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Cover: FRETILIN soldiers (1975).
EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

A Collection of Documents

edited by TORBEN RETBØLL

Copenhagen 1980
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The present document has been written especially for the IWGIA Document series.

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Copenhagen, March 1980
The Documentation Department of IWGIA
PREFACE

The purpose of this collection of documents is to show three points: Firstly, Indonesian atrocities in East Timor; secondly, the responsibility of the Western democracies; and thirdly, the cover-up in the Western mass media.

The collection opens and closes with UN testimonies by Noam Chomsky. The documents in between are arranged by origin and topic, rather than in a chronological sequence. For reasons of space it has only been possible to present but a fraction of the material available. Sources which are quoted and discussed in the UN testimonies are not repeated as separate items*.

The bibliography at the end is intended as a guide to further reading, and also as a guide to some of the East Timor groups around the world that are working to bring the matter to the attention of the public.

I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable assistance and continuing inspiration: Eva Belfrage, Carmel Budiardjo, John Cavanagh, Noam Chomsky, Maarten van Dullemen, Ken Fry, Jan Gustafsson, Finngeir Hiorth, Arnold Kohen, Poul Pedersen, Hannu Reime, Kevin Sherlock, Julie Southwood, and Willian Tully.

Torben Retbøll
December 1979.

* The documents have been faithfully transcribed. Only very obvious misprints - in newspaper articles - have been corrected.
1. FRETILIN demonstration (1975).
CONTENTS

Introduction: Statement delivered to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, November 1978, by NOAM CHOMSKY................................. 1

FRETLIN........................................... 27

Refugees......................................... 33

Letters Smuggled out of Timor.................. 41

East Timor Officials............................ 45

A Timorese in Indonesia.......................... 55

Indonesian Relief Workers in Timor............. 57

Indonesian Officials............................ 61

Foreign Visitors.................................. 69

The U.S.A. and the East Timor Question........... 85

Australia and the East Timor Question.......... 91

The United Nations and the East Timor Question. 101

Epilogue: Statement delivered to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, October 1979, by NOAM CHOMSKY........................................ 109

Appendix: The People's Republic of China and Indonesia........................................ 121

Bibliography..................................... 123

Journals and Magazines specializing on East Timor........................................ 127

Further Addresses............................... 128

Résumé in Spanish, by TERESA APARICIO......... 129
MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

MAPS, by JØRGEN ULRICHT:

1-1. General Map of the Indonesian Archipelago... viii
1-2. Map of the Island of Timor.................. viii

PHOTOGRAPHS

by HELEN HILL:
Cover, 1. (p.iv), 2. (p.vi), 3. (p.26),
4. (p.30), 5. (p.32), and 6. (p.40).

by PETER RODGERS:
9. (p.80).

by LENA HELLKVIST:
8. (p.68), 10. (p.84) and 11 (p.110).

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
7. (p.56).

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

APODETI
Associação Popular Democrática Timorense,
Popular Democratic Association of
Timorese.

FRETILIN
Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste
Independente,
Revolutionary Front of Independent East
Timor.

KOTA
Kilbur Oan Timur Aswain,
Sons of the Mountain Warriors;
literally, in Tetum, "Warrior-dogs."

Partido Trabalhista
A "labour party"
Little is known about this group except
that its members did not number more
than ten people.

UDT
União Democrática Timorense,
Democratic Union of Timorese.

2. East Timor (1975).
1-1. General Map of the Indonesian Archipelago
1-2. Map of the island of Timor
INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT DELIVERED TO THE FOURTH COMMITTEE
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 1978

by NOAM CHOMSKY

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the
problem of East Timor. I would like to begin by clarifying my
own position with regard to this problem.

My primary concern is not Southeast Asia but rather the
Western industrial societies, particularly my own country, the
United States: its foreign policy, the domestic matrix in
which this policy arises and the ways it is interpreted in
journalism and scholarship. In this context I have become
much concerned over the years with the impact of American
policy on Southeast Asia and other regions. I have strenuously
opposed certain basic elements of this policy, and believe
that it is often seriously misrepresented at home, a matter of
considerable significance, since such misrepresentation
facilitates the pursuit of dangerous and harmful programs
without the constraints that an informed public opinion might,
and sometimes does impose.

* NOAM CHOMSKY, Professor of Linguistics at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
On December 7 1975, Indonesian military forces invaded East Timor, capturing the capital city of Dili, the first major step in a war of aggression that has repeatedly been condemned by the United Nations but that still continues without respite. The United States surely knew of the impending invasion, which had been widely forecast in the international press, was expected by Australia and took place immediately after the departure of President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger from a visit to Jakarta, where Kissinger had pointedly told newsmen that "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question" of Timor.

Although Indonesia has effectively sealed off East Timor from the outside world, refusing entry even to the International Red Cross, nevertheless reports have filtered through indicating that there have been massive atrocities, with estimates by neutral or even pro-Indonesian observers of 50-100,000 slaughtered, roughly 10% of the population. The evidence compares very well in credibility with what is available concerning other areas of the world closed to direct investigation where atrocities have been alleged. I will return to some comparisons. Nevertheless, the American press - indeed, the Western press quite generally - has evaded the issue or has, with rare exceptions, adhered closely to the position of Indonesia and the U.S. government, a position that was expressed very well by Congressman J. Herbert Burke, ranking minority member of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, when he wrote that "it is in all our interests to bury the Timor issue quickly and completely."

At every crucial point, the U.S. government, with the press trailing loyally in its wake, has denied or concealed the atrocities committed by its Indonesian ally and has taken the position that whatever minor improper actions may have occurred in the past, it is now a matter of history and no useful purpose is served by questioning Indonesian control of East Timor. The effect has been that the United States and
its allies have been able to take part in massacres and repression in East Timor by providing Indonesia with the material support it requires to carry on its continuing war of aggression and the ideological support that enables it to do so virtually in secret. Again, I want to stress the significance of press complicity in these atrocities, unknown to a public that might be sufficiently aroused by the facts so as to prevent the governments of the industrial democracies from making their decisive contribution to what Shepard Forman, an anthropologist who worked in Timor, described in Congressional Hearings as "annihilation of simple mountain people." I want to stress as well that this is not ancient history. Only a few weeks ago a group of Australians who entered Dili harbor in a disabled yacht saw "frigates, patrol boats, barges crammed with Indonesian soldiers, and many aircraft and helicopters," heard explosions in the distance, and "were left without doubts that Dili was still a war zone" (Canberra Times, October 20 1978). The Indonesian effort to suppress the independence movement of East Timor continues, with the support of the industrial democracies. The whole affair has great import well beyond Timor.

According to the recent UNESCO declaration on news organizations, the mass media throughout the world "contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories." The example of East Timor is one of the many that show how far that vision is removed from reality. The submissiveness of the media has left the general public unaware of the massacres in East Timor and of the direct complicity of the United States and its allies in them. Thus far from giving expression to oppressed peoples, the mass media in the rich and developed
countries participate effectively in continuing oppression and major violations of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

I would now like to review the basic historical facts and their systematic distortion by the major Western powers and the compliant press, concentrating on the United States, though matters are little different elsewhere apart from Australia, to my knowledge.

East Timor had never been included within the colonial or post-colonial boundaries of Indonesia and, as Forman points out, "Indo-Javanese and Islamic influences barely can be noted." After World War II, he observed, mountain people "have proclaimed repeatedly their right of self-determination" and eagerly welcomed the steps towards independence which followed the 1974 Portuguese revolution. As soon as Portugal announced that independence would be granted to the colonies the tiny elite of Timor formed several political parties, of which the most important were the UDT and FRETIM. The UN study Decolonization reports that though UDT was initially regarded as the most influential party, "its lack of positive policies, its associations with the 'ancien régime', together with its initial reluctance to support the ultimate goal of full independence led many of the party's original followers to swing their support to FRETIM which by early 1975 was generally considered to have become the largest party in the Territory." In August 1975 the UDT staged a coup, probably with Indonesian complicity, setting off a bloody civil war that ended a few weeks later in a complete victory for FRETIM. The UN study estimated the numbers killed at 2-3000. The figures are worth noting, since the United States, after reports of later Indonesian atrocities began to surface, has tried to claim that many of those killed were victims of the civil war.

The handling of the reports by the first foreign visitors after the brief civil war gives a revealing insight into
the pattern of news management that has since prevailed in the United States. On September 4, the New York Times published an account by Gerald Stone, who was described as apparently "the first reporter allowed there since the fighting began." The Times story was actually revised and excerpted from a longer report carried by the London Times (September 2, 1975). The modifications are instructive.

Stone attempted to verify reports of large-scale destruction and atrocities, attributed primarily to FREtilin by Indonesian propaganda and news coverage based on it, then and since. His major conclusion was that the reports of destruction were vastly exaggerated and that "many of the stories fed to the public in the past two weeks were not simply exaggerations; they were the product of a purposeful campaign to plant lies." He implicated the Portuguese, Indonesian and Australian governments in this propaganda campaign.

In revising Stone's report for an American audience, the New York Times deleted this statement that there had been "much distortion and exaggeration" of the destruction and eliminated entirely his major conclusion about the purposeful lies of Indonesian and Western propaganda. What the New York Times did retain was Stone's description of terrible conditions in FREtilin hospitals (the Portuguese had withdrawn the only doctor) and maltreatment of prisoners by FREtilin. The sole subheading in the article reads: "evidence of beating." The process of creating the required history advanced yet another step in the Newsweek account of the edited excerpts that appeared in the New York Times. According to Newsweek, Stone had reported "devastation," "bloodshed" and FREtilin atrocities, and his "dispatch supported the stories of many of the 4,000 refugees who have already fled Timor." (September 15, 1975).

Note carefully the transition. A journalist visits the scene of reported devastation and atrocities which, he reports, were "filtered through the eyes of frightened and exhausted
evacuees" or produced by Portuguese, Indonesian and Australian officials, all of whom "had reason to distrust FRETILIN," a national independence movement with a moderate reformist program, according to direct reports by Western observers. He concludes that the reports are vastly exaggerated, in fact, in large measure propaganda fabrications. After editing by the New York Times that eliminates his major conclusion and modifies others, Newsweek concludes that he found that the reports were true. Thus the reading public is reinforced in the belief that what Newsweek calls "the Marxist FRETILIN party" is bent on atrocities and that liberation movements are to be viewed with horror. And the stage is set for general acquiescence when U.S.-backed Indonesian military forces invade to "restore order". This pattern of news management persists throughout until today, with rare exceptions.

From early September until December 7 1975, East Timor was effectively administered by FRETILIN. There were accredited Australian journalists in the Territory throughout this period as well as Australian visitors, who have given favorable accounts of the brief interlude of semi-independence. James Dunn, who is perhaps the best-placed Western observer with long experience in Timor, headed an Australian aid mission in October and reported that the FRETILIN administration was functioning effectively and "enjoyed widespread support from the population, including many hitherto UDT supporters." The Australian Parliamentarian Ken Fry has testified to the same effect before the UN Security Council. In the one major book on this period, Jill Jolliffe, who was a correspondent in East Timor at the time, concurs in this judgment. Until mid-November, FRETILIN requested that Portuguese authorities, who had left towards the end of the brief civil war, return to complete the process of decolonization and throughout the period requested foreign governments to send observers and fact-finding missions, in vain.

Immediately after the complete victory of FRETILIN in early September Indonesia began its armed intervention.
Indonesian border raids began on September 14. On October 16 Indonesian troops with a few Timorese in support roles captured the town of Balibo about 10 km. from the border. Five Australian newsmen were killed, an event that served effectively to warn journalists of the fate that awaited them if they remained after the outright invasion, as Jolliffe comments. Eyewitness reports of Indonesian military action were filed during this period by Australian journalists Michael Richardson, Jill Jolliffe and Roger East, but received little international notice. The town of Atabae fell to Indonesian occupation on November 28 after two weeks of intensive bombardment. The expanding Indonesian attacks and lack of foreign reaction led to a decision by PRETILIN to declare independence just three years ago, on November 28 1975.

A full-scale Indonesian invasion was generally expected at that point. The United States and Australia undoubtedly knew what was about to happen. Diplomatic cables leaked subsequently in the Australian press reveal that in August 1975 the Australian Ambassador to Jakarta had informed his government that the U.S. State Department had instructed the embassy in Jakarta "to cut down its reporting on Timor" and that the U.S. Ambassador had expressed his view that "the U.S. should keep out of the Portuguese Timor situation and allow events to take their course," despite U.S. influence based on Indonesia's need for U.S. military assistance. In October the Australian Ambassador advised his government "that Australian knowledge of Indonesian intervention be concealed" to avoid complications with Indonesia. The primary difference between Australia and the United States in this regard is that in the United States the cover-up continues in the media as well; and of course, U.S. complicity by means of military and other support is far greater.

The U.S. government professes ignorance as to what was happening during this period, and press reports adhered closely to Indonesian propaganda. The sympathetic picture of
FRETILIN administration conveyed by independent Western observers appeared nowhere, and the period is depicted as one of continuing civil strife. For example, David Andelman of the New York Times reported from Jakarta on November 26 that Indonesians "point to their hands-off policy with respect to the civil war that is engulfing Portuguese Timor" while Indonesian destroyers "cruise the waters around Timor to prevent infiltration of arms by sea to the left-wing rebels who seized control of the colony last August." In fact, there was no civil war and had been none for over two months, but rather a limited Indonesian incursion, and when Andelman wrote, Atabae had been under naval bombardment for 12 days and fell to Indonesian forces two days later. Andelman wrote that Indonesian forces "have been showing remarkable restraint, for what is at stake (is military aid)." This remarkable restraint in fact existed only in the pages of America's leading newspaper. This report is quite typical of press coverage of the period.

As already noted, the Indonesian invasion of December 7 took place immediately after the departure of President Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta. The New York Times reported on December 8 that "Indonesians hold Portuguese Timor after Incursion." Indonesian forces in fact held only the capital city of Dili, which they had captured with considerable barbarism. The difference is significant. The U.S. government has consistently been claiming that the fighting is essentially over, so that we must accept Indonesian annexation as a fact of life. The Times also reported falsely that the civil war (which had ended in early September) had been proceeding until the "incursion" and that Indonesia had been offering "no material assistance to the anti-FRETILIN forces." In a perverse sense, the latter claim is true: that is, since Indonesia was itself conducting the military operations while falsely alleging that "anti-FRETILIN forces" were doing so, it is true, technically, that Indonesia was not offering "military assistance to the anti-FRETILIN forces."
The New York Times persisted in the same distortions in an editorial condemnation of Indonesian aggression, maintaining that "To be fair there was provocation in the unilateral declaration of independence last month by the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, known as FRETILIN, which had seemed to be winning the civil war handily against pro-Indonesian forces until Jakarta began to intervene." Recall that Indonesia had not "seized" East Timor but rather held only the capital city. FRETILIN did not "seem" to be winning the civil war, but had won it by early September, at which time Indonesia began its intervention, not in support of "pro-Indonesian forces," but on its own. The Times editors do not explain why the declaration of independence was a "provocation" to Indonesia, which had no claims to East Timor, and they say nothing about the Indonesian "provocation" of the preceding months. The Times also adds that "The real losers are Portuguese Timor's 620,000 inhabitants, whose interests and desires have been ignored by all parties to this deplorable affair" - including the independence forces. Perhaps similar sentiments were expressed by thoughtful British commentators in July 1776*.

The U.S. government claims to have suspended military assistance to Indonesia from December 1975 until June 1976. This turns out to have been as much of a fraud as the pretence of ignorance as to what was happening. Military aid during this period actually was above what the State Department had originally proposed to Congress, and has increased since. Furthermore, at least four new offers were made during this period, in express contradiction to Congressional testimony by representatives of the State Department and the Pentagon, including supplies and parts for OV-10 Broncos which are "specially designed for counter-insurgency operations against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons, and

* date of the American Declaration of Independence. (Editor's note).
wholly useless for defending Indonesia against a foreign enemy," as was pointed out in Congressional testimony by Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson, who added that this policy has continued without substantial change through the Carter Administration. The "aid suspension" was secret - so secret, that the Indonesian government was never informed of it. Virtually nothing of this has been discussed in the national media.

In Congressional testimony, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, George Aldrich, conceding that the Indonesians "were armed roughly 90 percent with our equipment," contended that "... we really did not know very much." As to this "ignorance," it is a fact that the West generally, the United States specifically, does not want to know, preferring that the issue be quickly "buried," as Congressman Burke has urged, forgotten along with the mass graves and demolished villages of East Timor.

The official U.S. government view is "that resolution of the matter would be best reached by the parties directly involved - the Indonesians, the Portuguese and the Timorese." The legitimacy of the Indonesian "involvement" is precisely what is at issue; the Portuguese strenuously opposed the Indonesian involvement; the Timorese government that was in de facto control of the Territory apart from the border areas already conquered by Indonesia certainly opposed the invasion, with substantial popular support so far as is known, and continue to do so insofar as they are able to resist. Thus the official U.S. position reduces to acceptance of Indonesian aggression and its consequences, whatever the attitudes of the other "parties directly involved," and surely irrespective of the attitudes of the primary party, the people of East Timor themselves. Again, the media have been silent on these matters.

As for the continuing flow of U.S. arms, the Country Officer for Indonesia in the State Department, David T. Kenney, testified before Congress that one purpose is "to keep that area peaceful" - this, in testimony on the Indonesian invasion
of East Timor. Another State Department representative, at Hearings just last February, conceded that the conflict persists but notes "a certain change in the situation" in that a large number of people have moved from areas where they were "under the control of FRETIMIN to areas where they could be protected by the Indonesian government" - or to translate into plain English: have fled the merciless attack supplied and concealed by the U.S. government. The cynicism of the government formulations are matched only by those of the press, as we shall see directly.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

Indonesia has been attempting to conquer East Timor since December 1975, but so far without success. In July 1976 the formal incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia after a farcical "People's Council" was recognized by the United States. The State Department legal representative George Aldrich testified that "We actually know very little about the selection process for these delegates (to the People's Council), although the process itself took place at a time of military occupation by Indonesia during which considerable fighting was still going on." Actually, the U.S. government knows all that need be known about the "selection process," but it is striking that on the basis of this professed ignorance the U.S. government was willing to recognize the takeover while fully aware that fighting continued, "renewing" the arms shipments that had never been halted. While the government professes ignorance about the facts, it has a clear insight into American interests. The State Department legal adviser stated that the U.S. did not question the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia because it was "an accomplished fact" and "such a policy would not serve our best interests in light of the importance of our relations with Indonesia," which are sufficiently well-known so that I need not describe them here.
In March 1977, nine months after "integration," the Country Officer for Indonesia in the State Department, David Kenney, testified that about 200,000 of the 650,000 people of East Timor "would be considered in areas under Indonesian administration" - an assessment that contrasts strikingly with the government claim that the war was essentially over in early 1976 and that "Timor has effectively become a part of Indonesia." Kenney testified further that the people are happy with integration: "They have decided their best interest lies at this time, in incorporation with Indonesia." Their "decision" was expressed in the fraudulent "People's Council." Of course, there were still the two-thirds of the population who had not as yet been able to express their "decision" because they were not under Indonesian administration - or to put it in the terms favored by the State Department, because they are not as yet "protected" by Indonesia.

