

Alan R. Marcus

OUT IN THE COLD

the Legacy of Canada's
Inuit Relocation Experiment
in the High Arctic



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Preface

This study is based on a Master's thesis, of the same title, which the author completed at the Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, in June 1990. Some alterations and additions have been made to the original manuscript, based on subsequent interviews and archival research.

The author is most grateful to the following people and organizations: the Inuit relocatees and others in the communities of Inukjuak, Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord who kindly shared their experiences and thoughts with me – as did a number of former civil servants, police officers and government planners of the relocation; the staff of the Scott Polar Research Institute, the Government Archives Division at the National Archives of Canada, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Makivik Corporation, and Avataq Cultural Institute. The author would like to thank the following persons and institutions for their permission to reproduce photographs and illustrations: Bob Pilot (cover, fig. 4, 6, 10, 11), the Hudson's Bay Company (fig. 5), Makivik Corporation (fig. 15), Martha Flaherty (fig. 12), the National Archives of Canada (fig. 14), and the City of Vancouver Archives (fig. 2). Travel grants awarded by the B.B. Roberts Fund, American Friends of Cambridge, the Bartle Frere Exhibition, the Smuts Memorial Fund, and Clare College contributed to funding to allow the author to conduct archival and field research in Canada. I am also pleased to acknowledge support from a grant by the National Science Foundation.

Coverphoto:

Pauloosie from Port Harrison, at Grise Fiord, Fall. (Courtesy of Bob Pilot)

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Introduction

In March 1990, members of Canada's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs listened to testimony presented by Inuit (Eskimos) who had been the subject of a 1950s government relocation experiment. The Inuit recounted years of suffering and neglect as a result of their resettlement. Eleven Inuit families had been moved by the Canadian government from the region of Port Harrison (now Inukjuak) on Quebec's Ungava peninsula, 2250km north to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands in the High Arctic. They were joined by four Pond Inlet Inuit families from north Baffin. The operation was developed as a colonization plan (Larsen, 1952c), making the new colonies at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay the northernmost Inuit settlements in Canada (Figure 1).

Stark contrasts between reports by officials and the words of Inuit survivors now form a central part of the debate. Today Inuit relocatees claim that they were deceived by the government and suffered greatly as a result of the experiment. The government asserts that the relocation was undertaken for humanitarian reasons. The Human Rights Commission has conducted an inquiry into the issue, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have undertaken an internal investigation. At the request of Parliament, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) was required to submit a report responding to the allegations presented before the Committee on Aboriginal Affairs. A report was prepared for DIAND by the Hickling Corporation, a consultancy firm, and tabled in the House of Commons in November 1990. The 'Hickling Report' (1990: 6) concluded that "the evidence we examined does not support the allegation that the Government committed wrongdoing in the planning and conduct of the project". This comment should be treated with skepticism, for a number of the statements and conclusions presented in the Hickling Report are questionable (Marcus, 1991). Indeed, the Canadian Human Rights Commission Report of December 1991 found that the government "failed to meet its fiduciary duties of care and diligence in planning and carrying out the relocation, and in not taking steps in the first few years to honour its promise of return" (Soberman, 1991:56).




Figure 1: Map showing the government's Inuit relocation operations to Devon Island, 1934; King Georg Islands and Sleeper Islands, 1951-52; Churchill, 1953, Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay, 1953-55. (Grant 1988).

Problems with the planning and execution of the relocation were noted in official reports shortly after the move in 1953. Grievances by Inuit relocatees were voiced in meetings held in Resolute Bay in 1956 and reported to Ottawa by officials, yet little was done to remedy the situation. In 1978 the national Inuit organization ITC (Inuit Tapirisat of Canada) and Makivik Corporation, the northern Quebec Inuit organization, began their lobbying campaign to urge the government to investigate the issue. After various appeals, reports, and ministerial changes at DIAND, it was not until 1987 that the government offered to make some form of limited compensation. DIAND consented to return members of the relocated families back to Inukjuak, 35 years after officials had originally agreed to do so. However, the government was reluctant to negotiate other requests for compensation and recognition. After hearing Inuit oral testimony of mistreatment, some members of parliament have shown sympathy for the plight of the relocatees; whereas other officials have attempted to dismiss Inuit allegations. It has been suggested that time has altered survivors' memories, and that exaggerations are being made. After all, the Inuit for the most part have only their oral testimonies, they kept no records at the time events were taking place. In its archives, the government and its agencies have all the documents relating to the relocation project.

In order to understand the background of this controversy, there has been a need to obtain access to government files on the case in order to discover if hard documentation still exists to corroborate Inuit testimony. In this paper the results of an investigation of government documents provide a chronicle of the relocation's diverse socio-economic impact, much of which substantiates Inuit assertions of mistreatment (Marcus, 1990). Under Canada's "Access to Information" legislation, government documents and newly released police files offer important details about the planning and execution of the Inuit relocation experiment in 1953-55, and the administration of the colonies thereafter.

This study is based on a review of files held in government archives including the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, and on interviews conducted with former civil servants and Inuit survivors of the relocation. In addition, evidence given by the relocated Inuit in a parliamentary hearing in Ottawa on 19 March 1990 provides important testimonial accounts of life in the colonies. This study analyses the reasons the government has given for undertaking the experiment, and focuses on three additional motives related to economic policy incentives, moral convictions and sovereignty concerns.

The relocation experiment was organized as a joint operation of the Canadian government's Department of Resources and Development (DRD) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The DRD has since evolved, in 1954 becoming the Department of Northern Affairs and

National Resources (DNANR), and later to DIAND. The geographical term "Arctic Archipelago" is used to describe Canada's Arctic Islands; the "High Arctic Archipelago" refers to the northernmost island group known as the Queen Elizabeth Islands. In the documents, "Craig Harbour" often refers to the nearby Inuit camp at "Grise Fiord".

The relocation in 1953 and 1955 from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay will form the main case study of this paper. This move was a forerunner for numerous relocations in the 1950s-70s, which affected the entire Inuit population of Canada. The other relocations which will also be referred to in this study are as follows: Inuit from Cape Dorset, Pond Inlet and Pangnirtung relocated to Devon Island in 1934; Port Harrison Inuit to King George Islands and the Sleeper Islands in 1951-52; Fort Chimo Inuit to Churchill, Manitoba in 1953; and Pond Inlet Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953-55.

Three of the Inuit relocatees whom I interviewed for this study, and who testified before the parliamentary committee, are John Amagoalik, former president of Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, Markoosie Patsauq, an author and Canada's first Inuit High Arctic pilot, and Martha Flaherty, who appears on Canada's \$100 gold coin minted in 1990.

Chapter 1.

Volunteers for Rehabilitation?

1.1 Choice of Corrective Measures

In May 1952 the Canadian government organized the first Conference on Eskimo Affairs, its purpose to find solutions to "the Eskimo Problem" – considered to be an unstable economy, poor health, and growing welfare-dependency. Officials at the conference agreed on the policy directive "that the immediate need was to assist the native to continue to follow their traditional way of life as hunters" (Eskimo Affairs, 1952a: 4).

To this end, the RCMP was to continue to play an integral role in Inuit administration. The conference outlined the functions of the RCMP towards the Inuit. "The enforcement of law and order and the laws of the Northwest Territories", it stated, "were considered to be a minor part of the R.C.M. Police duties in the Arctic. Eskimos as a race are law-abiding and there is little crime" (ibid: 2). Thus the RCMP were occupied mainly in welfare work among the Inuit and served as representatives of other departments in the Arctic. They issued the Inuit with Family Allowances, old age allowances, pensions for the blind and relief to the destitute. They also issued game and hunting licenses, fur export permits, and even acted as postmasters.

Most of Canada's Inuit lived in the Northwest Territories. This vast region was supervised by the RCMP's 41 detachments of "G" Division, headquartered in Ottawa, which was also responsible for the Yukon, and northern Quebec. The Officer Commanding "G" Division was Inspector Henry Larsen, who was promoted to the position in 1949 (Figure 2). Larsen became an advocate for finding new ways of dealing with the "Eskimo problem". On 8 February 1952 Larsen sent a memo titled, "Proposed Movement of Eskimo Families from Baffin Island to Ellesmere Island, N.W.T." to the head of the RCMP, Commissioner L. H. Nicholson. Larsen recommended locating a detachment in the vicinity of Cape Sabine (also referred to separately as Bache Peninsula, Twin Glaciers and Alexandra Fiord) on Ellesmere Island and stated:

"...we should in addition to the two native families employed permanently by the Police, endeavour to recruit three or four good Eskimo families from Pond



Figure 2: Henry A. Larsen, R.C.M.P., 1944. (Photo: Vancouver City Archives)

Inlet area to be transported up there for the purpose of trapping, hunting, etc., and thereby in a general way improve their economic circumstances" (Larsen, 1952a).

With the exception of an Inuit special constable and his family living at the RCMP detachment at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere, reopened in 1951, there were no Inuit living on Ellesmere, or on any of the other islands in the High Arctic Archipelago. Commissioner Nicholson responded to Larsen's request by sending a "Confidential" memo to Major General Hugh Young, Deputy Minister of the DRD: "I thought you should have information on this matter now, as you may wish to have some thought given to its implications, particularly insofar as it may touch on the movement and welfare of the natives" (Nicholson, 1952).

In 1934, the government had organized a similar relocation to the one suggested by Insp. Larsen, by moving Inuit from Baffin Island to the High Arctic Archipelago. The Department of the Interior attempted to experiment with placing Inuit in an area where "game is more abundant" (Montagnes, 1935). The Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) post manager Chesley Russell was asked to take charge of the operation, and in the summer of 1934 the HBC moved ten families from the Baffin Island communities of Cape Dorset, Pangnirtung and Pond Inlet to establish a post at Dundas Harbour on Devon Island. According to Russell, the Inuit "had a depressing and pessimistic attitude towards the venture" (Russell, 1978). Due to the climatic severity of the region and difficulties with supplying the settlement, the colonization plan was altered and the Inuit removed from Devon Island in 1936.

Nonetheless, at the May 1952 Conference on Eskimo Affairs the suggestion was once again made to establish an Inuit colony in the High Arctic: "Movements could be initiated from over-populated or depleted districts", it concluded, "to areas not presently occupied or where the natural resources could support a greater number of people" (Eskimo Affairs, 1952a: 4). Officials also emphasized the plan's advantages for better conservation and utilization of food resources.

The DRD decided to develop the relocation plan further. In his report on the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol, the Officer-in-Charge, R.G. Johnston, described his attempt to encourage Inuit from the Port Harrison area to take part in a relocation scheme:

"If it is desired to move any native families off the Quebec coast and north to Baffin Island, Inukpuk E9-904, Pellypushie E9-720, and eight other families of the Port Harrison area have signified their willingness to move. In order that we might encourage natives to move from Quebec to better hunting grounds it is suggested that these people be moved next summer on the Howe". (Johnston, 1952).

The DRD's plan to move Inuit families from Port Harrison to Baffin Island was an extension of the RCMP's policy directive in 1951-52 to equip and relocate small groups of Inuit away from Port Harrison to the nearby King George Islands and the Sleeper Islands off the coast during the fall months. According to the RCMP, this action had proved to be an effective method of aiding the hunters to obtain more game and making the families more self-reliant. However, there was a fundamental difference between the types of assisted movement being considered. Whereas the earlier efforts by the RCMP were of a temporary nature to locations in proximity to Port Harrison, the DRD's new plan to move families from Port Harrison to Baffin Island would be on a more permanent resettlement basis to more distant sites.

The RCMP proceeded to develop their own plan for the Inuit relocation project. On 22 September 1952, Insp. Larsen informed Commissioner Nicholson of his idea to move to Craig Harbour, Cape Sabine and Dundas Harbour several Inuit families "where colonization by them appears to be suitable and feasible" (Larsen, 1952c). At a meeting of the Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs held on 16 October 1952 in Ottawa, a policy of relocation in accordance with Larsen's plan was discussed:

"Consideration was given to the possibility of assisting natives to move from over-populated areas to places where they could more readily obtain a living. It was agreed that Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine on Ellesmere Island should be investigated as possible localities where Eskimos could be placed under the care of the R.C.M. Police detachments" (Eskimo Affairs, 1952b: 4).

Larsen's plan of moving a group of Inuit from Pond Inlet and north Baffin to Ellesmere Island, and the DRD's plan of moving a group of families from Port Harrison to Baffin Island, were then brought together under one relocation scheme. As Alex Stevenson wrote on 8 December 1952 to James Cantley, Chief of the Arctic Services branch of the DRD:

"I understand that you are considering the transfer of about ten families from the Port Harrison area of Northern Quebec to Ellesmere Island where they can be looked after by the present R.C.M.P. Detachment at Craig Harbour and by the proposed detachment near Cape Herschel. In connection with the above I would suggest that one or two families from Northern Baffin Island be moved with the Port Harrison group. These natives would be familiar with conditions and could greatly assist the Port Harrison people, and would help to sustain the morale" (Stevenson, 1952).

By 18 December 1952, James Cantley had formulated DRD's initiative for the "transfer of natives" from "over-populated areas". He

advanced a plan for the Inuit to "be made self-supporting", and suggested "transferring" about ten families from the Port Harrison area to Ellesmere Island aboard the ships the *C.D. Howe* and the *D'Iberville* in the summer of 1953 (Cantley, 1952). Cantley also proposed to transfer in the same ships about ten families from northern Quebec and/or Cape Dorset to Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island, "provided arrangements can be made with the R.C.M. Police to station a man there to look after the natives". He added that "arrangements could probably be made with the Department of Transport or the R.C.A.F. to employ some on a year round basis as maintenance crew on the base at Resolute Bay" (ibid.).

Acting on Cantley's suggestion of moving some of the Port Harrison families to Resolute Bay, Major General Young asked Commissioner Nicholson if the RCMP would consider opening a detachment at Resolute: "It would be possible to establish these small settlements only with your co-operation as there is no one else at these places who could assist these people in adjusting themselves to new conditions" (Young, 1953a). Nicholson (1953) responded: "I would be quite willing to select a good man and have him stationed there with the specific job of taking care of the natives. Can we help any in the matter of selecting natives for Resolute?" Young replied to Nicholson that he was pleased the RCMP was prepared to open a detachment at Resolute Bay, and that the DRD "shall welcome the co-operation of your force in selecting the Eskimos who can be moved to better locations" (Young, 1953b). Once the DRD had referred the task of selecting the relocatees to the RCMP, Insp. Larsen requested his detachments at Port Harrison, Pond Inlet and Fort Chimo to prepare lists of families to go north. Larsen appointed Constable Ross Gibson as the officer to organize the selection of Inuit in Port Harrison.

