to four months between June and September 1981. In one action alone, he said, 500 civilians were killed at Lacluta in Viqueque District.

"Many Timorese were killed, including ...... innocent children, pregnant women and defenseless people without any crimes except their willingness to be independent from all oppression," Msgr. da Costa Lopes said in a recent interview here.

The Indonesian government says, officially, that Operation Security was a success and that it reduced the ranks of FREtilin to 300 men, sharing 120 weapons. Privately, however, several officials say there are still as many as 1,200 armed guerrillas at large.

The greatest casualty of Operation Security, in fact, was the 1981-82 corn and rice crop, much of which was not planted before the rainy season began in September because
the men of East Timor were with the army in the mountains.

That crop was to have been harvested in March, but it was a disaster, according to Msgr. da Costa Lopes, clergy elsewhere in the province and other independent sources. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which still has one representative in East Timor, stated in a report in March that, according to official figures, the anticipated crop of 40,000 to 60,000 tons of maize and 30,000 to 40,000 tons of rice would not be harvested in 1982 because of bad weather, attacks by rodents and "movement of population in the second half of 1981 (which) made planting in some areas, specially in the south, insufficient".

According to clergy here, the result has been a famine or near-famine in many parts of the province, particularly in Baucau and Viqueque districts in the east, where the continuing fighting between government troops and FRETILIN guerrillas has been most severe.

Msgr. da Costa Lopes hesitates to use the term "famine". He prefers to say that more than half of the population in those districts where more than 100,000 people live has "insufficient food to maintain life". In addition, he said, hunger and malnutrition are endemic throughout the country.

"In Viqueque they begin to eat the sagu (boiled palm pulp), and this is a sign for Timorese that famine is coming," he said.

Other clergymen stated the case more strongly. "If you quote me as saying this, I'll be killed," said one who was recently in the eastern part of the province. "Famine is always a relative term, and there is hunger and malnutrition all over the country, but it is truly a famine in this region" of Baucau and Viqueque.

One of the worst-hit towns in Viqueque, according to Msgr. da Costa Lopes, is Uatolari, a mountainside town close to the scene of the heaviest fighting. Not so, said East Timor's vice
governor, Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz.

"The bishop, you know, he just stays here in Dili, he doesn't go very often to the mountains," Lopes da Cruz said. "Uatolari, they have a surplus, plenty of corn. The military commander told me he bought 26 million rupiahs (about 41,000 dollars) of corn, so how could they be starving in Uatolari?"

"The truth is," he added, "no famine here in East Timor - you can see one or two people who don't have enough food, but not a famine."

A prominent Timorese viewed the issue of famine politically. Like many, he was clearly sympathetic to the guerrilla movement: "The FRETILIN is a symbol of resistance" to Indonesia, he said. "In the heart of the people there will always be resistance. That's why I think the Indonesians are happy to see famine. The Timorese people will always be a problem so, they figure, just eliminate the problem."

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When a party of officials and a reporter descended on Uatolari by helicopter, the grassy public square immediately was crowded with scores of children, standing just at the edge of the rotor wash. Many of them appeared to be severely malnourished, with the classic distended bellies and stick-like limbs that denote long-term, serious hunger.

Or so the reporter thought. Hans Meier-Eybers, the project director for a Catholic Relief Services agricultural recovery program in East Timor, a 5 million dollars, U.S. government-funded program, thought otherwise. Meier-Eybers, a Swiss, surveyed the children critically and said, "They look like healthy kids to me. Sure, they're a little dirty, but that is all."

An Indonesian doctor, S.C. Kurniati, approached and was asked if he thought the children appeared to be malnourished. "You can see for yourself," he said, seeming a bit taken aback by the question. "These children are all malnourished."
In another mountainside town in Viqueque District, Uato Carabao, which was also visited by helicopter, the picture of apparent starvation was the same. Tucked onto a narrow, cloud-covered shelf on the mountain's edge, Uato Carabau also is close to the fighting and, as a result, the town's residents are forbidden to go up the mountain slopes to tend their fields. As the helicopter touched down briefly, people emerged wraith-like from the mist and stared without smiling while the helicopter picked up visiting medical personnel and swooped off again.

Although visits were permitted to the districts of Los Palos and Baucau, reportedly the past and present sites of the heaviest fighting with FRETILIN, they were confined to the district capitals. No visits at all were permitted to places like Lufa in Los Palos, and Batumacela, Beguia, Quelicai, and Laga in Baucau - where clergymen say widespread starvation exists.

In Baucau, district administrative staff member Sinago, an Indonesian, introduced Sister Osario Saurez, a Timorese nun who is principal of the Catholic primary school there.

She listened as Sinago described what a success Operation Security had been. "Every time we go to a village now," he said, "they are happy to see us."

"Because of the political situation," Sister Saurez said quietly, "because the people had to help the military for the Operation Security, they were not able to plant the fields."

"There is plenty of food here," Sinago said insistently, and a little nervously.

The nun continued to contradict him with a soft-spoken resolve that clearly astonished some of the officials present. "We are very short of food, namely in Beguia, Quelicai, and Laga. But even here the food is not sufficient, the health care is not sufficient. Last year it is better, this year it is worse because of Operation Security."
The problem has been complicated, she explained, because much of the population has been resettled in the lowlands, far from the mountainside fields. In Baucau District, for instance, 61,000 of the 74,000 people in the district now live clustered around the town of Baucau proper.

"They can grow enough food there," said Sinago.

"More than 50 per cent of the people are short of food," Sister Saurez said.

Evidence of serious food shortages can be found all over the country, not just in the hard-hit areas in the eastern districts. On a trip to Aileu, a mountain district just 30 miles south of the capital of Dili by rough jeep road, malnourished people were a frequent sight along the way.

At a resettlement village called Saburia, just outside the district seat of Aileu, the party, which included half a dozen military and civilian officials as well as a journalist, stopped to see the corrugated tin houses the Indonesian government had built for people resettled there from the mountains.

Saburia lies in a deep mountain valley. The village chief is a Timorese, but his "assistant" is an Indonesian; they and a military intelligence major named Marsidik accompanied the journalist as he interviewed residents.

Bernardo, 56, who lives with his wife and 10-year-old son, sat on the bare dirt floor of his house, which was devoid of possessions of any kind; there was also no sign of food in the house. Asked how the harvest had been, he surveyed the circle of officials and, after a long pause, said, "There is not enough to eat".

The next house was identical, except that nine persons lived in it and that it contained a piece of furniture, a table. Under the table - the coolest place at midday in the tin house - lay a boy sweating and shaking in what his family said was a three-day-old malarial fever. Other children in the household had bloated bellies and emaciated limbs. Thomas Ferreria, the
family spokesman, was asked through an interpreter about his family's condition.

"Tell him," Major Marsidik warned Ferreria in Indonesian, "that it is OK here".

Ferreria did as he was told.

"So even though the crops are bad, you have enough food for the whole family?" he was asked, in English.

"Tell him you have enough until the next rainy season," said Marsidik in Indonesian.

"We have enough until the next rainy season," Ferreria said.

At the Betora parish church, on the outskirts of Dili, Sister Josephine Bordallo, a Spanish Carmelite nun who has worked here since 1979, single-handedly runs a clinic in which she sees 160 seriously ill people a day, including "many, many cases of malnutrition," she said. Most of the patients come to her clinic because the government-run facilities often have no medicine and no medical personnel.

"Tuberculosis is the most common disease, but hunger is the biggest problem," she said. "They come here and I give them medicine for TB, but then they go home and they have no food in their houses, so how can they get better?"

In the Lahane neighborhood of Dili, where hundreds of families have been forced to live in temporary huts along the steep banks of a mountain stream, severe malnutrition is widespread and apparent. Most of Lahane's residents were moved to Dili from their farms in the surrounding mountains; in Dili they have no job skills and little work.

Of 22 Lahane children under the age of 12, whose body weights and measurements were taken on May 9, 1982, 18 were proved to be chronically malnourished, according to standards adopted by the World Health Organization.

"If the situation is this bad in Dili," said Msgr. da
Costa Lopes, "you can imagine what it's like in Baucau or Los Palos. I've been there - to Laga, Beguia, Los Palos, last October. Even at that time there was hunger, and now it is far worse".

East Timor's de facto ruler is an army colonel named A.P. Kalangi. A non-Timorese who holds enormous power despite his modest title as East Timor provincial secretary, he noted in a recent interview that Indonesia had refused an Australian donation of 1,000 tons of corn because Australia had continued to criticize conditions in East Timor, which is only 350 miles off its north coast.

In place of the Australian grain, colonel Kalangi said, the Indonesian government is itself sending 1,000 tons of grain to East Timor. "But we won't just give it away," he added. "If you give people something for nothing, they get lazy".

"Yes," agreed Catholic Relief Service's Meier-Eybers, "and soon you have an island of beggars".

"That's what they are always telling me," said a priest in Dili. "We have to stop bringing in food so the people will make it for themselves, but these people are working hard and still they are hungry".

"What I cannot understand is the reluctance of the Indonesian government to allow one independent team to visit East Timor to see the real situation and assess its normality for themselves," said Michael Whiteley of Australian Catholic Relief, which in the past has been active in raising aid money for the Timorese.

"East Timor has enough foreigners who are refereeing us," colonel Kalangi said testily. There are two. Meier-Eybers is one of them, and agreed heartily with Kalangi. The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Cedric Neukomm, is the second. He declined to be interviewed.

"The Red Cross doesn't want to say the truth," said Msgr. da Costa Lopes, "because they are afraid the Indonesian govern-
ment will throw them out, and they want to stay to provide some help."

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"When we were kids," said a man from a Portuguese-Timorese family, "our mothers used to say to us, 'Don't eat so fast, the Indonesians aren't coming.'" It was something the East Timorese long feared.

In December 1975, when the Indonesians finally did come, colonel Kalangi was one of the commanders of the invasion.

He recently contrasted Indonesia's takeover with the current dispute over the Falkland Islands: "The British generals are bad. You don't give a little bit, a little bit, you go all at once. Like what we did here, is all at once - bok! - and then explain to the rest of the world that we are here. That is how to do it, like the Russians in Afghanistan."

Now he is enthusiastic about the government's far-reaching settlement policy. Since "integration," 150 new resettlement centers have been built and 50 more are planned by the end of this year, he said. To make it easier to control the population and to provide food and medical aid, education and other amenities, people have been moved from the mountains to these resettlement villages, usually in the lowlands, he explained.

"It is the new Indonesian civilization we are bringing," Kalangi said. "And it is not easy to civilize the backward peoples."

While the resettlement scheme may be effective in denying support to the guerrillas, critics say it has serious flaws. There was a good historical reason for the Timorese aversion to the lowlands: Malaria there is virtually epidemic, water supplies are poor and irregular, and the climate is far hotter than that of the highlands.
Still, under Indonesian rule the province's road system is being vastly improved; color television - as Kalangi is fond of pointing out - was introduced here even before it came to Portugal; there are new public works in virtually every large town, public buses now travel the highways and dozens of government schools have been opened.

"In many things, the Indonesians have done very well, far better than the Portuguese," a Timorese who is generally pro-Indonesian said in an interview. "Only in social justice and health have they fallen down." Later he was seized by military intelligence and interrogated for hours about the interview, according to well-informed sources.

"A referendum now would go in favor of Indonesia," said Lucio Engenio da Encarnacao, 55, manager of the Dili Hotel and a Portuguese citizen who has been trying unsuccessfully to get Indonesian government permission to leave. "I have to admit that in transportation, education, many areas, the Indonesians did in five years what Portugal didn't do in hundreds of years."

"As for freedom," he concluded, "we never had it under Portugal so we don't miss it now."

"Sure, in Portuguese times, many things were bad," said a former colonial government employee. "But it's not a comparison between Indonesia and Portugal, but between Indonesia and the independence we could have had."

"This whole island is just a big prison," said a part-Timorese man who holds Portuguese citizenship and said he wanted to join his family in Australia. According to reliable sources, he is one of 700 Portuguese who have been registered with the Red Cross as would-be emigrés. "We are being held hostage here until Portugal recognizes Indonesia's takeover of East Timor," he said.

The people of Atauro are hostages of a different sort. Thousands of Timorese are being held on the island, 15 miles north of Dili, and Indonesian authorities have announced their
intention of keeping the internees there until every last known FRETILIN guerrilla surrenders. Authorities freely acknowledge that the only reason they are being held there is that they are related to known or suspected guerrillas.

Between June and September last year (1981), 3,785 such people—entire families, including young children—were moved to Atauro and left there with no food supplies, according to church sources. Quiet pressure by the International Committee of the Red Cross persuaded the Indonesians to allow the Red Cross to begin an emergency feeding and medical-care program in February (1982).

But by then, according to Indonesian government figures, 176 internees had died in an outbreak of contagious disease. Some think it was cholera; others say it was gastroenteritis. Both are conditions that could have been aggravated by the crowded conditions in what the camp government calls the "rehabilitation camp".

It consists of 55 plywood and corrugated-tin barracks, each measuring 20 by 60 feet and housing an average of 65 people. For privacy, the inhabitants hang plastic sheets as room dividers.

"It is for their own good, and they like to be here," Colonel Kalangi contended during a guided tour of the camp. He said many of the internees had been harassed by guerrilla relatives, or forced to provide them with food, and he asked, "Does this look like a concentration camp to you?"

In Barracks B-2, many of the more than 50 inhabitants were there because they were related to a single FRETILIN member, Onrato da Costa; some were only cousins or distant in-laws. Da Costa's sister, Amelia da Costa Fernandes, was asked through an official interpreter how she felt about being imprisoned.

The interpreter repeated the question and Miss da Costa Fernandes, with bowed head and frightened expression mumbled one or two words.
"She said they are grateful to the government who take care of them, so they don't feel they are prisoners, but like others they can live as they want," the interpreter translated.

He was asked to inquire how long she thought her brother would stay in the mountains.

"God knows," she replied, her head still bowed.

Kalangi acknowledged that at least some residents of the camp were not pleased to be there. "You know, east or west, home is best," he said. "But maybe some of those who are in the mountains will feel their family is unhappy so they will come down. It is a positive system."

And if they don't come down, he said, the prisoners of Atauro Island will stay where they are.

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The most serious civil-liberties challenge raised in East Timor came last year (1981) in the petition of the four assembly men, who stressed the lack of legal recourse under military authorities.

"Although five years of integration have passed, although security has been restored by stages and in a variety of ways, although the masses of people have constantly made endless sacrifices," it said, "it is not possible to experience the implementation of law and discipline in this young province of East Timor."

The petition cited numerous instances of murder, torture, and sexual assault by soldiers and officials against civilians. "These people or groups commit murders without due process or the laws concerning investigation. Feelings of fear are widespread among the people ......"

All four of the men who signed the petition now repudiate it as a forgery and say they had nothing to do with it. Msgr.
da Costa Lopes said he felt sorry for the men, who he maintained were forced to recant after having been held in solitary confinement on the island of Bali for a month.

The author of the petition is believed to have been Joao Pedro Soares. According to Mulya Lubis, Jakarta director of the Legal Aid Society, Soares visited the society's offices to seek protection after the petition was filed.

Soares, during a tense interview at his home here, first denied ever having visited Lubis. Then, when a reporter mentioned having seen a photograph Lubis had taken of him during the visit, Soares said, "I might have been in their offices, but I didn't take part in this."

One of the central charges in the petition was confirmed by Manuel Carascalao, a prominent coffee planter. Timor produces some of the world's best coffee, much of it grown on small, individually owned plots that provide a source of cash income for peasant families who otherwise make a subsistence living growing corn, rice, or cassava.

After integration with Indonesia, Carascalao said, the military authorities granted a coffee monopoly to a Java-based company, P.T. Denok Hernandez International, and all growers, small and large, were ordered to sell their coffee to Denok, which became the only authorized exporter.

The Denok firm is widely believed to be owned by Major-General Leonardus "Benny" Murdani, Indonesia's chief of military intelligence and the man in ultimate command of East Timor.

The prices Denok set for the purchase of coffee were absurdly low; currently they are about 25 cents a pound for arabica coffee and 18 cents for robusta, less than half what buyers pay growers in Java and in other places in Indonesia.

Meanwhile, because of food shortages, the price of rice and other staple foods here is twice what it is elsewhere in Indonesia. The result is that a peasant grower cannot purchase
a 50-cent pound of rice with the proceeds from a pound of his coffee.

"During the coffee harvest" in June and July, a knowledgeable Timorese said, "there are searches at all the military checkpoints - but they are not looking for guns. They're looking for coffee."

The soldiers make sure the coffee is sold to Denok, and growers are even prohibited from trading or bartering their coffee for basic necessities in local markets.

+ + +

One evening, a young Timorese man fell quickly into step beside a reporter on Dili's Rua Antonio de Carvalho. "We are not allowed to speak to foreigners," he said. "But I just want to tell you. Before, we had Portuguese colonialism. Now, we have Indonesian colonialism."

When Indonesians began consolidating control in the province, they told everyone that the East Timorese people would be sama-sama, which in Indonesian means roughly, "everyone equal." The slogan was less than successful, however, since in Terum, the chief Timorese dialect, sama sama means "trample, trample."

EDITOR'S NOTE: In 1983, Rod Nordland received the George Polk Awards for Journalism for his dispatches from Southeast Asia which included the above account of the plight of the people of East Timor as well as reports on Kampuchea and Vietnam. The George Polk Awards, given annually, were established in 1949 by Long Island University to honour the memory of an American CBS journalist killed the previous year while covering the Greek civil war.

The case of George Polk deserves mention, particularly because it is similar in many respects to an episode that took
place some 27 years later in East Timor.

When the body of George Polk was found floating in Salonika Bay in May 1948, the Overseas Writers Association initiated an investigation of the assassination. But the U.S. Government did not really want the truth, because Polk had levelled criticism against the U.S.-supported right wing Government in Athens. Air Force Colonel James Kellis, who had been designated to investigate the case, became more and more convinced that "there was an attempted right wing cover-up," and thus he found himself caught in a dilemma "between what I thought is the truth and our national and personal interest."

The U.S. Government had no difficulty in choosing the latter, and Karl Rankin of the American Embassy in Athens asked to meet with Kellis, telling him, "I don't see why you are breaking your back trying to uncover who killed this correspondent." A few days later Kellis was recalled and no successor was appointed. Eventually, U.S. and Greek officials produced a rigged trial, designed to prove a communist plot to murder Polk (see Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece: 1943-1949*, Columbia University Press: New York 1982, pp. 158-160, and references cited there).

On October 16, 1975, five foreign journalists - two Australians, two British and one New Zealander - were killed in Balibo, a small town in East Timor near the Indonesian border. They were killed by Indonesian troops advancing into the territory in order to destabilize the FRETILIN administration and to prepare for the later, full-scale invasion that was launched on December 7. But the Australian Government did not really want the truth, because this would hurt the Indonesian Government whose official stance was that they had never crossed the border and had no intention of ever doing so.

The Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, Mr. Woolcott, explained the case in a secret cable to Canberra, dated October 29, 1975: "Although we know it is not true, the formal position of the Indonesian Government is still that there is no Indones-
ian military intervention in East Timor. If the Minister said or implied in public the Indonesian Government was lying we would invite a hurt and angry reaction."

Jim Dunn, who served as Australian Consul in East Timor from 1962 to 1964, has recently stated that "the killing of the newsmen was probably the worst and most wanton act of its kind in the history of Australian journalism, and yet, incred-ibly, it evoked not a word of formal protest to Indonesia." But perhaps we should not be surprised when we recall how Washington reacted to the murder of George Polk. Indeed, it was later revealed that Canberra had known the truth all along, because they were intercepting the Indonesian army's secret radio traffic; in other words a deliberate cover-up. And to Indonesia, Canberra's silence was a clear message: It was a green light for an outright invasion of East Timor (see Jim Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Jacaranda Press: Milton, Queensland 1983, pp. 229 - 252, and references cited there).

Taken together, these cases demonstrate that the American and Australian Governments would not lift a finger to clear up the murder of some of their own citizens, since the journalists were not promoting the "national interest". On the contrary, we find both of them working actively to conceal the crimes of their client regimes in Athens and Jakarta.
Chapter 5
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT ON EAST TIMOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE


I thank you for this opportunity to present Amnesty International's concerns in connection with the Committee's consideration of the question of East Timor.