The Indonesian attempt to conquer East Timor has been a story of mounting atrocities, attested by refugee reports, church officials, letters that have been smuggled out, and other sources. Virtually all independent observers estimate the numbers slaughtered as in the range of 50-100,000. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, estimated the number killed as "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000" (Age, April 1 1977). But, he added, "what does this mean if compared with 600,000 people who want to join Indonesia. Then what is the big fuss. It is possible that they may have been killed by Australians and not us. Who knows? It was war" (Canberra Times, April 1 1977). The silence in the U.S. media over this admission is remarkable, no less so than the silence accorded the report by Indonesian Church officials, who are strongly in support of "integration" and anti-FREITILIN, after a visit to East Timor in which they found that 500,000 people were not under Indonesian military control in late 1976 and that local priests estimated the numbers killed at 100,000. The Indonesian Church officials describe a town of 5000 that
allegedly welcomed the Indonesian troops though a year later only 1000 people remained in the village, the rest having joined FRETILIN in the mountains. They report that of the 30,000 people in the capital city of Dili, the one place where there may have been some initial willingness to accept the Indonesian invasion, 20,000 want to leave for Portugal while others are with FRETILIN. Neither this nor other information to the same effect has reached the American media, though the Australian Parliament Legislative Research Service described the report of the Church officials as "significant and disturbing" and concluded that there is "mounting evidence" that the Indonesians have carried out "indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War 2 history."

I cannot review here the evidence supporting this judgment, but it is ample. How has the American press responded? The New York Times index gives a good indication. In the year 1975, when the fate of the Portuguese colonies was a matter of much concern in the West, Timor received 6 full columns in the annual index. In 1976, when the Indonesian army was beginning the "annihilation of simple mountain people," coverage dropped to half a column. In 1977, when this massacre was reaching truly awesome proportions, coverage dropped to five lines.

On the rare occasions when the press has deigned to refer to this "indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War 2 history," it has followed the U.S. government in pretending that the killings took place largely during the civil war. On February 15 1976 the New York Times devoted all of 150 words to a report that "About 60,000 people have been killed since the outbreak of civil war in Portuguese Timor last August, according to the deputy chairman of the territory's provisional government" – that is, the government installed by the Indonesian army. The Times report went on to say that FRETILIN had been fighting "forces favoring union with Indonesia." Recall that in the civil war perhaps 2-3000
were killed, a fact that was not reported by the Times. Thus the remainder of the estimated 60,000 were victims of the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion. As for the forces "favoring union with Indonesia," these had been defeated in September and played no significant part in the subsequent fighting. These forces did not, in fact, favor such union for the most part, certainly not prior to their defeat in September 1975 and probably not thereafter, if we discount the effects of Indonesian coercion. The fact that the Times found it necessary to devote only 150 words to this massacre is revealing, as is the falsification of the facts, and the remark attributed with no comment to their source that "the war is virtually over" in February 1976. The war continues, while the American press maintains its silence.

James Dunn presented evidence of Indonesian atrocities in Congressional Hearings in March 1977, based on his interviews with Timorese refugees in Portugal. His testimony was reported, but the story quickly died. The U.S. press, which is assiduous in seeking out refugee reports alleging atrocities in countries that have escaped U.S. domination, has yet to interview these refugees; nor have they appeared before Congress, though Dunn reported that the refugees were eager to testify. Occasionally the U.S. press reports the plight of the refugees in Portugal, carefully avoiding anything they might have to report about Timor, however (e.g., New York Times, October 24 1976).

One can find an occasional indication in the press that something ugly may be happening in Timor. Thus, the New York Times carried a nine-line Reuters dispatch (March 1 1977) on a petition to President Carter by the majority of the Australian Parliament, "charging atrocities by Indonesian troops" and asking President Carter "to comment publicly on the situation in East Timor." But nine lines was evidently considered too much for a topic of such meager significance. The story did not make it to the New York Times index because it was deleted from the Late City Edition, which is the news-
paper of record for microfilm and for history. Times editors and correspondents are much too busy seeking evidence of Communist atrocities to bother with the possible massacre of 100,000 Timorese at the hands of a U.S. client using American arms.

Robert Shaplen, the noted Asia correspondent for the New Yorker, commented briefly on East Timor in his "Letter from Indonesia," December 12 1977. According to his reconstruction of history, "Indonesian troops intervened, somewhat crudely and clumsily, in December of 1975, in a war for independence which the East Timorese were ostensibly waging against Portugal." The idea that the East Timorese were fighting Portugal is a novel contribution, but the reference to the massacre of thousands of people as a somewhat crude and clumsy intervention is typical of the press. Shaplen claims that "the so-called Fight for Freedom" from Portugal, which exists only in his imagination, "turned into a civil war" among several factions, of which one, "the left-wing FRETILIN, objected strenuously to the manner in which Indonesian troops moved in to take over the former colony," an interesting way to refer to the resistance struggle against Indonesian aggression. "According to neutral observers," Shaplen continues, "some ten thousand East Timorese, including many civilians, were killed by the Indonesian forces..." In fact, "neutral observers" and even those who are pro-Indonesian and anti-FRETILIN have consistently offered figures five to ten times that high, and only the U.S. State Department has given the estimate that Shaplen attributes to "neutral observers." His reference suggests that he is simply passing "information" from some U.S. government source, identified as "neutral," not an uncommon practice, unfortunately. Shaplen concludes that the Indonesians "don't seem particularly perturbed by the criticisms" that they receive from "many Third World nations," which is natural, given the support they receive from the First World industrial societies and their journalists. He also reports an announcement by General
Suharto that "On December 31st (1977), the Army will start a new campaign against the guerrillas," a matter that is of little concern to this observer or his colleagues in the American press.

One final example of the kind of report that occasionally reaches the United States is a Reuters dispatch from Dili on a recent guided tour (Los Angeles Times, September 27 1978). The reporter discusses "the bitter civil war that preceded the merging of East Timor into Indonesia": "After the Portuguese colonial rulers departed in December, 1975, pro-Indonesian forces, later aided by regular Indonesian troops, defeated left-wing FRETILIN independence guerrillas in an eight-month civil war." Note that this report is false in every crucial particular, though it accords very well with the needs of Indonesian and U.S. propaganda. The Portuguese left just before the end of the civil war in September 1975, and the merging of East Timor into Indonesia, not recognized in most of the world, came ten months later, not after a "civil war" but after an Indonesian invasion that even the State Department concedes had conquered only a third of the population nine months after this "integration," after 15 months of bitter warfare.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

I have mentioned a few of the many examples of direct reports of atrocities that have been systematically excluded from the American press. A final example is a UPI dispatch from Singapore (Australian, October 8 1977) reporting that "30,000 Indonesian troops are still roaming East Timor slaying men, women and children." The report is based on the account of a French photo-journalist Denis Reichle of Paris Match, who was deported from Timor after a six-day visit to a mountain retreat of FRETILIN in East Timor. He gives "a safe estimate" of 70-75,000 East Timorese killed by the Indonesians in 18 months of combat. The Indonesians, he reports, do not seek
combat with FRETILIN forces but "were 'systematically wiping out' the populations of villages known or suspected to be FRETILIN supporters and destroying FRETILIN supply lines and sources." He said "Catholic missionaries, led by the Bishop of Atambua (in Indonesian Timor), were the only voices in Timor trying to stop the 'systematic killing-off of East Timorese'." The Bishop, he said, "had been trying to get an interview with Indonesia's President Suharto for 2 1/2 months, but his requests had so far been ignored," and he reported that "a German priest had been driven insane by the constant killings in his area." In contrast to fairy tales about a "civil war" in which "pro-Indonesian forces" had defeated FRETILIN, this eye-witness report by a Western journalist did not reach the U.S. media.

Unable to provide food and medical treatment to a population of half a million under the circumstances described, FRETILIN is encouraging refugees to move to Indonesian-controlled areas, according to James Dunn, who wrote: "It was therefore not surprising to learn that many of the population were encouraged by FRETILIN to return to towns and villages under Indonesian control."

We have already seen how these facts are interpreted by U.S. government spokesmen, who speak of the flow of refugees to areas where they can be "protected" by the Indonesian army. The press, once again, adheres strictly to the State Department version of events. Henry Kamm reported on the refugee flow in the New York Times (April 19 1978) in the following terms: "The diminishing of supplies of the FRETILIN guerrillas appears to have caused them to lose much of their hold over the significant part of the population of about 600,000 whom they have forced to live in regions under their control." How does Kamm know that the population has been "forced to live" under FRETILIN "control"? How are the "scattered FRETILIN groups," who barely exist according to the Indonesian propaganda ministry and the New York Times,
able to exert control over the population? These questions do not arise. It is a matter of doctrine, not fact, that FRETILIN must have "forced" the population to live under their control, and that they are now fleeing to areas where they can be "protected" by the Indonesians. It is hardly imaginable that the distinguished correspondent of the New York Times — who had just won the Pulitzer prize for his reporting of the suffering of refugees from Communism in Southeast Asia when this dispatch appeared — would report the observation by Denis Reichle after his visit to East Timor: FRETILIN forces "are simply East Timorese who would rather die fighting than submit to what they consider to be Indonesian slavery."

In similar journalistic style, the San Francisco Chronicle reports from Jakarta (October 18 1978) on the imminent collapse of FRETILIN. Relying entirely on statements by Indonesian military commanders, presented simply as fact, the report expresses deep humanitarian concern over "the plight of thousands of villagers still under FRETILIN control or in refugee camps," in particular, those who "are afraid to leave the mountains into which they had been forced from their homes to grow food for FRETILIN."

The Times Pulitzer prize-winning specialist on victims of Communism does not provide the source for his insight into the minds of the refugees fleeing from the regions where they have been "forced to live" by the "scattered FRETILIN groups." Perhaps it was General Ali Murtopo, Indonesia's Information Minister and the military officer in charge of the early stages of the Indonesian invasion, whom he quotes without any qualification as saying that the lack of security that requires Indonesia to keep foreigners away is not caused by FRETILIN forces (which are supposed to be virtually non-existent according to the propaganda line of Indonesia, the United States, and the U.S. media) "but from antiforeign feelings among Timorese, the origin of which he did not explain. 'When they see a foreigner they have a prejudice and would make moves that make trouble,' (General Murtopo) said."
Westerners have often been baffled by what they call the "xenophobia" of Asian peasants and tribesmen, a phenomenon not yet explained by modern anthropology, which seems to arise among groups that are subjected to saturation bombing, forced population removal and other modes of "protection" designed by their foreign benefactors.

Henry Kamm goes on to say that the international backing for FREITILIN "appears to be limited to highly vocal groups of Australian leftwing students who have made of eastern Timor an issue similar to Vietnam, with Indonesia playing the American role." His comparison of Timor and Vietnam is illuminating. Though this has escaped the Times Asia specialist, the protest over Indonesian exploits in Timor includes the majority of states in the United Nations, the majority of the Australian Parliament, the Australian labor movement, church groups, and many others. In the interest of burying American complicity in massacre as quickly as possible, however, it is expedient for the press to pretend that only highly vocal leftwing students are trying to whip up opposition to the Indonesian invasion, as they did, in such an annoying fashion, at the time of the American war in Vietnam.

One of those protestors is Michael Hodgman, a strongly anti-Communist Australian MP, who had specifically denounced the effort to identify opposition to Indonesian aggression as a leftwing plot. Writing in February 1977, he said that "For us, as Australians, to bury our heads in the sand and turn our backs on what is alleged to have occurred, would be a gross act of national moral cowardice... future generations would have to bear the same shame and disgrace which fell upon those citizens of nazi Germany who turned a blind eye to Auschwitz..." How much more true is this of American Congressmen, journalists and the public, given the direct American role in implementing the aggression and its consequences and building a wall of silence around it. More recently, Hodgman
charged in Parliament that between 30-40,000 people have died in East Timor because defoliants destroyed their crops. His allegation received 33 words in the Manchester-London Guardian (September 14 1978), 33 words more than it has received in the United States, to my knowledge. Representative Donald Fraser wrote a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on December 8 1977 citing "a reliable report that Indonesian forces have been using chemical sprays on crops in areas under FRETILIN control and that U.S.-manufactured planes, the OV-10s, are being used to spread these chemicals." The State Department responded that it believed the report to be erroneous. The press has not been sufficiently interested to inquire.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

I mentioned earlier Robert Shaplen's off-hand remark that Indonesia planned a new offensive in December 1977. A report by the Asia correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, George McArthur, adds some highly significant information (International Herald Tribune, December 5 1977). He quotes a Western diplomat as saying that the Indonesians "are running out of military inventory. The operations on Timor have pushed them to the wall." Indonesian arms supplies have been virtually exhausted, according to this report, even though "the guerrillas now number only about 600 men." McArthur does not explain how a war against 600 men can exhaust the military supplies of Indonesia, but people not constrained by the conventions of American journalism can perhaps draw some inferences. McArthur then reports that arms salesmen from the major Western industrial nations are attempting to pour arms into Indonesia, adding falsely that the Carter Administration is "slowing down international armaments sales." But his remark about Western arms salesmen is quite accurate; the major arms suppliers do not wish to miss the opportunity to take part in the glorious adventure in East Timor, where
Indonesian arms supplies have been virtually exhausted in a war against 600 scattered men. In April 1978 British Aerospace signed a contract with Indonesia for Hawk ground-attack/ trainer aircraft, well-designed for counterinsurgency. The French Foreign Minister, on a visit to Jakarta in September 1978, reported plans for substantial armaments sales, adding in response to a query that France would not place Indonesia in an embarrassing position in any manner at the United Nations (Le Monde, September 14 1978). The announcement that France too will join in the torture of East Timor aroused no great indignation in France, to my knowledge. The Carter Administration, meanwhile, had requested a sizable increase in military assistance to Indonesia for fiscal 1978 (New York Times, July 17 1977).

To conclude this survey, let us turn to the Human Rights Reports of the State Department. In the March 1977 Report, covering the period when Indonesia launched its murderous attack, there is no mention whatsoever of Timor. The omission is rectified in the 1978 Report, which deals with allegations of genocide in Timor as follows, in toto:

Questions have been raised concerning atrocities by Indonesian troops in East Timor in 1975 and 1976 prior to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. The Indonesian Government withdrew and disciplined offending units guilty of individual excesses, but most of the human losses in East Timor appear to have occurred prior to Indonesia's intervention.

The final statement is a disgraceful falsehood. No less disgraceful is the refusal even to concede that questions have been raised concerning atrocities after July 1976, let alone to consider the substantial evidence supporting the allegations that there have been massive atrocities and that the U.S. government is participating in them and that with the complicity of the press, it is concerned to bury the issue as quickly and completely as possible.

The fact that the State Department Report "was gentle
on alleged atrocities in East Timor, asserting that most lives were lost before Indonesia's intervention in the former Portuguese colony" was reported in the New York Times (February 10 1978). Neither the reporter nor the editors commented on the glaring falsity of this claim or the significance of the State Department cover-up, nor did they mention that the Carter Administration had been stepping up military aid to Indonesia.

The United Nations have repeatedly called upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from East Timor so that the people of the Territory will be able "freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence." The most crucial vote was the one that immediately followed the Indonesian invasion. The United States abstained. In a cablegram of January 23 1976 entitled "The Blocs are Breaking Up," then UN Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan took pride in the "considerable progress" that had been made by U.S. tactics at the UN "toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums..." He specifically cited the General Assembly vote on Timor, when "the non-aligned were similarly divided in the voting." This division and the U.S. abstention were significant. As Professor Thomas Franck of New York University Law School testified before Congress, it "sent a clear signal to Indonesia that the United Nations lacked the political will to oppose Djakarta's action and that the United States would turn a deaf ear to the demands of the East Timorese to be accorded the benefits of the firmly established international normative right of self-determination."

The subsequent record shows that this assessment is accurate. I will not review the UN record, but will merely note that two years later, the United States voted against a UN General Assembly resolution calling on the UN Special
Committee on Decolonization to send a mission to the Territory. This vote again was significant, in the light of the fact that Indonesia was preparing for a new military offensive at that time. The United States was joined by Japan and other countries which, as the Christian Science Monitor reported, "seek close political and economic ties with Indonesia" (December 8 1977).

The latter comment is, of course, crucial. The economic advantages offered by good relations with Indonesia explain why the outside world has been intent on burying the tragedy of East Timor, which continues to unfold, quickly and completely.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

I will conclude these remarks by offering a comparison which, I believe, gives some insight into the ways in which the mass media in the West "contribute effectively to promoting human rights," in the words of the UNESCO declaration. The period of alleged Indonesian atrocities in East Timor is late 1975 to the present. The evidence derived from neutral or even pro-Indonesian and anti-FRETILIN sources suggests that the numbers slaughtered in this period may be in the neighborhood of 50-100,000. There is, of course, another country in the region where major atrocities have been alleged in exactly the same time frame, namely, Cambodia, where the harshest critics claim that perhaps 100,000 people have been slaughtered since April 1975. In addition, it is alleged by the same critics that perhaps a million have died from starvation and disease, but although the Western press is careful to hide the fact, such deaths are chargeable in significant measure to the American account. Comparing East Timor and Cambodia, we see that the time frame of alleged atrocities is the same, the numbers allegedly slaughtered are roughly comparable in absolute terms, and five to ten times as high in East Timor relative to the population. Furthermore, the evidence is quite comparable; I have reviewed both cases
in considerable detail and my own conclusion is that the sources in the case of East Timor are more credible than those that have received massive international publicity in the case of Cambodia, though there are of course fewer sources in the case of East Timor, since the West prefers silence and apologetics.

We have here two paired examples of comparable allegations concerning major violations of human rights. For Westerners concerned with human rights, the case of East Timor is, obviously, of vastly greater significance. Whatever the situation may be in Cambodia, it is beyond the reach of Western human rights activists. But the case of East Timor is radically different. Even a show of displeasure by the great power that provided 90% of the arms for the Indonesian invasion and that continues to provide Indonesia with material and diplomatic support for its depredations while laboring to conceal them would be likely to have significant effects, and the same is true of the other powers that are working to bury the issue as quickly and completely as possible as they seek to join in the bloodshed by supplying arms themselves. For Westerners who speak of human rights out of genuine moral concern, then, it is quite obvious that the case of East Timor should be the focus of far greater attention than alleged atrocities in Cambodia.

It is instructive, therefore, to compare the Western reaction to these two cases of reported atrocities. In the case of Cambodia, stories of atrocities and repression have not only been eagerly seized upon by the Western media and offered massive international publicity, but also embellished by substantial fabrication, a fact that is well-documented. In the case of Timor, in dramatic contrast, the media have shown no interest in discovering or exposing what may have happened; quite the contrary. Apart from Australia, there has been near total silence. On the rare occasions when the press deals with Timor it generally presents as fact the latest handout of the Indonesian propaganda agencies or the State
Department, or else reports the iniquity of the resistance, which is forcing people to live under its control.

The difference in international reaction is revealing. Specifically, it reveals how empty and hypocritical is much of the "human rights" clamor in the West. It teaches us something about the meaning of the sudden concern for "human rights" that has moved to stage center just at the moment when the lustre of classical colonialist and interventionist ideologies has dimmed.

The nations of the world and honest journalists in free societies need not adhere to these practices and doctrines. They can demand that the International Red Cross, UN observers and independent journalists be admitted to East Timor, and that the flow of arms to Indonesia be halted, so that the invaders will be forced to cease their savage attacks and the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination may finally be exercised.
3. FRETILIN soldier (1975).
The FRETILIN representative in Luanda was quoted by the Angolan agency, Angop, yesterday as telling a news conference that the guerrilla struggle against Indonesia would continue whatever happened. Mr. Roque Rodrigues, a member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, alleged that US pilots and advisors were fighting on the Indonesian side, and criticized France and West Germany for supplying helicopters and submarines to Indonesia. But he said that FRETILIN forces, celebrating the fifth anniversary of their struggle, still controlled about 85 per cent of East Timor.