1.2 The Selection Process: Recruits for Reform

In virtually all DRD and RCMP accounts, as well as press releases on the relocation, officials emphasized that the families were "volunteers". James Cantley and Alex Stevenson of the DRD prepared a statement in November 1953 describing the relocation for publication in the journal *Arctic Circular*. What is striking is their choice of rhetoric (emphasis mine):

*"Food supplies were reported to be plentiful and there is every indication that this **migration** should prove a success. This **transfer** of Eskimos was organized by the Department of Resources and Development . . . If the results this year warrant it, other natives can be moved to these **pioneer points** and to other points selected later. For the present, however, this migration is being considered as an **experiment** to determine if Eskimos can be **induced** to live on the*

northern islands . . . All the Eskimos moved this past summer, did so voluntarily" (Cantley, 1953).

Cantley and Stevenson did not use the word "relocation", which might imply dislocation or intervention. Instead the words "transfer", an innocuous military term, and "migration" were used. "Migration" suggests a naturally occurring annual movement; the title of this report was "Movement of Natives". Yet the description of the relocation in naturalized terms is offset by the use of the words "pioneer points", "experiment", and "induced", which hint at possible coercion. Nevertheless, the authors were quick to add that the participants moved "voluntarily".

The Inuit, however, feel that "induced" would be a more apt description of the recruitment process. As Anna Nungaq (1981) explained, the officials "were actually looking for volunteers, and no one offered to go so therefore we had no choice. We had no idea of where we were going or why. We were very confused". Other Inuit agreed with her comments, as John Amagoalik (Figure 3) stated:

"[My parents'] first reaction was no we cannot leave our home, we cannot leave our families. We just cannot agree to this. The RCMP went away but they came back, they came back two or three times as I remember and they were very, very persistent . . . Now you must also remember, understand that in 1953 the white man was viewed as almost a God by our people. They were feared. I mean we were afraid of them. We were afraid to say no to anything they wanted" (Canada, 1990a).

When families acquiesced to the RCMP's request for relocation recruits, their experience of earlier RCMP initiated projects was founded on the 1951-52 assisted moves to the King George and Sleeper Islands (Chapter 1.1). The Inuit assumed from these episodes when they were able to return to the nearby Port Harrison area, that a similar arrangement would be possible with the new resettlement project being proposed. They were further reassured by official guarantees to that effect.

The process of Inuit relocation became one of the three policy options developed by the DRD (1953), as outlined in a classification system the Department formulated in 1953. Under this procedure, Canada's Inuit were divided into three broad categories:

1. In areas where the natural resources would support the inhabitants, it was decided that their basic way of life was to be maintained.
2. In areas where permanent white settlements existed, the Inuit would be educated to adapt them to this new situation.



Figure 3: John Amagoalik, Ottawa, 1990. (Photo: Alan Marcus)

3. In areas which could not continue to support the present population, attempts would be made to move the Inuit to areas with greater natural resources.

Fort Chimo in northern Quebec was temporarily included in the relocation plans along with Port Harrison. During World War II, Fort Chimo had been the site of a U.S. air base which employed local Inuit as labourers. As such, Chimo would be classified category 2. Because the base was now closed, the loss in wage-employment had to be offset by comparatively large allocations of state benefits. As an alternative the Chimo Inuit were also considered for relocation under category 3. However, after receiving an RCMP list of potential relocatees from Fort Chimo, DRD reversed its earlier decision to include them with the Port Harrison Inuit as part of a relocation to the High Arctic. Shortly before the move Deputy Minister Hugh Young upon reconsideration felt that the Fort Chimo Inuit had become too acculturated, and might therefore be unsuitable for inclusion in the experiment. Young's concern was whether

"...they would be able to adapt themselves to conditions at such a place as Resolute Bay. Few, if any of them, can build snow-houses and would certainly have to be housed and be guaranteed full- time employment at the base" (Young, 1953c).

In June 1953, the month before the move, the DRD informed Larsen that the Inuit families selected from Fort Chimo were being dropped from the High Arctic relocation plan (LeCapelain, 1953). The DRD therefore decided to experiment with a different type of relocation and move five of the Fort Chimo Inuit families in 1953 to a site of wage-employment and housing at an Army base in Churchill, Manitoba (see Figure 1).

According to the DRD's criteria, the Port Harrison Inuit would also be classified in category 2 – the community had been a permanent settlement with a white population for forty years. As such, Port Harrison was one of the first Arctic communities to obtain a school, which was built in 1949. However, the decision was made by the DRD to include Port Harrison in category 3, thereby using relocation as a means to depopulate the region. Unlike the Fort Chimo Inuit whom the DRD decided would "certainly have to be housed" (Le Capelain, 1953), the Port Harrison Inuit would not have to be provided with housing, or the benefits of wage employment.

During this period, one of DRD's "welfare teachers", Miss Margery Hinds, was based at Port Harrison. There were no special materials for Inuit children, so the DRD's policy was to use the standard primary

readers used in the south, such as *Fun With Dick and Jane*, *Our New Friends*, and *Streets and Roads* (Jacobson, 1955). Aside from the daunting task of teaching Inuit children who lived in small hunting camps about "streets and roads" in English, the welfare teacher's job was to monitor the health and welfare of the Inuit families in the area. She collected information on the local Inuit and filed regular reports of her findings to DRD's Northern Administration & Lands Branch. Her reports provide important background information both about the relocation selection process and on the individuals involved.

In Port Harrison on 4 May 1953 RCMP Constable Ross Gibson informed Miss Hinds that he was calling a meeting that evening to discuss the question of moving some families to the north. According to Miss Hinds (1953a), Gibson said that "he was under no obligation to discuss the question with anyone", but that he thought that people of the various departments might be interested and have suggestions to offer. All of the whites in the settlement were present at the meeting, including the nurse Mrs Reynolds and the HBC post manager Mr Ploughman. Miss Hinds later recorded in her report: "I suggested that those who have proved themselves capable of living far from the trading post, and who get along without much help from the government or the H.B.C. are more likely to prove successful folk to go north" (ibid.).

Yet Cst. Gibson (1990) apparently decided not to allow the welfare teacher or the other white officials, with the exception of the HBC manager, to take part in the selection process. He also decided not to choose families "who have proved themselves capable of living far from the trading post, and who get along without much help from the government", as Miss Hinds had suggested (Hinds, 1953a). Instead, Gibson selected those families who in general had become most reliant on relief benefits and supplies from the HBC post (Gibson, 1990). He did so despite the welfare teacher's recommendation that she "did not consider any local Eskimos suitable for they had acquired un-Eskimo habits at the post" (Hinds, 1953a). RCMP Cpl. G.A. Mansell (1950) illustrated these "un-Eskimo habits" in a report for Port Harrison in which he discussed some of the individuals later selected by Gibson:

"... their families spent all their efforts in begging around the post; they were in to the post sometimes four or five times each week instead of remaining in their camp hunting . . . These two families have now been put on permanent relief".

Similarly, in her welfare teacher's report for July 1953, Miss Hinds described her visit to the camp of some of Gibson's relocatees. This camp included four families selected for relocation. Hinds stated that "they seemed to be among the most destitute in this camp . . . [one] tent gave

an impression of utter destitution" (Hinds, 1953b). Cst. Gibson (1956) himself described one relocatee in a report: "While in Port Harrison [he] had poor equipment, three poor dogs and lived entirely from his family allowance and asked from time to time for assistance".

The Inuit relocatees remember when Cst. Gibson came to their camps looking for volunteers to go north. Edith Patsauq recalls the incident:

"My late husband and I were visited by a police officer and his interpreter. They sat themselves in front of us and for the first time we heard about the relocation issue. They said they had come to ask us if we will want to be relocated as well since our relatives had already agreed to go. Not being able to do without our relatives, we said we would go too, for he was also saying that we could return home after two years" (Makivik, 1986).

Gibson selected the relocatees on the basis that "these people were all welfare cases and were perhaps some of the poorest Eskimos in the Arctic" (Gibson, 1990). He says that the HBC trader at Port Harrison, Rouben Ploughman, was "most helpful in making the final decision". Ploughman knew who the good hunters were, and who were classified as "lazy" or as "indigent Eskimos" dependent on relief benefits. Gibson still believes "the natives made their final decision – no one was pressured or promised anything by myself" (ibid.). However, the Inuit remember things differently:

"There was a lot of arm twisting. The RCMP was held in fear by our people. It was intimidating to my parents. To say that people were eager to move is nonsense" (John Amagoalik, 1988).

Several of the Inuit whom Cst. Gibson selected could have been deemed inappropriate for the relocation. They included a pregnant woman, Sarah Amagoalik, a grandmother of about 80 years old, Nellie Amagoalik, and a disabled person who could not walk, Anna Nungaq. Some of the elders Gibson chose were in their 50s. The welfare teacher's criticisms of the selection process, duly noted in a report to her superiors, the DRD planners of the experiment in Ottawa, were overlooked or dismissed. The files do not show that there were any other comments by DRD officials or the RCMP on the ability of the individuals selected to participate in the relocation experiment, despite their handicaps and physical unsuitability. Not surprisingly, later in a report from Resolute Bay regarding a second shipment of relocatees, Cst. Gibson advised that "it is felt this area is not the place for aged who would be a hindrance in making this programme a success" (Gibson, 1955).

Cst. Gibson's disagreements with Miss Hinds over the selection process was indicative of the occasional conflict between the RCMP, who

had long governed the north, and the DRD, who were represented by new personnel such as Miss Hinds. The RCMP dominated the relocation process from the beginning, and was effective for a number of years in maintaining virtual total control over the new colonies once they were established. It did so despite subsequent efforts by the DRD to exert some influence over their jurisdiction and intercede on the Inuit's behalf, as will be discussed later.

In a letter from Major General Young to J.C. Lessard, Deputy Minister of the Department of Transport (DOT) on 8 June 1953, Young (1953d) confirmed that "plans are now completed" for the relocation, and outlined the revised quotas to be filled (see Table 1).

Port of embarkation	Number of Inuit
Port Harrison, Quebec	7 families (34 Inuit)
Pond Inlet	4 families (20 Inuit)

Table 1: Quota of families for 1953 relocation to Craig Harbour, Alexandra Fiord and Resolute Bay.
Source: Young (1953d).

Young commented that "the above list of Eskimos will be distributed in groups – four families to Resolute Bay, four families to Craig Harbour and three families to Cape Herschel" (ibid.). Soon after, one family from Pond Inlet was dropped from the plan, which left ten families altogether.

On 25 July, the government's Eastern Arctic Patrol ship the *C.D. Howe* anchored off Port Harrison on the northwest coast of the Ungava Peninsula, and picked up Gibson's seven Inuit families, consisting of thirty-four men, women, and children, and their dogs and belongings. They were stowed in the bow of the ship and mattresses were placed on the steel deck for them to sleep on. On 28 August the ship reached Pond Inlet on northern Baffin Island, and a group of three Inuit families of sixteen men, women, and children were taken on board (Appendix A). The following day the ship arrived at the RCMP detachment at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island (Figure 4). Four of the Inuit families disembarked, including the Port Harrison families of Paddy and Joadamie Aqiatasuk and Philipusie Novalinga, together with Samuel Anukudluk's family from Pond Inlet. The other families were separated and transferred to the icebreaker *C.G.S. D'Iberville*.

Problems soon developed. The ice conditions were so bad that the new icebreaker *D'Iberville* was damaged by an iceberg at Craig Harbour. Doug Wilkinson (1953), who filmed the relocation for the Film Board,



Figure 4: RCMP detachment at Craig Harbour, 1955. (Photo: Bob Pilot)

recounted that he could see daylight through the two big gashes in his starboard cabin. The ship proceeded north to reach the new RCMP detachment 402 km. away at Alexandra Fiord. At lat. 78°35N, it was the northernmost RCMP detachment and was established just a month before under the supervision of Insp. Larsen. However, due to heavy pack ice, the ship was unable to reach Alexandra Fiord, and returned to Craig Harbour, where on 4 September it dropped off two more Inuit families. This group included Thomasie Amagoalik and his family from Port Harrison, and Akpaliapik's family from Pond Inlet.

The *D'Iberville* reached Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island on 7 September and left Cst. Gibson with nineteen Inuit. These included the three families of Simeonie Amagoalik, Daniel Salluviniq and Alex Patsauq from Port Harrison, and the family of Jaybeddie Amagoalik (no relation to Simeonie) from Pond Inlet. Cst. Gibson's mission was both to establish an RCMP detachment at Resolute Bay and to ensure the success of the relocation (Gibson, 1991).

1.3 Dividing up the Families

The trip north in 1953 entailed the segregation of families and friends. Upon reaching Ellesmere Island after a six-week voyage aboard *C.D. Howe*, officials separated the Port Harrison families on the ship without

prior warning. Elijah Nutaraq (1989), who was 21 years old at the time of the relocation in 1953, recalled that "I had assumed that we would all be together, so I was not happy when I learned that we were going to be such a small community". The division of the families made a lasting impression on John Amagoalik:

"When we got near [Craig Harbour] the RCMP came to us and they told us: half of you have to get off here. And we just went into a panic because they had promised that they would not separate us . . . I remember we were all on the deck of the ship, the C.D. HOWE, and all the women started to cry. And when women start to cry, the dogs join in. It was eerie. We were dumped on the beach – and I mean literally dumped on the beach" (Canada, 1990a).

Government documents and statements made by officials support the Inuit contention that they were not told in advance that they would be split into different groups. A final ship passengers' log prepared by the DRD lists the relocatees collectively under the three destinations, and does not distinguish between them. While the families were on board the C.D. Howe in August 1953, RCAF Squadron Leader O'Neil asked a DRD official "how many families would be going to each of the three settlement areas" (DRD, 1953; Appendix C). Mr. Cantley replied "that this would be decided on the boat taking the Eskimo to their destination. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible". Ross Gibson (1990) explains that

"I was not made aware of what was in the workings until we got to Craig Harbour when Henry Larsen advised me of the decision to split the Eskimo people. Due to the time element I doubt that very much thought was given to the final outcome and how it would affect those people involved".

The Inuit had no idea where they were, or where the other groups were being sent to. As Anna Nungaq (1981) recalled:

"When we were told we had to move, we automatically thought we were going to be neighbors with the people who were sent to Resolute Bay. Because we were related and had lived together all our lives, we thought we would be settled close to each other".

The fact that the Inuit were not informed about the planned separation to different colonies demonstrates that they were not fully consulted about the relocation beforehand. This point also indicates the methods of "inducement" used by officials, as suggested earlier by the wording of a DRD press release (Cantley, 1953).