On this occasion, we consider it appropriate to present the Committee with a comprehensive review of the conduct of Indonesian forces in East Timor and the violations of the human rights within Amnesty International's mandate which have resulted - particularly in view of the evidence recently received by Amnesty International indicating that official policy has condoned the most serious violations of human rights and reports that, since the invasion of December 1975, Indonesian forces in East Timor have engaged systematically and persistently in practices of brutality.

It has been necessary to stress on each occasion that Amnesty International has presented a statement on East Timor that its information cannot be regarded as complete. The strict control imposed by the Indonesian forces continues to limit access to the territory and the free flow of information out of it. Violations of human rights in East Timor have occurred in a context in which the right to freedom of expression does not exist. Persons expressing that right have been detained and ill-treated. Movement and communication within and beyond East Timor have been tightly controlled. Amnesty International further understands that East Timorese recently permitted to leave the territory to be reunited with their families abroad have been warned routinely by Indonesian intelligence officers before leaving not to reveal information which might discredit the Indonesian occupation, and have been threatened with reprisals against themselves and members of their family still in East Timor if they do so.
Despite the circumstances, it has been possible to accumulate a large body of evidence on the situation of human rights in East Timor, based on mutually corroborative testimonies from sources which were geographically dispersed and independent of each other.

The reports available to Amnesty International have long suggested a clear and consistent pattern of human rights violations. Recently, Amnesty International received a copy of a manual containing guidelines issued in July-September 1982 by the then Indonesian commander for East Timor and his intelligence chief to Indonesian military personnel serving in the Baucau district of East Timor, providing direct evidence that these violations have been officially condoned. These guidelines condone the use of physical and psychological torture in certain circumstances during interrogation and the taking of steps to prevent its exposure. They condone the issuing of threats on the lives of persons undergoing interrogation to ensure their co-operation. They also prescribe a policy of deporting FRETILIN supporters and the families of FRETILIN members still in the bush to "determined places" including the island of Atauro.

Amnesty International is deeply concerned that military instructions issued to Indonesian forces condone and prescribe policies that have resulted in violation of fundamental human rights in East Timor, including rights recognized internationally as absolute and never to be violated in any circumstances. Amnesty International has consistently reported to the United Nations and to other bodies the use of torture by Indonesian forces in East Timor, particularly of persons thought to be supporters of FRETILIN. It has also stated its concern over the transportation of several thousand people to the island of Atauro, where they have been confined in conditions which seriously endanger their health and well-being.
Interrogation and Torture

Amnesty International has received many reports of the torture of East Timorese suspected of having opposed the Indonesian occupation. These reports often concern persons undergoing interrogation after capture or surrender in circumstances described in the manual on interrogation quoted above.

A Timorese who had worked with Indonesian intelligence from 1978 on has described the procedure in these circumstances:

"The normal procedure was to interrogate the captives or those who surrendered. People who surrendered and were not soldiers who had engaged in battle with FRETILIN would be permitted to go free after the interrogation but only after approval from intelligence headquarters in Dili.

During the interrogations they were normally tortured, especially if the interrogators thought they were FRETILIN soldiers or leaders. The would be tortured by hitting them with a blunt instrument, by jabbing lit cigarettes into their faces around the mouth, or by giving them electric shocks, sometimes on the genitals.

The senior authorities would decide who was to be killed after interrogation. Most of the leaders or more educated ones, those who were talented, were killed. Their wives would also be interrogated, tortured and killed."

This description accords with information received by Amnesty International on individual cases concerning the treatment of captured and surrendered Timorese.

Amnesty International would particularly like to draw attention to two interrogation houses reported to be in current use in Dili as of the beginning of 1983. There have been persistent reports of the torture and ill-treatment of persons held in these places. They are:
Photograph of atrocities which have been carried out by the Indonesian Army in East Timor (from FRETILIN publication)
- a warehouse attached to the house formerly owned by Francisco Babo in the Rua Abilio Monteira in the Colmera district, now believed to be occupied by a unit of the RPKAD 1) (Resimen Parakommando Angkatan Darat), recently renamed Kopsandha;

- a house formerly owned by Joao do Rosario Martires in the Rua Alferes Duarte O Arbiru in the Farol district used since late 1979 for interrogation by army intelligence 2) (A-I, commonly known as Intel).

Amnesty International has reports of persons taken to these interrogation houses who emerged bearing visible signs of torture. One such account referring to the Intel house reads:

"One of my FRETILIN friends was tortured with electric shocks and burning in December 1980. After the shock treatment his lips were burnt and broken as they had attached the wire to his lips. His body had also been extensively burnt with cigarettes. He was tortured because he was suspected of passing information to the FRETILIN forces."

Among those held for interrogation and allegedly tortured were a number of women, some of whom had reportedly been picked up on suspicion of having communicated with relatives in the bush. Amnesty International has the names of several women held by intelligence who were reportedly raped and had burning cigarettes applied to their breasts.

An account of the RPKAD house in the Rua Abilio Monteiro attests to its reputation:

"If you go there, things are 99,9% hopeless. Those sent there had been caught in the mountains fighting against

1) Paratroop Regiment of the Armed Forces.

2) Until late 1979, army intelligence had used the San Tai Ho warehouse for conducting interrogations.
Indonesian troops, especially the bush commanders. They are tortured for information with cigarettes to the cheeks, breasts, ears, genitals and with electric shocks. Then they are killed."

Amnesty International also has the names of people who were held in either of the two above-mentioned houses who "disappeared" and are feared dead.

An informant who had access in mid-1982 to the warehouse behind the RPKAD house where prisoners were held reported seeing about 100 people there whom the informant judged from their appearance and dress to be predominantly village people from outside Dili. Amnesty International does not know the present situations of these people. However, there are grounds for concern for their safety in view of other reports indicating that people understood to have been taken to one or other of the interrogation houses in Dili have not reappeared.

Amnesty International has received reports of persons dying as a result of torture and beating suffered during interrogation and this may also have been the fate of others who are reported to have "disappeared".

**Extrajudicial Executions and "Disappearances"**

There is now a large body of evidence indicating that Indonesian forces in East Timor have resorted to extrajudicial executions on a large scale since the very first days of the invasion. Amnesty International now has lists of hundreds of people who were reportedly killed outside combat or "disappeared" between December 1975 and the end of 1982. Amnesty International's own investigations have concentrated on the period from early 1979 and have revealed recurring patterns of large scale killings and "disappearances" as well as cases of what appear to be random killings of individuals and small groups.

Amnesty International believes that it is now firmly
established that several hundred East Timorese were executed throughout the territory between late 1978 and September 1979. Some were killed immediately following surrender or capture, others some time after. Others still were people suspected of associating with FRETILIN but who had not themselves joined FRETILIN in the bush. An analysis attached to one list of 51 names of persons killed in the eastern part of the territory during these months states that people on the list had held positions of second and third rank in FRETILIN and that some were people in civilian occupations who had never participated in the fighting. Amnesty International's own investigation of these killings suggests that the worst affected areas were in the eastern part of the territory and in particular the district of Los Palos and the towns and villages in the vicinity of Mount Matebian. In the course of one operation in the vicinity of Mount Matebian between 15 and 17 April 1979, 118 people not engaged in combat were reportedly executed in Uatolari, Uatocarabau, Viqueque, Osso, Bagua and hamlets on the southern slopes of the mountain. Amnesty International has the names of 31 people reportedly executed in Kelikai in May-June 1979. A report on the situation in this period states: "when they want to liquidate someone, they say that they have gone to continue their studies or that they have left for Jakarta or Lisbon, or that they were called urgently to Kelikai. Kelikai is an administrative post at the foot of Mount Matebian where they have carried out many murders. To speak of Kelikai makes our heart beat and our hair stand on end, for Kelikai means certain death for those called there." Amnesty International has received the names of 82 persons who reportedly "disappeared" in parts of the territory other than the eastern region, including the districts of Aileu and Same and in the capital, Dili.

During 1979, there were also many reports of people "disappearing" particularly in Dili. An Indonesian who
visited East Timor for several months in the first half of 1979 reported that in late March "the people of Dili were in a state of nervousness because of the news that the remaining FRETILIN Leaders had been kidnapped at night and no one knew of their whereabouts". Father Leoneto Rego, a Portuguese priest who had been allowed to leave East Timor in June 1979, described the situation in Dili at the time of his departure: "No one who had links with FRETILIN is safe; at any time they can be taken without their family knowing and put somewhere else, put in a prison camp, or sometimes they just 'disappear'." Several surrendered and captured FRETILIN leaders "disappeared" in Dili and elsewhere at this time.

Leopoldo Joaquim, a member of the FRETILIN Central Committee, surrendered in Same in the Southwest of the territory in early 1978. The event was considered sufficiently important by the Indonesian authorities for them to draw up a propaganda leaflet bearing his photograph and announcing his surrender. He was detained for several months after his surrender in the San Tai Ho warehouse. In April 1979 some time after his release, he was taken by Indonesian troops from his house and escorted to the home of his 17-year-old niece, Maria Gorete Joaquim. Maria Gorete Joaquim had been detained in 1976 as a member of the FRETILIN student organization, UNETIM. Both were then taken away, purportedly to work in Baucau. Neither has been seen or traced since. Various unconfirmed reports of their execution have reached Amnesty International.

Several of those who "disappeared" from Dili were being held in prison at the time of their "disappearance". Among them was the FRETILIN armed forces commander, Domingos da Costa Ribeiro, who had reportedly been captured and brought to Dili in 1977. He and ten other prisoners held in the former Portuguese District Prison (the Cadeia Comarca still known as the Comarca despite being renamed Lembaga Pemasyarakat- katan Dili by the Indonesian authorities) were reportedly
taken on the night of 18 April 1979 from the prison to a beach in the east of Dili called Areia Branca and executed by members of Battalion 745, a Timorese unit commanded by Indonesians. In this group of prisoners were also Filomeno Alves and Manecas Exposto, known in Dili before the invasion as members of a popular musical group, the Cinco do Oriente, both of whom had surrendered in Maubisse in January 1979. Two other prisoners held in the Comarca, Joao de Conceicao, formerly an official in the Public Works Department under the Portuguese, and Joao Bosco Sarmento Quintao, formerly a military policeman in the Portuguese army, were both taken by troops of the RPKAD one night in March 1979 and never reappeared.

Relatives of Nicolau Lobato, the FRETILIN president, who was reportedly killed in combat in December 1978, were apparently singled out for execution. After a period of detention following surrender, the mother of Nicolau Lobato, Felismina Lobato, was reportedly killed with several of her children in March or April 1979 in Lacluta, Viqueque. Nicolau Lobato's sister, Maria Lobato, and her husband Moises Piedade were reportedly killed in Uai Bobo, Baucau in March 1979. Nicolau Lobato's uncle, Paolo, "disappeared" in late 1980 in Dili some time after his surrender.

Reports of "disappearances" and executions have continued since 1979. Further arrests, killings and "disappearances" occurred in Dili after the FRETILIN attack of 10 June 1980. Amnesty International has received reports of outright killings by forces under Indonesian command in the immediate aftermath of the attack. 50 families living in the neighbourhood of Dare where the attack took place were reportedly killed at random in reprisal for the raid. A report on some of the killings that occurred in Dare after the June attack was sent by the then Bishop of Dili, Msgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes, to the Archbishop of Jakarta. Amnesty International has also been informed that following the attack of 10 June
1980 approximately 18 persons were taken by truck to a place called Fatu Ha'i near Becora east of Dili on the road to Baucau by members of the RPKAD. These persons were reportedly shot as they descended from the truck, their bodies then being rolled down a hill and left. Amnesty International has the names of 74 persons who are reported to have been executed, "disappeared" or died as a result of torture in the Dili area following the 10 June 1980 attack.

During Operation Security (Operasi Keamanan) in July-September 1981 thousands of Timorese were deployed to form "fences" of people who were to converge on and flush out remaining FRETILIN forces. Reports indicate that civilians recruited for this operation were placed in extreme danger to their lives. They were required to advance in front of Indonesian forces and were unarmed or armed only with primitive weapons. Amnesty International received many reports that those who returned to their homes after the operation showed signs of serious physical debility as a result of inadequate food rations. It is also clear that many did not return to their homes. It is not possible to gauge the numbers killed in the operation or to establish the precise circumstances of their deaths.

Although Amnesty International has not received reports of large-scale killings and "disappearances" since the time of Operation Security in 1981, reports of individual killings have persisted giving grounds for concern that, in the absence of any clear intent to bring Indonesian forces within the framework of the law, circumstances may arise in which Indonesian forces resort to brutal measures on a large scale.

Amnesty International continues to receive reports such as the following:

- In November 1982, four persons, Jose Viegas, Augusto Bello, Augusto Gusmao and Cosmo Freitas were picked up by
Indonesian troops in Vemasse, Baucau on suspicion of having
relations with PRETILIN. Jose Viegas, a primary school
teacher, was reportedly killed after his arrest. The others
who were reportedly protected by the intervention of their
families were taken to Dili where they were held for a
period in the former Portuguese barracks in Taibesse.

- Also in November 1982, Joao Brito from Viqueque was re-
portedly executed by Indonesian soldiers in Venilale, Baucau
after he had beaten an Indonesian soldier who had sexually
molested his wife.

- In about October 1982, F., who had surrendered the pre-
vious month, was reportedly publicly burnt to death in
Ainaro. After his surrender, he had reportedly been recruited
to work with the Indoneseans and had been sent back to the
bush with the task of inducing PRETILIN followers to surren-
der. Soon after his return from the bush, the town of Ainaro
was attacked. The Indonesians accused him of betraying them
and burned him publicly as an example.

In the past the torture, extrajudicial killing and "dis-
appearance" of noncombatants has been associated with in-
creased military activity. For that reason, Amnesty Interna-
tional is particularly concerned by reports of a new Indo-
nesian offensive.

**Atauro and Other Places of Detention**

Reports of the transportation of people to the island of
Atauro began in mid-1980 when an unknown number of people
were reportedly sent to the island for alleged participation
in the attack of 10 June 1980 referred to earlier. The ma-
jority of those transported to Atauro were sent there in
June-September 1981 during Operation Security when over
3,400 persons were sent to the island. A high proportion
of those held on the island have been women, children and old
people.
As you are aware, the conditions facing people sent to Atauro in 1980-81 were deplorable. At that time detainees were being provided with no more than one can of maize a week as their food ration and were supposed to supplement this by growing their own food. In practice the infertility of the island and the composition of the population held there made this extremely difficult. Official statistics put the number of deaths among the detainee population between June 1981 and May 1982 at 176. However, reports received by Amnesty International indicate that at least twice this number of persons were reported to have died of malnutrition, gastro-enteritis and malaria in the second half of 1981.

Families transported to Atauro were initially expected to build their own shelter but in December 1981 the detainees were moved into newly-built barracks each measuring 20 feet by 60 feet and accommodating approximately 60 people. Following the visit to Atauro by a delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in February 1982, the Indonesian authorities agreed that the Committee should undertake an emergency food and medical relief program on Atauro.

Despite earlier Indonesian assurances that Atauro would be closed, possibly by mid-1982, the number of detainees held there increased substantially during the year from 3,280 persons in February 1982 to more than 4,000 by mid-September 1982. Since the beginning of 1983, substantial numbers of people have reportedly been returned to the mainland. It is understood that the number of persons still held on Atauro has been reduced to about 1,600. However, Amnesty International has received reports that those sent back to the mainland are not necessarily returned to their home villages. For example, one group of people was sent to "resettlement villages" near Maliana in the far west and not to their former homes in the eastern part of the territory.

Amnesty International continues to receive reports of
detainees held without charge or trial in places other than Atauro. In addition to the small remaining group of prisoners held in Dili District Prison, Amnesty International has received frequent reports of detainees held without trial in other detention centres. Detention facilities attached to the local military and police commands exist in each of the 13 districts of the territory. Reports have been received of detainees held for political reasons in such prisons as Liquica, Uatolari, Viqueque and Baucau. There have also been frequent reports of special detention centres in Aileu and Atabae where political prisoners are reported to be held; and of people arrested for political reasons being sent to islands other than Atauro offshore East Timor and to the Indonesian islands other than Atauro offshore East Timor and to the Indonesian islands of Flores, Sumbawa and Bali.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not been permitted access to any prisons aside from Dili District Prison and a prison attached to the military district command (KODIM) headquarters in Los Palos and it is understood that visits even to these prisons have not been carried out since November 1982.

Conclusion

On 20 July 1983, Amnesty International wrote to President Suharto bringing to his attention its concern that the guidelines referred to above appeared to officially condone the torture and possibly even the killing of PRETILIN supporters. In its letter, Amnesty International urged President Suharto most strongly to issue immediate instructions to all forces under his command prohibiting the torture of prisoners in all circumstances.

Amnesty International reminded President Suharto that it had communicated to the Indonesian Government on a number of occasions in recent years its concern at repeated reports
that a number of people who had surrendered to or been captured by Indonesian forces had subsequently "disappeared" and may have been executed. On that occasion, Amnesty International urged President Suharto to instruct Indonesian forces in East Timor to ensure the safety of such people in compliance with the terms of the amnesty which he had personally offered in August 1977.

The Indonesian Government has responded to Amnesty International's concern that serious human rights violations appear to have been officially condoned in East Timor by denying that the Ministry of Defence and Security has issued any manuals specifically covering East Timor.

Amnesty International does not regard the Indonesian Government's response as satisfactory. The guidelines in Amnesty International's possession were issued not by the Ministry of Defence and Security as the spokesman seemed to imply but by the military command for East Timor and Amnesty International has no reason to doubt that they are genuine.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, substantial evidence is now available that the human rights of individual Timorese have been systematically and persistently violated since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. Official assurances that the types of policies prescribed and condoned in the guidelines are not to be countenanced have not been given. To the knowledge of Amnesty International, the Indonesian authorities have not conducted or permitted impartial investigations into the violations of human rights brought to their attention in the past several years. Indeed, they have stated that they do not have the resources to conduct such investigations. For example, they reported to the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance that they had no resources to investigate individual cases of "disappearance". In these circumstances you will understand the deep concern of Amnesty International, both about the present humanitarian situation prevailing in
the Territory and about the future prospects for the effective enjoyment by the East Timorese of their fundamental human rights.

For these reasons, Amnesty International believes it is essential that the United Nations and its Special Committee on Decolonization continue to keep the humanitarian situation in the Territory under active consideration in order to guarantee that the human rights of the people of East Timor are protected and safeguarded. Every effort must be made by the international community to this end.
Chapter 6
THE UNITED STATES
FORGOTTEN SORROWS IN TIMOR


Aggression forgotten is aggression rewarded. Because Britain could send a fleet to the Falklands, Argentina paid in bitter coin for its seizure of the islands. Indonesia had better luck seven years ago: it grabbed East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, and heard only token protest. Indonesia's crime is nearly forgotten.

Yet not wholly forgotten. On the eve of President Reagan's meeting with Indonesia's President Sugarto, a bipartisan group in Congress has asked America not to avert its eyes.

East Timor was indifferently governed from Lisbon for 400 years. Its half million people, predominantly Catholic, were unprepared when independence was thrust upon them. But at worst, it was a slum; now it is a wasting prison. As many as 200,000 people may have perished under Indonesia's occupation. And the denials of ill treatment remain implausible as long as Jakarta refuses both free exit to Timorese and Portuguese nationals and unimpeded entry to relief organizations.

At the very least, Indonesia's rulers have to be persuaded to open the doors to East Timor. And it does not help for the United States to mute its protest in gratitude for Indonesia's anti-Communism.

Protesting the situation in East Timor is not just a matter of arranging a new nation for what the old colonial powers used to do with impunity. It is a way to help the United Nations and world opinion elevate standards of conduct. What other help is available to a remote and vulnerable people when their cause dwindles to a footnote?

Creditably, though tardily, Portugal is not shrugging. Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão reminded the General Assembly last week that he still cared. He appealed for using all
mechanisms of the U.N. to find a remedy. Maybe the effort would fail. So far, it has not really been made.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO OF INDONESIA

Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony, October 12, 1982; published in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents October 18, 1982.

President Reagan. Mr. President, I take particular pleasure in welcoming you and Madam Suharto to the United States and to the White House. And Mrs. Reagan joins me in extending personal hospitality on this important occasion.