STATEMENT DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION, 16 AUGUST 1979

by ROQUE RODRIGUES

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

On behalf of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and the people of East Timor, I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the distinguished delegates of this Committee for this opportunity given to my delegation to address this Committee.
The history of East Timor and the struggle for national self-determination of our people is already known to members of this Committee. Documents abound that can offer an excellent historical background of East Timor. For this reason, we shall refrain from repeating what has been said here in this Committee in order to save time for other useful purposes. It is clear to everyone that Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor was a breach of the United Nations charter and international law. Indonesia's arguments for its intervention in East Timor are the very same arguments used by other colonial expansionist and racist regimes to justify armed aggression and military occupation of other people's lands, be they in Africa, the Middle East or Asia. The people of East Timor have the right and ought to be granted the opportunity to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence. Indonesia's continuing armed aggression and occupation of East Timor constitute an impediment to the full implementation of Resolution 1514 and other General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the question of East Timor. As a matter of fact, Indonesia has not complied with the four General Assembly and two Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor.

It has been almost four years since the Government of Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor with many thousands of troops, airplanes, helicopters, tanks, and warships. In the course of this savage war of aggression, more than 10 per cent of the entire East Timor's population has been killed. However, the war of national liberation and resistance against foreign domination has continued unabated in East Timor. In spite of overwhelming odds, lack of material support from third countries, serious shortage of medical supplies and clothing, the people of East Timor, under the leadership of FREITILIN have not succumbed to Indonesia's attempted annexation.
Indonesia is spending almost a half million dollars a day on the war in East Timor. Several thousand Indonesians have been killed or wounded. In the meantime, Indonesia is experiencing a serious economic, social and political crisis. There is starvation in many parts of Indonesia. Unemployment is at about 30 per cent. Corruption is widespread and has become an institution and a means of survival for many millions of Indonesians. The Central Committee of FRETILIN is fully aware that the war in East Timor might continue for many years to come. The people of East Timor are prepared for this war. One thing is certain however: time is on our side. Just as the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with all his imperial might was crushed by a simple popular uprising by unarmed people, the regime of General Suharto and his corrupt and repressive clique of generals will follow the Shah's fate. Whatever military and economic aid that the Western countries - particularly the USA - might give to their puppets in Jakarta will not save the regime. The Shah of the old Iran had the most powerful army in the Third World. No one in the Western capitals would have dreamed that Reza Pahlavi could be ousted by any opposition, let alone by unarmed peasants, students, workers and intellectuals. The Iran that was the so-called bastion of the "free world" in the Middle East has now been freed from Western neo-colonialism.

The international community cannot accept the politics of "fait accompli" for it would set a very serious precedent. If armed intervention and annexation are to be condoned by the United Nations, the very survival of many small States around the globe will no longer be guaranteed by the rule of law. Armed aggression, military intervention in other country's affairs, violation of colonial and established boundaries must be opposed by the international community as a whole and must be condemned. Indonesia's invasion and attempted annexation of East Timor has been a gross violation of the United Nations charter and international law and, therefore, it
INTEGRATION-NEVER AND NEVER
THE PEOPLE IS WITH FRETIL
must be condemned and opposed by member states. The failure to enforce existing international laws will set very serious precedents that will threaten the very survival of many countries in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia. No country should call upon itself the role of policeman of the world for no country can justify military incursions into the territory of other states.

Indonesia's invasion of East Timor is a clear-cut case of military aggression and attempted conquest. It has been a case in which the international community has been mocked by an arrogant power. Indonesia, a United Nations member state, has been defying the entire international community and by its actions has contributed to the sorry discredit of this organization in the eyes of millions of people around the world. It is high time for other member states to stand firm on the noble principles that inspired the creation of the United Nations Organization and to enforce its resolutions. Only by doing so, can peace and order be safeguarded.

The Central Committee of FRETILIN, and the people of East Timor, will continue their armed resistance to Indonesia's military occupation. The Central Committee of FRETILIN will not accept any cosmetic solution short of total and complete national independence. To achieve these ends, the FRETILIN military command will strike on every single Indonesian military, economic and political target. The lives of many thousands of East Timorese people - women, children and men - would not have been lost in vain. East Timor will be free, independent and sovereign.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4. FRETILIN demonstration (1975).
REFUGEES

Journal of Contemporary Asia
Stockholm 1977, Vol. 7, pp. 409-17

EXCERPTS FROM JAMES DUNN'S TALKS WITH REFUGEES IN PORTUGAL
JANUARY 1977 *

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The fact that nearly all of the refugees are supporters of UDT, and include some of that party's leaders, seemed to present an opportunity to construct a more balanced account of the events leading to the civil war which began in August 1975, of what happened in Indonesian Timor when the UDT remnants withdrew there in late September 1975, and of how and when the Indonesian military invasion began.

......

I made it clear to those with whom I spoke that I had gone to Portugal privately and did not represent the Australian Government. I also sought to make it clear to those who gave information that I was not searching for evidence to build up a case against Indonesia. ..... In the case of those Timorese who produced information of a sensational or sensitive kind, I repeatedly asked that they should not exaggerate their accounts, reminding them that the prospects of being permitted to go to Australia would not be enhanced in any way by the information they gave me. A Timorese community leader whom I regard as a balanced observer,

* MR. JAMES DUNN: Director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Australian Parliament Legislative Research Service, former Australian Consul (in the 60's) in East Timor (Editor's note).

5. FRETILIN soldiers (1975).
accompanied me on most of my visits to the refugee communities. I noted that he, too, repeatedly urged the Timorese not to exaggerate their accounts.

During my stay in Portugal I visited camps containing about 900 Timorese, and talked to perhaps 200 of them...... It should be borne in mind that, with the limited time and means at my disposal, I was hardly in a position to take precise evidence and, although I believe my notes to be generally accurate, further and more detailed questioning of the refugees would seem to be desirable.

......

I was particularly interested to talk to those Timorese who had spent some time in East Timor after the Indonesian invasion. There are probably about 25 Timorese of this category among the refugees and I talked at some length to more than half of them. Because of the importance of what they had to say, I sought to ensure that their accounts were as accurate as possible. In each case I urged them not to exaggerate or distort their stories. Without exception, however, they related stories of excesses by Indonesian troops as the latter entered towns and villages. A number of these accounts were from people who claimed to have witnessed the incidents. Others that I took note of were from sources that seemed reliable - e.g. prominent Timorese who had not been involved in the politics of East Timor, and who had not initially been strongly opposed to "integration." According to the informants, many of the Indonesian troops killed indiscriminately from the beginning of their attack on Dili. However, several prominent Timorese said that the killing in the mountain area was far more extensive than it was in Dili. In the mountain areas, they claimed, whole villages were wiped out as Indonesian troops advanced into the interior.

I was given an account of how Indonesians shot an entire family simply because they heard that the family had given a chicken to PRETILIN soldiers; of families being shot
when Indonesians discovered a FRETILIN flag in their house. According to one source the entire Chinese population of Maubara and Liquica was shot by the Indonesian troops when they entered these villages. A Timorese who said he had accompanied the Indonesians said that when the Indonesian troops captured Remexio and Aileu, all the Timorese in the village, except children under the age of three, were shot because "they were infected with the seeds of FRETILIN." An informant also told me that the Indonesians shot more than 150 men in the town of Suai (on the south coast) because they tried to prevent the Indonesian troops from interfering with their women folk.

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One refugee ...... gave the following account ......: At 2.00 p.m. (on December 7 1975) 59 men, both Chinese and Timorese, were brought onto the wharf. One was her brother-in-law, whose widow, my informant told me, is in Australia with her two children. These men were shot one by one, again with the crowd, which she believed amounted to some 500, being ordered to count. The victims were ordered to stand on the edge of the pier facing the sea, so that when they were shot their bodies fell into the water. Indonesian soldiers stood by and fired at the bodies in the water in the event that there was any further sign of life. Many of the men, and the women who had been executed earlier, had pleaded with the Indonesians, some of them on their knees, but none of the group was spared. Another informant told me that the next day the bodies were washed up on the beach opposite the Bishop's house and Timorese were subsequently ordered to remove them. These informants said that they had heard that further executions had been carried out on the wharf.

......

I asked the leaders of the refugee community whether it was conceivable that 100,000 people have been killed in East Timor. All said that this figure was credible because of the
extensive bombing (I was told that in recent months napalm was used). Many people had left the main towns and villages and were now in the mountains, in areas more or less under FRETILIN control. A Timorese said that there were, in September (1976), about 30,000 Indonesian soldiers in East Timor. The latest information related to the situation in November (1976). A Chinese, who had left Dili at that time, (he went to Portugal via Jakarta), said that with the coming of the wet season the security situation had deteriorated. Food in Dili was very scarce because supplies could not be obtained from the producing areas.

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An analysis of the information I collected from the Timorese refugees in Portugal adds considerable substance to the sketchy reports, which had been received in Australia during the past twelve months from Indonesian, Timorese-Chinese and FRETILIN sources, that the Indonesian military seizure of East Timor has been a bloody operation, in which atrocities of a disturbing nature, have been committed against the civilian population. Indeed, these accounts of Indonesia's behaviour in East Timor, suggest that the plight of these people might well constitute, relatively speaking, the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time. Reports that one sixth of the population may have been killed are impossible to assess, let alone authenticate, but the fact that such reports persist serves to highlight the magnitude of the tragedy of Timor.

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INTERVIEW WITH FATHER LEONETO VIEIRA DE REGO

by JILL JOLLIPFE

A Portuguese priest who spent three years in the mountains of East Timor with FRETILIN guerrillas says there is no sign that the population of East Timor will accept Indonesian rule, although the Indonesian military now controls most of East Timor. Father Leoneto de Rego, 63, accompanied FRETILIN forces to the mountains in July 1976, when Indonesian troops occupied the village of Soibada, where he taught at a Salesian mission school. During his three year ordeal in the bush, he travelled around Fatu Berliu, Barique, Turisca, Laclumar, Lacluta and Crias in the central south coast region.

Early this year he surrendered to Indonesian authorities at Barique, almost dead from malaria and starvation. He was then imprisoned in Baucau, on the north coast, for one month, before being allowed to return to Portugal in June. The priest said that although FRETILIN strength was greatly reduced and many FRETILIN leaders were believed to be dead, some armed resistance was continuing when he left Timor in June. He also described widespread hunger in the mountainous interior of East Timor.

Father de Rego, a shy, slightly-built man, is not the sort of person one would normally guess to be a supporter of a liberation front. He is anti-communist, but rejects accusations that FRETILIN is communist.

"Some FRETILIN boys from Dili might have been communists," he said. "But the main leaders of FRETILIN certainly weren't, let alone their followers." He said the East Timorese would never accept the occupation: "Resistance
will grow again," he said. "Indonesian control is not secure anywhere. To talk of recognizing Indonesian rule in East Timor is quite unjust. Indonesia invaded East Timor, and the country is under military occupation as surely as Europe was occupied by Nazi Germany, and Timor was occupied by Japan, during the second world war."

Indonesian authorities were herding surrendering villagers into internment camps, where the problem of hunger was aggravated: "When people first began to surrender due to hunger and lack of ammunition, Indonesian forces began to put them in centres from which travel is prohibited," he said. "This has created great difficulties, because you have many people in areas with little resources, so there is widespread hunger and old people and others of a certain age die quickly, because they can't continue - they were already starving in the bush."

After his surrender, the elderly priest was imprisoned in Bacau for a month. He was interrogated five times by Indonesian security police, but not beaten. He was given half a mug of cooked rice a day. He said the prison was full with "hundreds" of East Timorese accused of supporting FRETILIN. Their cases were not being heard in court, although written records of interrogation were kept.

Father de Rego said the ... situation in the south coast areas where he travelled was better than in many other areas, where food resources were scarcer and the death toll could be higher. Hunger first became a problem in late 1977, when Indonesian attacks intensified. At this time FRETILIN had a civil administration, with schools, hospitals and regular central committee meetings. The Timorese Escudo was used as currency in liberated zones, rather than the Indonesian Rupiah, and local bazaars functioned as they had in pre-war times.

The course of the war changed in August 1977 when Indonesian aircraft attacked FRETILIN's national defence headquarters between Laclubar and Lacluta. After the attack
FRETILIN abandoned a centralized military command in favour of regional commands throughout East Timor. From that time Indonesian "search and destroy" offensives forced the population to flee from one area to another without being able to plant crops.

He had not seen chemical defoliants used in any attacks in his area, and did not think they caused the famine. Indonesian forces were mainly using conventional weapons, although he had heard of tear-gas being used, and observed the results of what he thought may have been napalm, dropped on some property. The Indonesian change to the use of small jet bombers soon after the war began had increased their efficiency, he added.

The decline in the resistance in 1978 was due to hunger, and lack of medicines and arms supplies. FRETILIN guerrillas were still using the Portuguese arms they had when the war began, although FRETILIN leaders had constantly hoped that China, Mozambique or the Australian Labor Party might send them fresh arms or at least humanitarian aid.
6. The alphabetization campaign organized by FRETILIN in 1975, before the invasion.
LETTERS SMUGGLED OUT OF TIMOR

Timor Information Service, No.24, April 1978

LETTER FROM A CATHOLIC PRIEST, WRITTEN IN OCTOBER 1977

In East Timor, the violence of these "friends," the Indonesians, continue to intensify, with all sorts of dire consequences. A barbarous genocide of innocent people goes on, apparently with complete peace of conscience. The Timorese have not taken any steps to declare themselves independent from Indonesia, and they did not attack Indonesia, for Timor was not part of Indonesia. But now Timor is being wiped out by an invasion, a brutal conquest that produces heaps of dead, maimed and orphaned. Consciences are kept at peace by claiming, with or without reason, that the people of Timor are "communists." In this conflict in which we are all involved, I hardly hear any questioning of the supposed justice of the initial attack, or of the present continuation of the war. All I hear expressed is the regret that the Timorese are not recognized as "communists," and the apparent report that they are strong, courageous and prepared to die rather than give themselves up to the conquerer. Even if they were communists, they would have a right to live.

That is why I ask you to pray a lot. There are many attacks - and many dead. Of course many die on the Indonesian side also.

It seems that starting in December (1977), Timor will
become a practice area for the use of mortars. Thereafter, the Indonesians will wash their hands of the whole thing by declaring a general amnesty. Please ask the communities to pray hard for these people.

The whole series of events has simply been a manoeuvre, prepared long ago, to conquer these people and annex them. Two years ago, the Indonesians lent support to one of the parties in Timor. Then they attacked because, they claimed, the Timorese government was communist. Thereupon they annexed them, and from that moment on, they have considered the Timorese as being in rebellion against "legitimate authority."

Today is October 13 (1977), the 60th anniversary of the apparition of Our Lady of Fatima. May the Immaculate Heart of Mary accept in reparation the sufferings of these poor people who are defending themselves and their homeland, and also the sufferings of those sent to kill them.

...... and do not forget these people. Pray also for the people of Indonesia. It is very sad to see the lack of concern here, given the heavy responsibility that falls on them. We will have a new bishop soon in Timor. The present one cannot take it anymore. He is tired. He sees everything reduced to ashes; all the values are shattered, and Christian family life is destroyed...... Pray, pray hard for the Timorese.

It will not be easy to write again......
LETTER FROM A RESIDENT IN DILI

published by KEN FRY

Tell my son that for nothing on this earth should he return to Timor. I would rather die without seeing him again than to know that he had returned to this hell.

Dili, however, presents a picture of war, mourning and pain. In the middle of October, the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta visited Dili and celebrated an open air Mass in one of the main squares of the city. Thousands of people from the city and surrounding areas attended the Mass, looking for spiritual comfort. It would certainly have been difficult to find some one from amongst all of these people who had not had a relative killed, or unheard of, or a prisoner in one of the Indonesian dungeons. The ceremony was responsible for a great wave of emotion to evolve, made manifest in the tears, the cries, and in the sobbing of the orphans, the widows, and the forsaken, so much so that the Mass was interrupted for a quarter of an hour.

Timor is no longer Timor; it is nothing but an oppressed worm. In the villages occupied by the Indonesians, even the most basic foodstuffs are unavailable; salaries were reduced to less than a third of those paid by the Portuguese Government, the highest salaries do not even amount to 50,000 rupias, which is less than four contos in Portuguese currency.

A continuously-increasing violent war rages in Timor. The group of villages in which I lived has been completely destroyed. There is not one soul there. I myself am in Dili and I have gone many days without having lunch. These are the
effects of war. But there are people who are worse off than I. I have been sick several times and at death's door for want of medication. The cost of living in Dili is very high and the salaries are very low. One sees no one else but Indonesian soldiers and Chinese on the streets of Dili; there are very few Timorese for the majority is either in the forest, dead or in jail. The luck of Timor is to be born in tears, to live in tears and to die in tears. It would, perhaps, be more appropriate to say that one does not cry for one has no more tears to shed for Timor is no longer Timor; it is nothing but an oppressed worm.......

The majority of Government personnel has been sent to Jakarta in order to learn Malayan or the administrative practices of Indonesia. And in the meantime, their wives, who have been left behind are systematically raped by the Indonesian soldiers who do as they please, taking no heed of their superior officers.

The people are crying because they are fed up with demagogy. We are in a dead-end street because we have no one to help us. Do not believe the news you might hear that everything has returned to normal and that progress has set in here. The only truth is that a curtain has been hung to close the mouth of the world.

Is the free world going to continue to pretend to ignore the drama of Timor? And will we have to go on watching the sad sight of the Government of our country shaking off the shackles of responsibility? Let there be at least a little respect for the suffering of so many innocent people!
EAST TIMOR OFFICIALS

Timor Information Service, No.9-10, May 1976

JOSE MARTINS, LEADER OF THE KOTA PARTY,
EXPLAINS HIS DEFECTION FROM THE PRO-INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION

His Excellency,
The Secretary General,

Excellency,

On the 16th of December 1975, I addressed the Security Council of the United Nations as President of the KOTA party. I was requested to do so by the permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, in connection with the item "The Situation in East Timor."

I was a member of a three man delegation. The others were Mr. Guilherme Gonçalves and Mr. Mario Carrascalão, as representatives of APODETI and UDT respectively. Our parties were in a coalition opposing the FRETILIN movement.

I came in December not as a free man. I was forced, like the others then, as a prisoner, to read what the Indonesians had written. Now I am a free man. I do not wish to give details of how I managed to escape from the evil Indonesian hands. I have been entrusted by my people in East Timor to tell the truth of the situation.
I am writing to Your Excellency as President of KOTA party and as an East Timorese who has witnessed and experienced Indonesian bloody intervention in East Timor which has already cost many thousands of lives.

My views reflect the feelings and sufferings of my countrymen and women who are now struggling for self-determination and the independence of East Timor. Those who like me were forced to cross the border into Indonesian territory are prisoners and realize now the evil nature of the Indonesian military. The very moment we entered Indonesian territory in the first week of September 1975, fleeing from advancing FRETILIN forces, we became instruments of the Indonesian government. The dismembered leadership of APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista soon realized that while looking for "freedom" we fell into the hands of the Indonesian military.

With the leaders about 10,000 people also entered into Indonesian territory. I wish to stress the fact that while the Indonesian authorities claimed that over 40,000 East Timorese sought refuge in West Timor, the real figure was no more than 20,000. It is also necessary to stress that these people did not flee to Indonesian territory because they wanted to join Indonesia. They were just looking for a safe place until they could return to their homes. But they also fell into the hands of the Indonesian authorities; they soon realized that while seeking peace they found only maltreatment and misery. The refugees were either forced to take military training and fight against FRETILIN or to work without pay for the Indonesians. Their belongings were confiscated, such as money, jewelry and so on. Obviously, the Indonesian government was using the "40,000 refugees" as a political weapon against FRETILIN. This was also a trick to get funds and aid from the International Red Cross and foreign governments!