1.4 Problems, Opposition and Press Response

Even while the Inuit were en route to Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay, some officials, including Air Commodore Ripley, voiced their objections to the plan. In July 1953, James Sharpe, Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, wrote to Major General Young regarding the Inuit relocation to Resolute Bay, where the Canadian Air Force had a base:

"It will be noted that the Air Officer Commanding is quite worried that the experiment will result in hardship on the Eskimo families concerned and that the RCAF will likely be faced with the problem of tendering care for which they are unprepared" (Sharpe, 1953).

In response to the concern expressed by the Air Force, Hugh Young quickly arranged an interdepartmental meeting to discuss the operation. The meeting took place in Ottawa on 10 August 1953. RCAF Squadron Leader O'Neil raised one of the Air Force's primary concerns about the availability of natural resources on Cornwallis Island, and said he "was afraid that there was not sufficient wildlife in the Resolute area to provide for the proposed Eskimo population". Mr. Cantley replied that he had "reason to believe that there was sufficient marine life to support the Eskimo families concerned. No one could say for sure that this was the case and, consequently, the experiment was being staged" (DRD, 1953; Appendix C).

DRD had justified the move in public by stating that families from an area where resources were scarce needed to be moved to a region where resources would be plentiful. However, it had made no wildlife studies on the areas' resources. Now, according to Cantley, one of the reasons being offered by the DRD for relocating the families to the region was to see if there were sufficient resources. One of the main reasons given in public for moving Inuit from Port Harrison was that hunting was poor in the area. In fact, 1953-54 was a peak year for trapping in the region of Port Harrison, with 4,920 foxes traded (Willmott, 1961).

The question about sufficient resources in the areas of the new colonies became an important issue. Despite their initial setback in the summer of 1953, officials still wished to establish an Inuit colony at Alexandra Fiord. Supt. Larsen (who was promoted to Superintendent at the time of the relocation) sent a message to the detachment there in January 1954, requesting that they "advise from result of your experience to date whether you consider that Alexandra Fiord district will easily support four or five Eskimo families" (Larsen, 1954a). In February 1954 the Alexandra Fiord detachment reported: "Presently consider this district will not support four or five Eskimo families. To date no land game has been obtained or sighted and none believed to be in district" (ibid.). Alex

The Beaver

A MAGAZINE OF THE NORTH

JUNE 1953




Figure 5: The hospital-supply ship, C.D. Howe on the front cover of June 1953 issue of The Beaver. (Photo: Hudson's Bay Company.)

Stevenson (1954) subsequently made a note to James Cantley advising that "maybe we should just carry on for another year with the families at Craig and add to Resolute".

Because Alexandra Fiord appeared to be poor in resources, and it now seemed that the original families designated to go there would have to remain at Grise Fiord, the plans were changed to keep the Inuit at Grise Fiord at the same population level. One of the Pond Inlet families at Grise Fiord was transferred in the summer of 1955 to the Alexandra Fiord detachment where the father served as an RCMP Special Constable, and a family from Port Harrison was sent up to fill their place at Grise Fiord. Three more families from Port Harrison were relocated to Resolute Bay, as Alex Stevenson had advised. They were joined by Idlout's extended family from Pond Inlet (Appendix B).

The DRD was proud of the relocation experiment and assured a comprehensive reportage by the press. It was only fitting that the *C.D. Howe*, which carried the Inuit families north, appeared in full colour on the front cover of the June 1953 issue of the nationally-distributed magazine *The Beaver* (Figure 5). Canadian newspapers accepted officials' statements and press releases on the relocation without critical assessment. The *Vancouver Province* (30 July 1953) stated that the Inuit were "to be resettled in better hunting areas". The *Kitchener Record* (30 July 1953) noted that the "Resources department is undertaking a project of Eskimo resettlement which may be the forerunner of larger population movements". The *Record* continued that "if they are successful in fending for themselves, other families may be moved north from the game-depleted southern Arctic".

By October 1954 the *Montreal Gazette* reported that the Inuit were pleased with their new surroundings. Under the headline, "New Homes For Eskimos Said Success", the article claimed that the six families at the new settlement of Grise Fiord "have expressed a desire to remain there, although they do not see the sun from mid-November to mid-February". It quoted RCMP Cst. Fryer as saying that the "Port Harrison natives could hardly be recognized as the same ones who had first landed at Craig Harbour. They all looked happier, healthier, having visibly put on weight".

Chapter 2. "Their Garden of Eden"

2.1 Differences of Climate and Resources

Cpl. Glenn Sargent (1954; Figure 6) informed his superiors that for the Port Harrison newcomers: "Craig Harbour and surrounding country is their GARDEN OF EDEN" (emphasis his). The Inuit have since countered that quite the opposite was the case. Shortly after they arrived at Craig Harbour, the RCMP moved the relocatees to Lindstrom Peninsula in Grise Fiord. This site was 65 km west of the RCMP detachment and store, which remained at Craig Harbour until 1956 when the officers also moved to Grise Fiord.

The climatic differences between Inukjuak (Port Harrison) and Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay are extreme. Inukjuak is at lat. 58°27N in the southern Arctic, whereas Resolute Bay is at 74°42N, and Grise Fiord at 76°25N in the High Arctic. Inukjuak is 960km south of the Arctic Circle, whereas at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the High Arctic there is no daylight from November to mid-February. Temperatures and weather conditions are generally much colder and more severe in Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord and are of longer duration than in Inukjuak, which is located just 320km north of the tree line.

During the planning stage of the experiment, Alex Stevenson expressed his concern to James Cantley about the relocatees' ability to cope with the three month dark-period: "As you are well aware the Port Harrison natives will have to contend with the dark-period which they are not familiar with and although the terrain is similar to the Quebec Coast, I know that from past experience with the Dorset natives that the dark period causes some discontentment" (Stevenson, 1952). The mountainous terrain at Grise Fiord is decidedly different from the low elevations characterizing the Port Harrison area. Aside from this comment, it seems the planners were not unduly concerned with nor foresaw the physiological effects and hardship that long months of darkness would have on the families. Yet this was the first time that Inuit from the southern Arctic regions were going to be exposed to these extreme conditions.




Figure 6: Insp. (later Supt.) Henry Larsen and Cpl. Glenn Sargent, Grise Fiord, 1958. (Photo: Bob Pilot)

DRD officials have maintained that the Inuit were told in advance what the conditions in the High Arctic were going to be like. But the high mountains behind Grise Fiord, the dark-period and colder temperatures clearly came as a shock:

"The first two or three years were terrible for us. Especially the dark season" (John Amagoalik, 1988).

"I assumed that the far north had the same terrain as the Inukjuak area. It turned out that the land was not the same, and that the sun behaved differently at those latitudes . . . It got darker and darker and eventually disappeared for good in November . . . We couldn't get used to the never-ending darkness" (Elijah Nutaraq, 1989).

Even the RCMP officers found the conditions difficult to get used to. Ross Gibson (1990) remarked that "I found during the dark season it was quite depressing for me under such circumstances". Nonetheless, in a publication in 1954, Cst. Fryer reported that "the dark period . . . hadn't seemed to interfere with [the Inuit's] routine" (Fryer, 1954b). The Inuit have since officially named Resolute Bay "Qausuittuq" or "place of darkness".

Finding sources of drinking water at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay became an initial difficulty for the relocatees. Inukjuak is in a region where streams, rivers and lakes provide drinking water all year round. Land-sited water is more difficult to obtain in the Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay areas, and the families had to obtain fresh water from ice floating in the sea. Elijah Nutaraq (1989) recalled that Grise Fiord "did not have much greenery, and there were no lakes or rivers to draw water from. We had to get ice from icebergs for drinking water". The annual precipitation at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay averages only 5.28 inches, while at Inukjuak the average is over twice as much at 13.60 inches. As Elijah Nutaraq observed: "We used to come across the same polar bear tracks that we had seen the year before, looking just as new as the day they were made" (ibid.).

The Inuit also had to conform to a change in diet, and learn new hunting skills adapted to the different ice, terrain, and dark-period conditions. The Inuit were told by the officials that there would be an abundance of game up north. Yet as has been shown, the government had made no wildlife resource studies to support such statements. In fact, in the case of Alexandra Fiord, the officials were proven wrong, and game resources were subsequently deemed to be poor. In Inukjuak the Inuit had a diverse diet consisting of three types of seal, three main fishes including whitefish, Arctic Char and trout, walrus, white whales and some caribou. They hunted Canadian and blue geese, ducks, sea pigeons, gulls, terns, and gathered eggs and berries. But at Grise Fiord

and Resolute Bay there were few birds or caribou or fish; instead their diet was restricted mainly to seals, walrus and polar bear.

The High Arctic Archipelago was within the Arctic Islands Preserve, created in 1926, and special game regulations applied. Accordingly, the RCMP forbade the Inuit to hunt musk-ox, and strictly regulated the killing of caribou. "There were a lot of musk-oxen, but we were forbidden to kill them", says Elijah Nutaraq (ibid.). In fact the RCMP in part justified having its detachments at Alexandra Fiord and Craig Harbour so that the officers could ensure that Greenlanders from the Thule district did not come over to Ellesmere and hunt musk-oxen, as they had done in the past. The relocatees did not understand why they should not be allowed to hunt musk-oxen or caribou when they were hungry. Elijah Nutaraq remembered that they "survived on seal and polar bear meat" (ibid.).

2.2 Survival: Scavenging for Food and Shelter

C.J. Marshall of DRD's Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) visited Cst. Gibson and the Inuit camp at Resolute Bay within a few months of the move. In a "Confidential" report Marshall (1953) expressed his dissatisfaction with the relocation and outlined the operation's mismanagement. For example, he noted that when the relocatees arrived at Resolute Bay, they had no stockpile of meat for the winter. "They have had to hunt every day since they arrived there", he stated, "and must continue to do so as long as the weather allows leaving them insufficient time to repair their gear and prepare in other ways for the winter". Marshall also reported that their "tents were in very bad condition but no new tents or repair material were sent to Resolute". Among the items he listed which were sent to Resolute Bay were:

"24 pairs of men's work pants although there are only 4 men in the group. These pants are in sizes of 35 to 38 which make them much too big for the Eskimo.

12 pairs of boys' pants although there are only 2 boys in the settlement.

200 gals. of gasoline at approximately 70 cents a gal and 2 Hot Shot batteries although the Eskimo have no internal combustion engine of any kind"(ibid.).

Marshall declared that "I personally examined the goods in the Eskimo store and would say that for the prices charged some of the items are extremely poor quality". Marshall also reported the critical number of important items missing from the shipment. These included rifles, tent material, lumber, duffle cloth, oil lamps, fish hooks and first-aid supplies. When Cst. Gibson went over the supplies, he found a shortage of \$1,124 worth of goods. By Marshall's calculation, it appeared

that about 40% of the supplies intended for the Inuit store at Resolute Bay were not landed. Marshall added that:

"Everyone wants the experiment at Resolute to be a success and I feel sure it will be but the task at Resolute has been made more difficult than it need have been through what appears to have been hasty planning during the early stages of the experiment" (ibid.).

Though the families were clearly unprepared for the drastic change in environment, that is not what the public were told. Cst. Fryer published the following statement in an article in the Spring 1954 issue of *RCMP Quarterly*:

"It would be difficult to find a group of Eskimos anywhere in the North that could claim to be as well off as the Grise Fiord camp . . . Eskimo conditions could hardly be better. The Port Harrison natives have adapted themselves well, following the example set by the Pond Inlet group" (Fryer, 1954b).

While the officers reported to their superiors that the Inuit were "happy" in their "new homes", the Inuit have since offered a different picture. They have testified that they felt far from content during those early years; they were struggling to survive and they found it difficult to adapt to the severe environmental conditions. Martha Flaherty (1986; Figure 7), who was relocated to Grise Fiord, remembers that her father

". . . used to go hunting in -40° to -60° weather in the dark for days at times without eating . . . I don't think I even had a childhood between the ages of 7 to 12 because I had to hunt with my father for food, in very cold weather, with absolutely no daylight . . . Sometimes I used to cry knowing how cold it was going to be, but then my father would just say, 'Do you want us to starve?'"

Cst. Gibson (1955) noted in his report of March 1955: "The native camp at Resolute Bay continues to survive". In order to survive, the relocatees needed to hunt, regardless of the weather conditions. Whereas in Port Harrison there were other options, like receiving supplies from the store on relief if necessary, the Inuit had no option at their new location. John Amagoalik remembered "being very excited when any military airplane arrived in Resolute, because we knew that the people on those airplanes had box lunches, food. We used to rush to the dump five miles away in the middle of winter to go to the dump and get those boxes of half-finished sandwiches" (Canada, 1990a). Lizzie Amagoalik (1989) agreed that they

". . . were always hungry. We had to look through the white man's garbage for food for our children. We had to take clothes that had been thrown away, for our children. When the policemen found out that we were living off their garbage,



Figure 7: Martha Flaherty, Ottawa, 1988. (Photo: Alan Marcus)

they got very angry at us and told us to stop. We asked, "How are we going to eat?"

Supplementing their diet of country food with left-overs from the white man's dump became a contentious issue with the RCMP officers and officials at DNANR. Cst. Gibson (1954) reported that: "Strict instructions were given the natives that they were not to carry away any articles found in the dump". DNANR planner Ben Sivertz (1958) wrote to the Deputy Minister to warn him of the implications "of the growing problem of Eskimos scrounging from garbage dumps":

"... it is the sort of thing which can give rise to embarrassing publicity . . . It is our view that, if Eskimos are really destitute, they must, as a temporary measure, be provided with relief and proper food. We must not be put in the position of providing garbage as relief rations for Canadian citizens, which is exactly what is happening in some places".

This situation was still prevalent in 1964, when Cst. Lucko at the Resolute Bay detachment commented on the Inuit's means for finding building materials. They still needed to resort to "what they obtained for themselves from the local dump" (Lucko, 1964).

Despite newspaper stories of "new homes" for families in the High Arctic (*Montreal Gazette*, 1954), housing remained a serious problem for the Inuit. In his inspection report of Resolute Bay, C.J. Marshall (1953) disclosed that many of the relocatees had tents which were in poor condition. In Inukjuak the Inuit were able to build igloos to move into by November, whereas in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay they discovered that despite colder temperatures the snow might not be appropriate for making igloos until January. During the first winter, Cst. Gibson (1953) at Resolute Bay reported on 14 October 1953 that tents "are still being occupied by the natives, but with low temperatures and drifting snow, igloos will be built within the next few days". Cpl. Sargent (1953) at Craig Harbour in his report on 31 December 1953 conceded that "at present all families are living in tents due [to] lack of suitable snow for snow houses". The snow conditions surprised the officers and the cold caused hardship for the families.