You are no stranger to these shores, Mr. President, having visited the United States twice before as leader of your great nation. As one of the world's longest serving chief executives, indeed, as a senior statesman of Asia, your views on world affairs carry special authority and add special meaning to our discussions today. Your viewpoints and wise counsel will be greatly appreciated.

I warmly recall my last meeting with you, Mr. President. My visit to Jakarta and private talks with you in 1973 were among the highlights of my international experience as Governor of California. And although I have not had the opportunity to visit your country since then, I know of the great strides made by Indonesia in national building under your leadership.

I am sure that our talks during your state visit will further strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual respect between our two countries. The United States applauds Indonesia's quest for what you call "national resilience." No nation in our era has shown itself more formally committed to preserving its own independence than Indonesia; and yet, no
nation has pursued that goal in a more responsible manner.

Indonesia has lived by and brought credit to the concept of genuine, constructive nonalignment. The United States, too, fought for its independence and over the years has jealously guarded certain fundamental principles. We, consequently, understand the striving of Indonesia for national resilience. We wholeheartedly respect it. It is this respect which lies at the heart of our excellent bilateral relationship.

President Suharto, the challenges confronting our nations are great indeed. Both strive for world peace, whether in important areas of Asia such as Kampuchea, or in the Middle East, where particularly vexing problems await lasting solutions. The United States regards Indonesia as an important force for peace, stability and progress. We value our bilateral relationship with your country most highly, and we hope to broaden and deepen that relationship.

On the economic front, I believe it is in the clear interest of both our countries to maintain and improve our economic and trade relations. Mutually beneficial economic cooperation, equitable two-way trade, and investment in enterprises which involve the transfer of technology to meet your country's pressing development needs are part of the fabric of healthy U.S. - Indonesian economic relations.

The United States will also continue to provide appropriate development and food assistance in the framework of the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). I am proud to say this consortium has had wholehearted American backing since its founding. Let me also assure you that the United States wishes to pursue actively joint collaboration in science and technology for the economic development of your country.

It is particularly fitting today to make special mention of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, and of Indonesia's important role in it. The success which ASEAN has enjoyed during the 15 years - or 16 years of its existen-
ce would have been impossible without Indonesia's farsighted and enthusiastic participation. As one of ASEAN's founding fathers, Mr. President, you deserve a great measure of credit for the accomplishments of that organization in the economic and social areas. These accomplishments have far surpassed the expectations of most observers a decade and a half ago when ASEAN was established.

Since that time, the most important milestone for ASEAN has been the 1976 summit meeting in Bali, which demonstrated your personal commitment. Indeed, ASEAN now stands as a model for regional cooperation and, if I may use your term, Mr. President, of regional resilience. Let me assure you that support for ASEAN has been and will continue to be the keystone of American policy in Southeast Asia.

As we pursue our overall policy in Asia and the Pacific, we will never lose sight of ASEAN's concerns or neglect our commitments to the ASEAN countries. Let me also stress our full support for the important initiatives which ASEAN has undertaken to resolve the tragic situation in Kampuchea.

I also extend a special warm welcome to Madam Suharto. Her good works on behalf of charitable organizations for handicapped, needy, and disadvantaged people are recognized at home and abroad. These activities are in line with the spirit of voluntarism which Mrs. Reagan and I have encouraged in our own country.

And, once again, I welcome you, President, and you, Madam Suharto, in a spirit of friendship and respect. Mrs. Reagan and I are personally delighted with your visit. Welcome to Washington and, again, welcome to the White House.
President Suharto. Your excellency, Mr. President, and Mrs. Reagan, ladies and gentlemen:

I am deeply moved and would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation for the warm hospitality accorded me at this moment, and also by the kind words of Your Excellence, Mr. President. All of this reflects the profound sense of friendship existing between our two countries and, indeed, it is to promote the close, friendly relations and to reinforce the mutual understanding between our two countries that truly become the principal objective of my visit to this great country.

My present visit to the United States is actually for the third time. I have deep impressions about my previous visits, particularly from the exchange of views with prominent leaders of this country and leaders of various circles. These have all added to my understanding of the United States, namely its views, its attitude, and its steps.

Today, 7 years have passed since my last visit to this country. The world has changed considerably. The political and economic map of the world has undergone great changes. This is the reason, Your Excellency, that on my current visit to the United States I will use it to have an exchange of views with Your Excellency and leaders of this country based on identical, fundamental attitudes of aspiring for a world which is more peaceful and prosperous for the whole of mankind. I attach great importance to this visit, because the world is presently undergoing various, successive upheavals that are long drawn out. Our two countries and all countries in the world have the common responsibility to exert all their will and ability to overcome those upheavals for the sake of the tranquility and the safety of all.

With a different weight, because our respective capabilities are also different, our two countries should nevertheless have the common duty and hold the responsibility of contributing to the efforts of preserving world stability and
peace in order that we can bequeath a better world - a world filled with peace, prosperity and justice - to generations which hold together the future of the world.

It is my sincere hope that my visit to the United States this time will further reinforce the bonds of friendship and enhance the mutual understanding between our two countries, as well as expand the cooperation in various fields which are mutually beneficial to both our peoples.

Thank you.

REAGAN, SUHARTO HUDDLE

by Bruce Drake


Washington (News Bureau) - President Reagan yesterday met with Indonesian President Suharto, but administration officials refused to say whether they discussed the sensitive issue of alleged human rights abuses by the Suharto government in East Timor.

A bipartisan group of senators and congressmen last week had told Secretary of State Shultz of their concern over reports of widespread hunger and violence in East Timor, a predominantly Catholic former Portuguese colony annexed by Moslem Indonesia seven years ago. It is estimated that about 100,000 people have died of famine on the island.

An administration official who delivered the press briefing after the 90-minute White House meeting grew irritated when pressed about the subject. He repeatedly refused to say anything other than "our policy is to rely on quiet diplomacy - this is an issue we do not bring up in public."

Reagan has frequently condemned the human rights policy of former President Carter, who publicly attacked human rights abuses in other nations.

"Sixteen questions and no answers," a reporter shouted at the senior administration official after the briefing. The official responded, "That's what I'm paid for."
In the White House meeting and in public remarks, Reagan assured Suharto, on his first visit in 12 years, that the United States considered the anti-Communist alliance to which Indonesia belongs - the Association of South East Asian Nations - as the keystone of its policies in that part of the world.

Reagan also assured Suharto that the U.S. would not let its efforts to maintain good relations with China interfere with its support for allies in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia and China have been on bad terms since the 1960s, when Indonesia broke off diplomatic relations in part because of reports that China had encouraged Indonesian leftists in a coup attempt.

100 IN CONGRESS BID REAGAN TAKE UP RIGHTS ISSUE IN TIMOR

Special to New York Times

Washington, December 10. More than 100 members of Congress, led by Representative Tony P. Hall, Democrat of Ohio, have signed a letter to President Reagan urging him "to add the suffering of the people of East Timor to America's foreign policy agenda".

The letter asks the President to help in getting officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross into East Timor, a former Portuguese colony that was invaded by Indonesian forces in 1975.

The East Timorese, the majority of whom are Roman Catholic, have resisted Indonesian rule. From occasional reports, information reaching church officials and diplomatic sources have come indications that more than 100,000 East Timorese have died since then.

The letter, which is scheduled to be sent to the President next week, asserts that "like Afghanistan, East Timor is the scene of massive violations of human rights and wide-
spread human suffering".

"In August of this year", the letter said, "Indonesian armed forces commander General Benny Murdani stated that there would be 'no mercy' for those in East Timor who continue to actively resist Indonesian rule".

The letter said that a report from church sources recently "described a massacre of 200 East Timorese villagers by Indonesian troops". Amnesty International has reported that "the Indonesian military has systematically tortured and summarily executed many prisoners in East Timor since 1975".

The "latest offensive", the letter said, "comes at a time when the International Committee of the Red Cross has been denied unrestricted access to East Timor". The signers asked the President to assist the Red Cross to gain entry for its officials.

Both Portugal, the former colonial power, and Australia, a neighbor of Indonesia, have shown concern over East Timor, the letter said. "We hope you will work with Portugal and Australia to develop creative policies to address the underlying causes of the ongoing human suffering in East Timor", it said.

Attempts to reach the Indonesian Embassy spokesmen for comment by telephone today were unsuccessful. In the past, the Indonesian Government has repeatedly denied reports of human rights abuses on the island.
A PRISON CALLED EAST TIMOR


While visiting Indonesia this week, Secretary of State Shultz has a chance to demonstrate the United States' even-handedness in opposing unjust colonial wars. Everyone knows where Washington stands on Afghanistan and Cambodia, nations occupied by Communist neighbors. But Indonesia's occupation of East Timor has been passed over by three Administrations with shamefully vague murmurs of the kind Americans scorn in United Nations declarations.

Indonesia has triply offended. It invaded East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, in 1975. A year later it annexed the territory. And under its administration since then, more than 100,000 Timorese, a sixth of the mostly Catholic population, are believed to have died from famine, disease and fighting. The extent of the calamity can only be estimated because Jakarta has impeded relief measures and closed the island to foreign observers.

Americans have only gradually become aware of Indonesia's assault on this poor and primitive territory. The pretext is combating Communism. The invasion began a day after President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger visited Jakarta. Though they did not condone the attack, they failed to condemn it. Mr. Ford's memoirs make no reference to East Timor.

Mr. Shultz has been reminded of this persisting neglect by the bipartisan plea of 22 senators and 123 representatives. They urge him to press Indonesia to give relief organizations and other monitors unrestricted access to East Timor. Last Saturday their appeal was reinforced by an unusual admonition from Pope John Paul II.

In accepting the credentials of an Indonesian Ambassador, a general, the Pope broke with custom by speaking out on behalf of the Timorese. He "earnestly recommended" respect for their human rights and said it was his "ardent wish" that relief organizations gain access to the many in need.
East Timor has as much right to self-determination as Cambodia and Afghanistan. At the minimum, its people should be rescued from starvation and brutal persecution. Saying that may not sway Indonesia's military rulers. But they need to hear it, and high-placed Americans need to say it.

THE UNSEEN HOLOCAUST

Source: The Tribune, Oakland, California, July 12, 1984 Editorial

For too long the United States has spoken softly and carried no stick at all in the face of a modern-day massacre of innocents.

The victims, largely ignored by the outside world, live on East Timor, a small island at the end of the Indonesian archipelago. The executioners are the armed forces of the Indonesian military dictatorship.

Secretary of State George Shultz, currently on state visit to Indonesia, can help bring the killing to an end by wielding strong words and big sticks against aggression and murder.

East Timor, ruled for four centuries by Portugal, tasted independence in 1975 when the Lisbon dictatorship finally collapsed. But the island's freedom was short-lived. Indonesia invaded on December 7, 1975, and declared sovereignty over its 700,000 inhabitants.

From the start, the United States ignored this blatant violation of international law and morality. President Ford, who arrived in Indonesia 12 hours before the attack began, did not raise the issue with his hosts. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia not to discuss Timor "on the grounds that the United States is involved in enough problems of greater importance at present".
Indeed, the ambassador told colleagues that the United States hoped Indonesia would get its invasion over with "effectively, quickly, and not use our equipment".

But use it they did; U.S. counterinsurgency aircraft wreaked havoc on villages and crops through incendiary bombing attacks. Though such offensive use of American-supplied weapons was illegal, the United States continued to offer Indonesia further arms.

The results of Indonesia's invasion ranks with recent holocausts in Cambodia and Uganda. Some 150,000 people, one fifth of the population, perished from war, famine and disease. An equivalent disaster would have killed more than 40 million Americans - roughly the impact of a nuclear war.

In late 1979, international relief officials, who finally gained access to the tightly closed island, reported that conditions were "worse than Biafra and potentially as serious as Cambodia".

Even today, Amnesty International reports that "human rights violations occur there within the context of an occupation of extraordinary brutality in which a whole range of fundamental human rights have been denied the population".

And the Vatican's chief representative on the island appealed in February "to the free world to open its eyes to the barbarities of which the Indonesians are capable". He reported widespread "sickness, hunger, lack of liberty and persecution" of the church.

Yet while the United States denounces the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia, it accepts as a fait accompli Indonesia's yet unfinished "pacification" of Timor. Since 1975 the United States has opposed 10 United Nations resolutions condemning the illegal invasion.

Despite the testimony of refugees, church officials and international relief workers, despite the vow of Indonesia's
commanding general to show "no mercy" in the latest round of fighting, the State Department assures congressional critics that "the Indonesian forces, in conducting their operations, are attempting to minimize the impact of the fighting on non-combatants".

No doubt the Kremlin makes the same claims about its search-and-destroy missions in Afghanistan.

But 123 members of the House and 21 senators do not buy it. In separate letters to Secretary of State Shultz, these legislators have expressed their concern and implored the administration to help end the fighting and dying.

Shultz has at least taken up the matter with Indonesia's foreign minister during his recent visit. He must persist forcefully to make that regime know the issue will not be forgotten. East Timor may be small and remote, but it remains close to the hearts of Americans who deplore its tragic fate

EDITOR'S NOTE:

The December 1983 letter to President Reagan states that both Portugal and Australia "have shown concern over East Timor". This is true, in a technical sense, since both Lisbon and Canberra have issued official statements using the word "concern," but it is, in fact, much too flattering and frankly misleading.

Portugal made a belated and quite insufficient effort to raise the issue during 1982 but soon fell back to the earlier inactivity, in spite of the fact that the new Portuguese constitution contains a special paragraph obligating the country to ensure an orderly decolonization of East Timor.
Australia has completely sold out by recognizing the Indonesian takeover, both de facto and de jure, and the new Labor Government which came to power in March 1983 is striving hard not to implement official ALP policy which demands support for East Timor. See Chapters 7 and 9 on Portugal and Australia.

Nevertheless, the initiative by Tony Hall is highly commendable and it is to be hoped that it will gain further support.

On December 23, 1981, President Reagan made a speech that was broadcast on nationwide radio and television. He said, "Make no mistake, their crime will cost them dearly," and he asked: "How can they possibly justify using naked force to crush a people who ask for nothing more than the right to lead their own lives in freedom and dignity?" (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, December 28, 1981).

He was, of course, talking about the situation in Poland where the military had seized power just ten days earlier; he was not referring to the Indonesian generals and the people of East Timor. It is, in fact, quite inconceivable that an American President should use the word "crime" about the actions of a client government. Such terms are strictly reserved for the official enemies of the West, as the historical record amply demonstrates.

The July 1984 letter to Secretary of State George Shultz was also initiated by Congressman Tony Hall who has been very active on this issue. Back in June 1983, for instance, he also initiated a letter to the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, urging him to maintain his Labour Party's commitment to self-determination in East Timor. This letter was signed by 72 members of Congress.

Schultz's visit to Jakarta was an occasion for much reporting and comment in the American press. The cover-up that
existed during the first four years of the conflict is gone by now. Since the end of 1979, East Timor has been mentioned in the international media from time to time, and there is even much sympathy for the plight of the East Timorese people. Nevertheless, much of what is written is still dishonest in that it ignores the Western arms sales to Indonesia and the consequent Western responsibility for Indonesia's actions. The New York Times editorial (July 11) is included as an example of this type of reporting. Fortunately, not all papers are like that, and the Oakland Tribune editorial (July 12) is presented as an example of a more honest way of telling the story. There were similiar honest editorials in the Boston Globe (July 11) and the Philadelphia Inquirer (July 18), both of them newspapers that have often carried good reports on East Timor (see e.g. Chapter 4, "A Visit to East Timor", and Chapter 11, "A new Military Offensive").
Chapter 7
PORTUGAL
SECRET REPORT CONFIRMS LISBON DEAL ON TIMOR

By Jill Jolliffe

Source: The Manchester Guardian, October 17, 1981

A secret report on East Timor which was declassified by President Eanes released in Lisbon yesterday, has reinforced a scandal triggered off last week by a television programme on Portugal's ill-fated decolonisation of its former Asian territory. East Timor, 380 miles from Australia, was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and has been the scene of guerrilla fighting ever since.

The 1000-page report confirms the claims of the programme that after Portugal's 1974 Revolution, left-wing leaders secretly negotiated with Indonesia and accommodated that country's ambition to annex the territory.

According to a description of the last of these secret meetings, held in Hong Kong in June 1975, a Portuguese delegation told Indonesian officials that it had drafted Timor's new decolonisation statute in such a way that it would give them a year to try and persuade the population by peaceful means to accept incorporation into Indonesia. But if they did not, and Indonesia chose to use force, "The Portuguese Government is not prepared to create problems, and could easily send a ship to Timor to evacuate all Portuguese".

The Hong Kong meetings were held at the time of a summit meeting in Macau between Timorese political parties and representatives of Portugal's decolonisation committee. The Portuguese negotiators were Colonel Vitor Alves, and two Socialists, Mr. Jorge Campions, and Dr. Almeida Santos, then minister responsible for decolonisation.

President Eanes had suppressed the report since 1976 on the grounds that the Portuguese public were not ready for its release soon after the traumatic decolonisation in Africa. The release of the report has long been a demand of the Right, and
the Prime Minister, Mr. Francisco Pinto Balsemao, has pushed the point since coming into power in January (1981).

The formation of his new cabinet last month hastened the process. After last week's TV programme, which was partly based on material leaked from the censored report, public pressure to release the dossier became irresistible and President Eanes agreed to declassify it if the Government took responsibility for the consequences.

Government printing presses worked throughout Thursday night to produce copies of the document.

The President's reluctance was also based on the fact that the reputation of some of his closest political associates stand to be damaged by the revelations. The declassified document has two parts - a report by Timor's last Portuguese Governor, Brigadier Mario Lemos Tires, and the findings of a military inquiry into the administration's evacuation of the territory during a civil war between the FRE Tilin and UDT parties, in August 1975.

The reputation of the former Governor has been blackened in Portugal since the Timor debacle, but the documents show that he was rather a victim of policies largely decided without his knowledge in Lisbon, by the President, Mr. Francisco Costa Gomes, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vasco Goncalves, Dr. Almeida Santos, and Colonel Alves of the Council of the Revolution. In the crucial period of late 1974 and 1975, when tension was mounting in East Timor, Governor Lemos Tires struggled to control mutinous Portuguese troops stationed there and to counter destabilising activities of the Indonesian Government among the Timorese population.

While he was assuring the Timorese political parties that Portugal's policy was to allow them three options: continuing ties with Portugal, total independence, or integration with Indonesia - Lisbon politicians were publicly proclaiming only two options: to continue with Portugal or to join Indonesia, but they were in fact privately supporting Indonesian plans.
The report contains a secret cable sent by the Governor to Lisbon complaining that a speech made at the United Nations by Dr. Almeida Santos, in which he described only two options, had created serious tensions in Timor. A telegram sent by the Governor to President Francisco Costa Gomes went unanswered due, it now appears, to an understanding already made with Indonesia.

PORTUGUESE POLICY ON EAST TIMOR


Within the framework to which they are constitutionally committed, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister have analysed the latest developments concerning East Timor, taking into consideration the following aspects:

1. In terms of UN General Assembly resolution no. 37/30 of 1982, the question of East Timor is explicitly charged to the responsibility of the international community. To this effect, and in terms of the resolution, the Secretary General was mandated to begin consultations with all interested parties to seek appropriate measures towards a global solution to the East Timor problem.

2. Portugal is internationally recognised as the administering power of that territory.

3. The conflict in the field between Indonesian forces and elements of the Timorese people has become an increasing concern, and discussed by important sections of the parliaments of various countries, having been the object of specific interventions by the American and Australian governments.
4. The same can be said of numerous non-governmental organisations which are active in the human rights field, and whose activity is much appreciated by Portugal.

5. On the other hand, Portugal registers its respect for the concern expressed by His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, and by the bishops' conferences of Portugal and Indonesia in relation to the situation and sentiments of the Timorese people.

6. Such positions have been taken towards a real situation in which the territory of Timor lives which arouses the continuing concern of Portugal as regards the integrity, cultural identity and dignity of a people with whom it has maintained the closest ties for five centuries.

In the perspective of its historic responsibilities and in its capacity as administering power, Portugal re-affirms its role in realising the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination as recognised by the principles and practice of the United Nations. At the same time, Portugal rejects any attempts to interfere in the free expression of the will of the East Timorese people.