The Declaration of Integration in Indonesia: This is a farce! The Declaration of Integration of East Timor into Indonesia was a farce because it was made in Bali in Indonesia
on December 2, 1975. While FRETILIN made the unilateral declaration of independence of East Timor on November 28, 1975 in Dili, the capital of the territory, our "Anti-Communist Movement" declared "integration" some 1000 kilometers away in Bali, in the luxurious Peneda View Hotel which belongs to Colonel Suglanto, General Ali Moortopo's assistant. It was a real farce, the whole thing, without a mandate of our people.

The Invasion of Dili: On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian Government ordered the invasion of Dili. Fifteen "Hercules" aircraft carrying "red berets" headed for East Timor; nine landed in Dili and six in Bacau. Warships also landed hundreds of marines in two places. After the fall of Dili a puppet "Provisional Government" was set up. The minority APODETI party was in prominence. The other parties were banned. Many thousands of people, including supporters of KOTA, UDT and APODETI, were machine-gunned. Houses were sacked. The Indonesian soldiers took away everything they could find: refrigerators, fans, beds, windows, cars, bicycles and so on. Leaders of the pro-Indonesian parties were deeply shocked by such behaviour. Even the long-term supporters of the "integration" were disillusioned and many are now openly opposing Indonesian presence in the territory. The so-called Provisional Government is a one man band. Arnaldo Araujo is the only one who is still loyal to the Indonesians.

Excellency, I do not wish to make further comments on the subject, as I understand that during the various Security Council sessions, the FRETILIN representative made a lengthy report concerning the situation in the territory. However, I am available if Your Excellency wishes to learn more details about what has happened in East Timor. As President of the KOTA party, but above all as an East Timorese, I appeal to Your Excellency to use your good offices to end the Indonesian presence in East Timor. I must assure Your Excellency
that all parties in East Timor are anxious to stop the fighting and to reconcile. Therefore I believe that the Indonesian forces must withdraw and let the United Nations mediate and organize observers, including the Indonesian government. If the Indonesian forces do not withdraw immediately, many people will continue to die each day.

Cordially yours,
(Hand-written signature)
José Martins, President of KOTA

Indonesian TEMPO, 8 July 1978
English translation in TAPOL-USA, No.16, November 1978

INTERVIEW WITH GUILHERME A. GONÇALVES
HEAD OF THE EAST TIMOR PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY

Two years after integration with the Republic of Indonesia, an almost normal atmosphere has finally been restored in East Timor. This situation is symbolized by the first planned visit by President Suharto to the 27th province on July 16 and 17. The President is to inaugurate a number of development projects and also to open a commercial air connection to Dili. Various ministers, including Coordinating Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs Widjojo Nitisastro and Minister of Defence General Jusuf, visited East Timor last month to make preparations for the visit by the head of State. Beforehand, Minister of Information Ali Murtopo told Antara news agency that the Garuda airlines company would
connect Dili with other regions of Indonesia. Furthermore, East Timor will be opened up for visits, and no longer closed as it is now.

The Garuda people themselves do not yet know precisely when regular flights to Dili will start. "But if asked, Garuda is ready to do the job," said R.A.J. Lumenta, Secretary of the Garuda Corporation. Does Garuda see this new air route as commercially profitable? "Garuda sees good prospects wherever there is development," said Lumenta.

And indeed, development is being kindled in this youngest of our provinces. Last month Governor Araujo delivered central government aid via Inpres for the first time ever to the bupatis (administrators) of the region. On the eve of the President's visit it seems that this type of development is being still more actively pursued.

But overall how far is East Timor on the road to development? There may be some advantage in listening to views outside official circles in the province. On the eve of the President's visit, Tempo succeeded in meeting with Guilherme A. Gonçalves (aged 59), head of the East Timor Provincial Assembly.

Formerly well-known as the Liurai (ruler) of Atsaba, ex-chairman of APODETI, he has been in Jakarta these last two months for treatment of a heart condition. He admitted that the government apparatus does not fully function in the way it does in other provinces; yet the Assembly he heads is still trying to exercise its corrective rights, including the issuing of resolutions denouncing the present corruption in Dili. Here are some excerpts from this interview with Tempo reporter George Y. Adicondro.

TEMPO: It has been announced that East Timor will participate in the forthcoming Third Five Year Plan. Are the preparations over there ripe?

GONÇALVES: There must first be peace and calm among the people. As of now the people can only get on with their jobs in places where our troops are concentrated, such as
Dili, Same or Maliana. This is not because FRETIMIL strength is so impressive, and it's also not because our troops move too slowly. But one or two FRETIMIL people, operating on their own, can cause confusion and spread fear among the people. Very often small gangs of FRETIMIL terrorists emerge not to fight, but simply to steal food from the people.

TEMPO: Aside from the question of security, is the provincial governmental apparatus ready to participate in the Third Five Year Plan?

GONÇALVES: Is our provincial government capable of channeling the aspirations of the people? A hard question to answer. Jakarta has already "dropped" so much money in for East Timor, but on the eve of the Third Five Year Plan, it is essential that the central government secure better guarantees that this money will truly be used for the welfare of the people of Timor.

TEMPO: What is the best way to find out what the aspirations of the people are now that political parties no longer exist there?

GONÇALVES: In Timor political parties are still something quite new, only emerging after the revolution in Portugal. But as for right now, the aspirations of the people can be determined via the liurai (rulers) and the whole traditional structure underneath them. The simple people usually have higher respect for traditional rulers whom they know rather well. And after all, the liurai cannot take decisions on their own. They have to have the agreement of the ethnic group heads below them. A liurai can be deposed from his office if his policy is opposed by the ethnic group heads.

Right now, the ethnic group heads who are elected by the knua (clan) heads, have to justify their policies to the various groupings within the ethnic group. And so on down to the heads of families. Even in the Portuguese period, even though there was a colonial structure represented by the administrators (bupatis) or chefes de posto (district-
officers), the success or failure of the policy of the Governor of Dili depended on the support of the traditional leaders. Right now, only 7 liurai sit in the East Timor Provincial Assembly. Before the war there were 35 liurai, but many have disappeared, have been killed or perhaps are being held by FRETILIN in the jungle.

TEMPO: What about the economic situation?

GONÇALVES: As a matter of fact, commerce has once again generally fallen under the domination of Chinese traders, who have been on top ever since the Portuguese period. The problem is that the Timorese have no capital. Most lost all their property in the civil war. What is then left that can be used as collateral for borrowing capital from the banks? The result is that they cannot compete successfully with the Chinese traders.

TEMPO: What about the coffee trade?

GONÇALVES: I don't really understand the mechanism by which the coffee monopoly works. But if the coffee trading monopoly is held by civilians, I fear that the consequences will be still worse. People will fight each other to harvest the coffee in other people's gardens, not in their own.

Canberra Times, 27 November 1979

ARNALDO DE ARAUJO, FORMER GOVERNOR OF EAST TIMOR,
REPORTS TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO

by JILL JOLLIFFE

A report written to Indonesia's President Suharto by Mr. Arnaldo de Araujo, former Governor of East Timor, has
thrown light on Indonesia's 1975 invasion of the former Portuguese colony. Mr. de Araujo, who was dismissed by the the Indonesian Government last year, accused Indonesia of treating his Government as a "puppet government" and charged Indonesian troops with looting and indiscriminate killing. He also warned, only six months after the invasion, of the possibility of a food crisis if urgent steps were not taken.

The report was written in June 1976, and later smuggled to East Timorese refugees in Portugal. The refugees have only agreed to its publication after lengthy negotiations, fearing reprisals against those in Timor who obtained the document. Mr. de Araujo's dismissal reportedly followed continued friction between him and the Indonesian Army. The report bears the seal of the Indonesian Government's provisional administration of East Timor. The author complains that his Government is completely subordinate to the Indonesian Army. The report said the Indonesian military in East Timor placed no confidence in the provisional government, which had no authority to deal with it and was thus a puppet government.

Mr. de Araujo said that some Timorese had greeted the Indonesian troops as liberators, but their support had changed to opposition when they had begun killing supporters of the then pro-Indonesian UDT and APODETI parties. "We were even more alienated as events progressed because no leaders of FREtilIN were imprisoned, while those of APODETI or UDT, some were vilely massacred, others detained and taken to unknown destinations," Mr. de Araujo said. Mr. de Araujo accused Indonesian soldiers of systematic looting: "We concede that the looting of private business, government offices and the State treasury could be due to emotions of war, but it is difficult to understand why it continues six months after, leaving everybody in a state of cruel insecurity, that they may lose the little of their savings which have escaped from
foreign hands," he said. Speaking of the distress of war victims, Mr. de Araujo, an APODETI leader, warned that since the Indonesian invasion no attempt had been made to resume agricultural production in Indonesia-controlled areas.

"From December 1975, the people of Timor have only been consumers: circumstances demand that we guarantee the security of agricultural workers in zones under our control," he said. "The soil must be prepared now for the planting of the second crop of corn, etc. Day and night, at my home and office, widows, orphans, children and cripples come begging for milk and clothing. I can do nothing but join my tears to theirs, because the provisional Government owns nothing."

Mr. de Araujo protests to Mr. Suharto about Indonesian takeover of formerly local business, corruption, the use of Indonesian as an official language when it is not understood by most of the population, and the forcible occupation of private houses by Indonesian soldiers. "In Dili 130 business houses have already reopened," he wrote, "but none are under the control of their previous owners, or of Timorese people, and are causing inflation of around 500 to 1,000 per cent. The articles displayed raise many doubts about their origins."

Of the use of the Indonesian language, he notes: "Instructions have been given to write all official documents in Bahasa Indonesian or Tetum. This means the signatory is sometimes compelled by artifice, or by translations bearing little resemblance to the original, to sign documents of social or economic importance which carry serious responsibility." Of the housing crisis, Mr. de Araujo wrote: "The military continues to use private houses, leaving the barracks of the former colonial army vacant, and we have to take into consideration that thousands of refugees are still living in schools, government offices and clinics."

Mr. de Araujo made a number of proposals to Mr. Suharto, which he says could improve relations between the East
Timorese and the Indonesian Army. They include the use of the Portuguese language for internal official correspondence, and the permanent transfer of four Indonesian officials - Mr. A. Sugianto, Mr. Mohamad, Mr. Ibnu Harjani and Mr. Luis Taolin - to Dili, on the ground that they have good relations with the local people.

Mr. de Araujo was replaced as Governor by Mr. Guilherme Gonçalves, also an APODETI leader. At the time of his dismissal last year (1978) he was offered a seat in the Indonesian Parliament, which he accepted after some hesitation.
A TIMORESE IN INDONESIA

Le Monde, 22 September 1979
Translation: Torben Retbøll

INTERVIEW WITH AN ANONYMOUS TIMORESE (Excerpts)

by PATRICE DE BEER

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One Timorese, who supports Indonesia, gave us a rather
desperate image of his country. "It is the most corrupt
province of the country. We lack everything, and with regard
to food and sanitation the situation is catastrophic. Much of
what is sent here never arrives." He recounted to us that he
had been invited by the Governor to visit an agricultural
school outside the capital Dili: "Once we got there, we dis-
covered that it had been closed for several months."

Having assured us that "the FRETILIN is in disorder,"
he admitted that "there are still several thousands of
rebels." "I cannot go all by myself in my car," he added.
"The people who surrender hide their weapons. Perhaps they
intend to use them later on, if the situation does not be-
come better." East Timor, the poorest province of Indonesia,
does seem to have benefited as little from three and a half
years of annexation as from four centuries of Portuguese
colonialism!

......
INDONESIAN RELIEF WORKERS IN TIMOR

Tribune, (Australia), 1 December 1976

A CONFIDENTIAL REPORT LEAKED TO THE PRESS*

1. THE PRIEST

There are 31 priests in East Timor. 15 Native priests, 16 priests of foreign nationalities. Note: 2 Portuguese, 1 Italian and 3 native priests are known to be held by FRETILIN in the mountain. Nobody knows about their well being.

Whether priests of foreign nationalities will stay and work in East Timor is an open question but it is believed that some priests will leave for Portugal.

2. THE PEOPLE

One third of the population had been baptized Catholic. The rest, however, claimed themselves to be Catholic. At the moment many ask to be baptized because they heard in the other parts of Indonesia, everybody must have a religion.

3. DILLI

The total town people of Dilli is 30,000. 20,000 of them have now registered themselves for passage to Portugal. Others are with the FRETILIN in the mountains so that in fact the real town people of Dilli numbers only a couple of

* Spelling errors are reproduced as in the original (Editor's note).
thousands not counting the Indonesian soldiers.

4. POLITICAL SITUATION

All villages and towns in East Timor are occupied by the Indonesian military forces. Beyond the villages and towns there is no main land. And the safety is not guaranted because of the FRETILIN raids. The total population of villages and towns occupied by the Indonesian forces amounts to 150,000 people. Taking the total population of East Timor of 650,000 people into consideration it means that 500,000 people is not under their control.

Land communication has been disrupted. The only means of transportation is helicopter or sea route. About the territory: 80% of the population is not under direct control of the Indonesian military forces.

5. DEAD TOLL

According to report, 60,000 people had been killed during the war. We found this figure rather high, because it means 10% of the total population of East Timor. But when I asked two Fathers in Dilli they replied that according to their estimate the figure of people killed may reach to 100,000.

6. POLITICAL PARTIES

As Dilli sees it: * 25% are members of FRETILIN. (But the top leaders who are the real Communists are only 20-30 in numbers. They all came from the Lisbon University in Portugal). * 40-50% are UDT (Democratic Party). *20-25% are APODETI. When the FRETILIN came into force the UDT and APODETI joined together for integration with Indonesia. The FRETILIN was at that time an independent party although most of their leaders are Communists. Later it became real Commu-

7. INTEGRATION

The desire to integrate with Indonesia is beginning to cool off because of bad experience with the occupying forces. (stealing, robbery, burning houses, violating girls, etc.)
An example: 5,000 people welcome the Indonesian troops in Amaru (Demonstration for integration). Now there are only 100 people in Amaru, others have joined the FRETILIN in the mountains. If this is an exceptional case, then it will not be so bad, but if this is a symptom of the real situation, than it is very bad.

8. REHABILITATION

At present it is very difficult to start rehabilitation program because the people we intended to help are still in the mountains. A teacher school might be an important subject but there are no pupils or only a very few. The other possibility that looks promising is the language course. Father da Costa plans to open the language course in September or December. But the house that Father da Costa has kept ready for the course was taken by the military.

9. THE GOVERNMENT

The East Timor Government is without any authority. It is only a puppet government for the military commander. The new Governor promised to build a big new mosque for the few Moslem in Dilli. Before the war their number was about 300. Now there are a lot of Moslem soldiers.

10. THE FRETILIN

It appeared that the FRETILIN has changed its tactics to win the people. They treated the people well now and do not offend them in their believe. They tried to keep their discipline high. The FRETILIN soldiers are cultivating land now and make gardens. Some comments heard in passing: "In the FRETILIN there are Communists, but among the Indonesian troops there are more Communists." - "There are good people in the Indonesian troops, but many of them are bad soldiers." - "If there should be held a real referendum people will choose FRETILIN."

11. WEAPON

It is rumored that Indonesia will start using napalm, because they cannot win the war otherwise......
12. THE FRETIILIN STRATEGY

They evade frontal attack or engagement with the Indonesian troops, or raid village where there are Indonesian troops. They employ guerrilla war pattern. When they are out on raid for food and material they often send mothers with children, followed by older people then young villagers and at the rear the FRETIILIN, as much as six or ten. The FRETIILIN keep watch while the villagers steal and rob. The FRETIILIN has access to the sea on the south coast facing Australia. It is rumored that they got supply (men and material) from Australia.

13. DOMESTIC REFUGEES

The domestic refugees are farmers from the border region in Timor Indonesia. They fled their home because of the frequent FRETIILIN raids. They lost their houses and gardens and live in a very poor shelter. The help the Indonesia given to them is poorly managed.

14. ACTION FOR HELP

The Indonesian government helps with thousand tons of rice. The East Timor refugees received dish money. Rp. 100 per person per day. But the help for the domestic refugees is far from satisfying with many leakages. As afar as we could we try to help the people by conducting a rehabilitation program. We have the following program on our schedule: Repairing 13 furfuson tractors, to be used in the Maliana plain, for food production. We have already contacted Misereor for help. Purchasing 200 ton corn seeds for next year planting time. We have already made contact with German Veritas Vereni for this program. Repairing printing machine in Dilli. Our contact for this matter is LPPS and CRS Jakarta. To solve land transportation problem we need two trucks. Request for help has been sent to Misereor. We like to have representatives in the rehabilitation area. Request for help was sent to CRS. In the meantime our help for the refugees - both the East Timor and the domestic refugees - still continues.
INDONESIAN OFFICIALS

Timor Information Service, No.20-21, October 1977

PUBLICATION OF A PRIVATE LETTER
FROM A HIGHLY PLACED INDONESIAN OFFICIAL, DATED JULY 1977

Reliable sources have told me that the living conditions of the East Timorese population in areas under Indonesian control are gradually deteriorating—especially in the basics such as food, clothing and medicines. In some of the FREtilin-controlled areas, the food situation might be a little better but clothing and medicines are most likely even worse. Indonesian Red Cross aid is often not accepted by East Timorese because that would be a sign of collaboration with the Indonesians.

Except for the border area around Balibo and Bobonaro, the countryside is accessible only to the military. People are getting weaker because of poor living conditions in the Indonesian-controlled areas. Fear and anti-Indonesian feelings are increasing. I have heard of East Timorese leaving the mountains to live in Indonesian-controlled areas but after a short time, they return to the mountains.
STATEMENT DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION, AUGUST 25, 1978

by PURBO SUGIARTO
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA

Mr. Chairman,

The position of Indonesia with regard to East Timor was explained at length during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. My delegation has nothing to add. The decolonization process in East Timor was terminated in July 1976. It is not the intention of my delegation to respond to the nonsensical allegations made by Mr. Ramos-Horta*. However, my delegation would like to avail itself of this opportunity to inform the Committee briefly of the latest development efforts undertaken in the province of East Timor.

Since integration with the Republic of Indonesia two years ago, many significant developments have occurred.

Order has been restored and peace prevails in the territory. In this context I should like to point out that remnants of the so-called Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FREtilIN) and thousands of innocent people forced to join them have availed themselves of President Suharto's offer of amnesty and returned to their communities. The so-called FREtilIN no longer exists in East Timor. The available reports filed by visitors and foreign correspondents who have travelled in the territory bear witness to the fact that internal peace and security have been restored in the province.

The President of Indonesia accompanied by Mrs. Suharto, the heads of various diplomatic missions, eight cabinet

* MR. RAMOS-HORTA: Representative of FREtilIN (Editor's note).
ministers, thirty domestic newsmen and sixteen foreign correspondents, arrived in Dili on 16 July, the second anniversary of the integration of East Timor with Indonesia, and he was greeted by thousands of people waving red and white flags.

In Dili, the President addressed a special session of the Regional House of Representatives and received a progress report from the Governor of East Timor. Later, President Suharto visited Maliana in the Bobonaro Regency, a mountainous region in the western portion of East Timor 160 kilometers from Dili to formalize the start of the construction of an irrigation project.

It should also be noted that the restoration of security in the region has been due to the direct participation of the people of East Timor. Not only have East Timorese youths, including former "FRETIILIN" rebels, surrendered and joined the civil defence to help in promoting security and stability in their villages, but many of them have also enlisted in the national Army. Two battalions composed mainly of former "FRETIILIN" rebels were recently commissioned.