"We had to live in tents all winter because there was not enough snow to build a snow house. I remember waking up every morning rolled up like a ball because it was so cold! Today, I am glad I did not have a wife then – it would have been very difficult for a young couple's relationship to survive in that severe climate" (Elijah Nutaraq, 1989).

Ross Gibson (1983) admitted that "the cold was something the Quebec Eskimos had never endured the like. I am sure they would have all gone

home right then if they could". Larsen had advised in 1952 that "wherever the Eskimos continue to remain as hunters and trappers permanent wooden dwellings should be built for them" (Larsen, 1952b). Yet no wooden dwellings were built for the families until they started building shacks for themselves after 1956, using discarded packing cases from the dumps at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. Even in 1959 when the RCMP submitted a low-cost housing plan for Grise Fiord, Alex Stevenson (1959) at DNANR was not supportive and advised that "the existence is marginal here and it may be more practicable to use this settlement for experimental purposes".

2.3 Lack of Services

The map in Figure 8 was drawn for the DRD in 1953, at the time of the relocation. It clearly illustrates the variety of facilities at Port Harrison and a lack of basic services available in the new colonies at Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay. At Port Harrison there had usually been two stores – an HBC store since 1920, a Revillon Freres trading store from 1913 to 1936, and a Baffin Trading Company post from 1939-1949. At Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay the RCMP set up a government store. Supplies were shipped north once a year on the *C.D Howe* on its annual visit. Due to the colonies' isolation, though, supplies for the new stores were greatly restricted, whereas Port Harrison was closer to southern supply sources. Port Harrison had an Anglican church since 1927, a nurse and medical station since 1947, and a welfare teacher and a school since 1949. The new colonies had none of these services.

Health care was lacking during the early period of the relocation. Markoosie Patsauq (Figure 9) was twelve years old at the time of the move, and his brother John Amagoalik was five. Both recall how sick Markoosie was before they boarded the *C.D Howe* in Port Harrison. "I was spitting up blood", said Markoosie Patsauq (1988). Markoosie had tuberculosis, but his illness was not diagnosed. In his report, the Chief Medical officer aboard the *C.D Howe*, Dr Simpson (1953), noted that "the 34 Inuit from Port Harrison to be transferred to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands were examined". DIAND's recently commissioned "Hickling Report" (1990: 54) states that the Inuit "were X-rayed and medically examined beforehand". However, the X-ray machine used routinely to check the Inuit was not on board the ship at the time medical staff examined the families at Port Harrison (Hinds 1953b). Within the first year of being at Resolute Bay, Markoosie's condition deteriorated to the point where he could no longer stand up and was confined to his family's tent. Despite the Inuit camp's proximity to the air base at




Figure 8: Map of northern Canada, 1953, showing Eskimo Registration Districts and settlement services. (Arctic Circular, 1953)

Resolute, Markoosie was not evacuated until the summer of 1954 aboard the *C.D Howe*.

RCMP officers in charge of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord were responsible for providing health care, but had limited knowledge as lay dispensers and equally limited resources. Grise Fiord's isolated location and severe winter weather could make emergency airlifts difficult. In one



Figure 9: Markoosie Patsauq, Inukjuak, 1988. (Photo: Alan Marcus)

emergency, for example, on 4 November 1960, the RCMP at Grise Fiord radioed Resolute Bay warning that there was an epidemic in the settlement (Sivertz, 1960a). Due to bad weather conditions, a radio black-out prevented the message from reaching Resolute Bay, but the United States Air Force Base at Thule, Greenland, picked up the message and relayed it on. They tried, on their own initiative, to air-drop medical people into Grise Fiord but were unsuccessful. Indian and Northern Health Services arranged for a doctor to fly from Ottawa to Resolute Bay via an RCAF plane. Five days later the doctor reached Resolute Bay and discovered that one child, Elisapee, had already died in the interim. That same day on 9 November the doctor finally arrived by chartered plane at Grise Fiord and diagnosed that six children were seriously ill with whooping cough, complicated by a secondary infection of bronchopneumonia.

In an effort to maintain its exclusive control over Grise Fiord, the RCMP attempted to block later efforts by DNANR to provide professional health care to the community. In 1964 Chief Supt. C. B. Macdonell reaffirmed this position: "I might say that the placing of a nurse at Grise Fiord would now negate the necessity of our having a detachment there at all" (Macdonell 1964). Macdonell ended with the warning: "Content of this memorandum is not to be passed along to anyone outside the Force for obvious reasons".

2.4 Conflict between Port Harrison and Pond Inlet Groups

DRD backed the decision to include the Pond Inlet families in the relocation plans because they were more accustomed to conditions in the High Arctic and could help the Port Harrison Inuit adjust to the new environment (Figure 10). In a published article, Cst. Fryer at Craig Harbour described the situation as he saw it in 1954: "Relations between the Port Harrison and Pond Inlet natives are good. Differences in dialect and routine hasn't [sic] formed any barriers" (Fryer, 1954b).

However, social relations between the Pond Inlet and Port Harrison families were not as cohesive as officials might have wished. Rather than the co-operation that the officials had hoped for, inter-group relations could reflect "indifference, ridicule and even hostility" (Freeman, 1969). Due to the difference in their dialects, they even had initial trouble understanding each other. The social incompatibility of the two groups had lasting effects. At Grise Fiord the groups split into two camps, so that in 1962 the Pond Inlet families had their dwellings on the east of the RCMP detachment, and the Port Harrison families had theirs on the west. At Resolute Bay the two Inuit groups had similar problems of co-operation, as Cst. T.C. Jenkin noted in his report in December 1959:



Figure 10: Angnakudluk's family from Pond Inlet, at Grise Fiord, 1957. (Photo: Bob Pilot)

"There is only one factor of morale that could develop to a serious situation here at Resolute Bay. That is the jealousy between the group from Port Harrison and the smaller number from Pond Inlet. Openly, these people get along together well, but . . . the dislike, jealousy, or whatever it might be called, is plainly present" (Jenkin, 1959).

Cpl. V.R. Vitt (1968) at Grise Fiord reported in December 1968 that the "social division between the Port Harrison and Pond Inlet groups continues as strong as always and remains the greatest obstacle to the community morale". By creating artificial Inuit communities, Supt. Larsen's vision of utopia floundered when no forethought was given to what the long-term social implications could be of placing two groups from different cultural backgrounds together in confined colonies.

2.5 Looking for Eve: Trouble in "Paradise"

Despite Cpl. Sargent's (1954) optimistic appraisal that Craig Harbour was the Inuit's "Garden of Eden", finding marriage partners became a complication of the experiment. The relocated Inuit were groups of extended families, and intermarriage within a family group was not preferable. Intermarriage with the Pond Inlet group was socially

problematic. The small populations of the colonies limited the prospect of Inuit finding suitable spouses. This eventuality did not occur to the planners of the experiment, and no forethought was given to the effects of limiting the group's reproductive capacity. In his annual report for 1955 Cpl. Sargent (1955) at Grise Fiord noted that three young men had approached him in regard to wives. His recommendation was that one who was not considered a good provider should be discouraged, but that the other two be assisted in obtaining wives "before they caused trouble". The experiment's defects were apparent when RCMP officers assumed the role of match-makers and marriage counselors for the Inuit.

Supt. Larsen wrote to Commissioner Nicholson in September 1956 offering a solution to the problem of finding spouses. He suggested that "a few young boys or girls might have to be added to the settlement from year to year as they become of marriageable age" (Larsen 1956). This solution might have worked had it not been for the reluctance of single girls to agree to be moved north for this purpose. Evidence of the tragic long-term social implications of the relocation experiment is revealed in an RCMP report from Grise Fiord (Vitt, 1965), which stated that even by 1965 "there are not really sufficient of either sex in the same age group to allow much, if any, choice of a partner".

2.6 Economic Mismanagement

Supt. Larsen (1952b) suggested that Inuit employed at air force bases "should receive the same pay that is paid for comparative work to white persons". At the base at Resolute Bay the Inuit were paid a percentage of white man's pay, according to their level of skill. In light of Larsen's comment, it is therefore ironic that in both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, which he supervised, the Inuit claim that some people were not paid for the work they performed. Simeonie Amagoalik (1989) recalls that whenever "the policemen and his friends wanted to go polar bear hunting, I had to act as their guide. I never got paid for those times". At the colonies, whites asked Inuit, such as Simeonie Amagoalik, to be guides for their hunting parties in return for giving them some of the meat from the hunt. Cst. Gibson concurred in his report in March 1954:

"While on hunting trips the writer has at different times invited members of the Airforce, United States Weather Bureau and Department of Transport to accompany him for company and an outing for the persons concerned. . . As is customary the natives consumed some of the food while on the hunt, any in excess was distributed to the natives at the conclusion of the trip" (Gibson, 1954).

In addition, John Amagoalik recalled how his father "and other relatives spent months at a time taking government surveyors around the High Arctic, mapping the islands and collecting mineral samples. And they were never paid for it" (Canada, 1990a). Supt. Larsen (1954b) voiced his concerns about nonpayment for Inuit wage-employment at Resolute Bay in a memo to F.J.G. Cunningham, DNANR's Director of Northern Administration: "There is one matter which I am not clear about and that is the disposal of the wages earned by the Resolute Bay Eskimos for their employment with, for instance, the geological survey party on Prince Patrick Island and with the RCAF and DOT at Resolute Bay". Larsen cited as an example that "Amagoalik and his wife, each [earn] \$5.00 per day, for their employment with the geological survey party, I get the impression [they] do not actually receive their wages either in cash or in goods from the Eskimo trading store but that the whole of their wages goes to your Department [the DNANR] to help pay off the Eskimo Traders' Loan Account". Similarly, a Department of Transport (1954) receipt dated 23 April 1954 shows that Alex, Simeonie, Salluviniq, and Amagoalik earned \$13.75 each, and Jaybeddie earned \$10 from wage-employment at Resolute Bay. However, an attached DRD (1954) Treasury Office receipt, dated 5 May 1954, has grouped the five wages together to form a total sum of \$65, made out to the Eskimo Loan Fund, not to the individuals themselves.

The Eskimo Loan Fund was set up in 1952 by the DRD and the Treasury Board in order that "returnable advances could be made to Eskimo groups or individuals to assist them to purchase necessary supplies and equipment" (Eskimo Affairs, 1952b: 3); \$5,000 loans were extended to both the trading store at Craig Harbour, and to the store at Resolute Bay. The loans were made out in the names of two Inuit, "Fatty" (Aqiatasuk) at Craig Harbour, and "Sudlavenich" at Resolute Bay. The RCMP designated these men as the traders for the new camps. Though the loans were officially in their names, their duties in running the stores were minimal (Sivertz, 1954). The RCMP officers became the traders at the two stores; they ordered the supplies and allocated them, kept the accounts, valued the furs, and shipped the furs south to be sold.

Government officials who purchased supplies to equip the relocatees prior to embarkation from Port Harrison also charged the supplies to the two loans (Stevenson, 1953). During the 1950s, the Inuit at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, as elsewhere in the Arctic, were not paid in cash for furs traded or work done. Instead, they received credit at the local store. It was therefore up to the RCMP officers at the two colonies to keep proper accounts of all the inhabitants, listing the amounts of standing credits or debts owed. The Inuit brought in the white fox furs, which the RCMP valued at a price set by the DNANR, after which the hunters' accounts were credited. The Inuit could then

purchase merchandise in that amount, or leave a credit on the books. It was the same system the Inuit had been accustomed to in Port Harrison at the HBC store but with two differences. First, the officers carefully controlled the Inuit's spending, whereas in the past the HBC traders might have induced the Inuit to spend all their earnings. Secondly, in place of the HBC, the DNANR assumed the responsibility for the sale of the furs at auction.

James Cantley, Chief of DNANR's Arctic Services branch, was one of the key planners of the relocation experiment. Cantley was a veteran fur trader and former Assistant Fur Trade Commissioner for the HBC. He organized the trade supplies required for the new colonies, and purchased them from funds made available from the Eskimo Loan Fund. He also handled the fur returns when they were sent to the auction house in Montreal (Stevenson, 1977). Proceeds from the Inuit's fur catch paid off the two loans, and profits accrued. Yet it seems that the detachment officers and the Inuit were not told about the profits in the loan fund. In fact, Bob Pilot (1990a; Figure 11), constable at Craig Harbour, said that to his surprise he was informed by DNANR in the late 1950s that the loan was still in arrears. Yet records show that as early as November 1955 the loan account to the store at Craig Harbour had a credit balance of \$3,153 (DRD, 1955). In addition, while interest had been charged on the loan at the rate of 5%, there was no provision for paying interest on the profits accumulated in the account once the loan had been paid off (Sivertz, 1959).

In 1960, RCMP Assistant Superintendent W.G. Fraser learned that during the previous trapping season, the Inuit at Grise Fiord received \$6,140 in credits for 379 white fox pelts. He further learned that the fox pelts were sold at auction by the DNANR for \$17,953. But the balance of \$11,800 in profit never reached the Inuit hunters (Fraser, 1960a). After receiving a memo from Stevenson and Bolger at the DNANR, Fraser (1960b) informed his Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay detachments that:

"In the past, concern has been expressed because the profit from the annual operation of the Eskimo Trading Stores has not been returned to the Eskimos. We now understand that this cannot be done because of the unusual circumstances whereby the Trading Stores were established".


Former Grise Fiord constable Bob Pilot (1990a) also recalled that "someone in Ottawa, in their wisdom, was cutting back on our annual order of supplies for the Inuit". During the early years at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay the Inuit faced their greatest hardship. Yet they were not credited properly, nor told of the profits made on their fur catches. Instead, DNANR was using these profits as a revolving fund to purchase



Figure 11: Constable Bob Pilot, Grise Fiord, 1958. (Photo: Bob Pilot)

supplies in advance for the government-operated stores at the two colonies, rather than use its own funds. This situation was finally corrected for future transactions in 1961 when the government stores became Inuit Co-operatives. However, the bookkeeping remained in the hands of the RCMP officers until 1967. By retaining the bookkeeping as their responsibility, the RCMP were able to keep a tight control on the stores. Ironically, Supt. Larsen (1952b) felt it was important that individual Inuit should know "how his credit standing stood [so that] he would be encouraged to endeavour to better himself". Yet, on their visit to Resolute Bay in August 1956, Supt. Larsen and J.C. Jackson discovered that for three years Cst. Gibson had been reportedly withholding information from the Inuit about their amounts of credit held at the store (Jackson, 1956), presumably to control their spending habits.