Portugal's motivation in this question is the moral imperative to contribute to a peaceful solution in the territory which recognises the aspirations of the East Timorese people as recognised by the international community.

In re-affirming the principles which guide the community of nations, Portugal expresses its appreciation for the activity of the UN Secretary General in honouring the mandate with which he is charged and renews its determination for dialogue with all directly-involved parties, in keeping with the above-mentioned principles.
Raising the flag of FRETILIN and of the Democratic People's Republic of East Timor

(Photograph FRETILIN)
HAYDEN, EANES GLOSS OVER DIFFERENCES

By Jill Jolliffe


A new importance is being placed on the Timor issue by the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, after talks with Portuguese Leaders.

Mr. Hayden refused to reveal the contents of his talks with President Antonio Eanes and the Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama, on the grounds of their sensitive nature, but informed sources believe an important change has resulted.

Mr. Hayden is travelling to Latin America on the next leg of his trip before going to New York, where he will continue Timor talks with the UN Secretary General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, and Indonesia's Dr. Mochtar.

Whatever the understanding reached, it was clear that Mr. Hayden now has a more sympathetic view of Portugal's position. He would only describe the talks as "encouraging", but whereas as Australia has previously reiterated criticisms of Portugal's abandonment of East Timor in 1975 and what it sees as the colonial neglect there, Mr. Hayden stressed that Portuguese leaders were "deeply embarrassed" about events of 1975 and hoped to redress the injustice.

It is the first time Portugal and Australia have talked on the issue at a senior level since the period of the Indonesian invasion. Both Mr. Hayden and Portuguese leaders repea-
ted that any negotiated settlement must involve "the Portuguese people, the Indonesian people, the Timorese people and the UN."

In the new mood created in Lisbon, it was as though Australia had never recognised Indonesian sovereignty in Timor, nor voted against Portugal in the UN. The rancour associated with Australia's pending renegotiations of its maritime border of Timor with Indonesia, ignoring Portugal's UN status as administering power, was glossed over.

As the Australian Minister arrived in Lisbon, Indonesia's foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar, speaking from Jakarta, criticised Australian pretensions to be a mediator in the conflict. Mr. Hayden scotched this idea, saying that Australia would not act as a mediator. "Australia has a national interest. We are not a middler from outside..... We have a national interest," he said. He stressed that Australia is a principal interested party in a solution; generally upgrading the issue as a foreign policy priority.

Asked about reports of heightened military conflict in Timor, Mr. Hayden said some of the reports which appeared in Australia were "erroneously based", coming from "people who have rather emotional concern about the issue." He said he believed FRETILIN to be beleaguered, "badly broken up ....reduced to pillaging East Timorese villages." He said Indonesian-secured areas had increased, and he did not believe FRETILIN had ever represented Timorese aspirations.

APP reports that Mr. Gama said Portugal harbored "the greatest reservations" over a drive by Canberra to legalise Australia's territorial limits with East Timor in talks with Indonesia. Australia, anxious to start exploration on promi-
sing oil and gas deposits in the sea of Timor, has begun talks with Indonesia on legalising the limits of mineral rights and jurisdiction for both countries.

Mr. Gama reportedly reasserted Portugal's opposition to legalising Indonesia's take over during a 90-minute meeting with Mr. Hayden today. He said the Australian-Indonesian talks "do not respect the resolutions of the United Nations or international law".

EDITOR'S NOTE: At the end of March 1984, President Eanes called a meeting of the powerful 17-member Council of State, which includes the Prime Minister, to discuss the East Timor question. Until that time the Social Democratic government had not articulated a clear policy since taking office in June 1983. On the morning of this meeting, Socialist Foreign Minister Jaime Gama invited foreign journalists to breakfast, where he said Portugal was ready to open direct negotiations with Indonesia under UN auspices. But he did not anticipate any East Timorese involvement in the talks. And he criticized as hypocritical a letter written by 48 U.S. Congressmen to Prime Minister Soares expressing concern about the situation in East Timor.
The President seems to be more concerned about East Timor and Portugal's responsibility than the Social Democratic government which would rather bury the whole issue. The statement of 1984 was issued from the President's office after a meeting with Prime Minister Soares and Foreign Minister Gama, and this is the current official position on East Timor.

Portugal's role is also discussed in Chapter 14 on the United Nations.
Chapter 8
SWEDEN
LETTER FROM THE INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR IN SWEDEN TO THE
SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER

December 3, 1981; secret; published in the Swedish magazine
April, No. 2, September 1982. By Achmad Djumiril, ambassador
of Indonesia.

His Excellency Mr. Ola Ullsten,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to present my compliments to Your
Excellency and to express as well as my Government's gra-
titude for the decision of the delegation of Sweden to
abstain on East Timor in the United Nations General Assembly
on 24 November, 1981, maintaining its position in the matter.

The position of Sweden as expressed in the explanation
of the vote is considered by my Government as a recognition
of the successful humanitarian and relief operations and
development in that area, as well as an indication of further
understanding with the Republic of Indonesia.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia, in view
of the position pursued by the Government of Sweden, would
like to express the sincere hope of greater support from
Sweden with regard to East Timor.

Expressing once again my personal as well as my Govern-
ment's gratitude for the valuable support and understanding
of the Government of Sweden at the 36th United Nations
General Assembly, I avail myself of this opportunity to re-
new to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest con-
sideration.

Achmad Djumiril
Ambassador

(Signature)
CALLING THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT'S BLUFF ABOUT EAST TIMOR: UNCREASED EXPORTS TO INDONESIA
by Ole Johansson
Translated from the Swedish by Philip Edmonds

Our abstention will pave the way for Swedish aid. This was (Foreign Minister) Ole Ullsten's argument in 1980 and 1981 when Sweden refrained from supporting the UN resolution on East Timor. Broderskap has looked into the argument. Everything points to the fact that it has never had any real validity.

In 1979, a group of American congressmen received permission to visit East Timor from Indonesia, the occupying power. They sounded the alarm about a disastrous famine among the population. The International Committee of the Red Cross was brought in to conduct a relief program. After consultation with Indonesia and the Indonesian Red Cross, the organisation turned to a number of other countries for help. Their request came to Sweden, too, and a September 1979 memorandum from the Swedish embassy in Jakarta specifically stated that "Swedish voting in the UN (in support for East Timor) ought not to stand in the way of a Swedish contribution".

SIDA Assistance

Since 1979, Sweden has given, through SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) assistance via two relief organisations. The largest amount – 2.8 million Swedish kroner – has been given to the Red Cross as a contribution to the ICRC relief program.

Lutheran Assistance has received a million kroner which was given to the American relief organisation, Catholic Relief Service, for its relief program in the coastal areas of East Timor. No other Swedish assistance has ever been given to East Timor.

Both the organisations concerned were equally sceptical about the theory that the Swedish voting in the UN in any way
affected their possibilities for contributing to the international relief program. Even so, the Swedish Government has referred to humanitarian assistance each time over the last two years when Sweden abstained in the UN.

The Social Democrats Abstain

In spite of their own earlier criticism, the Social Democratic Government also abstained last week when the UN resolution on East Timor was discussed.

Now, references to humanitarian assistance are if anything even less credible. Lutheran Assistance is no longer contributing to East Timor and the Swedish Red Cross has received no request for Swedish assistance for the remaining part of the ICRC's relief program.

Instead, the Social Democrats maintained that they were unable to support the resolution because this year's text contain a direct demand that the UN Secretary-General should intervene in the conflict. But even this is in contrast to an earlier stance: in 1976, after the Indonesian invasion, the then Social Democratic Government maintained in the Security Council that the Secretary-General ought to intervene in the conflict!

Growing Arms Trade

Other reasons would seem to lie behind the attitude Sweden has adopted in recent years. Indonesia is a growing market for Swedish exports. During the first 8 months of 1982, exports showed a record increase of 80 per cent compared with the same period in previous years. The value of these exports was 380 million Swedish kroner. Exports of military equipment are growing even faster: in 1980, their value was 21 million Swedish Kr., in 1981, 40 million Swedish Kr., and during the first 8 months of 1982 about 80 million Swedish Kr.. Already this year, Sweden has exported electronic equipment, too, to the tune of 70 million Swedish Kr., and a sizable amount of this may in effect be military equipment.

As Foreign Minister, Ole Ullsten received an embarrassing - and hence classified - letter of thanks from the Indonesian ambassador because of Sweden's abstention in the UN. It has undoubtedly benefitted our foreign trade with Indonesia.
Yet another aspect concerning the arms trade: if, by its vote in the UN, Sweden were to recognize that the Indonesian occupation is a violation of the independence of East Timor, our own laws on arms exports would not permit the sale of arms on the present scale....

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Minister for Foreign Trade in Sweden's new Social Democratic government is Mr. Matts Hellström. These days he and his colleagues are busy explaining why it is right for Sweden to sell arms to Indonesia, even though this country is engaged in open warfare against East Timor, and even though Swedish laws forbid the export of war material that might be used for offensive purposes. Certainly not an easy task.

Back in 1979, one of the public speakers at an international East Timor conference held in Lisbon was the very same Matts Hellström. At that time, he had just gone into opposition and strongly criticized the then Right-wing government in Sweden for allowing an arms export to Indonesia. If the Social Democrats were in power, he implied, this would never have happened! Here are some excerpts from his May 1979 speech:

"I would like to bring you greetings from the Social Democratic Party of Sweden. We regard it as important to take part in the international solidarity work for the liberation of the people of East Timor, represented by FRETILIN.

"The other question which I think it is important that we deal with in solidarity work, is the question of arms sales to Indonesia. The new Right-wing government in Sweden has been selling arms or are making the sale of arms to Indonesia legal and possible. We, in the opposition in Parliament, have attacked and challenged the government's position, namely that they have sold arms to Indonesia in large quantities.

"So this is why it is very important to stop the arms sales. Indonesia needs new reinforcements. They need new imports of arms badly to fight the resistance wars. Therefore we should try to stop the arms sales."

Now that the Social Democrats are back in government, Sweden has again abstained in the United Nations and is selling more arms to Indonesia than ever before, and so the lesson is obvious: what you say in opposition is one thing: but what you do in government is something quite different.
Chapter 9
AUSTRALIA
HAWKE RENEGES ON ALP'S EAST TIMOR POLICY

By Carmel Budiardjo
Source: TAPOL Bulletin, No.58, July 1983

Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke has already reneged on major aspects of Australian Labor Party Policy towards East Timor, and appears to be in the process of abandoning the entire programme unless opposition to this betrayal now developing inside the ALP can force a reversal.

While on a visit to Jakarta in early June, Prime Minister Hawke announced that Australian defence aid to Indonesia, currently running at about 10 million Australian dollars a year, would continue. This violates his party's policy which states that all defence aid to Indonesia should stop until Indonesian occupation troops have been withdrawn from East Timor. He compounded the betrayal by declaring that in the interest of preserving relations with Indonesia "we should put East Timor behind us."

Furthermore, though ALP policy categorically rejects the previous Australian government's recognition of the Indonesian takeover and supports self-determination for East Timor, which means supporting The United Nations resolution on East Timor, Prime Minister Hawke has refused to commit his government to support the UN resolution later this year. (For the past four years, Australia has voted against the resolution, and last year lobbied heavily to pressure Pacific nations to vote with it.) On the resolution, Hawke insists that a final decision on Australia's vote can only be taken after an Australian Parliamentary delegation visits East Timor in July (1983), when it will be possible to hold an "informed debate" on the issue.

Parliamentary visit seen as a "concession"

The decision by the Indonesian government to allow an Australian Parliamentary delegation to visit East Timor for three days during a ten-day visit to Indonesia was described by Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, as a "concess-
ion" won from the Indonesian government during his visit to Jakarta in April (1983). He claimed to have won other concessions, namely agreement to allow Australian Associated Press to set up an office in Jakarta - ending Indonesia's total rejection of the presence of any Australian journalists - and agreement to permit family reunification for Timorese whose families are now in Australia. Thus, the Australian government is trading concessions like these, which in fact are what Indonesia ought to have been doing all along, for ALP policy on the principle of self-determination.

As for the parliamentary delegation's visit to East Timor, it remains to be seen whether the team will be able to examine actual conditions, especially since Indonesian officials are insisting that this will not be a fact-finding mission. In addition, a restricted and very brief examination of conditions in East Timor cannot effect the question of self-determination one way or the other. Whatever the team sees, and it is hardly likely to get a chance to assess Timorese opposition to the Indonesian takeover, the question of East Timor's right to self-determination remains a matter of principle.

"Assessing the cost" of ALP policy

Foreign Minister Bill Hayden told a group of East Timor activists who visited him in June (1983) to register their protest at any reversal of ALP policy, but that by supporting UN resolution on East Timor, Australian business interests stand to lose 160 million Australian dollars. The Foreign Department had calculated this figure from losses Qantas Airways might suffer if Indonesia went ahead with threats to cancel Qantas flying rights to and through Indonesian airspace. Commercial shipping companies also stand to lose earnings if they are refused permission to sail to or through Indonesian waters.
Gordon Bryant, formerly a minister in the Whitlam government, who was among those on the protest visit to Hayden, described as "provocative" any attempt by Indonesia to pressurize Australia over the way it votes at the UN.

State ALP conferences discuss East Timor

The moves by Bob Hawke and Bill Hayden to reneg on party policy about East Timor came just as ALP state organisations were about to hold their annual conferences. Under the circumstances, East Timor has become one of the major issues discussed in these conferences, with South Australia and Victoria vigorously supporting official policy and New South Wales supporting the government.

One of the most outspoken ALP politicians, Ken Fry, a long-standing supporter of self-determination in East Timor, accused the Labor government of "sacrificing principle for expediency" and warned that the dispute now developing in the party could split it. Another Labour parliamentarian, Senator Gordon McIntosh, who has been named as one of the five to visit East Timor this month, was angry at suggestions made by Prime Minister Hawke that the delegation would return with a report favouring recognition. Senator McIntosh, who is a member of the Senate Inquiry Committee on East Timor, said the new Labour government was in danger of losing international credibility over its about-face: "Do we sweep 200,000 bodies under the carpet and accept Indonesia's idea that we continue this de jure recognition of their occupation?"

CRAWFORD HITS TIMOR GAG

Source: The Age, Melbourne, August 1, 1983, by Olga Fernley

The Victorian president of the ALP, Mr. Crawford, yesterday accused the Federal Government of back-peddalling on ALP Policy on East Timor at the instigation of the Indonesians.
Mr. Crawford called for positive action "in line with what FREtilin and the East Timorese people want." He assured members of FREtilin of the utmost co-operation by the Victorian branch of the ALP in the campaign to get the Federal Government to implement ALP policy on East Timor.

Speaking before more than 1,500 people at the Dallas Brookes Hall at what is believed to be the biggest rally in Australia in support of East Timorese self-determination, Mr. Crawford said that members of the ALP would not be satisfied until the Federal Government had implemented ALP policy "in its entirety." He called on the Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke, to meet the FREtilin representatives now in Australia.

Senator Georges (Labor, Queensland), who attended the rally in place of the Minister for Defence Support, Mr. Howe, attacked the Government for gagging Mr. Howe and said such an action was not in keeping with the tradition of the ALP.

Mr. Howe, who was to have been a guest speaker at the rally, cancelled his speech after being reprimanded by Cabinet for speaking on matters outside his portfolio. Mr. Howe was outspokenly critical of United States policy at a meeting in the Northcote town hall last Saturday.

Senator Georges said that it was a violation of the rules of the ALP for a member of the party not to be "permitted to speak in public in support of Australian Labor Party policy". He said Cabinet's decision to restrict Ministers to their portfolios in public speeches was "questionable on moral grounds" and was an "unacceptable position, and ought not to prevail".

Senator Georges said there would be a strong move to free members of the ALP to speak on "matters of conscience" such as the East Timorese independence.

"The Hawke Government cannot expect to survive if it takes a position on foreign policy which is contrary to the position laid down by the party and determined in a democratic
way," he said. "We have reached the point where we have ac-
cepted the advice of fascists in the determination of our
foreign policy ..... certainly in regards to East Timor."

"Yet we fought against fascism, and in that fight the
people of East Timor sacrificed themselves on our behalf," he said, referring to East Timorese involvement in World War
II in aid of Australia. He said it was "humiliating for us to
now see an Australian Government, a succession of Australian
governments, deny the rights of the East Timorese because the
fascist militarists of Indonesia demand that we do so".

The foreign affairs spokesman for the Australian Demo-
crats, Senator Colin Mason, said that Indonesia was destroying
the East Timorese culture. He said the line that the Federal
Government was taking would be seen as appeasement, and warn-
ed that Indonesia might feel encouraged to attack Papua New
Guinea if it were ever to elect "a slightly more leftist
Government".
HOW AUSTRALIA CAN STOP THE FIGHTING IN EAST TIMOR

Source: East Timor Report, no. 7, June 1984, Editorial by Pat Walsh

"East Timor is a running sore. They have tried the hearts-and-minds approach and it did not wash. Now they have gone back to the big stick policy and it does not seem to be working much better. This thing is going to go on and on until we all get old." Western military attaché after a visit to East Timor. (Toronto Globe and Mail, February 10, 1984.)

"Armed groups can hold out for a very long time if they have support. This support can come from outside and it can also come from inside. Usually the most decisive factor is the support from inside, i.e. from the people. Experience shows that if this kind of support is to be handled, it cannot be done only by military means." Editorial on East Timor in the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, December 29, 1983.

"The war in East Timor will go on and on for as long as natural justice and freedom are denied to the East Timorese people." Monsignor da Costa Lopes (former head of the Catholic Church in East Timor) in a speech to the UN Commission on Human Rights, February 21, 1984.

The war in East Timor is now in its ninth tragic year. Yet there is every prospect, as the witnesses quoted above testify, that like West Irian it will continue for another nine years, into the 1990s and quite probably beyond - unless Indonesia and her allies, such as Australia, radically rethink their position.

The staggering human cost (on both sides) and the political destabilising potential of another decade or more of war in Timor must surely be an intolerable spectre to both Jakarta and Canberra.

What compassion and the politics of national interest dictate is a real solution to the issue. In the first instance, however, this search for a lasting solution must en-
Members of the resistance movement in training exercises (Photograph FRETILIN)
tail a recognition by Jakarta that its Timor policy to date has been an utter failure, as the recent Merdeka editorial referred to above intimates in its subtle Javanese way.

The last nine years have shown convincingly not only that Indonesia has not been able to win the war in East Timor outright (despite enormous odds in her favour) but also that the excessive application of the military option has been counterproductive. Brute force has generated resistance, of both the attitudinal and guerrilla kind, not eliminated it. More repression in the years ahead will only further politicise the East Timorese and create more antipathy, thereby ensuring that the cycle of violence continues.

General Jusuf's decimation of FRETILIN in the late 1970s may have seemed like the end at the time. But the fact is that FRETILIN, virtually from nothing, rebuilt itself so successfully that Jusuf's successor as Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Benny Murdani, has been compelled to commit thousands more troops to yet another offensive. Conceivably he may win this battle but the record shows it will not amount to winning the war, so entrenched and militant now is the hostility of the Timorese at every level of their society, including the highly influential Catholic Church.

True Jakarta has also tried a so-called "hearts and minds" approach. But the developmental and relief concessions involved have been so marginal for the bulk of the Timorese and so far outweighed by the intensity of their experience of repression that their impact has been minimal.

As things are at the moment, then, East Timor faces the alarming prospect of joining the ranks of those societies where violence has become institutionalized as a permanent feature of life because there has been a failure to redress a fundamental injustice.
There are many who believe that Australia can still play a constructive role in the search for a just and lasting peace that is so badly needed in East Timor. To do so, however, Canberra must step back from the support for Jakarta on the issue that has now characterized three successive governments.

Going all the way with Suharto is no solution. The last nine years have demonstrated that. Reuniting a few families and moving in with aid to pick up the pieces is no solution, laudable though these activities are in themselves. The cycle of violence in East Timor has to be broken - for the sake of the Timorese primarily but also for the sake of Australian-Indonesian relations which have also been a casualty of the war and will suffer even more the longer the conflict persists.