East Timor has been administered in precisely the same manner as all other Indonesian provinces. The people of East Timor have equal status and rights of citizenship with other Indonesian nationals, along with equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedom without discrimination. They also have equal rights and opportunities for representation in executive, judicial and legislative bodies both on a regional and national level.

Touching on the welfare of the people, their condition as a whole has been greatly improved. In an effort designed to spur economic development, the Indonesian House of Representatives allocated for fiscal year 1977-1978 a budget of 3,550.00 million Indonesian rupiah for rehabilitation and development projects. Also, 2,500 million rupiah were allocated for the routine budget and 2,937 million rupiah
from Presidential Aid Funds; therefore the total expenditure for East Timor for the fiscal year 1977-1978 was 8,937 million rupiahs. This forms an integral part of the overall Indonesian National Five Year Development Plan and is aimed at the goal of placing East Timor on a par with the other provinces of Indonesia in the shortest possible time.

A budget of 3,500 million rupiahs has been allocated for development projects for the fiscal year 1978-1979. Like the budget of 1977-1978, the above cited allocation for development is to be supplemented by the routine budget and by Presidential Aid Funds. For the 1978-1979 budget, a combined allocation of 10,500 million rupiahs, or $25.3 million, has been approved. The efforts of the central government in this area have been supplemented by assistance rendered by the other provinces of Indonesia as gestures of national solidarity. It should also be noted that employment in the province has risen substantially and that thousands of East Timorese are working in the development projects.

Substantial progress has been made also in food production, education and health care, as well as in other areas. Advancement has also been made in the field of agriculture and crop yields this year are expected to surpass the levels of previous years. In order to make East Timor self-sufficient in food production, the central government is constructing a dam and irrigation system at Maliana in the Bobonaro Regency which will have the capacity to irrigate 42,000 acres of rice fields. Upon completion of the irrigation project, Maliana will be able to produce an estimated 375,000 tons of rice per year, enough to make East Timor self-sufficient in rice. President Suharto's visit to East Timor marked the beginning of the implementation of this project.

In the field of education there have been many achievements. For instance, in the past two years the central government has allocated 830.0 million rupiahs for the construction of six new schools and the rehabilitation of thirty others.
Youths who were only recently barefoot and idle are now clothed and attending classes, and numerous scholarships for advanced study in the other provinces of Indonesia have been awarded. The central government is constructing a dormitory at Gajah Mada University in Jogyakarta at a cost of 48.5 million rupiahs which will provide accommodations for thirty East Timorese students studying there. The central government's efforts in the field of education have not been confined only to the youths of East Timor. For example, vocational training for the more than five hundred widows of the civil war has been instituted.

The area of health care has also benefited from increased governmental assistance. The central government, in addition to doubling spending in this area, has sent a large number of physicians to East Timor over the past year and has provided substantial paramedical training. Only recently a team of thirty additional physicians were dispatched to the province.

The central government has also made strides toward linking East Timor with the other provinces. Toward that aim, on his trip to East Timor in July, President Suharto opened a television relay station at Dili that will serve the city and surrounding areas. The people of East Timor have been enjoying direct telecasts from Jakarta since 16 July of this year (1978).

East Timor is now open to commercial airline flights. Merpati Nusantara Airlines operates air service between Kupang in West Timor and Komoro, the airfield of Dili, in East Timor, and other flights will be added in the coming months.

Postal service was up-graded in the past year, and recently twenty-five of the employees of the central post office in Dili were sent to Java for training. The present post office is being rehabilitated. The harbor at Dili was recently reopened to commercial traffic and extensive efforts are under way to rehabilitate existing roads and to construct
new ones. A road connecting Atambua in West Timor with Los Palos in the far eastern part of East Timor is being constructed. The road, which spans 327 kilometers, will connect Atambua, Batugade, Maliana, Bobonaro, Dili, Manatuto, Baucau and Los Palos.

At the outbreak of hostilities in 1975, hundreds of East Timorese, fearing for their lives, fled to Australia and have been separated from their families and relatives in East Timor since that time. The government of Indonesia and Australia have entered into extensive consultations with the objectives of reuniting those refugees with their families and friends.

Mr. Chairman, as you and the distinguished members of this committee can no doubt ascertain from the developments I have enunciated here, substantial progress and achievements have been accomplished in East Timor. We are, however, under no illusions; we know that this is only the beginning and that there are no quick or easy shortcuts to development. One should not, however, belittle that which has been done already: much progress has been achieved and additional advancements will be made in the years ahead.

As it should be clear to the members of this committee from what has been said, the problem of East Timor is no longer a problem of decolonization; it is a problem of rehabilitation and development and of how to catch up with the other provinces of Indonesia.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it is my delegation's sincere hope that the people of the province of East Timor will be left in peace and allowed to concentrate on rehabilitation and development of the province as an integral part of Indonesia. In light of what I have said, it is hardly necessary for me to emphasize that any further discussion of this issue in the United Nations forum would clearly constitute an unwarranted interference in the internal
affairs of a sovereign member state. It is therefore our belief that the interests of the people of East Timor would best be served if the United Nations would refrain from any further considerations of the matter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
8. A mother and her children waiting to get their foodration from the Red Cross in the town of Iliomar. (1979).
FOREIGN VISITORS

The London OBSERVER, 31 July 1977

BRAINWASH FOLLOWS THE BLOODBATH

by RICHARD CARLETON*

"I saw at least 150 people lined up on the wharf and shot. It took about 40 minutes. As each shot was fired, a body fell into the water and they all eventually floated out to sea."

The gruesome account was given to me in secret last week by an eyewitness of the Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. It was the first wave of Indonesian marines and paratroopers that was responsible for most of the killing, looting and rape at Dili, the Timorese capital. The Indonesians themselves implicitly acknowledge (this fact), since they replaced the first wave during the first two weeks of their operation.

The victims of this massacre were the Chinese traders and Timorese peasants who had either stayed to fight the Indonesians or had judged the invaders to be less ruthless.

East Timor is a half island 500 miles off the north coast of Australia in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago. For 450 years it was a Portuguese colony. The other

*RICHARD CARLETON was the first independent Western journalist allowed to travel in East Timor since the Indonesian invasion in 1975.(Editor's note).
half of the island belonged to the Dutch until it became part of independent Indonesia in 1949. As in Angola, Portugal's legacy was a civil war. Little is known about it and the subsequent Indonesian invasion. One reason is that Australia and Indonesia successfully connived to prevent correspondents covering them. Journalists who tried to reach the island from Australia were prevented from chartering planes and boats were stopped. Now, two years later, the best one can do is to gather the odd eye-witness account from those who are not too terrified to talk.

Indonesia invaded Timor not because it wanted more territory but because it feared that an independent Timor might turn Communist some time in the future. Indonesia used much the same techniques to take over Timor as it had used in taking over the former Dutch colony of West New Guinea (Irian Jaya). It moved in, set up a puppet assembly and then magnanimously agreed when the assembly sought integration with Indonesia. The "integration" of Timor is on the agenda for the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September.

Despite the efforts of pockets of left-wing FRETILIN guerrillas in the mountains of Timor, Indonesia does exercise effective control now. An occupying army of 15,000 ensures that, but it still faces problems. The helicopters supplied to transport me were under instructions to fly above 3,000 feet, beyond the range of small arms fire. That the pilot did not always follow instructions was evident from the three bullet holes in the fuselage.

Everywhere the Indonesians took me they had three guards always within earshot and two concentric circles of "civil defence" troops surrounding me. They claimed that this was not to restrict my movements but rather to protect me.

According to their version of events, the killing of five Western journalists during the fighting in October 1975 was a propaganda boost for the FRETILIN guerrillas by attracting attention from the Western media (though pro-Indonesian forces were reportedly responsible). The FRETILIN
had mentioned I was in Timor and the fear was that the guerrillas would do anything to get their story back in the newspapers.

The one centre to which I specifically asked the Indonesians to take me was Balibo, the tiny settlement on the East Timor-West Timor border where the journalists were killed. For my television cameras I tried to re-create the events surrounding their deaths. Apparently my presentation was too graphic for the authorities. We were flown out with the excuse that the blue skies looked threatening.

Nobody can really be sure how many Timorese died during the civil war and the invasion. The Indonesians admit to 10,000. Others have claimed the figure is 100,000. From the estimates I was given, 50,000 may be nearer the mark. The population of Timor was 670,000. If 50,000 is anywhere near right, about seven per cent of the population died to make the Timor decolonization process the bloodiest, on a per capita basis, the modern world has witnessed.

The Indonesians were not the only culprits. After 450 years of colonial rule the Portuguese left behind one university graduate, one dentist, one high school and one (unstaffed) hospital. They also left a territory rife with TB, virulent malaria, encephalitis and yaws - all by-products of poor nutrition and hygiene.

Indonesia is now engaged in a full-scale Orwellian re-education of the Timorese. In Dili, children were paraded before me to sing propaganda songs about the chain of islands from the east to the west being one nation, one Indonesia. And, despite the brutality of the annexation, Timor may be better off in the long term within Indonesia for the territory is economically non-viable and dependent on aid.
REPORT ON THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION VISIT TO EAST TIMOR

by Representative HELEN MEYNER

...... Having extended an invitation for a Congressional visit, the Government of Indonesia was in general determined to retain control over the trip arrangements. It was not happy at certain requests by subcommittee staff to meet privately with East Timorese individuals, or proposals that we bring an independent interpreter. As the time for the actual visit to East Timor drew near, other requests on behalf of Representative Meyner and staff for specific arrangements were likewise politely ignored. In short, it was clear that the Government of Indonesia would consider efforts to tamper with or question its arrangements as an ungracious response by guests of the Indonesian Government. As a result, there was little free time for conversations which were not directly in the presence of Indonesian officials; those individuals whom the delegation asked to see were available only, if at all, in the context of public group meetings.

......

On April 14, we visited Viqueque and Baucau. On April 15, we visited Bobonaro and Dili.

In each town the form was fairly similar. We were received by large and friendly crowds including children in uniforms and tribal people in colorful indigenous dress. Both at the airstrips and in proceeding to the villages we were greeted with banners, signs and chants saying "Viva Indonesia, Viva Suharto, Viva Jimmy Carter," and even some saying "Viva
U.S. Congress." Upon arriving at each village, we would proceed to a meeting hall. The administrator of the village or sometimes several local officials would formally address the delegation.

......

(1) Restrictions on the trip make it difficult to reach firm conclusions on (a) the question of whether the Timorese have freely chosen integration with Indonesia, and (b) the question of alleged atrocities by Indonesian or FRETILIN forces. The Indonesians were concerned about our security and this may explain the reason for the restrictions.

(2) The delegation received the impression that the Timorese people were satisfied with Indonesian integration. It appeared as though the Indonesian Government was making a determined effort to assist Timorese economic development.

(3) There was no opportunity to investigate the charges of Indonesian or FRETILIN atrocities as alleged in the sub-committee hearing. However, there was no indication of ongoing repression; quite the contrary, the people appeared free and uninhibited.

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Far Eastern Economic Review,
Hong Kong 29 September 1978

TIMOR'S ARITHMETIC OF DESPAIR

by DAVID JENKINS

Remexio (East Timor) - The three large Puma helicopters had only just settled on the outskirts of this tiny hill town when a Foreign Ministry official noticed something amiss in the welcoming arrangements. Along the dirt track leading to
the town was a small red and white Indonesian flag flying up-
side down on a bamboo pole. "It is well meaning," said the
official, righting the flag with an embarrassed smile. "It
just needs a small adjustment."

For the people of East Timor, learning how to fly the
Indonesian flag correctly is one of the more minor adjustments
of daily life. As many as 60,000 Timorese - one tenth of the
population of this former Portuguese colony - have died in
the past three years, according to Deputy Governor Francisco
Lopez da Cruz. Another 125,000 have passed through or are
still living in squalid refugee camps, and officials here
estimate there could be as many as 100,000 more people still
hiding in the mountains.

For the Timorese it is the arithmetic of despair, a
social and political upheaval of such magnitude that its
significance is still only dimly understood. Today, two years
after its official incorporation into Indonesia, East Timor
is in a state of deep collective trauma.

In Remexio, as in most other towns, the people are
stunned, sullen and dispirited. Emaciated as a result of
deprivation and hardship, they are struggling to make sense
of the nightmarish interlude in which as much as half the
population was uprooted.

Recently, as a party of foreign diplomats called in
on Remexio on a three-day inspection tour of East Timor, they
found bewildered residents drawn up in two rows, jiggling
Indonesian flags and mouthing the words merdeka (freedom) to
the prompting of local cheerleaders. It was, as Indonesian
officials themselves admitted, something less than an
effusive welcome.

"These people are totally stunned by what has
happened," a senior East Timorese official told the REVIEW.
"Thousands died in this kabupaten (district). The people are
shocked both by the severity of the killing and by the recent
political changes. Four-fifths of them wouldn't know what
they are doing. I could give them a Portuguese flag and they
would wave it."

For Remexio, a hamlet of 4,000 people in the parched brown mountains behind Dili, the trauma began in mid-1975 when rival Timorese factions turned on one another in what was to become an especially horrifying civil war. Remexio was, almost to a man, on the side of FRETILIN, the leftist political grouping which was seeking immediate independence for the Portuguese territory. In the months that followed, the town was to pay heavily for its political affiliations.

Attacked by members of the conservative UDT faction in late 1975, it was to suffer even more severely at the end of the year and in early 1976 as Indonesian "volunteers" let loose their fury on FRETILIN units dug in around the town. The scars of the recent fighting are apparent everywhere. Each of the half-dozen brick and mortar buildings in the town is pockmarked from automatic weapons-fire, as is the stately Catholic church which sits on a hill overlooking the main square.

The townspeople are undernourished and desperately in need of medical attention. Many have recently come down from the hills, where they have lived on tapioca and leaves - and berries so poisonous they have to be cooked six times before they can be eaten. Tuberculosis is a major problem and with so many people sleeping on the damp ground there is danger of widespread pneumonia. The children in Remexio are so undernourished that one ambassador said they reminded him of victims of an African famine.

Remexio is a singularly depressing place. It is not, however, by any means unique. Timorese officials said there are 14 similar "transit camps" in the province, with many of them worse than Remexio. "This is nothing," said one official. "At Suai things are much worse and there are many more people. There is an urgent need for humanitarian aid."

Government officials make no bones about the fact that they face major difficulties as they set about the twin tasks of caring for the refugees and establishing the most
rudimentary infrastructure in the province. "I have never seen poverty like this in any other part of Indonesia," Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja told the REVIEW. "It is a legacy of 400 years of Portuguese neglect."

Now, as the Foreign Minister's visit showed, the main problem facing the government in East Timor is not so much FRETILIN, a divided and disputatious grouping which poses little military threat, but the care and welfare of the refugees. Unfortunately, the administration is severely handicapped in its capacity to deal with this task. There is a serious shortage of food, medicine and clothing, compounded by the problem of "bureaucratic leakages," the Indonesian euphemism for corruption.

In Remexio, government officials say 56 people have died of "severe illness" despite emergency food aid which includes 0.4 kilo of rice per person per day for an initial three days and 0.6 kilo of maize per person per day for three months.

In Bobonaro district in the far west of the province, resources are spread even more thinly. According to the bupati (district head) of Bobonaro, João da Silva Tavares, a total of 36,000 refugees have come out of the hills in the past 12 months, some of them naked after two or three years away from civilization.

Most of these people were "very ill" when they arrived and a number of them died, Tavares said. To date 65 per cent of these people have been resettled. Nevertheless, there are still many thousands in the towns of Liquica, Ermera, Maliana, Ainaro, Same and Suai, and additional refugees were still appearing, the bupati said, "because they cannot stand it any more in the hills." FRETILIN guerrillas order them to grow rice, he said, and then confiscate their crops.

Although acknowledging a shortage of relief supplies, Tavares strongly denied reports that refugees were dying of starvation in Bobonaro. Church relief workers have claimed that as many as 500 refugees a month have died of starvation
in this district.

Indonesia is saddled with this enormous humanitarian and development problem as a result of its takeover of East Timor in December 1975. Alarmed by the prospect that leftist forces would come to power in the restive edge of the archipelago, the Jakarta government sent as many as 30,000 troops into East Timor as "volunteers." In a series of brief but bloody engagements these forces gained control of the major population centres, and laid the groundwork for a rushed political convention which petitioned Jakarta for "integration" with Indonesia.

Today, there are about 12,000 troops in the province, though sources differ on the composition of the force. Brigadier-General Dading Kalbuadi, the military commander of East Timor, says he has 8,000 local Hansip (civil defence) men under his command, plus 4,000 regulars. The regular force includes two Timorese battalions of 400-500 men each, he says, and a total non-Timorese strength of about 3,000. Other sources in Timor say a more accurate breakdown would be 6,000 Hansip and 6,000 regulars.

The Indonesian units, backed by helicopters and OV 10 anti-insurgency aircraft, are deployed against a FREITILIN force of anything from 200 to 300 men. According to government sources, FREITILIN operates in small bands of five to 20 men. FREITILIN troops are armed with G-3 rifles and Mausers, as well as traditional weapons.

By and large, a stand-off seems to have developed on the military front: FREITILIN units seldom attack Indonesian positions (though they occasionally ambush Indonesian patrols), and Indonesian officers are apparently making little effort to go in and finish their opponents off. As in Irian Jaya eight years ago, Jakarta seems ready to wait, enticing the guerrillas down when possible with promises of amnesty and material advancement.

"We have no intention of wiping them out," said a senior Indonesian Foreign Ministry official. "We want to
invite them to join in the development effort." In the long run, the Indonesians say, the sheer hopelessness of the FRETILIN cause will bring an end to all meaningful opposition.

Already this policy is meeting with some success. On September 14 last year (1977), FRETILIN Radio announced the arrest on charges of high treason of Xavier do Amaral, the diminutive ex-schoolteacher who was president of the revolutionary group and of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET).

According to FRETILIN, do Amaral was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup in conjunction with the Indonesians. The activities of do Amaral and those working with him had caused "enormous, immeasurable damage to the East Timorese people." The arrest of do Amaral, the most popular and politically attractive man in the FRETILIN line-up was, in itself, a major bonus for Indonesia. But there was more to come.

Early this month, an Indonesian patrol stumbled across a small FRETILIN force in the hills outside Remexio. The group consisted of several FRETILIN guards and their prisoners, and when the Indonesians came into view the guards fled, abandoning their charges. Among those left behind was do Amaral, shockingly wasted after 12 months in captivity. Now recuperating in Jakarta, do Amaral is expected to play a central role in Indonesia's continuing psychological war against FRETILIN remnants in East Timor.

Already the Indonesian authorities have been getting considerable mileage out of Arsenio Horta, 28, the anti-FRETILIN younger brother of José Ramos Horta, until recently the DRET "Foreign Minister." A captive of the leftist forces until early this month, the younger Horta paints a grim picture of conditions in the so-called "liberated zones."

"Arsenio Horta provides the answer to those people who entertain mistaken notions about FRETILIN," said Suryono Darusman, director-general for political affairs at the
Foreign Ministry. "He had the opportunity to get a first hand impression of FREtilin and he has seen they are just a bunch of adventurers and torturers, people who are not interested in the welfare of the Timorese."

Whatever the validity of that assessment of FREtilin, one thing is clear: Indonesia, having taken Timor, must now show that it does have the welfare of the Timorese people at heart. East Timor has always been a minus area in terms of food production and infrastructure. Today the need for significant input is greater than ever.

Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1979

WHERE ARE ALL THE PEOPLE?

by PETER RODGERS

How many East Timorese have died since 1975, either from the armed strife in their homeland or the starvation and disease that is greatly exacerbated? This question has probably aroused more controversy than any other aspect of Indonesia's take-over of the former Portuguese colony. Claims of the number of deaths range as high as 350,000, more than half the pre-1975 population. A more likely figure is about 100,000 - still a horrifying number. The dislocation in the territory during the past four years has been such that any claim about an exact number of deaths can only be the result of fantasy or mendacity.

The 350,000 figure is said to result from a population survey carried out by the Indonesian armed forces, which found that there were fewer than 330,000 people remaining in
9. This picture was taken in November 1979 by the Australian journalist Peter Rodgers. The Indonesian authorities tried to suppress its publication and had it smuggled out of East Timor.
East Timor. Not surprisingly, senior Indonesian military figures have denied that such a census has been carried out. There are, in fact, several major problems with the 330,000 population claim. The survey is said to have been conducted in October last year (1978). However, according to both critics of Indonesia's East Timor policy, relief workers now in the territory, and Indonesian military officials in their more candid moments, at that time Indonesia still faced security problems in East Timor.

Relief Aims

The 330,000 claim therefore raises the remarkable spectre of Indonesia's armed forces carrying out a population survey in East Timor and arriving at an exact number of people even before Indonesian control of the territory was complete. The other problem concerns the current relief program in East Timor, which is aimed at providing basic assistance to about 300,000 people. If the 330,000 figure is correct the relief program would cover almost all of East Timor's population.

Officials with the three organizations involved in the program, the International Red Cross, the Indonesian Red Cross, and the Catholic Relief Services say that this is far from the case. During a recent week-long visit to East Timor I spoke to a range of relief workers and church sources. They are cautious about estimating the current population of the territory. But broad agreement emerged that a figure of "around" 500,000 was "reasonable."

The first official population figures for East Timor are contained in a survey which has just been carried out by the provincial Government. It puts the population of East Timor at 522,433, down more than 130,000 on the official Portuguese figure for 1974 of 653,211. Some of the decrease is explained by the estimated 5,000 or so people from East Timor now living in either Australia or Portugal. There are
also an undetermined number of East Timorese still in West Timor, where they fled in 1975.

Census hopes

The deputy governor of East Timor, Mr. Lopez da Cruz, puts their number at between 5,000 and 10,000. One senior relief worker, however, estimates that there are as many as 25,000 East Timorese still in West Timor. Officials in Dili do not describe the recent population survey as a census, which they hope to carry out next year after the situation in the territory is more settled. It is more than likely that some East Timorese have yet to reappear from the jungles and mountains where they retreated after the outbreak of violence in the territory in 1975.

The stark fact remains, however, that the first official population statistics for East Timor since its integration with Indonesia indicate that its population has declined by about 100,000 as a result of the violence and deprivation of the past four years. That this figure is some 250,000 more than the death toll alleged by some critics of Indonesia's integration of East Timor is of small comfort.

Nevertheless, allegations that the East Timorese have been the victims of a policy of "genocide" by Indonesia suggest more than anything else that those making these claims have not consulted their dictionaries about the meaning of the term. The East Timorese have been the tragic victims of violence and neglect. The end result of the upheaval in the territory of that past four years should not be confused with deliberate intent on Indonesia's part.

Mr. Frank Carlin, regional director of the Catholic Services, says that "I have seen nothing" which would confirm allegations of genocide. He considers claims that the population of East Timor has been reduced to less than 330,000 as "totally erroneous.". Mr. Lopez da Cruz responded to a query about the 330,000 figure by saying: "We have not
had a nuclear war." The accuracy of any future population
count will of course be affected by the security situation in
East Timor. A major sweep by Indonesian forces in late 1978
which resulted in the death of the FRETILIN president,
Mr. Nicolau Lobato, further eroded FRETILIN's already severely
stretched military capability. Indonesian military sources in
East Timor admit that between 300 and 600 FRETILIN members
are still located in the area between Baucau and Los Palos
in the eastern half of the territory. The sources claim that
FRETILIN poses no security problems and that its only interest
is in obtaining food.

Occasional ambushes

Government forces in the territory are officially
said to number two infantry battalions of about 800 men each
plus about 80 Timorese territorials in each of East Timor's
13 administrative districts. While the military situation is
relaxed it is also clear that occasional ambushes of
military vehicles still take place. One military source in
Dili claimed that one or two Government soldiers are now
killed each month, compared to seven or eight a week at the
beginning of the year.

A Timorese church source says that the villagers from
Quelicaí and Baquíaí south of Baucau have been prevented from
going into the nearby mountains to tend their gardens because
of FRETILIN activity in the area. Another church source
claims that the remaining FRETILIN are fanatics who still
believe that they can get independence. "We know this is
impossible," he said. What this adds up to is that Indonesia's
military war in East Timor is well won, if not over.
Irrespective of the political arguments about integration,
the cost to the people of East Timor has been great.
10. Red Cross personnel distributing medicine to the population of Uatolari (December 1979). The International Red Cross was admitted into East Timor late in 1979. (Editor's note).
THE U.S.A. AND THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION

The Australian, 22 January 1976

AID TO INDONESIA DOUBLED AS U.S. SHRUGS OFF TIMOR

by ROSS WABY

The United States will double its military aid to Indonesia this year, even while condemning Indonesia's military presence in East Timor. Last year the U.S. gave Indonesia $15 million in grant aid and $5 million in repayable credits for military equipment. This year, the military aid will be $20 million in grant aid and $23 million in credits. Economic aid will continue at about the level of last year - $80 million.

"In terms of the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Indonesia, we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor," said a State Department official. "We abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution deploiring the armed intervention. But we did support the Security Council resolution of December 22 (1975) calling for the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces."

"We don't want to make a strong stand one way or the other. The problem of East Timor is basically one for the countries involved - Indonesia, Portugal and the near neighbors, such as Australia."

"The United States wants to keep its relations with Indonesia close and friendly. We regard Indonesia as a friendly, non-aligned nation - a nation we do a lot of
business with."

Congressional Record, 3 March 1976, pp. H 1551-53

COMMENTS ON CONGRESSMAN HARKIN'S MOVE
TO LIMIT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

(The move was rejected with 24 votes for and 46 against it)

MR. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that Indonesia is a very important country which has great strategic and political importance to the whole area of Southeast Asia. To cut out our military assistance program in that country could have an adverse impact on the U.S. national interests in that area.

......

Mr. Chairman, if this amendment is adopted it would greatly retard the modernization plans for the Indonesian armed forces...

If we start here today pointing our fingers at the Philippines, and Indonesia and other countries, we may undo what we hope to accomplish.

I think it would be absolutely disastrous at this time to eliminate grant assistance to Indonesia. They are a very friendly country, a country that I think we can work with in the future in developing our mutual interests in that area.

......

MR. BROOMFIELD. ......

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman (Mr. Morgan) on this statement...... I think this is not only an overkill,
but I think it would be a serious blow to our relationship with Indonesia. Here is a strong anti-Communist nation which is just getting on its feet. Obviously, they have problems over there but I think this country's relations with Indonesia are extremely important.

The timing of a cut in U.S. security assistance to Indonesia - occurring as it would a little over 1 year after the fall of Saigon - would be most unfortunate. Indonesia is strongly anti-Communist and a good friend of the United States.

......

MR. MURPHY.... Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to Mr. Harkin's amendment to eliminate the $19.4 million grant military assistance authorization to Indonesia......

...... The funds requested, and which the gentleman (Mr. Harkin) would deny, represent only about 1.5 per cent of the Indonesian defense budget. This does not necessarily mean bombs and guns, but assistance for the protection of one of our staunchest allies in the Pacific. It is a rich source of minerals for western markets, and is on a key oil transport route between Japan and the Middle East. The collapse of the non-Communist governments in Indochina is cause for great concern about the future plans of the aggressor nations in that sector of the world. Such a key to the best interests of the United States should not be denied through misinformation such as this amendment.
Melbourne Herald, 7 April 1977

TIMOR TOLL NOT THE ISSUE, SAYS THE U.S.

by JOHN HAMILTON

Washington, Wed. - The actual number of people killed in Timor is not the issue today, according to an American assistant secretary of State. At issue was what was the actual situation in Timor today and what had happened in the past, he said. The comment came from Mr. Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Holbrooke was speaking to Australian correspondents in Washington before leaving on a tour of Asia, which will include four days in Jakarta. I asked him if he would comment on the disparity in estimates of casualties in Timor. I pointed out that the US State Department had estimated there were about 10,000 casualties while the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik, had said some 50,000 may have been killed.

"I don't think our information was very good," said Mr. Holbrooke. "It does appear that the figure of 100,000 is substantially higher than any reasonable estimates - but I want to stress I am not remotely interested in getting involved in an argument over the actual number of people killed."
COMMENT ON THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON EAST TIMOR

by J. HERBERT BURKE
CONGRESSMAN OF FLORIDA and RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
of the SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

MR. BURKE of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have asked to address the House today on a subject of concern to me because it has involved this body in the machinations of foreign, even hostile interests with regard to an important ally in Asia. I refer Mr. Speaker to the events of the past several months in a remote corner of the Republic of Indonesia - East Timor, formerly Portuguese Timor. As this last outpost of Portugal's colonial empire finally slipped from Lisbon's weakening grasp, a local struggle erupted in which inevitably the Government of Indonesia had to involve itself. However, by the time matters were put to rights by the Indonesians and their supporters in East Timor, the situation had become a catspaw of Communist conspiracy, designed to embarrass and weaken the Government of Indonesia, erode the necessary and peaceful ties between Indonesia and Australia, and finally, to embarrass the current conservative government in Australia. In this last effort, Mr. Speaker, this House of Representatives has been involved.

We have assisted, directly at the behest of the Australian opposition, in elevating the relatively insignificant question of East Timor to an attention it does not altogether deserve......

...... by having hearings and suggesting the legitimacy of an independent East Timor, the remnants of the FRETILIN forces are encouraged to continue killing other Timorese and
Indonesians.

...... There is no right time for such a hearing.

In short, Mr. Speaker, the Congress has been manipulated to further the cause of groups whose purposes are sharply inimical to the interests of the United States. I regret that this has occurred.
AUSTRALIA AND THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION

Canberra Times, 16 January 1976

ENVOY PUTS JAKARTA'S VIEW

by BRUCE JUDDERY

Australia should accept the inevitability of East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia and emphasize "letting the dust settle and looking ahead," the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, Mr. Dick Woolcott, has urged the Government.

"Indonesia wants to know whether, privately, we still sympathize with their objective, even if we cannot condone the means they have adopted in pursuit of it," he reports in a lengthy - and secret - "appreciation" of Indonesia's East Timor policy, and Indonesian-Australian relations. It is understood the cable was received in Canberra this week. Indonesia wanted the Government to redress "anti-Indonesian pro-FRETILIN bias" in Australia, he adds.

Mr. Woolcott reports that Indonesia had made up its mind to take over East Timor some months before he took up
his post as Ambassador last March (1975). At one point he describes Indonesia's methods as "clumsy." He accepts — though Jakarta has denied it — that the Indonesian Government has resorted to force.

Indonesia had not acted because Australia had given it a "green light": it would have done so if the lights were amber or red, he adds.

......

From President Suharto down, Indonesia had been "shocked" by Australia's vote on the East Timor question at the United Nations. However, Mr. Woolcott did not think this necessarily a bad thing, as it would remove the illusion that Australia was a "compliant" neighbor.

A lengthy summary of the East Timor situation is followed by "some thoughts on how it seems from Jakarta that we might approach the policy issues now involved in the Australian-Indonesian relationship..."

"The Indonesian Government will be looking to the Australian Government to help in redressing what it regards as an anti-Indonesian pro-FRETLIN bias in the more vocal elements of the Australian community. This may become easier as FRETLIN's own position weakens..."

"Indonesia will also be looking to the Government to counter three theses which have gained some support in Australia and which they find false and offensive, namely that another Vietnam is in the making in Timor," that Papua New Guinea and East Malaysia are next on the list and that the Indonesian invasion is analogous with the Japanese occupation of East Timor during the war.

Mr. Woolcott is personally critical of this "another Vietnam" thesis. The great powers were involved on both sides in Vietnam, he says. He adds that FRETLIN's position has all along been hopeless without great power support.

"Indonesia would welcome the Australian Government making some public comments on the situation in Timor with
emphasis on the practical realities of the situation," he adds. "Without detracting from the principle of self-determination, some reference to the difficulties of conducting a proper act of self-determination might be made..."

"Indonesia would also welcome it if the Government - without seeking to apologize for the Indonesian use of force or its lack of sensitivity in handling some aspects of the Timor problem - could act to blunt hostility in the Australian community and to help the Australian public as a whole to acquire a more objective picture of the Timor situation."

Turning from Indonesian desires to his own advice to the Government, Mr. Woolcott added: "We believe the emphasis should now be on accepting the inevitability of Timor's incorporation into Indonesia, letting the dust settle and looking ahead, while taking what steps we can in Australia to limit the further growth of hostility towards Indonesia within the Australian community."

......

Discussing the subject in general terms, he writes, "On the Timor issue...... we face one of those broad foreign-policy decisions which face most countries at one timor (sic) or another. The Government is confronted by a choice between a moral stance, based on condemnation of Indonesia for the invasion of East Timor and on the assertion of the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, on the one hand, and a pragmatic and realistic acceptance of the longer-term inevitabilities of the situation on the other hand.

"It is a choice between what might be described as Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism. The former is more proper and principled but the longer-term national interest may well be served by the latter. We do not think we can have it both ways."

Australia's Ambassador to Japan, Mr. K.C.O. ("Mick") Shann, a former Ambassador to Indonesia, has described it as
one of the most sensible papers written on the Timor issue that he has read.

Washington Post, 2 May 1976

AUSTRALIA'S RIFT WITH INDONESIANS OVER TIMOR TROUBLES U.S.

by PETER COSTIGAN

Canberra - A bitter dispute between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor, the internationally forgotten tail end of Portugal's abandoned empire, is causing U.S. officials in the area deep concern. Both the rightist military government of Indonesia's President Suharto and the rightist democratic government of Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser have reluctantly acknowledged their dispute.

But both maintain that they will not let the argument - generated by growing anger in Australia over Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in November and its determination to incorporate the tiny territory into Indonesia - disturb the basic friendship between the two nations. American concern over the dispute has deepened in recent weeks with signs of a possible long-term split between Australia and Indonesia. The two nations militarily and economically dominate the confluence of the Indian and Pacific oceans.

With the State Department and Pentagon watching closely, American diplomats in the area have worked overtime since early April to contain the dispute. Indonesian and Australian officials have gone out of their way to avoid any reference to the American interest in their dispute.

The death of five young journalists from Australia - three of them Australian citizens, one British and one New-
Zealander - in October (1975) has threatened to escalate the dispute into confrontation. They were killed near East Timor's border with the portion of Indonesia that shares the same island. The five television journalists went to East Timor last September to cover the exploding civil war there after the Portuguese administrators left the island.

In October they disappeared and the Indonesian government originally claimed that they accidentally burned to death when mortars set fire to the house they were in during cross-fire between warring Timorese factions. At the time, the Labor Party government of Gough Whitlam was in the middle of a constitutional crisis that resulted in Whitlam's being sacked in November. On December 13, Prime Minister Fraser's government was elected by a landslide majority. Australians paid little attention to the fate of the five newsmen.

But suddenly the mood has changed. Newspapers and the Australian Journalists' association generated parliamentary pressure that pushed the government into ordering an inquiry. Australian concern was heightened by the realization that Indonesian "volunteer" forces had invaded East Timor while Australia was consumed by its December domestic political crisis and had set up a provisional government that planned to supervise the incorporation of the 600,000 people of East Timor into Indonesia.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik added fuel to the fire of Australian anger last week by announcing that President Suharto would have an "important" announcement in August, that there would be a new national day and that Indonesia would then invite foreign correspondents to visit East Timor. Nobody doubted what he was talking about - the incorporation of East Timor. Even more infuriating for Australians, Malik proposed a very Asian answer to the problem of the five journalists' death. "Let us forget them," he told a press conference in Jakarta attended by Australian correspondents, "and we will erect a monument to them."
José Martins, the leader of one of several small political parties in East Timor that until recently encouraged the Indonesians to move into the tiny country, last week gave a detailed version of how the journalists allegedly weregunned down by Indonesian troops.

Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock managed to persuade the Indonesian government to allow three Australian officials to visit East Timor in an effort to find out what happened. But government officials in Canberra are pessimistic about how much they will find out.

......

The last thing American diplomats in the area want is a split between the two friends, especially one that current Australian emotions could force into a confrontation in which Washington would be asked to choose sides.

Canberra Times, 31 May 1976

MINISTER WAS URGED TO CONCEAL INFORMATION

by BRUCE JUDDERY

A Ministerial statement was altered last year to conceal the fact that Australia knew Indonesian troops were active in East Timor, more than a month before the all-out Indonesian invasion of the territory on December 7. The Australian ambassador in Jakarta, Mr. Dick Woolcott, advised that though Australia knew Indonesia was lying in its insistence that Indonesian forces were not operating in the territory, it should not say so publicly.

The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator
Willesee, was to have said on October 30 that he had seen reports suggesting a degree of Indonesian military involvement in East Timor and that he regretted this development. In the event he said only that "the Government has viewed with concern widespread reports that Indonesia is involved in military intervention in Portuguese Timor." He made no comment on the validity of the reports.

The discovery that Senator Willesee's statement was "sanitized" to accommodate Indonesia is part of a mounting body of evidence that Australia had many months' foreknowledge of Indonesian intentions but actively collaborated in its plans to "integrate" East Timor with the republic, and that this collaboration continues behind a cloak of ostensible disapproval.

In his cabled advice to the Department of Foreign Affairs on October 29 (1975) that Australian knowledge of Indonesian intervention be concealed, Mr Woolcott said he had conveyed the text of the draft statement to the Jakarta Government, except for the first paragraph, the one acknowledging Indonesia's role in fighting in the territory. That paragraph, he said, seemed to pose a problem.

"If the Minister says publicly that he regrets the degree of Indonesian intervention in the affairs of Portuguese Timor, will he not stir up a hornet's nest in Australia itself as well as producing a cold reaction here?" Mr Woolcott cabled. "Would not the first paragraph of the statement in its present form invite headlines of the type 'Willesee Accuses Indonesia of Intervention' and would not this lead in turn to increased pressures on the Government to act against Indonesia by stopping the defence assistance program and, possibly, by cutting aid? Such a statement at ministerial level would also stimulate hostility to Indonesia within the Australian community, which it has been our policy to minimize."

"Although we know it is not true, the formal position
of the Indonesian Government is still that there is no Indo-
nesian military intervention in East Timor. If the Minister
said or implied in public the Indonesian Government was lying
we would invite a hurt and angry reaction. We would also be
the only country in the region, probably including New
Zealand, to make such a statement and we would then be
regarded by Indonesia as having acted in a way which could
stir up international opinion against Indonesia."

The Melbourne AGE, 3 August 1976

FRASER GIVEN BLUNT WARNING AT WASHINGTON TALKS:
DON'T ANGER JAKARTA

by MICHAEL RICHARDSON

Singapore, August 2 - The US has warned Australia not to
allow further deterioration of relations with Indonesia over
Timor. It also warned that if Australian relations with
Indonesia worsened it could hinder US strategy for balancing
Russia's military might. US officials stationed in South-East
Asia disclosed this today.