Another point of controversy centred on the Inuit's marketable skill of stonecarving. Both the welfare teacher at Port Harrison, Margery Hinds (1953b), and Alex Stevenson (1953) commented on the fact that "a number of natives to be moved are excellent stone carvers". James Houston of the Canadian Handicrafts Guild successfully established a local handicrafts industry from soapstone carvings in Port Harrison in 1949. As a result, the community achieved a rapid growth in income from carvings in the early 1950s (see Table 2).



*Table 2: Port Harrison estimated earnings from handicrafts.
Source: Houston (1954).*

In the 1953 relocation some of the best carvers were removed from Port Harrison and their new source of livelihood without the planners having assessed if soapstone was available at the new colonies. That there was no soapstone at Grise Fiord or Resolute Bay became a source of discontent for the Inuit. RCMP officers ordered supplies from Port Harrison to be delivered on the *C. D. Howe's* annual visit, though often the shipments did not arrive, or were of inferior quality. Although a profitable market grew for handicrafts, carvings, rugs and clothing at the Resolute Bay base, J.C. Jackson (1956) reported that "Gibson has been loath to encourage this activity too much as it could result in less hunting and prove a detriment". Thus at times the relocatees were dissuaded from earning a viable income from carving because soapstone supplies were insufficient or some of the officers insisted they adhere to a traditional hunting culture.

2.7 Promise of Return and Containment

To inform the public about its relocation plans for the second shipment of Inuit from Port Harrison in 1955 to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, DNANR issued an enthusiastic press release (emphasis mine):

"It will be moving day this summer for 35 Eskimos in Canada's Arctic. And they are moving further north.

The 'moving van' for the Eskimos will be the Arctic Patrol vessel 'C.D. Howe'

*This is a **purely voluntary migration**, the continuation of a policy started two years ago by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources . . . The programme has been an unqualified success, and the Eskimos have been enthusiastic about **their new homes** farther to the north. Although they are **free to return** if they wish, the response so far has been to urge their friends and relatives from the 'south' to join them" (DNANR, 1955; Appendix D).*

According to the DNANR's press release, not only was the relocation "a purely voluntary migration", but the Inuit were "free to return if they wish". The question of whether the Inuit were actually free to return home, and whether a promise was made to return them home within two years if they wished to do so, has featured prominently in discussions the Inuit have held with the government regarding repatriation. The government has until recently queried whether a two-year promise of return was ever given. In 1984 DIAND (formerly DNANR) commissioned a report to investigate if such an alleged promise was made. In his findings, the author Marc Hammond (1984) concluded that the Pond Inlet Inuit moving in 1953 "received such a promise in no uncertain terms". The Port Harrison Inuit moving in 1953 "quite likely received such a promise, but if they did not, it is clear that they were not discouraged from thinking that they did". Hammond added that the Pond Inlet and Port Harrison Inuit moving in the second stage relocation in 1955 "probably moved with the same understanding as Inuit moving in 1953".

In a more recent investigation, DIAND's "Hickling Report" (1990: 55) addresses the question of when the Inuit first asked to return to Port Harrison for a visit; stating that "the earliest example of such a request, that we could find, occurred around 1960". Curiously, DRD planner Alex Stevenson (1977) remarked that "there were rumours from time to time in the first seven years that there were some dissatisfied or were homesick but this was never confirmed nor were there any approaches on record having been made to officials of the Federal or Territorial Governments".

However, there is ample evidence that some Inuit wanted to move back to Port Harrison early on. J. C. Jackson, DNANR's officer-in-charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol in 1956, informed his superiors that he had held a meeting at Resolute Bay on 21 August with all of the Inuit men, Supt. Larsen, Cst. Gibson, and an interpreter. "The question of returning to Port Harrison for a visit was raised", he wrote, and "there seems to be some thought that this was in the original agreement" (Jackson, 1956). In November 1956, RCMP Cst. Gibson at Resolute Bay reported that the Inuit "from time to time express their desire to return to friends and relations at Port Harrison" (Gibson, 1956). He sent this report both to RCMP Commissioner Nicholson, and to DNANR's Director of Northern Administration, F. J. G. Cunningham.

On 22 October 1956, Ben Sivertz, Chief of the Arctic Division, sent a memorandum to the Director of Northern Administration & Lands Branch, F.J.G. Cunningham, on the "Eskimo Settlements at Resolute and Craig Harbour". Sivertz (1956; Appendix E) wrote:

"It should be remembered that we are feeling our way in these projects. So far things have gone well – better than we could properly have hoped. After two years the people seem content to stay on, whereas they only agreed to go in the first place on condition that we promise to return them to their former homes after 'two or three years'".

DNANR planners in Ottawa knew of the Inuit's desire to return, and privately acknowledged the department's two-year promise of return, but ignored the Inuit requests. This was a repetition of a similar pledge of return made to the 1934 relocatees to Devon Island, discussed in Chapter 1. In that instance, there was an understanding between the Department of the Interior, which authorized the relocation in 1934, and the HBC which implemented the project, that if the Inuit "were dissatisfied in any way after two years at Dundas Harbour, they would be returned to their homes" (Russell, 1978). However, when the decision was taken in 1936 to terminate the experiment, the HBC informed the 53 men, women and children that they would not be returned home, but moved to Arctic Bay on the north coast of Baffin Island where a trading post was to be reopened. The families "were terribly disappointed" (ibid.). Over the course of the next few years the survivors were shuttled from Arctic Bay to Fort Ross to Spence Bay. The promise of return after two years was not honoured, and many of the families were permanently separated from their relatives back home.

The 1953-55 relocation from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay also separated families from their relations. Removed from a collection of camps with strong kinship bonds, the families were placed in distant colonies from which they were unable to easily communicate with their relatives down south. Cst. Gibson was uneasy about the effect the lack of communication would have on the families. As an expedient, he notified Supt. Larsen that he was going to try to arrange "for the natives to speak over the radio to their people at Port Harrison, it is felt that this will keep the people more settled at this point" (Larsen, 1953). Anna Nungaq (1981) insisted, "I never heard from our relatives at all. I recall getting a letter after being there many years. There was no means of communication and therefore no contact with relatives".

In the 1950s it would have been difficult for the families to return to Port Harrison to visit or to live. Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay were supplied once a year by the government ship the *C.D Howe*. "It was a one-way ticket", says former constable Bob Pilot (1990a). The *C.D Howe*

stopped at Port Harrison on the way north, but not on the return trip. Not only was it physically impractical for the families to find their way home, but it was also actively discouraged by the officials. Samwillie Elijahsialuk recalled:

"When discussing moving back to Inukjuak with the police, they used to try to convince me not to go. They would even go so far as to say that I would be leaving my mother's grave behind and would often say that the situation in Inukjuak was bad" (Makivik, 1986).

The officials were not only unsympathetic to requests for returning home, but they also made it appear almost impossible for the Inuit to do so. In his report on a crucial meeting with the Inuit in 1956 in Resolute Bay and a discussion about returning to Port Harrison, DNANR's J.C. Jackson recounted:

"I pointed out that transportation difficulties might require that visits be for a year and that it would be expensive to transport a family there and back. . . I do not know what the agreement may have been when the move was first made, but aside from any definite promises, if there were any, I would be inclined to suggest that if any family goes back for a visit, the family should pay part or all of the transportation cost and be able to guarantee to be self supporting during the visit" (Jackson, 1956).

At the same time that the relocatees were asking to return home, so were some of the Fort Chimo Inuit relocated to Churchill in 1953 (Chapter 1). DRD Deputy Minister Young (1953e) informed C.M. Drury, Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence: "I agree that it would be the responsibility of the Department of Resources and Development to return to his original settlement any Eskimo who proved unsatisfactory or who did not wish to remain at Churchill". Indeed, a number of Chimo Inuit were returned home by the DRD. Yet, because the DRD had placed the Port Harrison Inuit in such distant colonies as Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, it did not abide by the same policy of return.

In the 1960s-70s, with the coming of commercial aviation, it became feasible for some relocatees to visit or move back to Port Harrison, if they had money to do so. But the visit needed to be for an extended period of time, even up to a year, due to difficulties of arranging transport. In addition, they would be separated from their family back at Grise Fiord or Resolute Bay during the process. Thus for most of the relocatees it was not a viable option.

Unable to return to Port Harrison, some Inuit tried to move between Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord to join their relatives. The RCMP at times discouraged this practice. In 1959 Elijah and his wife and mother

requested to move from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay to join Elijah's brother Samwillie, who had gone to Resolute Bay in search of a wife (Pilot, 1959). In his report, Cst. Pilot at Grise Fiord recorded that he was "against such a move as it is known that others from this area would like to live at Resolute also, and if one moves it is felt that more will follow" (ibid.). He then specified that others "who have, in the past, indicated a desire to move to Resolute Bay are Issac E9-834 and Moses E9-833". Consequently, Cst. Pilot discussed the matter with his colleague at the Resolute Bay detachment, Cst. Jenkin, and asked that he report to Headquarters and request that DNANR write to the Inuit concerned and discourage the move. In his report, Jenkin (1960) warned that if these families were not successfully discouraged from moving to Resolute, "in all probability three other families will also move with them".

Isolated from their families and social groups and unable to return to Port Harrison, some Inuit wrote to their relations asking them to move north to join them in the colonies. Without having assessed game resources in the Queen Elizabeth Islands, DNANR became concerned after 1955 with overpopulating the region, and therefore restricted further Inuit relocation to the colonies. Cst. Jenkin at Resolute Bay reported in 1960 that there were growing difficulties in enforcing this policy. He wrote that "two other families have been corresponding with relatives from Port Harrison to have them settle at Resolute" (ibid.). The Inuit claim that some of their letters to relatives were destroyed. John Amagoalik remembered that "to our horror we found that our letters were thrown in the dump" (Canada, 1990a). In order to dissuade the families at Resolute from writing to encourage relatives to come north, Cst. Jenkin (1960) warned them that they "would lose many of their present advantages such as free electricity, a fair amount of employment and good hunting and trapping". Aided by the sheer distance from Port Harrison and the geographical isolation of the colonies, the RCMP and DNANR were effective for a number of years in their strategy of limiting immigration and keeping southern Inuit from joining their relations.

Chapter 3. Economics, Morality and Sovereignty

The preceding chapters have described the planning of the relocation, and documented some of the difficulties which the Inuit experienced. What then was the government's motive for undertaking such an experiment? The government's official reason for the relocation was to encourage Inuit living in "overpopulated" areas whose natural resources had become overharvested to "migrate" to areas which were rich in resources. Yet there were three other motives behind the relocation which the government did not state publicly – namely, **economic policy incentives**, **moral convictions**, and **sovereignty concerns**. These three interrelated factors will be analysed respectively.

3.1 Instability of the Inuit Welfare Economy

Between 1950 and 1957 Canada experienced a period of sustained economic growth under the Liberal government of Prime Minister St. Laurent. Employment reached the highest level in Canadian history. The nation's economic boom resulted from rapid development of Canada's natural resources, including iron ore, petroleum and natural gas. Exports of non-ferrous metals tripled, and the pulp-and-paper industry maintained its leading position in Canada's external trade (Creighton, 1970: 283-5). The economic developments of the postwar period increased the pace of natural resource extraction industries and expanded Canada's role as a producer of raw materials for export, principally to the United States.

The second key component which contributed in the early 1950s to the nation's growing economy was a result of the Korean War. Expenditure on defence rose from \$387 million in 1949 to nearly \$2 billion by 1952, which stimulated a revival and expansion of the shipbuilding, aircraft, and electronics industries (*ibid.*). In addition, there was a substantial increase in joint American and Canadian military activity in the Canadian Arctic, prompted by Cold War relations with the Soviet Union. These military factors, together with the dramatic increase in

development of northern resources, contributed significantly to the growing strategic and economic importance of the North.

Canada's economic boom and the international attention directed towards the Arctic regions were factors behind St. Laurent's decision to revise the government's Inuit administration policies. In a major policy speech delivered in the House of Commons in December 1953, the Prime Minister conceded that the government in the past had administered the North "in an almost continuing state of absence of mind" (Canada, 1953b). Concern over Canada's virtual benign neglect of its northern citizens led to fundamental changes in the government's Inuit administration policies. The early 1950s thus brought about new initiatives to improve what was perceived as the Inuit's low standard of living.

For the last half century, three authorities had controlled the affairs of the Canadian Inuit: the Hudson's Bay Company, the missionaries, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. But in 1949 the Inuit were given the right to vote in federal elections, and in 1950 authority for the Inuit was vested in the government's Department of Resources and Development. In practice, the RCMP continued to act for some time as the government's representative in administering the Inuit population (Freeman, 1971: 35). Increasingly, RCMP officials were disconcerted with the general state of decline of the health and welfare of the Inuit. As such, RCMP Inspector Henry Larsen reported on his northern tour in 1951:

"It is believed the encroachment of civilization is having a detrimental effect on the natives generally . . . It would appear that the natives are becoming more and more dependent on Family Allowances and Relief, congregating in the settlements and in many cases living in dire circumstances. The Eskimo as we knew them a few years ago are quickly disappearing, and in their stead we have a sadly dejected race, undernourished, ill-clad, living in filth and squalor, with no immediate hope of any improvement in conditions"
(cited in Diubaldo, 1985: 109).

The government had already sought to classify the Inuit into registration districts to keep track of them and administer them more effectively (Figure 8). It began in 1941 to assign them "E numbers" (also known as "disc numbers") as a form of identification. Once numbered, Canada's Inuit ceased to be an anonymous mass and became an organized collection of identifiable individuals. The Inuit were the only Canadian civilians required to wear identification discs. (They were expected to wear the tags around their necks, although occasionally they forgot, much to the dismay of visiting officials.)

The first major step St. Laurent's government took to address the problems of Canada's Inuit was to organize a Conference on Eskimo Affairs, the first meeting of which was held on 19-20 May 1952 and was

chaired by Major General Hugh Young, Deputy Minister of the DRD. Insp. Larsen (1951) had suggested that such a conference be organized, and DRD officials had supported the idea (Cantley, 1951). Some 58 people from a number of government departments and agencies, the Anglican and Catholic churches, the HBC and the U.S. Embassy attended the conference.