On this issue, instead of supporting Indonesia Australia should play the role of honest broker, drawing on its considerable reserves of international diplomatic credit to win the support of other governments for a negotiated solution to the conflict. FRETILIN has signalled its support for such a move, as has Portugal. The United Nations also currently favours this approach, its Secretary General having been directed in 1982 to bring the parties involved to the conference table. In fact it is reliably reported that an Australian initiative, no matter how discreet, would be enthusiastically received by the Secretary General whose efforts so far have yielded little for want of international support.

No honest attempt to solve the issue, however, can afford to ignore the East Timorese people and FRETILIN, both of whom would have to be fully consulted and involved in any talks. Any striking of cheap deals behind their backs is bound to fail. As the Portuguese Bishops wisely pointed out in their statement of March 1984, "it would be an illusion to think that behind the sad events that have developed in East Timor, there is no strongly felt awareness of a national
identity which refuses to be repressed or annihilated."

This peace proposal is modest and free of coercive measures. It is also ambitious and will not be easy to put into effect, given the hawkishness of the Indonesian Generals currently in power. The alternative, however, is to do nothing and let the cycle of repression and rebellion, with its in-calculable political and human repercussions, "go on and on until we all get old".

HORTA VISIT BRINGS TIMOR ISSUE TO CENTRE STAGE

Source: Tribune, Australia, June 6, 1984, by Denis Freney

The visit of José Ramos Horta, FRETILIN representative to the United Nations, began in Canberra last week. It will take him to all major cities in Australia over the next six weeks, and has already made its impact.

Speaking at the National Press Club last Thursday, Horta proposed negotiations with Indonesia, in the framework of FRETILIN's peace plan for East Timor.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar almost immediately felt it necessary to respond, rejecting the proposal.

Mochtar claimed Indonesia was not concerned about Horta's tour of Australia; he only regretted that Australian support would encourage the East Timorese in their "fruitless" struggle, and prevent them from "returning to the fold".

But, as Horta told a public meeting of over 200 in Sydney last Sunday, the East Timorese will continue to resist no matter what happens in the UN or in Canberra.

The leaders of the resistance inside East Timor are calling for strong international solidarity, including in Australia, to speed their victory.
Visit cancelled

Some observers have claimed that Indonesia's decision last week to cancel a visit to East Timor by Australian diplomats and the International Committee of the Red Cross was the result of anger with the Labor government for issuing Horta with an Australian visa.

But the cancellation of the visits was more likely due to increased fighting in East Timor and to preparation for a renewed Indonesian offensive in a desperate attempt to crush the resistance. Jakarta wants to capture and kill FRETIILIN resistance leaders, particularly Sha Na Na Gusmao.

But this new offensive will fail, just as an earlier major Indonesian offensive which began in August 1983 also failed.

Indonesia's failure to crush the resistance poses many problems for Jakarta's generals. United Nations debates on East Timor are scheduled to begin in August and end in November 1984.

And in July 1984, the ALP national conference in Canberra will have to take a decision on its East Timor policy. This currently conflicts strongly with government action on the issue.

Moreover, inside Indonesia, opposition to the war in East Timor is arising, not only from civil liberties and other opposition groups, but among intellectuals and the Catholic Church. Even inside the regime, enemies of military commander-in-chief and Defence Minister, General Benny Murdani, are becoming increasingly critical of the war.

The Jakarta regime, and Murdani in particular, need a quick victory in East Timor. But it is just as difficult now as it has been throughout the past eight and a half years to see this possibility.
Labor Party

The present state of play inside the Labor Party is interesting. The Victorian ALP state conference strongly supported East Timor. The South Australian ALP conference next weekend is expected to endorse a similar policy.

East Timor and other foreign affairs issues have been placed last on the agenda for the New South Wales ALP conference next weekend.

However, it remains to be seen whether the NSW ALP right-wing will be prepared to engage in debate over East Timor. Neither Hawke nor Hayden have campaigned on East Timor, unlike their continuing campaign around the uranium issue.

The ALP national conference is still five weeks away. Hawke and Hayden may be playing their cards close to their chests, hoping they can avoid criticism by pushing through a last-minute resolution on East Timor which endorses the Government sell-out.

The Government, no doubt, hoped the Australian diplomats' visit to East Timor would provide a suitable whitewash of Indonesian aggression - also "evidence" that resistance was minimal and "development" progressing apace. After all, the Morrison report, aimed at achieving such a goal, failed to convince the ALP membership.

Appeasement

Events in West Papua, and Indonesian provocations aimed against Papua New Guinea, have not exactly helped the government sell the view that appeasement of Jakarta is a paying proposition. Even Bill Hayden, according to some reports, feels less inclined to go along with his Foreign Affairs bureaucrats.

José Ramos Horta has concentrated much of his fire, with total justification, on these Foreign Affairs diplomats who
have played such a crucial role in betraying East Timor. In Sydney last Sunday, he described the way in which Australian diplomats at the United Nations had lobbied for a vote for Indonesia on East Timor. In fact, he said, Australian diplomats were more active than Indonesia's representatives in canvassing for votes against East Timor.

Horta is urging the Labor government to take a "bold, diplomatic initiative" with Portugal and the UN Secretary General, to explore a peaceful, negotiated settlement in East Timor. Australia should play a role commensurate with its political and economic importance in the region, he said. Australian policy had been one of "subjective pragmatism" on East Timor, not decided on objective grounds.

No one believes the bankrupt and corrupt Indonesian regime poses a military threat to Australia when they cannot handle East Timor or West Papua, he said. Nor could Indonesia place economic sanctions on Australia when it has a huge 20 billion dollars debt and is very weak economically. Any negative effect of Australia taking a principled position on is exaggerated by Foreign Affairs officials to justify a "pathetic, bankrupt diplomacy," he said.

**Change of policy**

Horta called for an objective analysis of the pros and cons of Australia taking a strong, courageous diplomatic initiative for peace in East Timor. Horta's questioning of the very bases of Australian appeasement of Jakarta's generals, and the strong evidence that the resistance continues in East Timor, and will continue for the foreseeable future, combined with the strong moral strength of the East Timorese case, can force changes in policy.

And as John Birch, national chairperson of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid said last Sunday, the vast majority of Australians support the East Timorese. Whether a Labor
government can afford to ignore that is something we shall see in coming weeks.

MR HAYDEN'S TIMOR VICTORY

Source: Sydney Morning Herald, July 12, 1984. Editorial

Mr. Hayden deserved his victory, 55 votes to 43, over East Timor, even if the Federal Conference resolution was not quite the one he sought. No one has fought harder than he, or argued better, to ensure that the Labor Party should officially recognize - one hopes for good and all - that East Timor is part of Indonesia. Anything short of that would have proved a disastrous, long-term setback to Australian-Indonesian relations while doing nothing for the East Timorese. The vote was yet another defeat for the ALP Left, similar to that which its members experienced over uranium and the U.S. defence facilities.

Mr. Hayden has not been consistently wise in his handling of the Timor issue, first in unfairly charging Indonesia's political leadership with being insensitive to Australia's interests and finally in publicly opening up, as Foreign Minister, the highly sensitive Indonesian issue of the "secret killings". His motive was clear. In pushing for a soft resolution on East Timor he felt practically obliged to prove himself as robust a critic of Indonesia as any of his left-wing colleagues over a highly charged issue. But it is doubtful that Indonesia's ruling elite, including the Foreign Minister, will prove as understanding as Mr. Hayden may hope.

The resolution itself will prove unpopular in Jakarta simply because it is critical of the situation in East Timor. While the resolution explicitly recognises East Timor's incorporation in the republic - albeit without a proper act of self-determination - it also calls on the Australian
Government to seek to get Indonesia to give access to organizations like the International Red Cross, the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International. In addition it calls for an international commission of inquiry to go to Timor. It also calls on the Australian Government to urge the Secretary General of the UN to continue to seek a solution to the East Timor problem. Indonesia does not need to do — and in fact will not do — any of the things required of it by the resolution. What it will totally repudiate is any attempt by the Australian Government to implement the resolution.

As it is there will be an inevitable cooling of bilateral relations while the Australian Government's intentions over the conference resolution are formulated. But Australia is now not alone among Indonesia's friends expressing concern over the republic's policies. Holland, Sweden and now members of the U.S. Congress have shown dismay over the continuing East Timor situation. Nor is concern restricted entirely to East Timor.

While Indonesia can confidently look to ASEAN backing it cannot be so confident of continued Western support for its Irian Jaya policies in particular, which have led to a marked deterioration of its relations with Papua New Guinea. Irian Jaya may will become for many in Australia, not only on the Left, the East Timor of the future. In alienating PNG feelings Indonesia also runs the risk of alienating Australia, New Zealand and the Melanesian mini-States which, while small, have large power clients and votes in regional and world forums. To this extent, while nothing can change the fact that East Timor is part of Indonesia, there is every chance that rising criticism on the part of Indonesia's Western friends may lead to more reasonable policies not only in Timor but in Irian Jaya.
East Timorese Youth in the Liberated Areas doing Physical Education (FRETILIN Publication)
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR EAST TIMOR DROPPED FROM ALP PROGRAM
Source: TAPOL Bulletin, no. 64, July 1984, By Carmel Budiardjo

The Australian Labor Party conference held in July 1984 failed to adopt a resolution reinforcing its policy of support for self-determination for East Timor. The policy adopted in 1982 called for a halt to Australian military aid to Indonesia until it withdraws its occupation troops from East Timor and pledged Australia to support an act of self-determination. The 1984 resolution which was lost by 43 votes to 55 would also have called on the Australian Government to reverse the previous government's decision to recognize Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor.

However, feeling on the issue of East Timor ran so high at the conference that the counter-resolution tabled by the faction of Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, who has striven so hard for a policy of accommodation towards Indonesia, had to be drastically amended to ensure its passage. The amended resolution declared:

The ALP indicates grave concern at reports of renewed fighting in East Timor and about the threats to human life and safety there, and calls on the Indonesian Government to give free access to humanitarian relief teams, to international organizations such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International and the Commission of Jurists, to allow an independent international mission to enter the territory to make an independent and impartial report on conditions.

On the crucial issue of the right of the East Timorese people to decide their own future, however, the resolution went no further than to criticise Indonesia for incorporating East Timor without an internationally-supervised act of self-determination. It called on the Australian Government to support "international initiatives, including the efforts
of the UN Secretary General, that have the aim of achieving a settlement of the East Timor problem." (Australian Financial Review, July 12, 1984).

The political framework in which the resolution is cast is revealed by its emphasis on the need to work for better relations with Indonesia, and by a claim made by Mr. Hayden during the debate on the resolution when he asserted that "if we want to do the best we can by the people of East Timor, then we must have an association with Indonesia which is credible and influential." (The Age, Melbourne, July 12, 1984).

Within hours of the adoption of the ALP resolution, Bill Hayden was on his way to Jakarta to attend a "dialogue" with Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries, profoundly relieved that he was taking with him a policy that Indonesian senior officials have already said they could "live with." General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, was less generous however. He bluntly told the Australian Foreign Minister that attempts by anyone to send a mission to investigate human rights in East Timor would be regarded as an act of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. (Sinar Harapan, July 14, 1984).

**Threats, counter-threats and on-off-on ambassadorial visit**

During the weeks preceding the ALP conference, East Timor and Australia's shaky relations with Indonesia were hardly ever off the front pages of the Australian press. Strenuous efforts by the Foreign Minister, sometimes supported and sometimes confounded by Jakarta, were made to ensure that the ALP conference would abandon its support for the principle of self-determination for East Timor.

Canberra had hoped that a visit to East Timor by its ambassador in Jakarta, planned for late May, would help ensure defeat for the self-determination resolution. But just
a few days before the visit was to have taken place, it was announced in Jakarta that permission for the trip had been withdrawn. A variety of reasons were given for this change; some Indonesian newspapers reported that this was a reprisal against Australia for having given permission to José Ramos Horta, FRETILIN's representative to the UN, to make a six-week speaking tour of Australia in preparation for the ALP conference. Others claimed that the visit could not proceed because of "transportation difficulties" or because Indonesia could not vouch for the safety of the ambassador in East Timor.

In fact, the decision to cancel the visit was taken at a time when Indonesian military operations in East Timor were again being stepped up. That this was the real reason is proved by the fact that it was not only the ambassador's visit that was cancelled. A visit by an International Red Cross team that was to have taken place at the same time was also stopped. But the decision to cancel the ambassador's visit also served the purpose of showing the Australian Government that Indonesia could be "tough," and would use all forms of pressure to assert its will on the government of Bob Hawke and the Australian Labor Party.

While the Australian media was still expressing anger over the cancellation and predicting that Hayden was now "sunk on Timor," Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, warned that Indonesia might take steps to downgrade its relations with Australia. According to the Sydney Morning Herald Foreign Editor, Peter Hastings (June 29, 1984), Mochtar implied that an anti-Indonesian resolution on East Timor could lead to a "major break" in relations between the two countries, though he denied that Indonesia might withdraw its ambassador from Canberra. FRETILIN's UN representative, José Ramos Horta, described this as "an arrogant bluff, a smart political strategy for the ALP conference" and referred to the Australian ambassador's projected visit as a "farce,
a big joke and irrelevant because the idea of the whole trip is to present a rosy picture." (The Age, June 30, 1984).

Bill Hayden, however, persisted in seeing the cancellation as a severe blow to his chances of pushing through with his policy of accommodation, and pleaded desperately with Mochtar to allow the visit to go ahead (Sydney Morning Herald, June 27, 1984). In the end, Jakarta announced that the visit was "on" again, and it took place just a few days before the ALP conference opened. By this time, the impact was minimal, and in any case, the ambassador was to complain at the conclusion of his trip that it had been "to narrow." It turned out to be a feeble gesture indeed, for the ambassador was not permitted to do more than visit the prison island of Atauro, go briefly by helicopter to Manatuto, 66 kilometers east of Dili, hold a meeting with East Timor's puppet governor, Mario Carrascalao, and pay a visit to a bridge built with funds from Australia. This was virtually nothing compared to what the Australian parliamentary mission had been allowed to see last July, just before the 1983 offensive was launched.

"Timor Gap" negotiations can now proceed

Shortly after Bill Haydens visit to Jakarta, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja announced that negotiations between Indonesia and Australia over exploitation of petroleum resources in the "Timor Gap" can now be resumed. Since the ALP has now agreed not to question any more East Timor's "integration" into Indonesia, the Indonesian Government is willing, he said, to continue negotiations with Australia. (Sinar Harapan, July 18, 1984). On several occasions earlier this year, Mochtar declared that Indonesia was in "no hurry" to resume negotiations on the "Timor Gap" and insisted that Australia's position on the question was "untenable."
The preliminary talks in the FRETIILIN held areas.
EAST TIMOR, 21st and 23rd March, 1983
Chapter 10

A CEASE-FIRE IN EAST TIMOR
FRETILIN CONQUERS THE RIGHT TO DIALOGUE

Source: Published by FRETILIN in Lisbon 1983

On May 20, 1974, ASDT/FRETILIN, the first legal nationalist organization, was founded aiming at the independence of East Timor. Since then, being the representative of the sacred aspirations of the people of East Timor, FRETILIN strengthened its influence throughout the territory. Having full control over the country, the FRETILIN central committee proclaimed the independence of East Timor and the foundation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28, 1975. Ten days later, the Indonesian armed forces invaded the country.

The invasion was supposed to control the country within three days. Indeed it was the blitz-krieg strategy. For that reason, the Indonesians were obliged to launch a campaign of barbarities and atrocities as a way of intimidating the people and obliging them to accept the foreign occupation.

Due to the resistance of the people led by FRETILIN, they were obliged to increase the violence against the resisting population. At the time, the two main goals of the invading army were: the physical extermination of the entire people and the crushing of the leadership of FRETILIN. They then launched successive campaigns of encirclement and annihilation followed by massive dropping of napalm and defoliants in order to reduce the possibilities of survival; these military campaigns took place from 1977 to 1979. The combination of massacre and cultural destruction demonstrate without a shadow of doubt that this is indeed a case of genocide.
In fact, they were successful in eliminating the overwhelming majority of the FRETILIN central committee members and murdering 200,000 inhabitants of the country.

A special military operation was launched by the Indonesian army to eliminate the President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor - Nicolau dos Reis Lobato.

On December 31, 1978, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato died in a six hour battle against the Indonesian army after having fallen into an ambush prepared by the enemy and some Timorese traitors.

With the physical elimination of President Nicolau and the overwhelming majority of the FRETILIN central committee members, the Jakarta regime felt that they had achieved their purpose of reducing East Timor to the status of an Indonesian province.

But the events that followed showed the contrary. The remaining members of the leadership were successful in re-organizing the resistance both in the armed and political fronts since they had never lost the unconditional support of the people of East Timor. Indeed, the military campaigns of the enemy produced opposite effects to those they aimed at. Instead of intimidating the people, the genocide campaign reinforced the determination of the Maubere (Timor) people to fight the foreign occupation.

As a result of the scorched-earth policy, a significant part of the population was obliged to leave the mountains and live in concentration camps established by the enemy.

This policy of concentrating the population in strategic hamlets aimed at preventing contacts between the population and the guerrilla fighters. Meanwhile the population, even under these conditions, did not give up and continued the struggle against the invaders.
The best known concentration camp is that of the island of Atauro where the relatives of the guerrilla fighters are kept. Atauro island is a semi-arid island unable to receive a reasonable number of people because there are no conditions for agricultural production and lack of water resources.

The surviving members of the central committee succeeded in assembling the remaining forces scattered throughout the country. Due to these efforts, it was possible to hold a congress in March 1981, where the national policy was defined to be pursued in order to drive the enemy out of the country. Since then, the enemy has been defeated in several strategic points.

Since 1979, the Indonesian army based in East Timor has made systematic attempts to "Timorize" the war. This is the case of the battalions made up of East Timorese citizens committed in confrontations against the patriotic forces and of the Hansips - armed civilians whose tasks are: "Defence" of the population in the concentration camps and preventing contacts between PRETILIN guerrilla fighters and the population living in those camps. The peak of those systematic attempts was the "Operasi Keamanan" in which 40,000 civilians were obliged to engage in search-and-destroy operations. Time and again these operations collapsed.

There was a renewal of tactics.

The policy of spreading the armed resistance throughout the country was reinforced. Entire battalions of the enemy left the battle fronts and returned to their barracks. On the way to the barracks, they left sophisticated military equipment. The morale of the occupying army reached its lowest point. A new era of the war began.

It is in this context that the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian armed forces stationed in East Timor realized that it would be better to initiate a dialogue with the leadership of the people of East Timor.
The Commander-in Chief of the Falintil, the armed wing of FRETILIN, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, delivering to Colonel Purwanto, the Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces stationed in East Timor, the massage of FRETILIN addressed to President Suharto of Indonesia. (Photograph FRETILIN publication) March 1983.
The process of dialogue began with preliminary talks held in Lari Guto on March 21 and 23, 1983, when an Indonesian delegation led by Colonel Purwanto was received by the Commander-in-Chief of PALINTIL (FRETILIN's army) - Jose Gusmao Sha Na Na.

The first result of these preliminary talks was the cease-fire agreed between both parties. This is the first positive step towards the process of finding a just and political solution to the war in East Timor. In order to go on with the process of dialogue, it is necessary that the Indonesian Government inform the United Nations that the preliminary talks were held in East Timor between FRETILIN and the Indonesian authorities.

Once the Indonesian Government has informed the United Nations Secretary-General, the process of dialogue will proceed to negotiations aimed at:

1. Unconditional withdrawal of the Indonesian occupying forces from East Timor.


3. The holding of free consultations to the people of East Timor.

4. Maintaining the PALINTIL (Fretilin Armed Forces) in order to keep the people free from any pressure.

These conditions were presented by the CRRN - the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance.

We appeal to all peace-loving countries and peoples to put pressure on the Indonesian Government to proceed with negotiations in order to find a just and peaceful solution to the Timor issue; a solution so that the martyred people of East Timor may finally be able to live in peace and freedom in their beloved country.
Chapter 11
A NEW INDONESIAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE
NO MERCY FOR FRETIMILIN: INDONESIAN GENERAL

Source: The Age, Melbourne, August 18, 1983

Jakarta, 17 August - Indonesia's armed forces commander, General Benny Murdani, threatened yesterday to wipe out East Timor's FRETIMILIN independence guerrillas if they ignore his call to surrender.

"This time, no more fooling around. We are going to hit them without marcy," Jakarta's evening newspaper Sinar Harapan quoted the general as saying.