They believe America's concern was expressed by high-
ranking members of the Ford Administration and the Pentagon
during meetings in Washington last week with the Australian
Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser. The officials also disclosed that
control of East Timor by a "friendly, anti-communist" govern-
ment was a matter of direct strategic interest to the US. This
is because the fastest and safest way for American nuclear-
armed submarines to pass submerged between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans is through the little-known deep water Straits
of Ombai-Wetar north of Timor island.
The US has 41 of these SSBN submarines, each armed with Polaris or Poseidon nuclear ballistic missiles. They are a key element in America's nuclear strike and deterrent force against the Soviet Union. Unlike landbased missile systems, the SSBNs are elusive and difficult to detect underwater. The US considers that Indonesian Government goodwill is important for securing American and allied interests in a global context as well as in South-East Asia. It is believed that Mr. Fraser and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Peacock, were told this by senior government figures in Washington.

Diego base

America's SSBN fleet has access to bases in Spain, Scotland and Guam in the western Pacific. Work is under way to make Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean a forward base for SSBNs. The Polaris and Poseidon missiles on these submarines have a range of about 4000 kilometres and could strike at Soviet targets from the north-west of the Indian Ocean. Until they are joined in the 1980s by bigger nuclear submarines carrying Trident missiles with a range of between 7200 and 10500 kilometres, Washington will have to rely on maximum mobility for its Polaris and Poseidon SSBNs.

Authoritative sources say the US has satisfactory working arrangements with President Suharto's Government about unimpeded under-water transit of SSBNs through Indonesian waters. One route is through the straits of Lombok and Macassar. But the preferred way is through the Moluccas and Banda seas and the little-used Straits of Ombai-Wetar. Observers believe the strategic location of East Timor is one reason why the US Administration has readily acquiesced to Indonesia's takeover of the disputed Portuguese colony and to its campaign to crush the Left-wing FRETILIN independence movement. They say it also helps to explain why Washington has suggested to Australia that it cease official criticism of Jakarta on the Timor issue - especially now that President Suharto has signed a law incorporating the territory as
Indonesia's 27th Province.

America is anxious to strengthen good relations with Jakarta because of Indonesia's influence in the region, the anti-communist disposition of the Suharto Government and the country's critical location at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific oceans. If all passage through the Indonesian archipelago were denied to American SSBNs, it has been calculated that eight to 10 days would be added to the submarine journey between Guam and Diego Garcia.

Washington believes that agreed under-water transit rights for nuclear-armed submarines are unlikely to be included in a Law of the Sea acceptable to island nations like Indonesia. The US is also aware of the importance Jakarta attaches to implementing - by unilateral action if necessary - its long-proclaimed archipelagic concept. This would turn all seas and straits between the 10,000 islands of Indonesia into internal waters. America therefore believes that continuation of existing SSBN transit arrangements in the future will be a matter for negotiations in which Indonesian goodwill will obviously be an important factor.

At present, Russian nuclear submarines entering the Indian Ocean from bases in the Soviet Far East use the straits of Molucca and Singapore where they have to surface in order to pass through safely. Some Soviet submarines may have ventured under-water through the straits of Lombok and Macassar on an exploratory basis. The Soviet Union has been making strenuous efforts to woo Indonesia and has kept its criticism of the East Timor annexation to a minimum.

While Moscow does not have the same urgent need as Washington for unimpeded passage of nuclear submarines through Indonesian waters, it has a vested interest in trying to monitor and disrupt US lines of communication.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION

TEXT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3485 (XXX)
QUESTION OF TIMOR, ADOPTED ON DECEMBER 12, 1975.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECOGNIZING the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

HAVING EXAMINED the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the question of Timor,

HAVING HEARD the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the administering power, concerning developments in Portuguese Timor and the implementation with regard to that territory of the relevant provisions of the Charter and the Declaration, as well as those of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

BEARING IN MIND the responsibility of the administering power to undertake all efforts to create conditions enabling the people of Portuguese Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination, freedom and independence and to determine their future political status in accordance
with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration, in an atmosphere of peace and order,

MINDFUL that all States should, in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or national independence of any State, or from taking any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

DEEPLY CONCERNED at the critical situation resulting from the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor,

1. CALLS UPON all States to respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom and independence and to determine their future political status in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

2. CALLS UPON the administering power to continue to make every effort to find a solution by peaceful means through talks between the Government of Portugal and the political parties representing the people of Portuguese Timor;

3. APPEALS to all the parties in Portuguese Timor to respond positively to find a peaceful solution through talks between them and the Government of Portugal in the hope that such talks will bring an end to the strife in that territory and lead towards the orderly exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Portuguese Timor;

4. STRONGLY DEPLORATES the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor;

5. CALLS UPON the Government of Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory in order to enable the people of the
Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence;

6. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council, in conformity with article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter to the critical situation in the territory of Timor and recommends that it take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination;

7. * Calls upon* all States to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor;

8. *Requests* the Government of Portugal to continue its co-operation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and requests the Committee to send a fact-finding mission to the Territory as soon as possible, in consultation with the political parties in Portuguese Timor and the Government of Portugal.

**TEXT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION No. 34/79**
**ADOPTED ON NOVEMBER 21, 1979**

**The General Assembly,**

*Recognizing* the inalienable right of all people to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL


_IN FAVOUR_: Byelorussia, Cameroun, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauretania, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

AGAINST: none

ABSTAINING: none

ABSENT: none


_IN FAVOUR_: China, France, Guyana, Italy, Libya, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R.

AGAINST: None

ABSTAINING: Japan and U.S.A.

ABSENT: Benin
EPILOGUE

STATEMENT DELIVERED TO THE FOURTH COMMITTEE
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 1979

by NOAM CHOMSKY

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

Four years have passed since the government of Indonesia began its armed intervention in East Timor in October 1975, four years of terror, massacre and starvation. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia extended its intervention to a full-scale invasion of the territory, capturing the capital city of Dili. This act of aggression was immediately condemned by the United Nations. On 12 December 1975 the General Assembly adopted resolution 3485 which "strongly deplores the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor" and "calls upon the Government of Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence." These demands have frequently been reiterated since, most recently, in a resolution of 13 December 1978. The regular response of the government of Indonesia has been to intensify its aggression, with
11. A ten-year old boy of Uatolari being treated by Red Cross personnel for undernourishment, malaria and TB. (December 1979.)
mounting atrocities. The United States and other Western powers have continued to provide the military and diplomatic support that Indonesia requires to persist in its attempt to subdue the population of East Timor.

In December 1978, immediately after the UN appeal for withdrawal of its armed forces, Indonesia launched new military attacks in East Timor. Indonesian Defence Minister General Mohammad Jusuf claimed that 1200 FREtilin troops were killed in a single Indonesian attack on Christmas Day. Previously, Indonesia had claimed that FREtilin had been reduced to a few hundred scattered guerrillas. FREtilin President Nicolau Lobato was killed a few days later. According to letters from Timor, members of his family in Indonesian custody were executed. Lobato was killed in an operation involving troops transferred from place to place by helicopter, the Indonesian press reports, while refugees who escaped to Portugal at the time say that bombing continued in the interior. In April 1979 the Indonesian press reported that Defence Minister Jusuf visited troops "at the front," not far from Dili. Other reports also indicate that fighting continues at a level that is difficult to determine, given the barriers to investigation imposed by the Indonesian military.¹

For the same reason, it is difficult to estimate precisely the human cost of the continued fighting, the Indonesian tactics of crop destruction and forced population removal, and other atrocities. A year ago, an Indonesian official privately admitted that more than 100,000 people had died in the territory because of the war, adding that hundreds of villages had been "wiped off the face of the earth" in the bombing. Citing this statement, an analysis of the situation by the Legislative Research Service of the Australian Parliament concluded that "On the basis of many reports of this nature, there can no longer be any doubt about the bloody and brutal nature" of the Indonesian aggression.²

Statistics provided by the Indonesian government are
still more startling. An October 1978 census reported by the Assistant of Defence and Security in East Timor estimated the total population of the territory at about 330,000. The same source estimated the population of displaced persons at almost 320,000. Most of these victims had been living for 2–3 years in "centers" that have been described as "concentration camps" or "prisons." In 1974, prior to the Indonesian invasion, the population had been estimated at about 690,000 by the Diocese of Dili. If we can believe the figures provided by the Indonesian government, more than half the population may have disappeared as a consequence of the Indonesian invasion, some 360,000 people, while virtually all the survivors are refugees. Commenting on these figures, James Dunn observes that "It is certainly very hard to believe that the population of the territory may have been halved in three-and-a-half years. But even if 100,000 Timorese escaped the attention of the authorities, the loss of life would still be at an appallingly high level."4

Another study prepared by the Foreign Affairs group of the Australian Parliament Legislative Research Service in September 1979 cites a "sensitively-placed Indonesian official" who confided to UN officials in December 1978 "that the military authorities had spoken of a population assessment of 'about 400,000 Timorese'."5 If accurate, his assessment again indicates that well over 200,000 people have died. Recent testimony by a Portuguese priest, Father Leoneto Vieira de Rego, supports such assessments. Father de Rego spent three years in the mountains with FREtilin before surrendering to Indonesian forces in January 1979, suffering from malaria and starvation. After imprisonment and interrogation, he was permitted to return to Portugal in June. Father de Rego reports that in the region around his village, probably one third of the population had died, most of them from hunger, which became a serious problem in late 1977 as a result of the intensification of Indonesian attacks at that time. From
August 1977, Indonesian "search and destroy" operations forced the population to flee from one area to another, unable to grow or harvest crops, while Indonesian authorities herded surrendering villagers into internment camps where, Father de Rego alleged, the problem of hunger was further aggravated. He said that the fierce offensives of 1978 extended Indonesian military control, though armed resistance to the occupation was continuous throughout the country. He added that "the East Timorese will never accept the occupation, and I think resistance will grow again. Indonesian control is not secure anywhere." He then added significantly that he did not believe that East Timorese independence is a lost cause: "We still have hope as long as the United Nations doesn't accept Indonesia's annexation. An authority is needed which can force the retirement of Indonesian troops from Timor." 6

The United Nations has a grave responsibility in this regard.

Other church sources add confirming evidence. A church report that reached Australia in July 1979 states that "an increasing death toll seems to be a phenomenon all over the villages of East Timor." In refugee camps the death rate is so high that Timorese are heard to say that "the more refugees, the more corpses." In one camp, according to a Timorese refugee now in Melbourne, the Indonesian army and local district chief "run a monopoly of the coffee trade, the Timorese must sell to them. If they try to travel to Dili to market their coffee, they are arrested and sent back." The camp residents confined to these centers "work for the army with no pay." "It is quite false," he adds, "to speak of the Timorese people in the displaced person centres as refugees. A good many of them were ordered into these centres by the military..." 8

The July 1979 report of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid provides additional evidence on the starvation and suffering within the areas controlled by Indonesian
armed force, specifically, among those who have been driven into internment centers in counterinsurgency operations. The report also quotes a senior Indonesian official as saying that "there is massive corruption associated with aid." It quotes letters smuggled from Timor which allege that aid supplies are being sold by the Indonesian army and the Indonesian Red Cross. Medicines and other aid sent from Australia and New Zealand are on sale in Dili at prices few can afford, while the hospital is "notoriously short of medicines" and people are starving and dying of disease. The situation in areas still under direct Indonesian attack is surely still more grim.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

I quoted Father de Rego's appeal to the United Nations as an authority that might be able to terminate Indonesian aggression. Apparently, the United States government shared this assessment. UN Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, in his recently published memoirs of his term at the United Nations, has the following to say with regard to Indonesian success in Timor: "... the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success." Ambassador Moynihan was presumably aware of the nature of his "success" in preventing effective action to impede Indonesian aggression. He cites a February 1976 estimate by the deputy chairman of the provisional government installed by Indonesian force "that some sixty thousand persons had been killed since the outbreak of civil war... 10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." He failed to add that at most a few thousand were killed during the civil war which ended in September 1975
with a FRETILIN victory. Thus in effect he is claiming credit for "success" in helping to cause a massacre of some 10 per-
cent of the population by February 1976, a feat that he
compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression - not to
speak of the far larger numbers of victims in the subsequent
period.

Ambassador Moynihan also comments that the Indonesian
invasion must have been successful by March 1976, since "the
subject disappeared from the press and from the United
Nations after that time." It did virtually disappear from the
press, though not from the United Nations. The curtain of
silence drawn by the press in the United States and much of
the West hardly demonstrates the success of Indonesian arms,
though it does stand as a remarkable testimonial to the
effectiveness of Western propaganda systems.

There is little doubt that the United States government
was aware of the impending Indonesian invasion in 1975.
Furthermore, it continued to provide the material support
required by the Indonesian military forces, 90%-armed by
the United States at the time of the invasion. Contrary to
false testimony by government witnesses at Congressional
Hearings, new offers of arms were made immediately after the
invasion. Then, and since, the flow of arms has been un-
interrupted, including attack helicopters and other equipment
required to "wipe hundreds of villages off the face of the
earth," destroy crops, and herd the remnants of the population
into internment centers, where they subsist under the
conditions already noted. Since the Indonesian invasion, the
US has granted Indonesia over $178 million in military aid
alone.11 This aid was crucial in enabling the Indonesian
army to carry out the brutal military escalation of late
1977, when it was running short of supplies. Other Western
powers have also sought to provide the needed armaments, a
profitable business conducted with little concern for the
vast human cost.
Some Timorese have been able to escape to Portugal or Australia, in many cases, they charge, after paying bribes of thousands of dollars to Indonesian officials.\textsuperscript{12} Within East Timor, many are imprisoned, and reports and letters make frequent reference to the "disappearance" of people, which Timorese assume means death. A letter of 14 July 1979 states that "Many people have already disappeared... Now many widows of the recently disappeared walk around in a very disturbed state, as thin as skeletons." The letter is cited in an Action for World Development Dossier submitted to the ICRC*, which adds that "people who surrendered under the Presidential Amnesty which expired on Dec. 31 1977, have also disappeared." It notes "disturbing reports" of torture and brainwashing in prisons, execution without trial, and other atrocities and repression.\textsuperscript{13} According to reliable sources, the Indonesian armed forces are following a policy of taking no prisoners and are executing people with close ties to FRETILIN, including their families.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

The September 1979 report of the Australian Parliament Legislative Research Service cites a "well-informed source" who estimates that an additional 20-40,000 Timorese will die even if relief is forthcoming, given the conditions in the country. The same report notes "the persistent refusal of those countries that normally champion human rights to examine, let alone accept, the steady flow of evidence that a tragedy of far greater proportions than was at first believed has been endured" by the Timorese. "Thus no single nation has sought to bring any significant pressure to bear on Indonesia, the power largely responsible for what must be

\*ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross (Editors' note).
one of the most flagrant denials of human rights in the
history of modern decolonization."¹⁴ In dramatic confirmation
of this conclusion, the 1979 Human Rights report of the State
Department, in keeping with earlier practice, avoids any
discussion of the actual Indonesian record in East Timor,
stating that "The Indonesian Government has been criticized
for its initial military occupation of East Timor," and
adding that the U.S. Government seeks to encourage Indonesia
"to expand its programs of assistance to the people of East
Timor."¹⁵ The Human Rights report is silent on the actual
nature of this "assistance" since 1975, and on the crucial
U.S. responsibility for the atrocities that are concealed
by the government and the press.¹⁶

The Australian report of September 1979 concludes,
surely credibly, that "it seems beyond doubt that most of the
deaths since December 1975, and the present poor physical
condition of the Timorese, are the grim consequences of the
deliberate Indonesian strategy designed to starve FRETILIN
and its supporters into surrender." The report might have
gone on to say that it is also quite beyond doubt that these
were the direct and predictable consequences of the policies
adopted by the Western powers throughout this period. The
report quotes "one of the more perceptive observers" as
saying that "The Indonesians tried to starve FRETILIN into
submission, and in the process succeeded in starving tens of
thousands of Timorese to death." The figures already cited
suggest that this is a cautious estimate. The report estimates
that tens of thousands of Timorese would flee abroad if they
were able to do so, but "the Indonesian authorities are
determined to prevent the kind of exodus that would attract
international attention." It concludes finally that "The
world's conscience has been appropriately shocked by the
ordeal of the 'boat people', and by the reports of enormous
loss of life and suffering in Kampuchea, yet scant attention
has been given to the humanitarian consequences of Indonesia's
forced integration of East Timor which seems to be assuming the proportions of genocide. The case of East Timor presents, in relative terms, the most serious case of abuse of human rights, not to mention the right of self-determination, ever to have been inflicted on a people, in the crude guise of integration."

Defenders of the Indonesian invasion occasionally argue that the grim fate of the Timorese is a residue of four centuries of Portuguese colonial rule. In this connection, it is worth noting the observation of the very well-informed director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Australian Parliament Legislative Research Service, Mr. James Dunn, formerly Australian consul in East Timor: "In fact in the last years of Portuguese rule food supplies were generally adequate in all parts of East Timor although, as in the case of neighbouring Indonesian islands, famine conditions occurred from time to time in certain districts." This effort to project the current situation backwards in time recalls the comparable attempt by Ambassador Moynihan and many others to attribute the massacres by the Indonesian army to the civil war of August-September 1975.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates:

Unless large-scale international aid is quickly provided, with adequate supervision to ensure that it is actually distributed where needed, the toll of death and suffering in Timor, already awesome, will continue to climb. The United Nations must act, forthrightly and effectively, to ensure that humanitarian aid is dispatched at a significant level and with adequate controls. And beyond that, it should, I feel, heed the appeal by Father de Rego and others who are able to speak out. Despite the cynicism of the great powers, the Timorese people are not inevitably doomed to near total destruction, and their courageous struggle for national independence is not a lost cause. The United Nations still
has the opportunity to play a crucial role in ensuring their survival, and helping them to realize their right to self-determination.

FOOTNOTES


2. J.S. Dunn, "Notes on the Current Situation in East Timor."


5. J.S. Dunn, "EAST TIMOR - Notes on the Humanitarian Situation."


9. ACFOA report; Age, 2 August 1979.


11. Cited in a memo by Bruce P. Cameron, Foreign Policy Director, ADA, to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 4 September 1979.


16. For detailed documentation on the role of the media in suppressing and distorting the facts, in conformity with U.S. government policy, see my testimony before this Committee, Document A/C.4/33/7/Add.3, November 1978. For much additional documentation on these matters, see N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume one, pp. 129-204, South End Press, Boston 1979.

17. "Notes on the Current Situation in East Timor."
APPENDIX

Xinhua News Agency, 7 January 1980

RESTORATION OF INDONESIA-CHINA RELATIONS BECOMES URGENT, SAYS INDOenesian FOREIGN MINISTER

Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaadmadja said that the restoration of relations between Indonesia and China has become more urgent than ever before, according to "Indonesia" quoting Antara News Agency today. For a year or so, the restoration of relations between the two countries has not been confined merely to the issuance of statements. Some steps have already been taken to remove obstacles toward the restoration of relations. The statement was made by the Foreign Minister in an exclusive interview with reporters which was relayed by Indonesian TV.

Referring to obstacles to the restoration of the relations, he said some progress had been made in 1979 on the problem of nationality of Chinese descendants. He stressed that "once these problems were clarified, the process of the normalization will start."

When asked whether a Chinese delegation will visit Indonesia, the Foreign Minister said the visit of a Chinese mission was just the beginning. The matter cannot be settled in a week. Negotiations and preparation are needed.
EAST TIMOR REBELS loose CHINESE AID

from REUTER in Lisbon.