One of the conference's chief concerns was the predicament of the Inuit economy, which was based on one leading commodity: the white fox fur which they trapped and sold to the traders. The drastic decline in white fox fur prices from \$25 a pelt in 1945 to \$3.50 in 1950 was accompanied by a post-war inflationary increase in the prices of store goods in the north (Wright, 1953). These two factors had a disastrous effect on the Inuit economy. Rather than using price supports, the government responded by increasing the amount of "relief" payments to the Inuit. Expenditure on relief had already risen from \$14,000 in 1946-47 to \$113,000 in 1950-51. During 1950-51 the government also paid the Inuit \$250,000 in Family Allowances (Diubaldo, 1985: 109). All Canadian children became recipients of these social benefits under the Family Allowances Act of 1944. While the allowances were a supplement for southern whites, for many Inuit families these payments soon constituted an important part of their income. Between 1945 and 1952 the government paid out a total of \$1,687,000 in Family Allowances and direct relief payments (Eskimo Affairs, 1952a: 2).

The Conference on Eskimo Affairs identified northern Quebec as one of the "most densely populated" and poorest Inuit regions in Canada. An examination of the records of relief issued to Inuit yields striking comparative data. During the ten-year period from 1945-1955, northern Quebec received \$484,000 in relief payments out of a total of \$830,000 the government paid to the Inuit, including those on Baffin Island, the west side of Hudson Bay, the Western Arctic and the Mackenzie Delta region (DNANR, 1956). For eight of those ten years, Port Harrison received by far the highest level of relief of all Inuit districts, only to be surpassed by Fort Chimo in northern Quebec in 1952-53 and 1954-55 (see Table 3). In 1950-51 Port Harrison received \$40,603 in relief compared with an average of \$2,554 paid to the other Inuit districts. In 1951-52 Port Harrison relief payments were \$40,337, whereas other districts averaged \$3,081.

According to a government statistical and financial report of March 1952, the Inuit registration district with the highest level of Family Allowances in Canada was District E9-Port Harrison, which up to that time had received \$161,773 in benefits, followed by District E5-Pond Inlet, NWT, which had received a total of \$122,303, and District E8-Fort Chimo, which had received \$111,334 (Crozier, 1952). Correspondingly, the E9, E5 and E8 districts, which received the highest levels of social

benefits, were also targeted for relocation experiments in 1953. Each experiment would have the effect of depopulating the districts by moving Inuit to sites elsewhere. Because there were no Inuit living in the northernmost islands of the Arctic Archipelago, those islands were not even part of a registration district. Dismay over escalating relief benefits to the E8 and E9 districts was summed up in a single notation by a senior DRD official in 1950: "We are distributing altogether too much relief in these northern Quebec areas" (DRD, 1950).




Table 3: Comparative statement of annual relief payments issued to Inuit.
Source: DNANR (1956).

In a study of Port Harrison's average Inuit family income for 1951, 61.8% was derived from social benefits (31.2% from Family Allowances and 30.6% from government relief), whereas only 12.7% came from proceeds earned by fur trapping (see Table 4; DRD, 1951). In the post-war market economy it was no longer feasible for the Inuit to subsist solely by living off the land. In the early 1950s the DRD felt it was paying too much money to provide for the welfare needs of Inuit in districts such as Port Harrison. Thus there was an economic motive for finding a cost-savings solution to a financial problem – fur prices had sharply decreased and the provision of social benefits had greatly increased. The Port Harrison district, with the high profile accorded to it by its record level of benefits in comparison to other Inuit districts, was in a very exposed political position and ripe for "rehabilitation". After the 1953 relocation from Port Harrison, which had the effect of depopulating the district, the financial figures in Table 3 demonstrate the decisive reduction in relief payments to Port Harrison from \$32,363 in 1952-53 to \$12,265 in 1954-55. That 62% reduction to Port Harrison, was in marked contrast to the 85% increase for the other Inuit districts from an annual

average of \$3,483 to \$6,454; and an overall increase of 24% in total Inuit relief payments from \$128,887 to \$160,671 for the same two-year period.




Table 4: Port Harrison’s average Inuit family income. Source: DRD (1951).

The government pursued a combined economic policy towards establishing the new colonies at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. At both sites relief benefits were abolished, except in extreme cases, and the Inuit were expected to become self-reliant on land and sea resources. However, Resolute Bay was the central base in the High Arctic Archipelago for military and government supply operations, and increasingly for resource exploration activity. One of the most important functions of the military air base at Resolute was to supply the five weather stations, Resolute, Mould Bay, Isachsen, Eureka, and Alert, jointly operated by Canada and the United States. (The national and strategic importance of maintaining these operations will be referred to in Chapter 3.3.) In view of these activities, the DRD envisaged a growing need at Resolute Bay for manual labour. Because of DRD’s belated preparation for planning the Resolute Bay component of the 1953 move, officials were unable to secure sufficient interest from the RCAF and government departments at the base to hire untrained Inuit workers.

After their initial objections and misgivings about the project, base officials and government agencies operating out of Resolute soon came to realize certain advantages of having a native labour pool on their doorstep. Transporting white Canadians up from the south to do manual labour at Resolute Bay, as well as to house and feed them, was a costly proposition. If Inuit could be located in the area for filling such job requirements as equipment operators, mechanics, garbage removers,

cleaners and general handymen, then transportation, housing and food costs could be reduced. Higher rates of pay were the primary attraction for civilians working at these stations in the Arctic, whereas initially the Inuit could be paid lower wages. Thus the government proposed the second stage relocation to Resolute Bay in 1955 "to meet a developing demand for casual labour in that area in unloading supplies during airlifts and during the summer resupply" (Eskimo Affairs, 1954). Yet it was still left to the Inuit to find their own shelter and to feed themselves from the land. Cst. Gibson concurred that the government brought the Inuit families to Resolute Bay "hoping they'd kill enough polar bear and seal to keep going. That way, men would be available to load aircraft and do other chores" (Brown, 1955). Grise Fiord did not offer the same opportunities for wage-employment, and its economy continued to rely almost entirely on hunting and trapping throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

3.2 Inuit Welfare and White Morality

The recent spate of media attention focused on the Inuit from Inukjuak is not the first time they have attracted widespread public interest. In 1922 Robert Flaherty's historic film *Nanook of the North* was premiered in New York, London and Moscow. The Inuit featured in the documentary-drama were from the Port Harrison area. Such was the public's fascination with the "happy Eskimos" that soon ice creams were being sold as "Nanuks" in Germany, "Esquimaux" in France, and "Eskimo Pies" in Britain and America. When the hunter who played the role of Nanook died of starvation two years after the film was made, his death was mourned in China. For whites, the film-starring Eskimos represented the symbolic image of "noble savages". From a white perspective, it was the transformation of the Inuit from the noble savage of the 1920s to the welfare-dependent "white man's burden" of the 1950s that altered the government's essential relationship with the Inuit. By replacing its former policy of minimal social intervention with that of financial provider, Ottawa was not responsible *to* the Inuit, it felt responsible *for* them. This gave Ottawa a prerogative to organize resettlement projects with a view to improving the Inuit's standard of living. Ironically, Robert Flaherty's Inuit son, Joseph Flaherty (Figure 12), his wife Rynee and their *children*, Martha (Figure 7), Mary, and Peter were relocated from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord in 1955.

Robert Flaherty once said, "what I want to show is the former majesty and character of these people, while it is still possible – before the white man has destroyed not only their character, but the people as well" (Barnouw, 1974). Thirty years after his classic film was made depicting the proud Inuit hunter and his family, administrators in



Figure 12: Joseph Flaherty. (Photo: Martha Flaherty)

Ottawa faced what they perceived as the moral degradation of the Inuit. Poverty was an ill, but so was its cure – relief payments. Officials struggled with a fundamental moral dilemma related to the provision of relief benefits. Relief, it was argued, was destroying the Inuit's moral character and independence (Eskimo Affairs, 1952a). The government was not alone in criticizing the Inuit's way of life. Reporting on the outcome of the Conference on Eskimo Affairs, the *Toronto Globe and Mail* on 22 May 1952 stated that "knowing that there is always government aid to fall back on, the Eskimo in some parts of the north has lost a certain amount of his interest in hunting and fishing for a living" (Bain, 1952). Based on these reports and others, an article in the *Wall Street Journal* in December 1952 attacked Canada's Inuit administration policy (McKenna, 1952). "The debut of the welfare state in the Arctic", it argued, "meant they didn't have to hunt seals or catch fish anymore".

Union Oil Company of California made use of the *Wall Street* article as the basis for a full-page advertisement in the 16 February 1953 issue of *Newsweek* magazine. Featuring a joyful Eskimo, it stated that the Eskimos' new life under the welfare state was "soft and easy", because they had complete security. As a result, they had "lost all *vigor and ambition*" (italics theirs). Underneath a cartoon of an Eskimo smoking, the advertisement offered the moral: "Enslavement by *security* isn't something that happens only to Eskimos. In fact, millions of people all over the world see nothing wrong with a welfare society" (Union Oil, 1953).

This type of adverse publicity did little to enhance the public's perception of the government's methods for handling Inuit welfare.

Although the advertisement may appear comical or racist, its exaggerated warning about the inherent dangers of Inuit welfare-dependency did mirror official perceptions. The government's position, as expressed in the 1952 Conference on Eskimo Affairs, was that the Inuit were coming to depend on relief rather than on their own efforts for a living (Eskimo Affairs, 1952a). Officials at DRD and the RCMP felt that in "over-populated" areas with a settlement, such as Port Harrison, there was a need as they saw it to reduce the tendency of Inuit asking for "handouts". It was with this moral concern in mind that DRD's Officer-in-Charge of the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol, Alex Stevenson, had received orders that "consideration should be given to the feasibility of breaking up the present concentrations of population around the main centres" (Sinclair, 1951). Insp. Larsen (1951) was similarly convinced that "there are concentrations of Eskimos at certain places, which if they could be broken up . . . would I feel result in a better standard of living for the Eskimos". Larsen took this approach one step further and advised Commissioner Nicholson in September 1952 that: "I also have in mind a plan to relieve the over population of some areas". He suggested that they "transfer by Department of Transport vessel, to Craig Harbour, Cape Sabine and Dundas Harbour, several needy families to these places where colonization by them appears to be suitable and feasible" (Larsen, 1952c).

According to Larsen's candid reports to Commissioner Nicholson, he believed that the Inuit were vulnerable in settlements to "the endless exploitation of Traders and Missionaries" (*ibid.*). Larsen was particularly alarmed that "ex-H.B. Company Traders now employed in the administration appear to have taken over the reins of administration of Eskimo affairs" (*ibid.*). Alex Stevenson and James Cantley, officials in the DRD, were former HBC traders. The rhetoric used by the DRD at times was indeed similar to that of the traders, as shown by a DRD brief in 1951: "The question of inefficient hunters should be gone into and the opinion of experienced northern men should be sought as to how best to control the issue of relief to shirkers" (Sinclair, 1951).

Larsen held the traders responsible for the Inuit's unfortunate circumstances for turning them from hunters of meat into trappers of fur. Good trappers were rewarded by the traders; unsuccessful trappers were called "lazy bum boys". Like the HBC, the DRD appeared to classify the self-worth of the Inuit in economic terms. Both agencies labelled an Inuk as an "inefficient hunter" if he did not trap enough fox. Even though he might be a good hunter and provider for his family, for lack of fox furs he could be denied credit or supplies by the traders in times of need. Insp. Larsen (1952c) informed Commissioner Nicholson that "the average

Canadian citizen has no conception of how the once healthful and resourceful Eskimo has been exploited to such a degree that he now lives a life comparable to that of a dog". The solution to the Eskimo Problem, Larsen (1951) believed, was to create a Crown Company overseeing "all trading with the Eskimos and to replace all other traders", which would mean breaking the monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company and nationalizing its trading operations. That was not a popular idea with the company, nor with former HBC men now at the DRD, such as James Cantley (1951). Cantley felt that Larsen's outspoken opinions were similar "to others we receive from well-meaning people who look at Eskimo problems from a purely humanitarian point of view" (ibid.).

Larsen was a staunch advocate for the RCMP's more active involvement in developing and implementing Inuit administration policy. The RCMP could "play a very important part in rehabilitating the Eskimos provided the proper policies are adopted" (Larsen, 1952c). The only region untouched by the traders and missionaries consisted of the unpopulated northern islands of the Arctic Archipelago. Larsen asked the Commissioner whether the Inuit's lives were to be "controlled more or less entirely by the Traders as at present", or whether the RCMP could ensure that with the government's help the Inuit could be located to new communities (ibid.). The region Larsen had envisaged would be ideal for his plan, where once again the Inuit could be self-reliant and "free on the land" like their ancestors.

Indeed, Larsen's apparent desire to create a utopian Inuit settlement embraced an element of folklore. He sited the new colonies near the archaeological remains of Thule Eskimo encampments over 500 years old on Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands. Despite the fact that fluctuations in climatic and environmental factors had probably made the area undesirable for human habitation, he felt that if their ancestors could survive here, perhaps these Inuit could do so as well. Larsen mourned the loss of the Inuit shamans at the hands of the missionaries, and explained to the Commissioner that the shamans not only gave spiritual guidance, but leadership as well. With sympathetic guidance, Larsen believed the police could provide the missing leadership he felt the Inuit needed (Larsen, 1952d). Larsen wanted young officers "who would be willing to devote their entire service to the Eskimo cause" (ibid.). Former Cst. Ross Gibson (1990), recalled that to make the relocation operation a success, Larsen "advised me to work closely with the Eskimos and be their leader in every way – hunting [and] spiritually".

Larsen (1952b) insisted that "the police are the most logical persons to control and to have supervision over Eskimo welfare". But Larsen's view of police supervision over Inuit welfare in effect turned the new colonies into reformatory camps. Cst. Fryer (1954a) at Craig Harbour outlined the need for a rehabilitation programme by reporting that the

"first impression given to the members of this detachment by the Port Harrison natives, was that they were a depressed, lifeless group of individuals, who were looking for too many handouts from the white man". In this experiment the officers sought to rehabilitate the Inuit to live off the land, without aid from the government.

Not all the Inuit could withstand the stringent regime at Grise Fiord. Paddy Aqiatasuk was a carver and the RCMP-designated camp boss. The RCMP referred to him in their reports as "Fatty", and Cst. Fryer described him as "the old fogey" who wanted to return home (ibid.). Aqiatasuk was a gregarious personality and an excellent carver, as noted by the teacher Margery Hinds (1953b) in her reports, and the HBC trader Rouben Ploughman (1992). Prior to the move, Aqiatasuk was quickly developing a reputation as an artist of some renown, but at Grise Fiord he became despondent by his family's isolation and difficulties, and the lack of soapstone to carve there. Aqiatasuk did not survive the first year, he died of a heart attack in July 1954. Such was the artist's repute that his death was reported in the Milestones column of *Time* magazine (1954). His son Larry Audlaluk (1991; Figure 13) recalls that his father was troubled about their relocation, and the week before his death he climbed to the top of the 2,400 ft. mountain behind the Grise Fiord camp, to try to see from its summit a way home to Port Harrison.