It was General Murdani's strongest threat against FRETIMILIN remnants since urging them last month to accept the Government's amnesty offer.

"If this call goes unheeded, the Government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of FRETIMILIN rebels," Sinar Harapan quoted the General as saying.

General Murdani set no deadline for the surrender of FRETIMILIN, whose numbers East Timor's Governor, Mario Carrascalao, estimates at about 100 armed men and several hundred families.

Last month a Federal Labor Member of Parliament Mr. Ken Fry, said FRETIMILIN sources in New York had evidence that General Murdani was planning a final "bloodbath" against the pro-independence rebels starting today, Indonesia's independence day. Mr. Fry said the threat was made in a letter from General Murdani to a FRETIMILIN leader, José Gusmao, in the East Timor hills. Military spokesmen in Jakarta denied all knowledge of such a campaign.

Diplomatic observers here believe General Murdani is fast losing patience with Governor Carrascalao's campaign of not provoking FRETIMILIN rebels and allowing them to trickle back to their homes without reprisals.
General Murdani played a significant role in Indonesia's military backed annexation of East Timor in 1975, following a bloody civil war in the wake of Portugal's decolonization of the territory. He is thought to have long advocated a final assault on FRETILIN rebels, who have fought an increasingly ineffective hit-and-run campaign against Indonesian and East Timorese troops. Until now he is believed to have stayed his hand in favor of Governor Carrascalao's "Hearts and minds" campaign aimed at enticing FRETILIN back to the community.

NEW INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE IN EAST TIMOR REPORTED BY FLEEING REFUGEES

By Peter Wise

Source: Boston Globe, September 26, 1983

Lisbon - Indonesia has launched a new offensive against nationalist guerrillas in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor following the breakdown of a cease-fire signed last March (1983), according to refugees who arrived recently in the Portuguese capital.

The refugees say parachute regiments and thousands of other troops have been massed in the tiny southeast Asian territory since mid-August (1983) in what they describe as a "final onslaught" against the mountain-based insurgents. They allege the military operation has led to the massacre of between 200 and 300 women and children at a village in the southern coastal district of Viqueque, together with the imposition of stringent martial law.

The occupation forces have ordered a dusk-to-dawn curfew, evacuated civilian Indonesians from the capital, Dili, and airlifted alleged guerrilla sympathizers held on offshore islands to the more distant Bali, refugees said.
In interviews last week, the refugees said they feared renewed food shortages by next January because villagers were being forced to take part in military building projects and could not tend crops. International relief agencies estimate that more than 200,000 Timorese died in the wake of the invasion, victims of famine, disease and the hostilities.

The refugees asked not to be identified because they feared reprisals against their families still in Timor. But their statements were independently corroborated by reports reaching Australia from Catholic Church sources on the island and letters written to Timorese living in Portugal.

Earlier last week the Portuguese parliament voted unanimously in favor of a motion condemning "the nefarious crime of the Viqueque massacre" and calling on the international community to "use all the means at its disposal to prevent continuing acts of Indonesian aggression against a people in legitimate search of self-determination."

According to reports from the island, which is subject to an information blackout, the alleged massacre was carried out in retaliation for the killing of 15 Indonesian officers by FRETILIN guerrillas after fighting broke out at a village dance August 9 (1983) when the cease-fire was still holding. Since then FRETILIN has launched several attacks, including a major strike close to Dili airport, reports say.

According to one refugee who arrived here on September 9 (1983), Indonesian officials initiated the cease-fire talks in March (1983) with the aim of persuading the guerrillas to declare a total surrender. When that failed, the refugee said, Timorese Governor Mario Carrascalao informed government department heads that resistance fighters would have from August 1 to August 15 to lay down their arms, otherwise Indonesian troops would be called in to eliminate them.

Describing the buildup to the new offensive, he said he had seen waves of paratroopers arriving daily in the capital
since mid-August accompanied by tanks, helicopters and planes. Civilian trucks had been commandeered to carry armaments throughout the territory, he added, and wounded soldiers arrived "almost daily" at Dili Hospital.

Reports on the number of troops involved vary, but diplomatic sources in Jakarta have been quoted as saying as many as 20,000 may have been massed in East Timor in recent weeks. Two of the planes identified by the refugee were OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft supplied by the United States.

CHRISTMAS IN EAST TIMOR: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AGAIN APPEALS, THOSE WHO REPORT WILL BE WELL TREATED

Source: Sinar Harapan, December 27, 1983. Translated by Carmel Budiardjo

The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (ABRI), General Benny Murdani has warned those who are deluded enough to believe that they can set up a state outside the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia to put a stop to their efforts which are doomed to failure because the armed forces will never stop performing the duty with which they have been entrusted.

Speaking on Christmas night to troops, religious leaders of the community and local officials in Dili, the Commander-in-Chief called upon everyone in the hills, the forests, the caves and the towns to halt their efforts and surrender to the authorities. "As Commander of ABRI, I give a guarantee that all those who declare that they have stopped carrying out such condemnable actions will be well treated, will be humanely treated," said Benny with great emphasis.

The Commander-in-Chief who spent Christmas Day visiting remote parts of East Timor, said that there are people who spread it around that the lives of people who surrender can-
not be safe. "I repeat once again," Benny went on, "that if they report to the closest civil or military authorities, they will be well treated."

The Commander used the occasion to make the point that the birth of Christ as a human being in a poor, simple cattle manger presented a picture of nobility and glory in the midst of suffering and hardship, a picture that was relevant for every single soldier. He felt convinced that this would strengthen the resolve of every member of ABRI. "Each noble and glorious task entrusted to ABRI members is never free of suffering and sacrifice." A soldier, said the Commander, possesses a deep sense of nobility and glory founded upon his devotion to the Motherland, to the Pancasila philosophy and to the Sapta Marga (the ABRI doctrine), so that if necessary he is willing to sacrifice his life. This attitude motivates a soldier's sense of duty as a Sapta Marga soldier, it consoles him and reinforces his mental outlook.

On the occasion of this simple Christmas celebration, General Benny Murdani expressed his pride in the knowledge that such consciousness inspires every member of ABRI from the moment he sets foot on East Timor soil to carry out his duties there. "I am quite certain," he went on, "that the great hardship of not being with your families, because you have been entrusted with this great and glorious task for the nation and state, can console you and strengthen your convictions."

He called upon those present to offer up a prayer that our misguided brothers would not need a long time to take their decisions to return to the correct path, and to build up East Timor, a country that has been neglected for so many centuries and has suffered so much brutality.

On this Christmas visit, the Commander-in-Chief was accompanied by the Chief of Staff for Operations of the Department of Defence and Security/ABRI, Lieutenant-General
Himawan Sutanto, Inspector-General of the Department of Defence and Security, Lieutenant-General Gunawan Wibisono, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro, and other senior officers from the Department and other forces. The Commander-in-Chief also visited several isolated ABRI posts in the subdistricts of Oessu, Natarborre and Alas.

12,000 INDONESIAN TROOPS IN BIG SWEEP ACROSS TIMOR

By Jill Jolliffe

Source: The Age, Melbourne, January 28, 1984

Lisbon, January 27 - Twelve thousand Indonesian troops set up a north-south cordon across Timor and swept eastwards against FRETILIN guerrillas, according to a coded message from FRETILIN which has reached Lisbon.

The eight-page document from FRETILIN leader José Gusmao Sha Na Na said the Indonesian troops were backed by air and naval bombardments. The document, dated December 21, 1983, was smuggled from the embattled territory, and reached Lisbon early this week. It said the Indonesian forces had set up a line from Baucau to Viqueque in November and December 1983 and were advancing east. It said most of FRETILIN's counter-attacks were concentrated on the south coast zone around Viqueque Barique.

The arrival of the document demonstrates that FRETILIN has succeeded in keeping its communication lines open to overseas representatives despite the Indonesian offensive first begun in August 1983. A FRETILIN delegate in Lisbon, Abilio Araujo, said his organization's main efforts after the offensive were directed at protecting communication in August, September and October," he said. "Communications are continuing, but with difficulty."

Many Timorese refugees, FRETILIN and non-FRETILIN, have also received letters recently. Five letters, two written
from Dili and three from Jakarta, correspond in their general description of a massive operation involving Indonesian troops supported by air and sea bombardment concentrated mainly in the east and on the central south coast, which FRETILIN has successfully resisted to date. All speak of arrests and disappearances of Timorese suspected of supporting FRETILIN.

The document from Sha Na Na, handwritten with a felt-tip pen in numbered code on eight pages of flimsy airmail paper, lists a series of engagements between the guerrillas and Indonesian regular troops, including ambushes by PALINTIL (FRETILIN's army), according to the decoded version made available by Abilio Araujo. For example:

"On December 6, 1983, the sixth company of PALINTIL attacked an armoured military column proceeding along the Zumalai-Mape road. The surprise attack caused a high rate of enemy casualties and the destruction of two assault cars which escorted the column. Only the intervention of enemy aircraft, bombers and helicopters to evacuate the wounded, forced the retreat and dispersal of the PALINTIL unit ...."

The FRETILIN leader describes similar attacks in the Alas, Fatuberilu, Barique and Hatu Builico areas.

The eastern zone, which was a key area for FRETILIN guerrillas before the offensive began, appears to be the scene of intense Indonesian action. According to Sha Na Na, in the period November 20 to December 10, 1983, "the invading forces used a massive and indiscriminate air bombardment against civilian and economic targets in the areas of Laga, Viqueque, Uatolari, Luro, Veniale and Fuiilore where thousands of people are gathered, living in deficient food and sanitary conditions."

The theme of arrests and disappearances is constant in the private letters coming from Timorese. Amnesty International, which has been monitoring the offensive closely, has
a growing list of people who were arrested after the offensive began and have not been seen since. One letter from a non-FRETILIN source in Dili, dated October 12, 1983, reported: "Timor is now in a state of great insecurity, especially in the east. The Javanese have removed prisoners from the Comarca prison and are sending them to other parts."

Another dated January 13, 1984 written from Jakarta, reads: "Everything is more complicated, more confused, more exhausting, in the widest sense .... The Red Cross are now only allowed to work in Atauro: the program elsewhere is cancelled. Little can be done to help. The Catholic Church is passing through difficult moments. The military are making life hell for them. Many prisoners are being sent to Bali to be interrogated. Some have returned to Timor, but nothing is known of the others. Over 2,000 prisoners are still on Atauro. I point out that Bali is the tourist centre of Indonesia - whose special market is Australia. If you start a political campaign about the prisoners in Bali maybe the Australian Government will take this into consideration."

A letter written by the same author a week earlier lists some of the prisoners whose cases are being followed by Amnesty International: Octavio Jordao de Araujo, Elder Jordao de Araujo, who are brothers, and Francisco Calcona. It continues to say that in the mountain areas around Viqueque Indonesian soldiers are "doing what they like" with 14-year-old girls, and that "it is the same in Lospalos. Couples who are suspected are dying in each other's embrace in common graves, riddled with bullets. The least suspicion leads to liquidation."

A letter written on January 6, 1984, notes that "Radio Australia has finally realized that Viqueque and Lospalos are the zones worst-hit by the military operation - in these respective regions there are about 12,000 - 15,000 soldiers concentrated with heavy arms (tanks, bombers, warships), continuing to kill civilians. Through the infamous Lieutenant-Colonel Iswanto (former commander of operations) we learnt
that the situation in Timor has deteriorated, that FRETILIN killed soldiers from Koromil and Camat in Lacluta – and that the fighting in the east has intensified, resulting in the defection of 269 armed militia from the Raith units to FRETILIN – the military has decided to continue the operation for some months more. They want to finish it off once and for all."

A representative of a U.S. congressman, Tony Hall, has been gathering testimony about the offensive from Timorese refugees in Lisbon. After a week of intensive interviewing Mr. Marty Rendon said he was surprised by the amount of detailed information available and the scope of the Indonesian operation. He said refugees who had arrived recently from Dili had described a massive influx of troops and equipment in August, 1983. He said he had also obtained evidence contradicting earlier reports that a FRETILIN attack on an Indonesian post in Viqueque in mid-August was the motive for the offensive. Refugees had told him that Governor Mario Carrascalao had briefed members of his staff on the military operation in late July, warning them to be careful, "Because even I won't be able to help you when it begins."

Congressman Hall, of Dayton, Ohio, has led efforts to raise the Timor issue in the U.S. Congress, resulting recently in a letter to President Reagan signed by 105 Congressmen from both major parties.

REFUGEES TELL OF CIVILIANS FLEEING NEW TIMOR FIGHTING

By Jill Jollife
Source: The Age, Melbourne, June 29, 1984

Lisbon, June 28 – A Timorese family, which arrived in Portugal recently, has carried reports of open fighting in many new areas in East Timor – and of the mass flight of civilians to mountain areas inaccessible to Indonesian forces.

The family which asked not to be identified, for fear
of retribution, said the situation had deteriorated dramatically in the weeks before they left, earlier this month. They spoke of an engagement between Indonesian soldiers and FRETILIN troops near Dili on June 3. They testified that the flight of civilians to mountain areas was similar to that which occurred immediately after the 1975 invasion, although the food situation throughout the territory - especially in rural areas - is poor. The motives for the flight are not entirely clear.

On the one hand units of Indonesian-trained Timorese had apparently staged a wholesale defection, with arms, to the join the FRETILIN resistance. Other Timorese who fled may also have been motivated to fight along FRETILIN, but certainly many were impelled by fear of the current Indonesian advance and to avoid conscription. All males between 15 and 50 had been forced to march with the Indonesian advance, they said, often as a human shield to Indonesian troops.

The refugees also brought the first information about trials of people accused of helping or belonging to FRETILIN.

They said these had taken place in the Dili court until mid-May, when they were suspended because of the Islamic fasting period, Ramadan. They said that on May 11, Mr. Alferes David Ximenes, who was accused of planning an uprising in Dili in June 1980, was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. He had appeared in court for sentencing on six previous occasions, on each of which he refused to acknowledge the court on the grounds that he was a Portuguese military officer.

He accepted the sentence on the seventh occasion, they said, because he was told the alternative was summary execution. Three other prisoners: Marito Reis, Manuel Guterres and Pagildo, were said to have received sentences of seven to eight years each, at around the same time. When their trials concluded, they were sent, with about fifty other convicted people to Bali, the informant claimed.

The family said that on June 3, 1984, a few days before they left Dili, there had been an engagement between FRETILIN
troops and Indonesian soldiers at Be-moz, on the outskirts of Dili. It resulted in the death of "two or three" Indonesian soldiers. They said the fighting began on the Sunday evening and continued strongly until Monday morning. In the continuous shooting they heard, it seemed that only light arms (principally automatic rifles) were used.

Movement

They also had hearsay reports that, 15 days before, an Indonesian captain was killed in fighting at Same, on the central south coast, and that on May 8, 1984, more than 100 houses had been burned in the Viqueque region.

They said there was constant military movement in Dili and that early this year an encampment of three battalions had been established at Coconut Beach, north-west of Dili - the beach chosen for the allied landing during World War II. They said a curfew was in force between 10 PM and 6 AM, reinforced by several nightly patrols of tanks.

Surveillance aircraft, in groups of three, were overflying Dili daily and helicopters brought wounded to Dili military hospital daily. They said there was one hospital flight a week from Dili to Indonesia for the seriously wounded. They said funerals of Indonesian soldiers in the "war heroes" section of the Dili cemetery were a regular occurrence.

They said that after the judgments in May, a new wave of arrests began, and that people were being arbitrarily taken from their houses at night.

The refugees told of growing problems for the Catholic Church. They said the recently-appointed Bishop, Monsignor Carlos Belo, who was attempting to restrain Indonesian actions towards the civilian community, had been taken to Bali for an inquiry in early June.

The refugees said their impression was that the situation was heading towards a crisis, and tending towards full-scale warfare.
Chapter 12
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS
RED CROSS AID BLOCKED AT CRITICAL TIME

Source: East Timor Report, No.5, November 1983

By Pat Walsh

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been significantly restricted in its East Timor operation since July this year (1983). These restrictions occur at a time when ICRC is most needed in East Timor - that is during the current Indonesian military offensive on the mainland.

Despite some semantic denials by Foreign Affairs Minister Hayden, it is clear from ICRC documents and internal Australian government material (see The Age, October 18-20, 1983) that ICRC is presently unable to visit any prisons or assess requirements for humanitarian aid on mainland East Timor. The Dili-based tracing and family reunion program and the food and medical program for detainees on Atauro island remain intact - though there have been difficulties on Atauro.

Humanitarian Aid

According to its Situation Report No.10 (September 1983), ICRC decided in July to suspend its participation in food and medical assistance activities because it was "unable to apply usual ICRC criteria." Specifically, ICRC delegates could not get permission to visit villages for evaluation of aid requirements. Two months of "very difficult" negotiations between ICRC and Jakarta have failed to alter the restrictions.

The 1983 ICRC program which cannot be implemented included:

- Urgent food distribution to several localities on the main island.
- Continued evaluation to keep authorities informed of problems and to cover possible emergency needs.
- Distribution of food parcels to detainees on Atauro returning to their villages and later monitoring their condition and distributing relief supplies in case of urgent need.

The ICRC surveys also found distribution problems on Luro and Iliomar due to unspecified "logistical difficulties".
In Iliomar, these difficulties had caused a deterioration in the food situation. ICRC also found that 600 people moved from Atauro to Cailcao were not self-sufficient in food.

At the end of April 1983, the ICRC team was reinforced by a relief delegate to monitor distribution, evaluate needs and help resolve logistical problems. This delegate was recalled to Geneva when the relief program had to be suspended.

Prisoner Protection

While traditional ICRC activities include prison visitation ('protection'), Red Cross was not permitted by Jakarta to do this until 1982 when it visited Atauro and Comarca prison in Dili in February of that year. The report of the Australian Parliamentary delegation to East Timor implied that ICRC had regular access to Comarca when in fact the prison had only been visited twice - the last time being in November 1982. At that time ICRC was also able to make one visit to a second mainland prison. This was a Kódim (army) prison in Lopsalos holding 12 Timorese. No mainland prisons have been visited by ICRC since then.

In January 1983 a senior ICRC representative, Jean-Pierre Hocke was assured by Jakarta that ICRC would be permitted to visit other detention centres outside Dili from June 1983. However, Situation Report No.10 revealed that Jakarta later requested ICRC to defer the visits until November or December 1983.

ICRC has for the first time stated publicly that it requires access to all centres. It has rejected a proposal to accept an "in principle" agreement for access to all centres but which would be implemented gradually. ICRC Geneva is reportedly doubtful that Jakarta would "carry through" such an agreement.

It is a matter for speculation as to how many prisons do exist in East Timor. Refugees have claimed that all 13 administrative districts can have up to three official deten-
tion centres and also report the use of unofficial "holding houses". There have also been frequent claims of the use of nearby islands for political prisoners - including Jaco, Liran and Alor and very recently, Bali. ICRC documents do not specify other centres, but do confirm the existence of places other than the well known Atauro and Comarca.

Atauro

Since being permitted to visit Atauro in February, 1982, ICRC has supervised a major food and medical program on the island. While described as "displaced persons" in ICRC reports, the Australian Parliamentary delegation saw them as "detainees without trial".

Unable to grow enough food to be self-sufficient, the Atauro detainees have been dependent on food aid for survival. Despite some decreases in the Atauro population with the return of some detainees to the mainland, there have clearly been problems because in late April, 1983 an ICRC nurse/nutritionist was despatched to Timor to take part in the Atauro program.

While the Red Cross program on Atauro is able to continue, the presence of the ICRC nurse has recently been under threat. In late September (1983) the Australian embassy in Jakarta was advised by an Indonesian official that the Indonesian military commander in East Timor was preventing the nurse from visiting Atauro and that he wanted her removed from East Timor altogether "because she was too active and talked to much". As far as we are aware, this removal has not actually occurred.

The Australian Parliamentary delegation reported that Indonesian authorities "hoped" to move all Atauro detainees back to the mainland by October (1983). This was certainly a false hope. The Australian embassy in Jakarta was informed on September 20, 1983, of the internment on Atauro of 90 Timorese members of the Civil Guard (Hansip) "whose loyalty was suspect". The embassy then calculated the number of detainees to be about 2,100.
A hospital in the Liberated Areas (Photograph FRETILIN)
Limitations not New

While ICRC and Australian Government documents carefully avoid linking restrictions on ICRC to new Indonesian operations, this is certainly the case. It is not the first time ICRC has been excluded from Timor during Indonesian military offensives.