China has halted all aid to the left-wing FRETILIN movement, fighting Indonesian forces in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. However, the FRETILIN Defence Minister, Mr. Rogerio Lobato, told the Lisbon daily newspaper, Diario de Noticias, that Vietnam had made up for the loss of Chinese help. He said FRETILIN was also receiving increasing help from Algeria.

Mr. Lobato was speaking in Bissau, the capital of Guinea-Bissau, the first of Portugal's African colonies to receive independence, in 1974. The others - Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and the islands of São Tomé and Principe - became independent in 1975.

Mr. Lobato said he was in Guinea-Bissau on a contact mission and that he would also visit neighbouring Guinea Conakry, one of the few other countries to have recognized East Timor's independence when it was proclaimed by FRETILIN at the end of 1975. Mr. Lobato said 200,000 people have died of hunger or because of the war in East Timor during the last five years.
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U.S. Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners, P.O.Box 609, Montclair NJ 07042, U.S.A. Irregular.
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Action for World Development,
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Victoria 3065, Australia.
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TIMOR ORIENTAL, INDONESIA
Y LAS DEMOCRACIAS OCCIDENTALES

El autor del prefacio de esta colección de documentos, Torben Retbøll, escribe que su finalidad con esta serie ha sido mostrar: primero, las atrocidades indonesas en Timor Oriental; después, la responsabilidad de las democracias occidentales, y, por último, el encubrimiento de la información por parte de la prensa occidental.

Hay numerosos testimonios sobre las atrocidades de la ocupación indonesa contra la población de Timor Oriental. Fugitivos que han podido llegar a Portugal, hablan de fusilamientos masivos; el sacerdote católico, Padre de Rego, que ha pasado tres años en las montañas junto con los seguidores de FRETILIN, ha visto como la población es perseguida por las tropas indonesas, y ha vivido el hambre que existe en todo el país, debido entre otras cosas, a las bombas de napalm usadas por los indoneses. Incluso altas personalidades de Timor Oriental que cooperan con los indoneses, culpan a los soldados indoneses de matanza y de saqueo.

Hoy, cuatro años después de la invasión indonesa, una tercera parte de la población de Timor Oriental ha muerto a consecuencia de la guerra, del hambre y de enfermedad. Casi todos los supervivientes viven en unos campamentos que han sido descritos como campos de concentración. Y debido a que el mundo occidental ha protegido a Indonesia, no ha sido posible entrar en el país, ni mucho menos prestar ayuda humanitaria. Solamente a finales de 1979 ha podido la Cruz Roja proporcionar una acción de ayuda limitada.

En fuerte contraste con las declaraciones del gobierno
indoneses en las Naciones Unidas, que describen la situación en Timor Oriental como completamente normalizada y en vísperas de desarrollo, existe un informe confidencial elaborado por un auxiliar social indoneses, que describe la situación de intranquilidad, de hambre y miseria; y admite también que el odio a los indoneses crece por día.

A pesar de las repetidas resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas, que claramente van en contra de la invasión indonesa en Timor Oriental, las democracias occidentales han abandonado totalmente a Timor, haciéndose de esta forma culpables indirectos de la muerte de miles de personas que han sido asesinadas.

Esta postura pro-indonesa se ha manifestado a través de varias conferencias (hearings) realizadas por el Congreso americano y también en la política exterior de los EE.UU., tal como se manifiesta en sus negociaciones directas con Indonesia y en las sesiones de las Naciones Unidas. Los EE.UU. han apoyado todo el tiempo en secreto la acción indonesa en Timor, no solo de forma política, sino también militarmente mediante créditos que han concedido a Indonesia para la compra de armamento. De la misma forma, Australia ha retenido su crítica sobre Indonesia debido sobre todo a la fuerte presión de EE.UU.

Las razones de esta política pro-indonesa deben verse en base a la angustia que existe sobre la influencia comunista en el Sureste de Asia, sobre todo después de la derrota de Vietnam.

En este sentido, el régimen del Presidente Suharto es un aliado seguro para los poderes occidentales. Pero también existen otras condiciones que han dejado sentir su importancia, a saber, la posición estratégica de Timor Oriental en las cercanías de las islas Molucas y Banda y del estrecho de Ombai-Wetar. Es precisamente en estos lugares donde se encuentran los pasos favorables para los submarinos norteamericanos del tipo SSBN. Estos submarinos están equipados con misiles Polaris y Poseidon que tienen un alcance de
4.000 Km., y solo pueden alcanzar las metas soviéticas si operan desde el rincón noreste del Océano Indico, para lo cual, deben ser relativamente movibles y al mismo tiempo tener la mayor invisibilidad posible. Esto es factible siempre y cuando puedan utilizar esas aguas navegables, de esta forma no necesitanemerger a la superficie y pueden navegar debajo del agua, pasando inadvertidos.

Sin embargo, la prensa occidental y los medios de información en general, tienen también su parte de responsabilidad en que Indonesia haya podido actuar con tanta libertad en Timor Oriental. Cómo esta "conspiración de silencio" ha ocurrido, a pesar de la existencia de hechos que hablan por sí mismos, es descrito por el conocido profesor americano en Lingüística, Noam Chomsky, en su declaración que fue leída antes el Cuarto Comité de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en Noviembre de 1978. Es sobre esta declaración en que el resumen que se presenta a continuación se ha basado.

El 7 de Diciembre de 1975, las fuerzas militares indonesas invadieron el Timor Oriental y capturaron su capital, Dili. Esta invasión ocurrió inmediatamente después de la partida del Presidente Gerald Ford y de Henry Kissinger de una visita a Jakarta, donde Kissinger declaró a la prensa que "los Estados Unidos comprenden la posición de Indonesia en la cuestión del Timor Oriental".

A pesar de que Indonesia ha aislado Timor Oriental del mundo exterior, impidiendo incluso la entrada a la Cruz Roja Internacional, se han filtrado informaciones y reportes sobre las atrocidades allí ocurridas. Observadores neutrales e incluso pro-Indonesia, han estimado que la cantidad de víctimas asciende a 50-100.000 personas, es decir, aproximadamente el 10% de la población. La prensa norteamericana y, en general, la prensa del mundo occidental o bien ha evadido la cuestión, o bien, con raras excepciones, se ha adherido a la posición de Indonesia y a la de los EE.UU. sobre el Timor Oriental.
En cada momento crucial, el gobierno de los EE.UU., con la lealtad de la prensa a su favor, ha negado o ha encubierto las atrocidades cometidas por sus aliados indoneses en el Timor Oriental, declarando que, cualquier acto que hubiera ocurrido en el pasado pertenecía ya a la historia y, por lo tanto, no era de ninguna utilidad el cuestionar el control de Indonesia en Timor Oriental. De hecho, los Estados Unidos y sus aliados, a través de su ayuda a Indonesia en armas y materiales, han apoyado activamente las represiones y masacres de las fuerzas indonesas en Timor. La complicidad de la prensa al ocultar los hechos o distorsionarlos, ha impedido que la opinión pública pudiera ejercer presión sobre las democracias industriales en lo que, un antropólogo que trabajo en Timor Oriental calificó de "aniquilación de gente sencilla de montaña". Debe además tenerse en cuenta que, al contrario de lo que los Estados Unidos afirman, la situación en Timor no es una historia antigua y finalizada: hace unas pocas semanas un grupo de australianos que llegó al puerto de Dili con su yate averiado, declaró haber visto "barcos, patrulleros y barcazas llenos de soldados indoneses, helicópteros y aviones, haber oído explosiones en el interior" no quedándose ninguna duda que Dili era todavía zona de guerra.

El Timor Oriental no ha estado nunca incluido dentro de la frontera de Indonesia, ni durante la época colonial ni durante la época del post-colonialismo. Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el pueblo de Timor proclamó repetidamente su derecho a la autodeterminación y acogió con alegría los primeros pasos que se dieron hacia la independencia, la cual, siguió a la revolución portuguesa de 1974. Tan pronto como Portugal anunció su decisión de dar la independencia a las colonias, la élite de Timor formó varios partidos políticos. Los más importantes fueron UDT (Unión Democrática Timorense) y, FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionario del Timor Oriental Independiente). Sin embargo, a principios de 1975 FRETILIN se convirtió en el partido político más importante de Timor.
Oriental. En parte, debido, según un informe sobre Descolonización de las Naciones Unidas, a las asociaciones de UDT con el antiguo régimen y a su reluctancia en apoyar un programa de independencia total, y en parte, debido a que muchos seguidores de UDT dejaron este partido para apoyar a FRETILIN. En Agosto de 1975, UDT dio un golpe de estado, probablemente con complicidad indonesia, que se convirtió en una sangrienta guerra civil y que finalizó a las pocas semanas en una completa victoria para FRETILIN. Las Naciones Unidas estimaron que las víctimas de esta corta guerra civil fueron de 2 a 3000 personas. Es necesario poner atención en estas cifras ya que los Estados Unidos, después de que las atrocidades de las tropas indonesas en los años siguientes comenzaron a salir a la luz, pretendieron que la mayoría de las víctimas habían caído durante la guerra civil.

Desde principios de Septiembre hasta el 7 de Diciembre de 1975, el Timor Oriental fue administrado por FRETILIN. Durante todo este periodo acreditados periodistas y visitantes australianos permanecieron en Timor y dieron reportes favorables, al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas entre otros, sobre este breve interludio de semi-independencia, y de cómo la administración de FRETILIN estaba recibiendo un apoyo popular masivo.

A comienzos de Septiembre e inmediatamente después de la victoria de FRETILIN, Indonesia comenzó su intervención armada. El 16 de Octubre las fuerzas indonesas tomaron la ciudad de Balibo situada a 10 Km. de la frontera donde murieron 5 periodistas australianos. Estas muertes sirvieron de toque de alerta a los demás periodistas sobre la suerte que podían correr si permanecían en el territorio después de la invasión. La información sobre la invasión indonesa fue cubierta por periodistas australianos, sin embargo, tuvo poca resonancia internacional. Y, a causa de los prolongados ataques de Indonesia y la falta de reacción internacional, FRETILIN decidió proclamar la independencia el 28 de Noviembre de 1975.
A partir de este momento se esperó una invasión indonesia a gran escala, y, sin lugar a dudas, Australia y los Estados Unidos sabían lo que iba a ocurrir. En Agosto de 1975, el Embajador de Australia en Jakarta informó a su gobierno que el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos había instruido a su embajada en Jakarta "ocultar la información sobre Timor Oriental". El Embajador de los Estados Unidos expresó también que "los Estados Unidos debían mantenerse alejados de la situación en Timor y dejar que los acontecimientos siguieran su curso". Esta fue la línea política que se siguió a pesar de la influencia que los Estados Unidos tenían, debido a la necesidad de Indonesia de recibir asistencia militar de los Estados Unidos. En Octubre, el Embajador de Australia aconsejó a su gobierno que "debía evitarse emitir informaciones sobre la intervención indonesa para evitar complicaciones con Indonesia".

La diferencia principal entre los EE.UU. y Australia dentro de este contexto, es que en los EE.UU. el encubrimiento continúa a nivel de información pública. Y, además, la complicidad de los EE.UU. es mucho mayor debido a su apoyo militar a Indonesia.

Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, la invasión indonesia del 7 de Diciembre ocurrió inmediatamente después de la partida de Presidente Ford y de Henry Kissinger de Jakarta. El 8 de Diciembre el New York Times informó que, "los indoneses habían capturado el Timor Portugués después de la 'incursión'". De hecho, las fuerzas indonesas solamente habían capturado la ciudad de Dili y además, con gran brutalidad. La diferencia es significante. El gobierno de los EE.UU. había estado insistiendo que la lucha había finalizado y, por lo tanto, debíamos aceptar la anexión como cosa hecha. También Times informó falsamente que la guerra civil (que había acabado a principios de Septiembre), había continuado hasta la "incursión", y que Indonesia "no había ofrecido asistencia material a las fuerzas anti-FREITILIN". Este reporte es típico de como la prensa cubría la información de este período.
El gobierno de los EE.UU. pretende haber suspendido la ayuda militar a Indonesia desde Diciembre de 1975 hasta Junio de 1976. En realidad esto ha sido tan fraudolento como el pretender ignorar lo que estaba sucediendo. Y, de hecho, la ayuda militar de los EE.UU. a Indonesia, superó lo que en principio el Departamento de Estado había propuesto al Congreso, ayuda, que, desde entonces, ha ido en aumento. Además, durante este periodo se hicieron, por lo menos, cuatro nuevas ofertas que incluyeron el suministro de armamento del tipo Bronco OV-10 que está "especialmente diseñado para operaciones contra-insurgentes contra adversarios sin armas aéreas efectivas, completamente inútil para defender Indonesia de un enemigo extranjero". Esta línea de actuación política ha continuado sin ningún cambio substancial durante toda la administración Carter. La "suspensión de ayuda militar" era secreta, tan secreta, que el gobierno de Indonesia nunca fue informado de ella.

Desde Diciembre de 1975, Indonesia ha estado tratando de conquistar Timor Oriental sin conseguirlo. En Julio de 1976, EE.UU. reconoció la integración formal del Timor Oriental en Indonesia, después de un absurdo "Consejo de Pueblo". En Marzo de 1977, nueve meses después de la "integración", el encargado oficial por Indonesia en el Departamento de Estado, David Keeney, testificó que alrededor de 200.000, de los 650.000 habitantes del Timor Oriental, "serían considerados bajo la administración indonesia". Aseveración que es de un contraste sorprendente con la pretensión del gobierno de los EE.UU. que la guerra había terminado a comienzos de 1976, y que Timor se había convertido en una parte de Indonesia. Keeney testificó además, que el pueblo era muy feliz con la integración ya que, "había decidido que su interés residía en su 'incorporación' a Indonesia". Su "decisión" fue expresada en el fraudolento "Consejo del Pueblo", y, por su-

* Declaración del Profesor Benedict Anderson, de la Universidad de Cornell, antes el Congreso norte-americano.
puesto, existían todavía dos terceras partes de la población que no había podido expresar su "decisión" porque no estaban bajo "protección" indonesa.

Otro ejemplo de la clase de información que ocasionalmente llega a EE.UU., es un despacho de Reuter desde Dili (Los Angeles Times, 27 de Septiembre de 1978) donde el periodista discute sobre "la amarga guerra civil que precedió a la anexión del Timor Oriental en Indonesia": "Después de la partida de la administración colonial portuguesa en Diciembre de 1975, fuerzas pro-indonesas, apoyadas más tarde por tropas regulares indonesas, vencieron a las guerrillas de izquierda pro-independencia de FREtilin, en una guerra civil de ocho meses de duración". Debe notarse que este reporte es falso en cada punto crucial, aunque por otra parte, está completamente de acuerdo con las necesidades de Indonesia y la propaganda de EE.UU. Los portugueses se fueron justo antes del final de la guerra civil en Septiembre de 1975 y, la anexión de Timor Oriental a Indonesia, no reconocida en la mayor parte del mundo, llegó diez meses más tarde; no después de una "guerra civil" sino después de una invasión indonesa. Incluso el Departamento de Estado ha aceptado que nada más se ha conquistado una tercera parte de la población - nueve meses después de la "integración" y después de quince meses de amarga guerra.

Un ejemplo, de como los informes sobre las atrocidades cometidas por tropas indonesas han sido sistemáticamente excluidos de la prensa de los EE.UU., es un despacho de UPI desde Singapur (Australian, 8 de Octubre de 1977), reportando que "30.000 tropas indonesas están todavía en Timor Oriental asesinando hombres, mujeres y niños". Este reporte fue realizado por el periodista-fotógrafo, Denis Reichle, de Paris-Match. Este periodista da una "estimación de confianza" de 70 - 75.000 timorenses orientales que han sido asesinados por indoneses durante diez y ocho meses de combate. Los indoneses, informa, no buscan combatir las fuerzas de FREtilin, sino que "están sistemáticamente aniquilando" la población de
los pueblos que están bajo sospecha de ser partidarios de FRETILIN, destruyendo de esta forma las líneas de abastecimiento de FRETILIN. Reichle reportó también que, misioneros católicos eran las únicas voces en Timor que estaban tratando de parar la "matanza sistemática de los timorenses orientales", y además, que un sacerdote alemán se volvió loco debido a las constantes matanzas en su área.

En contraste con los cuentos sobre una "guerra civil" en la que "fuerzas pro-indonesas" habían derrotado a FRETILIN, este reporte de un periodista del mundo occidental no llegó nunca al público de los EE.UU.

Mientras tanto algunos timorenses habían logrado escapar a Portugal o Australia, y en muchos casos después de haber sobornado con miles de dólares a las autoridades indonesas. Hay muchos presoneros dentro de Timor Oriental y cartas y reportes hacen frecuentemente referencia a la "desaparición" de gente, lo que los timorenses suponen significa muerte. En una carta de Julio de 1979, se afirma que "muchas gente ha desaparecido... y muchas viudas de los recientemente desaparecidos vagan por las calles en estado perturbado... delgadas como esqueletos."

Esta carta se citó en una Acción para el Desarrollo Mundial que fue presentada al ICRC (Comisión de la Cruz Roja Internacional) - donde se añadía que "gente que se había rendido bajo la Amnistía Presidencial que expiraba el 31 de Diciembre de 1977, también habría desaparecido". Esta carta informaba además sobre "inquietantes reportes" de tortura y lavado de cerebro en las prisiones, de ejecuciones sin juicio y de otras atrocidades y represiones. De acuerdo a fuentes bien informadas, las fuerzas armadas indonesas están siguiendo la política de no tomar prisioneros, y de ejecutar a gente que está estrechamente vinculada a FRETILIN, incluidas sus familias.

Estos y otros testimonios fueron expuestos por Noam Chomsky en el Cuarto Comité de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en Octubre de 1979. Por otra parte Noam
Chomsky subrayó una vez más, el papel que los Estados Unidos habían representado en las Naciones Unidas a través de su Embajador, Daniel P. Moynihan. Este Embajador, en sus memorias recientemente publicadas sobre su término en las Naciones Unidas, tiene lo siguiente que decir acerca del triunfo de Indonesia en Timor: "Los Estados Unidos deseaban que las cosas saliesen tal y como sucedieron, y trabajamos para que así fuera. El Departamento de Estado deseaba que las Naciones Unidas resultaran totalmente inefectivas en cualquier medida que tomaran. Esta tarea me fue encomendada, y la llevé a término no sin considerable éxito." Moynihan cita una estimación que en Febrero de 1976 hizo el Presidente del gobierno provisional instalado por Indonesia, según la cual: "desde el comienzo de la guerra civil han muerto alrededor de 60.000 personas... el 10% de la población, casi la misma proporción de víctimas que la Unión Soviética sufrió durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial."

Moynihan está en efecto pretendiendo, que se le conceda crédito por su ayuda a causar una masacre de alrededor del 10% de la población (en Febrero de 1976). Un hecho que él ha comparado con las consecuencias de la agresión nazi — por no hablar del número mucho mayor de víctimas que cayeron durante el período posterior.

Noam Chomsky acabó esta declaración, con las siguientes palabras: "A menos que una ayuda internacional a gran escala pueda ser ofrecida de inmediato, el sufrimiento y el número de víctimas en Timor Oriental continuará en aumento. Las Naciones Unidas deben actuar directamente y con eficacia, para asegurar que la ayuda sea efectuada con todos los controles necesarios. A pesar del cinismo de los grandes poderes, el pueblo timorense no está inevitablemente condenado a su destrucción total, y su valiente lucha por la independencia nacional no es una causa perdida. Las Naciones Unidas pueden todavía desempeñar un papel importante en asegurar la supervivencia de las gentes de Timor Oriental, ayudando a realizar el derecho de este pueblo a la auto-determinación."
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