The RCMP continued with their rehabilitation programme under Larsen's instructions, which according to Gibson (1990) were that "above all else keep them in their native clothing and foot gear, and their diet of country food should be encouraged". However, such plans were difficult to sustain. In August 1956, it was reported that Cst. Gibson "tried to keep them wearing sealskin boots . . . however, there is a demand for rubber boots, partly for the children in the spring" (Jackson, 1956). Such were the conflicting attitudes at times between the RCMP and DNANR that J.C. Jackson, DNANR's Officer-in-Charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, advised his superiors in Ottawa that "since these people have earned their own money, it would seem a delaying action is about all that can be done on such items as rubber boots and other items of civilized apparel" (ibid.). Jackson noted that much of the men's clothing were RCAF discards anyway.

In light of the RCMP's unofficial "keep the Eskimo an Eskimo" policy at Resolute Bay (Figure 14) and Grise Fiord, it is ironic that Jean Lesage, Minister of DNANR, should state in 1955 that "the preservation of the Eskimo in his primitive state is not a real alternative. . . It would involve segregation and isolation [and] denial of the most humane services" (Lesage, 1955). In this case, a social policy the government was presenting in public did not accord with how it was treating the Inuit in practice.



Figure 13: Larry Audlaluk at the grave of his father Paddy Aqiatasuk, Grise Fiord, 1991. (Photo: Alan Marcus)

3.3 The Sovereignty Argument: Cold War Imperatives

If Supt. Larsen and the DRD sponsored the relocation plan ostensibly for moral and economic reasons, there was a third reason which provided an additional incentive for undertaking the move – to exercise Canadian sovereignty. Today the Inuit claim they were deceived by the government and that sovereignty was the main reason for their relocation. The issue is clearly controversial, and the government has never formally conceded that sovereignty was a reason for conducting the experiment of moving Inuit to uninhabited lands.

The background to Canada's claim to the northernmost Arctic Islands, now known as the Queen Elizabeth Islands, is chequered by sporadic moments of insecurity and sensitivity to foreign incursions. Britain transferred the Arctic Islands to Canada on 31 July 1880 by Order-in-Council. In preparation for that action an official stated that "the object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is, I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada" (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1879). Exercising sovereignty over polar territories can present certain unique difficulties (Greig, 1976). From 1900 to the early




Figure 14: R.C.M.P. Resolute Bay detachment. (Photo: National Archives of Canada)

1930s, Canada was prepared to forestall rival claims to its title to the northernmost islands of the Arctic Archipelago, not just from the United States and its explorations of the area, but from Norway and Denmark as well. During the 1920s, as in the past, Greenlanders from the Thule region on the northwest coast of Greenland hunted musk-oxen on Ellesmere. When the Canadian government informed Denmark that Greenlanders were not allowed to hunt on Ellesmere, the Danish government replied that based on the opinion of Knud Rasmussen, Ellesmere Island was considered a "No Man's Land" (Johnston, 1933).

Canada at once realized the need for asserting its claims to the Arctic Islands and making a symbolic demonstration of Canadian sovereignty. It therefore established RCMP detachments in 1922 at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere, and Pond Inlet on north Baffin Island. The government accepted that in order for territorial sovereignty to be more than a passive declaration based on right of discovery, there had to be evidence of administrative activity (Morrison, 1986). Further RCMP detachments were established in the Arctic Islands at Pangnirtung on Baffin (1923), Dundas Harbour on Devon Island (1924), Bache Peninsula on Ellesmere Island (1926), and Lake Harbour on Baffin (1927). At Dundas Harbour, Craig Harbour and Bache Peninsula the only humans were RCMP officers and a few Inuit employees who had been brought in. As a means of exercising sovereignty, the government in July 1926

passed a regulatory act designating the northernmost islands as a special Arctic Islands Preserve, which gave the RCMP a further legal instrument for discouraging the activities of Greenlandic hunters on Ellsmere. In the previous year, an amendment to the Northwest Territories Act was introduced to require scientists and explorers wishing to enter the Northwest Territories to obtain a license. The Hon. Charles Stewart, Minister of the Interior, noted in the House of Commons debate on the bill in June 1925 that:

"... there is no intention to collect any taxes. . . . What we want to do is to assert our sovereignty. We want to make it clear that this is Canadian territory and that if foreigners want to go in there they must have permission in the form of a license" (Canada, 1925).

Mr. Stewart explained the purpose of taking the action at this time:

"Here we are getting after men like MacMillan and Doctor Amundsen, men who are going in presumably for exploration purposes, but possibly there may arise a question as to the sovereignty over some land they may discover in the northern portion of Canada, and we claim all that portion" (ibid.).

The Americans had a lively interest in the High Arctic Archipelago, which began with De Haven's search for Franklin (1850-1), and the expeditions of Hayes (1860-1), Hall (1871-3), Greely (1881-4), Peary (1896-1902, 1905-6, 1908-9), Cook (1907-9), and MacMillan (1913-17, 1923-5). Norway's claim to the Sverdrup Islands in the northern Archipelago was based on the explorations of Otto Sverdrup. Sverdrup (1904) proclaimed that the lands he had discovered west of Ellesmere Island on his explorations of 1898-1902 were taken possession of in the name of the Norwegian king. The dispute over the ownership of these islands was not settled until November 1930 when the Norwegian government formally recognized Canada's title to the uninhabited Sverdrup Islands in the High Arctic Archipelago. As an act of compensation, the Canadian government paid Sverdrup \$67,000 for his original maps, diaries, and documents from the expedition (Barr, 1984). While making these arrangements with Canada, Norway was in the process of asserting its claims to eastern Greenland. On the basis that Greenland was subject to Danish sovereignty, the Danish government in 1931 began legal proceedings against Norway before the Permanent Court of International Justice (Inch, 1962).

With a lessening of threats to Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic Islands north of Lancaster Sound, and because of difficulties of supplying the detachments during the country's economic depression, the RCMP posts at Dundas Harbour, Craig Harbour and Bache Peninsula were closed in the mid-1930s. In this respect the government was abiding by

the principle that "in the polar regions, because of their peculiar geographic and climatic conditions, the international legal requirement of *effective occupation* is in many cases quite impossible of fulfillment" (Svarlien, 1960). As an experiment, however, the Department of the Interior attempted a more cost-effective means for occupying the islands with Canadian citizens. The Department of the Interior (1935-36) authorized a colonization scheme of Devon Island in 1934 (Chapter 1.1), with the explanation in its Annual Report that "it was found desirable, in the interest of good administration, to transfer several Eskimo families to more congenial localities". "Good administration" could have several meanings. In 1934 and in the 1950s the lure of more plentiful game was used by the government as an inducement to the Inuit for relocation and as a justification to the public for carrying out their experiments. In this case, a 1935 document in the government's files provides a more complete explanation:

"In addition to the placing of the Eskimos in new regions where game is more abundant and work more regular, there is the angle of occupation of the country, now that aerial routes, mineral developments, and other reasons make possible the claims of other countries to part of Canada's Arctic, which now reaches to the North Pole. To forestall any such future claims, the Dominion is occupying the Arctic islands to within nearly 700 miles of the North Pole" (Montagnes, 1935: 56).

The short hiatus in Canada's sovereignty worries over the Arctic Islands during the 1930s was replaced by an uneasiness regarding American activities in the Arctic in the 1940s. In 1946 Canada discovered that the United States was preparing to construct several weather stations in the High Arctic Archipelago in order to collect climatic information as a defense measure to guard against Soviet attack. Canada's Department of External Affairs managed to obtain a copy of a report prepared by a U.S. Air Coordinating Committee, and was alarmed to learn of the report's advisement that U.S. Army reconnaissance flights be conducted in the sector west of Greenland to "determine whether islands exist which might be claimed by the United States" with a view to establishing weather stations (Canada, 1977: 1546). Canada was able to persuade Washington to delay plans for the weather stations until 1947, after which joint Canadian-American weather stations were established at Resolute Bay, Eureka Sound, Mould Bay, Isachsen, and Alert.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s the government felt the necessity to adopt measures which would once again "show the flag" and demonstrate "effective occupation" of the High Arctic Archipelago within the requirements of international law. Whereas in the past Canada could be content with a modest symbolic display of sovereignty, the effective-

ness of occupation now required a "consolidation of sovereignty" (Morrison, 1986). In the "Cliperton Island Case" involving a territorial dispute between the French and Mexican governments, the 1932 decision was interpreted to mean that "the occupation which is required of uninhabited regions is only such occupation as is appropriate and possible under the circumstances" (Head, 1963). However, in the 1950s there was now not only the Greenlanders hunting on Canadian soil to contend with, but the Americans increasing their defense-related activities as well. The Permanent Court of International Justice (1933) in its decision of the 1933 "Eastern Greenland Case" referred to "effective occupation" as a claim to sovereignty based upon continued display of authority. Canada's "en juris" claim to sovereignty over the northernmost Arctic Islands based on right of discovery might not be held in question. However, its position of "de facto" sovereignty based on effective occupation of the islands could conceivably come under scrutiny, if a country like the United States gradually increased its occupation of the territory. In his 1950 "Report on Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic", Dean Vincent MacDonald (1950) advised that Canada's title to its Arctic territories should be asserted and maintained "upon the ground of effective occupation alone as the chief and most satisfactory ground of reliance". Mr. Hamilton, a member of parliament, was later to echo that view in the House of Commons: "This great northland of ours is not ours because it is coloured red on a map. It will only be ours by effective occupation" (Canada, 1958a).

In an effort to display its authority over the High Arctic Archipelago once again, the RCMP was instructed to re-establish a detachment at Craig Harbour. When the RCMP set up the detachment at Craig Harbour in September 1951, Alex Stevenson represented the DRD at the ceremony, which was attended by Insp. Larsen, and filmed by a newsreel cameraman. Stevenson (1951; Appendix F) immediately sent a wireless message to J.G. Wright at the DRD in Ottawa which stated: "The flag was raised today in fine, clear weather that marked the opening of the Craig Harbour detachment [which is] now the most northerly active detachment". Stevenson completed his message with: "Sovereignty now is a cinch".

Some officials were concerned that the Inuit who were occupying Ellesmere were not Canadian, but Greenlandic, and there were no means of the government's asserting Canadian sovereignty over the region. As a basis for re-establishing an RCMP detachment at Bache Peninsula (Alexandra Fiord) on Ellesmere Island, Larsen informed Commissioner Nicholson in 1952 that:

"The advantages of placing our Detachment directly across from Greenland would be that we then would have full control and supervision of Greenland

Eskimos and others travelling back and forth, and over hunting activities they may engage in. As you already know, we had a Detachment established at Bache Peninsula in 1926, primarily for the maintenance of sovereignty" (Larsen, 1952a).

Commissioner Nicholson responded to Larsen's request by sending a "Confidential" memorandum to Major General Young, DRD Deputy Minister. Nicholson (1952) informed him that a new detachment at Alexandra Fiord "could maintain some surveillance over that part of the Coast of Ellesmere visited most frequently by Greenland natives". Coincidentally, during the same period of the government's interest in establishing detachments at Alexandra Fiord and Craig Harbour, the United States Air Force (USAF) was constructing a massive military installation and air base at Thule on the northwest coast of Greenland, across Smith Sound from Craig Harbour.

The "Top Secret" minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister St. Laurent on 19 January 1953 show that Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, raised questions about U.S. military activity in the Canadian Arctic (Canada, 1953a). He pointed out that transient U.S. officials both civil and military outnumbered Canadian transients during the summer months in the Arctic Archipelago. Pearson stated that: "Everything pointed towards an increase in U.S. activity in the Arctic during coming years". The largest U.S. project being planned was the establishment of the DEW line, a chain of 40 radar stations right across the Arctic. The USAF was also studying the possibility of constructing air strips on both Ellesmere Island and on Baffin Island for landing by the heaviest freighter aircraft and jet fighters. Pearson took the position that:

*"If Canadian claims to territory in the Arctic rested on discovery and continuous occupation, Canadian claims to some relatively unexplored areas might be questioned in the future. He was concerned about the **de facto** exercise of U.S. sovereignty, examples of which were numerous during the last war in other parts of Canada, and it seemed clear that an increase in U.S. activity in the Arctic would present risks of misunderstandings, incidents and infringements on the exercise of Canadian sovereignty"* (ibid.).

Pearson strongly urged the Cabinet to direct the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) to report on what means might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area. The Prime Minister in reply said that "it was within the realm of the possible that in years to come U.S. developments might be just about the only form of

human activity in the vast wastelands of the Canadian Arctic. This was the problem which had to be met" (ibid.).

The Prime Minister's point about human activity was essential; for in the full meaning of "effective occupation", Von der Heydte (1935) emphasized that:

"... effectiveness seems to be best illustrated by the actual display of sovereign rights, the maintenance of order, and protection. But as a matter of fact sovereign rights can be exercised only over human beings, in inhabited lands; a certain order can be maintained only amongst human beings, i.e., again in inhabited countries; and protection too can be granted only to human beings".

From all outward appearances, the government felt it would be desirable if the new police detachments being planned for the High Arctic Archipelago actually had human beings to administer, preferably Canadians. At an interdepartmental meeting with the RCAF on 10 August 1953 to discuss the relocation to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, Ben Sivertz of DRD pointed out that "the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this" (DRD, 1953; Appendix C). The Prime Minister on 8 December 1953 in the House of Commons affirmed that "we must leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to the pole" (Canada, 1953b).

Establishing the new RCMP detachments with their Inuit components in the High Arctic was a sovereignty objective, as was the Cabinet decision in 1953 to approve the establishment of customs and immigration offices at twenty-two northern points, eight of which were in the High Arctic Archipelago. Prime Minister St. Laurent made it clear that

"...there are quite a number of non-Canadians going into that territory. We felt that it was very important to have the situation such that whenever they went there they realized they were in Canadian territory and in territory that was administered by Canadian authorities" (ibid.).