It should never be forgotten that ICRC operated in East Timor after the (August/September) 1975 civil war up until the Indonesian invasion on December 7 of that year. ICRC was then excluded from East Timor by Jakarta until 1979 - that is until the completion of major military operations (1976-78) to gain administrative control of the bulk of the population.

It is also worth noting that there was no ICRC presence on East Timor during the next major military operation in late 1981. Normally making monthly visits from Jakarta, the ICRC delegate was absent from East Timor from June 24 to October 20 of that year. Indonesia's "fence of legs" offensive (Operasi Keamanan) was conducted during July, August and September 1981.

The restricted access to prisoners has been a notable feature of the ICRC presence in East Timor since 1979. This limited access compares very unfavourably with the ICRC experience in East Timor before the invasion. Within two days of arriving in Dili on August 28, 1975, the ICRC delegate made three visits to 100 prisoners held by FRETILIN. Fifteen places of detention were visited in September/October; 33 visits were made to 18 places from mid-October to mid-November, 1975. An ICRC Report (13/10/1975) said simply:"ICRC has free access to all prisoners".

ICRC needs Support

The decision to formally and publicly withdraw from participation in aid programs on mainland East Timor and to publicly insist on access to all prisons in the territory marks a new phase in the ICRC approach to the East Timor issue.
The ICRC is clearly not prepared to quietly accept vague assurances from Jakarta that the programs might be able to resume in November or December (that is, when Indonesian military manoeuvres cease). It is ready to implement important programs when its conditions are accepted by Jakarta. Indonesian Red Cross, through which ICRC has worked since 1979, will not be entrusted with ICRC relief supplies while ICRC cannot monitor the distribution process.

The Indonesian offensive in East Timor is certain to cause new problems for the East Timorese. These will be compounded by the absence of International Red Cross. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that ICRC has "gone public" in the hope of receiving some diplomatic support for its requirements.

Our own Government's response to this issue has, so far, been less than impressive.
According to the May 1984 ICRC Bulletin the only activity ICRC has resumed is the "Protection Program", i.e. prison visits.

ICRC's food aid program on the main island remains suspended, reports the Bulletin. This program, in cooperation with the Indonesian Red Cross, was stopped in July 1983 after ICRC delegates were refused access to all villages requiring assistance to evaluate food and medical needs, says the Bulletin.

Reporting on its prison program, the Bulletin says that so far one visit has been made during March 1984 to Comarca prison in Dili (where they saw 259 detainees) and to a military hospital (where they saw 7 sick detainees). They hope to visit other places of detention and nearly 3,8000 displaced people on the island of Atauro. The program on Atauro, never suspended, is continuing. ICRC visited over 2,000 displaced people there in March 1984, according to the Bulletin.

The Bulletin reports that the ICRC's program of repatriations and family reunions for people wishing to go to Portugal and Australia has also continued. Since the start of 1984, 81 people have been flown to Portugal and 10 to Australia under ICRC auspices. Last year 239 East Timorese benefitted from the program.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Newsletter East Timor Report is published by ACFOA (the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, a co-ordinating body for 52 Australian non-government agencies working in the field of overseas aid and development. ACFOA sent a task force to East Timor just prior to the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. They have also published an important dossier entitled East Timor Today (1980).
Chapter 13
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
TIMOR PRELATE VISITS AUSTRALIA

By Pat Walsh

Source: East Timor Report No.5, November, 1983

The former head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, Msgr. Martinho da Costa Lopes, recently visited Australia for four weeks, September 27- October 26, 1983, as the guest of Christians in Solidarity with East Timor.

Msgr. Lopes, 64 years old and indigenous East Timorese, was Apostolic Administrator of the East Timorese Catholic Church until his resignation in April this year (1983). 47 percent of East Timorese are Catholic though many more declared themselves Catholic for purposes of the Indonesian census of 1980.

He visited Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney, Darwin and Perth meeting with Parliamentarians, some Bishops, the Timorese community and laity and clergy of various denominations, before travelling on to five Pacific countries and North America.

Isolation from the International Church

After expressing appreciation for the material aid given by the Indonesian and international Church, the Msgr. commented:

"During 8 years I received only one letter of support. It came from the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission in Paris, written in French. One letter only during 8 years, but it was good for us because this letter gave us comfort in our suffering, to understand and be in solidarity with our suffering there...so the priests were very, very happy about it."

On speaking out

"At first I agreed with those who say we should keep quiet and until 1981 I was silent. I complained privately to General Dading about human rights abuses, and to the local commander. But nothing changed. In 1981, after 6 years, I decided that because there were no other means I should speak openly in accordance with the Church's prophetic mission. At a rally of
12,000 people in honour of Our Lady I condemned the abuses, without naming Indonesia. That was the first time I spoke out publicly."

On Peace

"Only a genuine, completely free act of self-determination will bring peace to East Timor. Australia must understand that the fighting will go on and the issue will continue to trouble Australian-Indonesian relations for as long as natural justice is denied to the East Timorese people. Some say we should stop fighting. But we know that according to the UN Charter and international law we have the right, like all people, to justice and freedom. If Japan had occupied Australia would Australians not have resisted?"

On Material Development in East Timor

"I agree Indonesia is spending much money there - building some houses, some roads, material things. But these are no substitute for our rights. Material progress is empty without justice and freedom."

On FRETILIN

"FRETILIN is fighting for an ideal. For freedom, justice and independence. They are a symbol of national resistance and have the support of the people until we get our independence like other small Pacific islands. José Gusmao Sha Na Na says FRETILIN is the people and the people is FRETILIN. It's true."


Pax Cristi!

We the Bishops of Indonesia felt our hearts overflow with gratitude when the Shepherd of the Diocese of Dili, Msgr.Carlos
Filipe Belo, whom we greatly respect, accepted our invitation in brotherly love and attended the recent Assembly of the Indonesian Bishops' Conference in November 1983.

Thus we were able to hear directly from him about the situation and about the true feelings of the people and the Catholics of East Timor. We were able to meditate on the conditions of the people and our brothers in the faith, whom we embrace in our hearts as friends and brothers sharing fully in their joy and in their sorrow.

In the person of the Shepherd of the Church in East Timor we have met in our hearts with all, but especially with those who are suffering, with those who have been wounded in body or in spirit, with those who have lost parents, children, relatives and friends, with those who have lost their possessions, with those who have lost any source of income and even with those who have lost their lives. We are not exaggerating when we say that we, the Catholics of Indonesia, are always close in our prayers and works with Monsignor, with his predecessor, with the Priests, Brothers and Sisters and all the Catholics of the Diocese of Dili, whom we never forget.

We pray for those individuals who are suffering, that they be given strength of body and soul and that their Faith may remain firm. Sacrifice based on Faith, Hope and Love has never been fruitless.

We do not want our solidarity with, and our concern for, the Church and the people of East Timor to be interpreted as any movement inspired by worldly consideration. Our attitude and our actions are based on "the collegial" nature and meaning of the episcopal order that found expression in the very ancient practice by which bishops appointed the world over were linked on with another and with the Bishop of Rome by the bonds of unity, charity and peace." (Lumen Gentium 22).

In this same way there is a relationship among the faithful from all places. It is because of this that we cannot
refuse to confront the events that are happening among the people, especially those affairs which determine the welfare or the misery of the masses who are involved in or who are the victims of cruel oppression. Thus, in accord with the wishes of the Fathers of the Council, we reaffirm that the "role and competence of the Church being what it is, she must in no way be confused with the political community nor bound to any political system." (Gaudium et Spes 76).

Based on the above mentioned factors, the Catholic Church in Indonesia, which is ever conscious that our Founder and Saviour Jesus Christ loves all mankind, in spite of all restrictions has made every possible effort to express its solidarity and friendship with the Faithful and the people of East Timor who are being deluged by most bitter trials both physically and spiritually.

It is said that "those who dedicate themselves to the ministry of God's Word should use means and helps proper to the gospel. In many respects these differ from the support of the earthly city." (Gaudium et Spes 76). We present to the Faithful and the people of East Timor the most precious gift that we, the Church in Indonesia and the Churches in other parts of the world, can give, that is: "our efforts towards the application of justice and charity within and between nations". (Gaudium et Spes 76). We give this along with the necessary aid that will help us to attain the harmony taught by our first teacher, Jesus Christ. We struggle so that with respect for all persons and with urgent haste, we may attain first and foremost: a return to peace for all those who are now at war. We struggle through various ways to enforce acknowledgement and respect for those things which are considered most sacred by the people of East Timor: their religion, their family and their land. In other words, respect for personal property rights, a higher value for the lives and dignity of mankind and behaviour which is both civilized and just.
Performing the Dance of Unity-U (FRETLIN Publication)
Moreover, we request understanding from all those who control the decision-making that any changes which will lead to a better situation can only be successful if they are carried out with a spirit of honesty.

We are conscious that the road to justice and peace demands extraordinary sacrifice of feelings. We also believe that respect for each party will shine forth much clearer if they are brave enough - with the spirit of noble heroes - to respect the human dignity of the other party. "Respect and love ought to be extended also to those who think or act differently than we do in social, political and religious matters too." (Gaudium et Spes 28).

We believe that for some time, but especially now at this time, the root of the problem has been directed toward the level of ability to understand the world of reason and of feelings of the other party, which in reality is most basic, uncomplex and humanitarian. We also believe that the ability to understand the basic attitudes of mankind which are most simple and humanitarian can still be found in both of the parties which are now confronting each other, but for the past eight years have been striving for harmony, justice and peace.

The sympathy and solidarity of the Church of Indonesia and other countries, with our brothers and sisters in East Timor who are suffering, is expressed not only in our prayers, but also in the form of material assistance, although from our hearts, we must confess that this has been a drop of water when compared to the ocean of pain that has been suffered by our brothers and sisters.

Following the requests of the leader of the Church in East Timor, we have tried to give special attention to the education of children and the formation of youth in the Diocese of Dili, by revitalizing the schools. Particularly for the orphans who have lost their parents, we direct funds that might lighten their sad fate.
Not forgotten are the widows and young girls who have been wounded both physically and spiritually whom we support with skill training so that they may be self-supporting. As far as our limitations allow, we have sent medicines for the sick and wounded. In preparation for the days when peace will prevail, we have tried to supply tools and equipment for workmen who must find a means of livelihood. Though the number is relatively small, we prepare teachers and others to serve along with the Catholics of East Timor, in fulfilling the needs of the Diocese of Dili.

Truthfully, what we have done thus far has very little meaning when it is compared with the great needs and the large number of our brothers and sisters who are suffering. Nevertheless, whenever you, Monsignor, or your Priests, Brothers, Sisters, or your Catholics in East Timor feel the need to call us, we are always ready, in as far as we are able, to support the efforts of the Diocese of Dili; whether that be with prayers, with material aid, or with personnel. We offer this in order that a road might be found for the people and Catholics of East Timor whereby they will reach a standard of life that will make it possible for them to feel free and at peace to carry out their vocation in life as is befitting the most loved sons and daughters of God.

We wish to emphasise to you Monsignor, and to your Priests, Brothers and Sisters whom we love, that whatever the Church in Indonesia has done and whatever efforts will be made in the future for the people and Catholics of East Timor, it is not given with the feeling of superiority, nor is it given from an affluence of material goods.

We pray that we will be servants of God in the spirit of St. Paul and that our contribution "will not only be to fulfil the needs of the saints, but will also be a showering of praise to God". (II Cor. 9,12).

In closing, we turn our hope to God, Our Father and to
Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, and to all who strive for peace. We pray that we will never be frightened from searching for a road to peace and a way to avoid the sacrifice of more victims in the future. We pray and hope for a lasting peace and a return to true harmony. As was stated by the Father of the Council, "Peace is not merely the absence of war. Nor can it be reduced solely to the maintenance of balance of power between enemies. Nor is it brought about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called 'an enterprise of justice'". (Gaudium et Spes No.78 Yes.32,7.)

Toward that end the Church in East Timor, which is united in Christian Faith, Hope and Love, will be the vanguard, holding strong until the above ideals are attained. This struggle will not only bring great blessings for the people of East Timor, but will also be the source of many graces for the Church in Indonesia.

May the grace and love of the Father protect and strengthen you, Monsignor, and your Priests, Brothers and Sisters, and all our brothers and sisters in the Faith. May you have consolation and fortitude. May the Holy Spirit guide you and direct all of us toward the path of truth.

We join with you, our brothers and sisters, with Christ in prayer and in the Holy Sacrifice.

Brotherly greetings in Christ

Msgr. F.X. Hadisumarta, President
(signature)

Msgr. Leo Soakoto, Secretary
(signature)
TIMORESE FACE STARVATION AS MILITARY OPERATIONS DISRUPT FOOD PRODUCTION

By Gilles Bertin, AFP

Source: The Australian, January 6, 1984

Jakarta - Severe food shortages have struck parts of East Timor following recent Indonesian military operations against pro-independence guerrillas in the former Portuguese colony, diplomatic and Catholic Church sources said.

The Indonesian army began a counter-insurgency drive in August (1983) against the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN), said to number a few hundred guerrillas with fairly active local support. An estimated 10,000-12,000 Indonesian troops, backed by helicopters, AMX tanks and counter-insurgency Bronco OV-10 type aircraft, have been involved in operations in the territory, which Jakarta annexed by force in December, 1975.

Church sources said the military move had completely disrupted already precarious food supplies in the territory of 550,000 people, the majority of whom are Catholic. Crops have been destroyed and farmers have been unable to get to their fields or to forage food in the forests, they said.

In the central region of Viqueque and the eastern region of Lospalos, food shortages have been aggravated by a flood of refugees, with about 3,000 living around the city of Viqueque. The serious scarcity of food in various areas has been confirmed by diplomatic and other sources here.

In a confidential letter dated last month (December, 1983), the papal administrator in the East Timor capital of Dili, Monsignor Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, expressed concern over the
problem of hunger and food shortages. Monsignor Belo, 35, generally considered a moderate, took over as papal administrator in May (1983) from the popular Monsignor da Costa Lopes, known for his opposition to the "Indonesianisation" of East Timor. The move was interpreted as a goodwill gesture towards Jakarta by the Vatican. But reliable sources here said the new papal representative later received a written warning from the local religious affairs office following a sermon in October (1983) in which he protested the "arrests and violence in East Timor".

However, on November 17, 1983, the Conference of Indonesian Bishops, often considered close to the local authorities, sent a six-page letter to Timorese clergy assuring them of their support and calling for the respect of human rights in East Timor.

Arrests

"We have met in our hearts with all, but especially with those who have lost parents, children, relatives and friends, with those who have lost their possessions, with those who have lost any source of income and even with those who have lost their lives," the Bishops said.

It was the first time the Conference of Indonesian Bishops had expressed in an open letter their concern over the situation in East Timor as they urged officials to work in a "spirit of honesty" to resolve the situation.

Meanwhile, arrests have continued: 600 people were brought in for questioning recently in Dili, 125 in Baucau and 34 in Viqueque, well-informed sources said. Eight schoolchildren, aged 14-15, were arrested in Viqueque and "held for several days in a room so narrow they could not sleep," said one Catholic source.

Dozens of people, including three children, were hauled away by unknown abductors in civilian clothes, the sources said. They expressed fear that those abducted could meet the same fate as the 3,000-4,000 presumed criminals who have been
executed by the "mystery killers" stalking the entire archipelago since April (1983).

About 130 auxiliary Timorese troops attached to the Indonesian army were disarmed and arrested, the sources said. Ninety were still in custody and the fate of the others was not known. In August, 1983, 86 militiamen deserted with their weapons to join FREILIN.

The toll of clashes between the Indonesian army and FREILIN is extremely difficult to establish since the military operations remain top secret in Jakarta where rumors circulate of big battles.

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The United States military attaché in Jakarta travelled to the territory in December, 1983, at the personal invitation of General Murdani, diplomatic sources said.

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BISHOP TELLS OF MASS ARRESTS, EXECUTIONS

Source: The Canberra Times, May 3, 1984

By Jill Jolliffe

An Indonesian military campaign in East Timor has resulted in mass arrests, disappearances and "popular judgements", at which Timorese are incited to publicly execute people accused of supporting the FREILIN Independence Movement, the Bishop of Dili, Monsignor Carlos Belo, has said in a letter abroad.

Military trials were also under way of opponents of Indonesian rule arrested at the beginning of the campaign.

The letter, written on February 18, 1984, in Portuguese, was addressed to the former Apostolic Administrator of Dili,
Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, who was withdrawn from Timor by the Vatican because of his outspoken stance. It was hand-carried from Timor.

The letter begins: "As you know, since August 8, 1983, the situation has deteriorated. In every district they have arrested people (600 in Dili alone), who are being judged in military trials. Others are made to disappear. We don't know if these trials are impartial and if they have defence lawyers."

It goes on to tell of the continuous military campaign throughout Timor:

"In the Kabupaten (Indonesian administrative districts) of Los Palos, Viqueque, Baucau and Ainaro there is war, and the people are being corralled. They are suffering from illness, hunger, the deprival of liberty and persecution."

According to Bishop Belo there are "10 battalions in Los Palos alone, and even with these they are not winning the war. They thought to finish things off by the end of December 1983, but we are already in February 1984 and there is no end in sight".

As a result, the Indonesian military was once again conscripting the civilian population - in Covalima, Ainaro, Same, Manatuto, Baucau and Viqueque.

"It is amazing that with so many battalions, helicopters, tanks and bomber aircraft in this country they still have to enlist local militia, and there go our men, armed with swords and knives, leaving their gardens unworked. It is a misery, Monsignor," Bishop Belo wrote.

He described the introduction of a brutal practice of "popular judgements".

"In Muapitini (Los Palos) and Iliomar there have been popular judgements, that is those implicated in contacts with those in the bush were murdered in front of the assembled
people - with knives, swords and sticks, and by their own families - we are living in a macabre situation," he said.

The Catholic Church was being persecuted during the current military drive, schools and seminaries were being searched and students and priests interrogated.

Bishop Belo appealed for those abroad "to pray for us, and appeal to the free world to open its eyes to the barbarities of which the Indonesians are capable".

Two other letters sent recently to Timorese in Portugal also paint a picture of a serious war and corroborate certain details of the bishop's letter. The recipients have asked that the writers not be identified.

The first, written at the end of February 1984, describes a campaign launched in the Bobonaro area during that month: "From the 1st to the 13th they began rounding up individuals. On the 14th they began massacring prisoners, initially capturing two hansips (Timorese enlisted in the Indonesian army)... and one civilian. The red berets tortured the two hansips with nails, needles, cigarette butts and razor blades until they died. The civilian did not die, but they broke his leg with a gunshot," the letter said.

More than 50 people were killed during the month in the Bobonaro area, but the military had a death list to kill 167 people in all the region.

The second writer said that "each village is now no more than a corral, where the military can select who they want to kill or torture. High prices are paid to spies to select people others want eliminated....."

He said the resistance was "active and tough" and had carried out surprise ambushes on Indonesian barracks.

In less than one month (from February to March 1984) in only one region....about 50 of the occupying forces were buried," the second writer said. "This is just one of indication of the
toughness of the struggle, which is continuing".

The Timorese said that the Indonesian administration was "furious" with the Catholic Church because it refused to call on the resistance to surrender.

"Persecution of the church is at every turn more blatant, not so much by the Moslems as by the Government, because of its interest in conquering this land," they said.

The country was "swarming" with troops, but the Indonesians had announced that dozens more battalions were coming, to begin in the next weeks "a grand campaign of extermination". The letter was dated March 22, 1984.
PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN LISBON

ABÍLIO ARAÚJO, head of FRETILIN EXTERNAL DELEGATION, addressing to the foreign press, on 29th June, 1983 concerning the process of dialogue initiated on March, 1983.
Chapter 14
UNITED NATIONS
STATEMENT ON THE CURRENT PORTUGUESE ATTITUDE ON THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR

By José Ramos Horta, Member of FRETILIN's delegation to the UN. (September 6, 1983).

Published in the Swedish Bulletin, Ost-Timor Information, No.3 October 1983.

I am issuing this statement in my individual capacity as an East Timorese patriot who is shocked by the indifference on the part of the current Portuguese Government on the question of East Timor. I witnessed with dismay the apathy of the Portuguese during the discussion of the item entitled "Question of East Timor" in the Special Committee on Decolonization (of the UN).

When I first approached the Portuguese delegation and asked whether the Portuguese Mission would make a statement in the Special Committee on Decolonization on the question of East Timor, I got an amazingly evasive answer.... "We don't know yet....We have no instructions as yet....Maybe.... Maybe not...." When I pressed further for an explanation of this lack of decision on a matter which is of Portugal's national responsibility and legal and historical obligation, the answer was even more absurd: "The Secretary-General has not produced a report and we cannot say anything before...." This is simply a dishonest excuse to justify the Portuguese moral and political bankruptcy.

The Government of Indonesia has not made a single concession on any issue on the question of East Timor. Talks that were held between FRETILIN and the Indonesians broke down and the Indonesians are now launching a major military offensive against the people of East Timor. The Portuguese Government has not uttered a word of protest against this Indonesian onslaught; did not lodge a complaint to Security Council; did not bother informing the United Nations Member States, as a normal procedure. In a brief, one paragraph statement before the Special Committee on Decolonization, the Portuguese dele-
gation simply said that it had nothing to add to its earlier statements.

In keeping silent in the face of a criminal war of extermination now being carried out by the Indonesians, the Portuguese authorities are accomplices of this crime. The criminal negligence and political cowardice is what have contributed in the last eight years to the erosion of the voting block in support of the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence. After a brief period of one year, under the Government of Prime Minister Belsamao, during which the Portuguese Government did make some serious efforts to alert the international community to the tragedy of the people of East Timor, we are now returning to the silence and desertion that has been the attitude of the Portuguese authorities from 1974 till 1981.

Five hundred years of history are being betrayed by the current Portuguese Government at a time when the struggle of the people of East Timor is gaining momentum and at a time when the Indonesian military are launching a new military offensive involving 20,000 troops, the largest by far, in four years.

As an East Timorese I cannot but vehemently condemn this outrageous desertion of the Portuguese Government and I consider it an accomplice with its silence and inaction of the crimes being perpetrated against the people of East Timor. The people of East Timor will not forget this treason and future generations will remember this shameful episode in the Portuguese history.
SHELVING A PROBLEM: NORWAY PROPOSES THAT A UNITED NATIONS DEBATE ON EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE POSTPONED FOR A YEAR

By Ted Morello


NEW YORK - With Norway playing the role of honest broker, a formula has been worked out to avoid a United Nations General Assembly showdown over East Timor and to give the agenda item a one-year cooling-off period. If the strategy works, the issue will be quietly shelved permanently next September without a loss of face by any of the protagonists - all of which have claims on the territory. Indonesia seized the Portuguese colony in 1975 and formally integrated it the following year. Portugal is still recognised by the UN as East Timor's administering power, but FRETILIN, an indigenous movement seeking independence for East Timor, has also become a protagonist in the UN debate.

As a follow-up to the Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar's decision not to submit an East Timor report to the current 38th Assembly, Norwegian Ambassador, Tom Eric Vraalsen proposed in the Assembly's steering committee that debate on the item should be postponed until the 39th session (in 1984).

Vraalsen based his proposal on his soundings of the concerned parties and on the Secretary-General's decision not to report on East Timor this year because of unspecified "recent developments" (see the Review, September 8, 1983). The Committee accepted Vraalsen's recommendation without debate, and on September 23, 1983, the full Assembly ratified the decision.

In an interview, Vraalsen described himself as a "disinterested Party" and pointed out that Norway has taken a neutral stand on the issue by abstaining in the annual voting since it first came before the General Assembly in 1976. He said he had been in contact with all three concerned parties. Vraalsen said he had "been approached" to propose the postponement, adding: "A confrontation in the Assembly at this
time would not have been helpful and might possibly have had a negative effect on the contacts that are going on."

There have been sporadic contacts in East Timor between representatives of PRETILIN and the Indonesian Government. In addition Pérez de Cuellar has assigned Undersecretary-General, Rafeeuddin Ahmed - his special representative on Southeast Asian humanitarian affairs - to help settle the dispute.

Between now and next September's Assembly session, Ahmed can be expected to play a conciliatory role in any discussions among the concerned parties. Under the most optimistic scenario, sufficient progress towards a peaceful settlement will be made by then, enabling the Secretary-General to issue a report hinting - but without saying so directly - that the time has come to delete the East Timor item from the agenda. A motion to that effect then could be introduced in the 39th session's steering committee by an acceptable neutral delegation other than Norway, which will not be on the panel next year. The Assembly plenary almost certainly would accept the committee's recommendation.

In a separate interview, Indonesian delegate Hadi Wayarabi said that it is a matter of indifference to his Government whether an East Timor resolution is tabled at the next Assembly session or not. He expressed confidence that Jakarta could muster enough votes to defeat the measure, which calls for self-determination negotiations. Jakarta rejects the resolution as interference in its internal affairs and insists that the Timorese already have opted for integration with Indonesia.

The consensus among diplomats agrees with Indonesia's assessment of a voting outcome but not necessarily with its position on Timorese self-determination. Privately, for example, other ASEAN delegations have been sceptical about the "integration". Nevertheless, they have loyalty voted with Indonesia in the interest of block solidarity, though with a touch of embarrassment. To Jakarta's four ASEAN allies the debate mo-
ratorium comes as a scarcely concealed relief.

OFF THE SHELF

Source: The Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1, 1983
Letter to the Editor.

By Torben Retbøll

It was surprising to read in "Shelving a problem" that the
East Timor question could be "quietly shelved" by the United
Nations General Assembly next year "without a loss of face by
any of the protagonists."

FRETILIN and the people of East Timor are among these pro-
taginists. To them it is not a question of loss of face, but
one of actual physical survival - a situation they have been
in since Indonesia's Western-backed invasion in December 1975.

Estimates of the death toll range up to 200,000 - almost
a third of the population. Furthermore, recent evidence shows
that Indonesia has even allowed its armed forces to use tor-
ture against the Timorese.

The Soviet Union has been widely condemned for its inva-
tion of Afghanistan, and rightly so. The same degree of con-
demnation should be applied to Indonesia also.
UN DEFERS TIMOR VOTE

By Pat Walsh

Source: East Timor Report, No.5, November 1983

For many different reasons, the deferral of the UN vote was greeted with signs of relief all round.

Had the vote been taken the issue may well have been defeated and dropped from the UN agenda - a major humiliation for Portugal and a mortal blow to FRETILIN's diplomatic struggle. The resolution of 1982 in favour of self-determination was carried by only 4 votes.

Deferral spared Indonesia its ninth year of public reprobation as the new offensive may well have cost it the victory it so earnestly sought. It has also provided extra time "to mobilise more pro-Indonesian votes" as the Indonesian Times pointed out in an editorial.

Deferral let the Hawke Government off the hook. Had it abstained or voted for the resolution Indonesia would have been offended. Had it voted with Indonesia it would have incurred strong criticism at home both within the community and within the Party itself whose official policy favours self-determination. (It should be noted, however, that FRETILIN's representative at the UN, José Ramos-Horta, is adamant that Hayden informed the Portuguese Foreign Minister that Australia would have voted with Indonesia had the issue been put to vote.)

The deferral has not meant the issue has been swept under the carpet altogether at the UN this year. Some member states,, have made reference to the issue in both the 4th Committee and the General Assembly. And FRETILIN expect the 3rd Committee, which deals with human rights, will formally address the subject.
Vanuatu's Challenge

Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Father Walter Lini, delivered a particularly impassioned appeal to both Indonesia and the UN itself in the course of his broader UN address. Attacking "the moral bankruptcy of those who speak so eloquently on other matters but who remain silent on the question of East Timor", he went on to ask with what moral authority could the UN challenge other territorial annexations or human rights abuses if Indonesia's action in East Timor were condoned. "Let the people (of East Timor) decide their own fate, and let the UN assist in that process. This is why we have a United Nations," he concluded.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONSULT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT SENDING UN ENVOY TO EAST TIMOR

By the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Commons.

A Parliamentary human rights delegation was told today by Minister of State Richard Luce at the Foreign Office that the British Government would ask the UN Secretary-General whether he would visit East Timor or send an envoy there in fulfilment of the mandate given him by the General Assembly in 1982 to consult with all parties to the dispute in that country. The delegation emphasised that in order to satisfy the requirements of the mandate, the UN should consult with FRETILIN, the movement resisting the Indonesian annexation, and could only do so
if the Secretary-General or his envoy were physically present in East Timor. As yet, only Indonesia and Portugal have been consulted under the terms of the mandate.

......

Welcoming the Minister's undertaking, the delegation emphasised that it would be necessary to achieve a cease-fire to ensure the safety of any envoy the UN might send to East Timor, and they asked the British Government to do everything possible to persuade the Indonesian Government to cease military operations in order to facilitate the work of the Secretary-General.

The delegation....consisted of Lord Avebury (Liberal) chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Sir Bernard Braine (Conservative) vice-chairman of the group, and Robert Parry (Labour)....

The delegation asked the Minister again if the British Government would suspend arms shipment to Indonesia as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Indonesia in favour of a cease-fire. In reply, the Minister said that generally speaking all arms sales were only approved after carefully checking that they would not be used against the civilian population and in violation of human rights. He said the Government was satisfied that the Hawk ground-attack aircraft already supplied to Indonesia were only being used for training purposes. The delegation nevertheless underlined the technical possibility that these planes could be modified in the field for ground-attack use. Britain has already supplied two squadrons of Hawks and was known to be negotiating last year for more deliveries of the aircraft. The new arms deal is also thought to include a frigate and armoured personnel vehicles. Last month, 128 Members of Parliament from all parties signed an Early Day Motion calling on the Government "to halt the sale of arms to Indonesia and to take other urgent steps to press Indonesia to halt military operations in East Timor."
QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR: PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

UN Document A/39/361, July 25, 1984

By Javier Perez de Cuellar

1. Upon assuming my responsibilities at the beginning of 1982, I undertook consultations with the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal with a view to contributing to the improvement of the humanitarian situation in East Timor and to promoting efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the problem. Following preliminary contacts with the Permanent Representatives of the two countries, I held separate meetings, on 30 April 1982 with Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja of Indonesia and Colonel Vitor Alves, Special Envoy of the President of Portugal.

2. I subsequently requested Under-Secretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed to assist me in my consultations with both parties and a team of Secretariat officials was formed, under his direction, to follow relevant developments and explore possible approaches towards a settlement. On 16 June 1982, Mr. Ahmed held informal talks in Singapore with the then-Director-General for Political Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, on the occasion of the annual Ministerial Meeting of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

3. Mr. Ahmed had an exchange of views, on 29 September 1982, with the then-Foreign Minister Vasco Putscher Pereira of Portugal. On the following day, I met with the then-Prime Minister, Mr. Pinto Balsemao.

4. During its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly considered the question of East Timor and adopted resolution 37/30 on 23 November 1982. The text of the resolution was subsequently transmitted to the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal.
5. On 3 December 1982, I held separate consultations with Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja of Indonesia and Mr. Paulo Marques Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Portugal. On 24 May 1983, I had further discussions with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia and, in the course of the next two months, I and Mr. Ahmed met separately on several occasions with the Permanent Representatives of the two countries.

6. As a result of this process of consultation, contacts were initiated between Indonesia and Portugal in July 1983, through their Permanent Representatives in New York.

7. The initiation of these direct contacts led me to submit to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly a note (A/38/352), dated 19 August 1983, in which I stated that, in view of recent developments regarding the question of East Timor, I did not consider it opportune to submit a substantive report on my efforts to contribute to a comprehensive settlement of the problem to the General Assembly at that time.

8. On the recommendation of the General Committee, the Assembly subsequently deferred consideration of the item and decided, on 23 September 1983, to include it in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session (decision 38/402).

9. During the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, I actively pursued my contacts with both sides. On 19 September 1983, I had discussions on the matter with President Eanes and Foreign Minister Jaime Gama of Portugal. I also met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar on 6 October 1983. Later in conjunction with his participation in international conferences in Bangladesh and Morocco, Mr. Ahmed had consultations with Foreign Minister Mochtar, on 8 December 1983 and 14 January 1984, respectively. On 22 February 1984, he had a further meeting with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, in Brunei Darussalam, on the occasion of the celebration of its first national day.
10. On 16 March 1984, I had an extensive exchange of views with Prime Minister Mário Soares of Portugal and I met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar on 9 April 1984. In conjunction with a mission to South-East Asia, Mr. Ahmed also met Foreign Minister Mochtar and other senior Government officials in Jakarta between 8 and 10 May 1984. I subsequently met with Mr. Jaime Gama, Foreign Minister of Portugal, on 28 May 1984. Since that date, I have continued to follow closely the developments relating to East Timor and pursued my contacts with both sides in New York. Most recently, Mr. Ahmed attended the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting at Jakarta, where he had a further opportunity to exchange views with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar on 11 July.

* * *

11. Since early 1982, I have periodically raised with the Indonesian Government the question of facilitating the activities of the international humanitarian organizations engaged in providing assistance and protection to the people of East Timor.

12. In April 1982, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Indonesian Red Cross agreed to initiate a special project of basic services for children, mothers and their families in East Timor. This project, which has been implemented since June 1982, is an integrated nutrition, primary health care and community development operation. Thirty-three villages, with a total population of about 45,000 people, scattered over seven subdistricts, have been covered during the last two years and it is expected that the project will be extended for a period of 12 months, as from July 1984. During the last year, UNICEF project staff have visited each subdistrict once a month for the purpose of monitoring the programme implementation.

13. In co-operation with the Indonesian Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) undertook in September 1979 a food and medical assistance programme in East Timor, which extended to the island of Ataúro at the beginning
of 1982. The implementation of the programme was monitored through evaluation missions carried out by ICRC representatives at regular intervals, until the end of 1982. In the first part of 1983, ICRC was unable to proceed with its regular evaluations for the purpose of subsequent distribution of aid. It consequently decided in July 1983 to suspend its participation in the assistance activities on the main island.

14. In the field of protection, the Indonesian Government agreed at the end of 1981 to allow delegates of ICRC to visit detention centres in East Timor and Ataúro. Two such visits were carried out in February and November 1982, when ICRC delegates were able to meet with the displaced persons on Ataúro island and with a number of detainees in Dili, Los Palos on the mainland. An agreement was reached, early in 1983, to extend the visits to other detention centres in East Timor, but implementation was subsequently deferred at the request of the Indonesian authorities.

15. Following these developments, I discussed the situation with Mr. Alexandre Hay, President of the ICRC, at a meeting in Geneva on 2 August 1983. In our subsequent contacts with the Indonesian Government, I and Mr. Ahmed raised the matter, with a view to encouraging a full resumption of the ICRC's activities in East Timor. ICRC has been kept informed of these contacts.

16. As a result of negotiations held between the Indonesian authorities and ICRC, an agreement was reached, in December 1983, on the resumption of ICRC's protection activities on the main island in four stages, to be implemented between March and October 1984, and whereby the visits would be gradually extended to all detention centres. The first stage was completed in March. The second stage of the visits took place in June and it is my sincere hope that the rest of the programme will be carried out as agreed.

17. With regard to relief assistance on the main island of East Timor, ICRC has expressed its willingness to resume it
on the basis of the standard criteria for such operations. In this context, it should be noted that ICRC's relief assistance activities to the displaced persons on Atauro island have continued without interruption.

18. A family reunion/repatriation programme to Australia and Portugal, established by ICRC in December 1979, has also been actively pursued throughout 1983 and during the first part of 1984, in co-operation with the Indonesian Red Cross. Until recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) contributed financially to the repatriations to Portugal, on the basis of an agreement concluded with ICRC in March 1980. UNHCR was also involved, in early 1982, in the movement of a number of persons from East Timor to Cape Verde.

19. The improvement of the humanitarian situation of the people of East Timor remains one of my primary concerns and I shall continue my endeavours towards that end.

20. The contacts established between Indonesia and Portugal in July 1983 have been held in New York at regular intervals, and both parties have expressed to me their willingness to continue the present process. For my part, I wish to reiterate my readiness to be of assistance to the two Governments, with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem.

LETTER FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP IN BRITAIN TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL

August 10, 1984

By Lord Avebury, Chairman of the PHRG

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar
United Nations
New York, NY 10017
USA

Dear Sr. Perez de Cuellar,

I am writing with regard to your recent "Progress Report" on the "Question of East Timor" (A/39/361, 25 July 1984). Although
I am pleased to note the many efforts you have made since the beginning of your tenure to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the East Timor question, I wish to bring to your attention a troubling omission in your report which I noticed immediately upon reading it.

As it stands, the report is essentially a log of contacts with representatives of the Indonesian government and the Portuguese government. It lists meetings with Special Envoys, Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of the two countries, sometimes separately, sometimes with both countries attending. What I did not find in the report, however, was any mention of consultations with the East Timorese themselves. There is no indication, for example, that any attempt was made to consult with the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) or any other Timorese parties.

I would respectfully remind you of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 November 1982 (E/37/30) which expresses the United Nations' position on the East Timor question. The resolution instructs the Secretary General "to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem". Would not the people of East Timor be considered as one of the "parties directly concerned"? And is a comprehensive settlement of the problem possible without the direct involvement of those most affected by any settlement, namely, the East Timorese? I submit that any negotiations that do not include representatives of the Timorese people will fail to produce a lasting solution to the East Timor problem.

I believe, Mr. Secretary-General, that you sincerely wish to arrive at a happy resolution to this tragic situation. Over the last two years, you and your deputy, Mr. Ahmed, have devoted considerable time and effort to the fulfillment of this goal. Frankly, I do not think you will succeed unless you
follow the dictates of common sense and Resolution 37/30, and include the East Timorese themselves on your agenda of consultations and discussions with "all parties directly concerned". I would be grateful to know what steps you will take to that end in the future, so that I can inform the members of the PHRG accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

Lord Avebury, Chairman
Parliamentary Human Rights Group

JAKARTA HAILS UN DELAY

Source: The Manchester Guardian, September 22, 1984

By Reuter

Jakarta - An Indonesian newspaper yesterday hailed the postponement of a UN debate on Jakarta's annexation of East Timor as a victory, saying that it might be the last nail in the coffin of separatist rebels there.

The Foreign Minister, Mr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, has also welcomed a UN decision to defer a General Assembly debate on the former Portuguese colony. "This second straight postponement of the East Timor debate at the UN may be the last nail in the FRETILIN coffin," the Jakarta Post said in reference to the leftwing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. "Lisbon certainly has nothing more to gain by propping up this defeated, diminished and demoralised band of outlaws."

Jakarta annexed the territory in 1976 after Portugal pulled out. For the past eight years, FRETILIN rebels have been fighting a sporadic war against Indonesian troops.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Ted Morello's report in the Far East Economic Review is extremely cynical. Moreover, he is wrong when he says that "Norway has taken a neutral stand on the issue by abstaining in the annual voting since it first came before the General Assembly in 1976". The first General Assembly resolution condemning the Indonesian invasion was, in fact, adopted on December 12, 1975, only five days after the full-scale invasion began. Norway has always abstained in the voting on East Timor, except for 1976 when they voted in favour. Later, however, they advised the secretariat that it was an error: They had intended to abstain.

Finally, it is typical of the Review that there is an interview with the delegates from Norway and Indonesia, but nothing from Portugal or PRETILIN, which might have produced a different story as is clear from the statement by José Ramos Horta reproduced above.
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**East Timor Update**, East Timor Human Rights Committee, Box 363, Syracuse NY 13201, USA.


**Timor Information Service**, Post Office Box 77, Clifton Hill, Victoria 3068, Australia.

**Öst-Timor Information**, The Swedish East Timor Committee, Bäckalidsvägen 44, S-13800 Alta, Sweden.
Example of FRETILIN propaganda poster.
The glorious Falintil army
Fight dying
Die fighting

By just cause
In a just struggle!

Mother land or death!!
The victory is certain and unavoidable!!
IWGIA LOCAL GROUPS:
Copenhagen: Fiolstræde, 10
              DK 1171 Copenhagen K
              Denmark

Århus:       c/o International Forum
              Fredensgade 34,
              8000 Århus C
              Denmark

Oslo:        pb 20, Blindern 0313
              Oslo 3
              Norway
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