The Prime Minister's speech mirrored the rhetoric of Mr. Stewart thirty years before when he introduced legislation in the Commons for the explorers license requirement (Canada, 1925). The renewed need to fortify Canada's effective occupation of the Arctic Islands was a response to the reality of geography and Cold War geo-politics. "[Canada's] own security is probably made more difficult to provide for", explained the Prime Minister, "by the fact that this northland of ours is between these two great world powers [the United States and the U.S.S.R.]" (ibid.). During the 1940s-50s the United States may not have had designs to lay claim to Canada's northland, yet the Canadian government clearly

perceived a threat; and its actions for enhanced occupation of the Arctic Islands were directed towards offsetting that threat, fictitious or not. "Occupation" became a key word in public debates about the Arctic Islands. In May 1954 Jean Lesage, Minister of Northern Affairs, reaffirmed in the House of Commons that "we should do everything to assert our sovereignty in those Arctic islands, of which Ellesmere is the most northern" (Canada, 1954). A member of parliament, Mr. Fraser, anxiously posed the query, "if the Royal Canadian Mounted Police post is on Ellesmere island, then a Canadian flag is flying there now?" (ibid.) Lesage responded:

"There are two, because there are two posts. There is no question of our sovereignty, and there is no question of occupancy. We occupy that island" (ibid.).

If there was no question of sovereignty, as the government has persistently maintained, then why was the issue continually being addressed? In August 1956 in the House of Commons the MP Mr. Harkness expressed the view that public sensitivity to the presence of American forces has "caused a considerable number of Canadians to think pretty seriously about what our situation is in the north, the extent to which our control of that area still remains in our hands. . ." (Canada, 1956). The Canadian government's heightened concern over sovereignty issues in the Arctic throughout the 1950s was linked to the importance of maintaining the new Inuit colonies at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. In August 1958 the MP Mr. Hamilton stated in the House of Commons that "you can hold a territory by right of discovery or by claiming it under some sector theory but where you have great powers holding different points of view the only way to hold that territory, with all its great potential wealth, is by effective occupation" (Canada, 1958b). In November 1960 C.M. Bolger, DNANR's Administrator of the Arctic, completed a "Confidential" report for his supervisor, Ben Sivertz, on the relocation to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. Bolger (1960b) explained that although the Inuit at Grise Fiord had not had the opportunities of employment that those at Resolute Bay had had, nevertheless "this community also serves a distinctly useful purpose in confirming, in a tangible manner, Canada's sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic". Sivertz (1960b) described the report as "a very good review" of the situation.

Chapter 4. Politicization of the Issue

4.1 A Success for Ottawa

In spite of the hardships the Inuit experienced in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, which officials in Ottawa either overlooked or were unaware of, the government saw the experiment as a great success. Numerous press reports and internal documents attest to this view. The project showed that the Inuit could live on Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands, as Inuit had done over 500 years ago. The experiment also succeeded in demonstrating that families dependent on social benefits could be taken off relief and be encouraged to survive off the land.

Perhaps most importantly, the government succeeded in creating permanent settlements of Canadian citizens in the High Arctic Archipelago, thus further establishing effective occupation and exercising *de facto* sovereignty over the region. As long as the colonies fulfilled this vital function, the DNANR was prepared to relinquish operational control of the settlements to the RCMP. All correspondence from the DNANR to the colonies needed to pass through Supt. Larsen first, before being sent on to the constable at Resolute Bay or Grise Fiord. Annual detachment reports occasionally concluded with the remark that "the natives generally are in good health, happy and prosperous" (Pilot, 1958). The DNANR would show its approval in a letter to the RCMP with: "We are pleased to note that conditions among the Grise Fiord Eskimos are favourable and they are in good health, happy and prosperous" (Bolger, 1959).

Admittedly, the rapport between the RCMP and the DNANR was not always on such friendly terms. This was especially true after Supt. Larsen retired from his position in 1961. Relations between the RCMP and the DNANR could involve conflict over who controlled Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. In 1964 Chief Superintendent C.B. Macdonell, Commanding "G" Division, informed a colleague in the RCMP on this matter:

"We have striven to maintain control over the Eskimos at both Resolute and Grise Fiord, and this has been no easy matter, as the Dept. of NANR have on a number of occasions expressed their desire to take over responsibility for

welfare of the Eskimos at those points and handle it through their own staff" (Macdonell, 1964).

In a "Confidential" internal memo in June 1964, Insp. E.R. Lysyk in the Criminal Investigation Branch of "G" Division stressed that the RCMP was particularly gratified with its administration of the two colonies:

"It would not be boastful if we said that this relocation of Eskimos was a very successful venture and one which we are quite proud of . . . We have received very favourable publicity over our management of Eskimo welfare at both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, and I do not want our members making any moves to lessen our responsibilities at those points" (Lysyk, 1964).

Officials were also gratified that one of the original intentions of the relocation – to reduce relief benefits to the Port Harrison area – had been achieved. Table 5 shows that by 1958 reliance on relief payments and Family Allowances as a percentage of average income had been diminished. This reduction had been offset since 1951 by a rise in income earned from trapping, handicrafts and wage employment. A detailed DNANR study of the Port Harrison Inuit by anthropologist William Willmott undertaken in the late 1950s stated that "relief plays a very small part in the economy of the settlement Eskimo" (Willmott, 1961: 34). The study noted that the list of those presently receiving relief included only "widows, cripples and old men, while in 1950 it included many able-bodied young men classified as inefficient trappers" (ibid.). A few years before, Port Harrison had been described as "overpopulated" and hopelessly dependent on relief. DNANR could now claim that based on a prudent financial policy Port Harrison was developing into a model northern community with a varied and balanced economy. One of the explanations offered for such a dramatic alteration in the native economy was the "phenomenal rise of the soapstone industry over the past decade . . . which has provided an income to all Eskimos in Harrison" (ibid: 35). The report stated that another contributing factor was "the Canadian Government's policy of reducing the population of Harrison through migration to the high Arctic [which] has increased the land resources available to each household, allowing them to depend more on country food". The study therefore acknowledged the success of the government's declared ambition at the outset of the 1953 relocation to reduce the pressure on available resources by moving people out of the district.

In his appraisal of the relocation Alex Stevenson (1968), DIAND's Administrator of the Arctic, wrote in April 1968 that "the outcome of these ventures has been more successful and satisfactory than had ever been anticipated". He recognized that the original "migration scheme"




Table 5: Comparative sources of annual income at Port Harrison, 1951 and 1958. Source of graph data: DRD (1951), Willmott (1961).

was in fact an attempt to depopulate the Port Harrison region. "Withdrawal of some of the hunters from the area", he wrote, "not only benefitted them but relieved Port Harrison of some of its large human population". Stevenson admitted, though, that in developing the experiment:

"It was thought at the time of the move that the Harrison group would not only find the environment strange but as they had never experienced the dark period the assumption was that travelling and trapping would be most difficult" (ibid.).

Because the RCMP and the DNANR considered the colonization plan to be a great success, it is perhaps not surprising that intentions to carry the scheme forward were still being considered in the 1960s. One of the original planners at the DNANR, Ben Sivertz, was interested in establishing new colonies at Mould Bay, Isachsen, Eureka, and Alert. The plan would be to use Resolute Bay as a hub community, servicing a number of satellite Inuit colonies throughout the archipelago. Ultimately, the project was not carried out. Perhaps the government realized that the old problem of welfare dependency might be repeated, but in even more distant and expensive locations. Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord were at the farthest end of the supply chain, and it could be both difficult and increasingly expensive to maintain them, especially if the Inuit became less reliant on hunting and trapping to support themselves. In the 1960s the cost of providing schools, facilities, teachers, mechanics and other necessary white personnel to the colonies outweighed the possible advantages of redistributing the Inuit in the High Arctic Archipelago.

One of the strongest indictments of government administration of Grise Fiord is to be found in a "Confidential" memo from C.M. Bolger, Administrator of the Arctic, to Alex Stevenson on 4 October 1960. Bolger (1960a; Appendix G) commented on a conversation he had with Ben Sivertz when they discussed "some of the problems we have had with Grise Fiord in respect of supply and of medical services and his own feeling is that while Grise Fiord should be continued for sovereignty purposes, it should not be duplicated at other isolated locations". Therefore, while the government was aware of the hardships and health risks it was imposing on the Inuit families at Grise Fiord, it was determined to keep the community functioning for political reasons. Bolger also discussed the fact that oil companies were trying to obtain approval from the Air Force for the release of some of their Inuit employees for oil exploration work. In this regard, "the Resolute Bay people are becoming an important factor in the economic development taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent islands" (ibid.). Thus as a result of the government's political and economic needs, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay were destined to remain the two most northerly Inuit settlements in Canada.

4.2 Campaign for Compensation

In recent years the government has been concerned about maintaining sufficient population levels at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. It has also faced a difficult period of continually having to deny allegations about its mismanagement of the relocation. The new-found "voice" of the Inuit people has been especially effective. With the landmark 1975 "James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement", the Inuit of northern Quebec negotiated a lands claim settlement with the government, and Makivik Corporation was formed. Since 1978 the northern Quebec Inuit organization, Makivik, and the national organization Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC – whose former president John Amagoalik was a relocatee to Resolute Bay) have lobbied the government to investigate the relocation issue. As a result, the government finally offered in 1988 to move some of the relocated families back to Inukjuak (Port Harrison) who had been relocated in 1953-55 (Figure 15). To this end, the government made payments towards travel costs and new housing in Inukjuak. Despite this late response to a long-standing promise made 35 years before, officials have been reluctant to negotiate further compensation to survivors.

However, the relocatees were still determined to obtain a proper forum in which to present their personal experiences of the relocation, and force the government to acknowledge the hardships which they had undergone. Makivik and ITC finally managed to secure a hearing before



Figure 15: Airport homecoming for Grise Fiord families moving back to Inukjuak, 1988. (Photo: Makivik)

the House of Commons Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on 19 March 1990 in Ottawa, and testimony was given before Members of Parliament by John Amagoalik, Martha Flaherty, Markoosie Patsauq and others. After hearing the disturbing oral testimony presented by Inuit relocation survivors, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in June 1990 recommended:

- that the government acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in protection of Canadian sovereignty;
- that recognition of and consideration for further compensation should be made to the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay "for their service to Canada and for the wrongdoings inflicted upon them" (Canada, 1990b).

Parliament then requested DIAND to submit a report responding to the allegations. A report was prepared for DIAND by the Hickling Corporation, a consultancy firm, and tabled in November 1990. After receiving the Hickling Report, the Minister for DIAND appears to have persuaded Parliament to accept the report's findings, which denied wrongdoing on the government's part, and to dismiss the recommendations of the multi-party standing committee.

Dissatisfied with the Hickling Report and DIAND's response to Inuit testimony presented before the parliamentary committee, ITC

appealed to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) to investigate their complaints. In January 1991, CHRC arranged with ITC and DIAND "to conduct a review of the complaints and their surrounding circumstances" (Soberman, 1991). Dr. Daniel Soberman, professor of law at Queen's University, completed a report on the issue in December 1991 for CHRC. Soberman's report found that the Government of Canada: "Promised the Inuit that if they so wished, they would be returned to the region of Inukjuak in northern Quebec, at most within three years after the relocation in 1953"; and that the government "failed to meet its fiduciary duties of care and diligence in planning and carrying out the relocation", which meant that "the Inuit relocatees of 1953 suffered unnecessary hardship" (ibid:56). The report stated that:

"Based on the documentary evidence between 1953 and 1960, the Government of Canada should accept that its predecessor Government of those years considered the presence of new Inuit communities in the High Arctic to be helpful in supporting Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the region" (ibid.).

Dr. Soberman's report recommended:

". . . that the Government formally acknowledge the contribution of the Inuit relocatees at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic and publicly thank them. The Government should apologize for the shortcomings in planning the relocation, and admit that it made no serious efforts to honour its promise [of return to Inukjuak], and that as a consequence a substantial number who wished to return were unable to do so for many years" (ibid: 57).

The report concluded that by the government's "recognizing these failures and their unfortunate consequences. . . it will demonstrate a new sensitivity to [Inuit] culture and values, and encourage mutual respect" (ibid.). Media reports on the relocation issue prompted some officials who were involved in the relocation to comment on the Inuit allegations made before the parliamentary committee. Bob Pilot, former RCMP Constable at Grise Fiord from 1955-60 stated that "Grise Fiord was a 'flag detachment'. We were up there for one reason – sovereignty, and the Inuit were moved up there for the same reason" (Pilot, 1990b). Other former civil servants hold opposing points of view about the issue. Some agree with the government's position and contest that sovereignty was not a motive for the relocation, but rather the move was proposed because of a desire to reduce the level of relief benefits (Rowley, 1990). That was an aim which the project did achieve. Others say that both sovereignty and economic motives played a role in the decision (Bolger, 1990). Ben Sivertz (1990) feels on reflection that the economic incentive was not the determining factor, but that humanitarian concerns were foremost in the minds of the planners of the operation. The controversy

regarding which of the motives played a greater part in the decision-making process is likely to continue to be a source of intense dispute between officials and Inuit relocatees.

Since the time the relocation was undertaken, a number of the original relocatees have died. It has therefore become a task of the younger members of the relocation party, such as John Amagoalik, Markoosie Patsauq, and Martha Flaherty, to press the government to respond to Inuit allegations. Other Inuit within Makivik who were not personally involved in the relocation have also become advocates in the issue. As such, its politicization signifies that the relocation has come to embody more than the actual event itself. Historically, the relocation experiment can be seen as a prime example of the government's presumed right to judge what was good for the Inuit.

For those Inuit who have moved back to Inukjuak, either on their own initiative or with recent assistance from the government, they face new problems. The second generation children who were born up north are now strangers in their parents' old community. In Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay there were social divisions between the groups from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet. So it is in Inukjuak today, where there is animosity between some local inhabitants and the returning families of relocatees. The social implications of the relocation for these Inuit will be long lasting.

Summary

It is only with hindsight and the benefit of substantial archival documentation that we are able to gain a better understanding of the nature of the relocation and the administration of the colonies at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The Hickling Report's (1990: 54) recent assessment that the government established the settlements "to improve the living conditions of Inuit" requires a qualitative evaluation. An appraisal of the events should be guided by an appreciation for the context of the times and the facts themselves. Relocation was a difficult physical undertaking for the Inuit, moving the families from a familiar climate to a severe one, including sick children, a pregnant woman, a disabled person, and elderly people. Hardly consulted beforehand, it was unlikely that the Inuit could have conceived of the great distance to the new colonies, or the environmental hardships they would have to endure.

From the outset of the relocation experiment, the government has consistently noted in its public statements and reports since 1953 that the Inuit who were moved were volunteers. The Hickling Report (1990: 6) also concludes that the relocation project "was conscientiously planned, was carried out in a reasonably effective manner and that the Inuit participated voluntarily". Much argument has centered on the word "volunteers" – what does the term fully imply? The Inuit did not request the relocation; working under the aegis of a "rehabilitation" scheme, officials found "volunteers" to fill their quotas. The Inuit did not volunteer to be separated on board the *C.D. Howe*, an action which was executed without advance consultation. The Inuit did not volunteer to be taken by the RCMP to a site 65km away from the detachment and store at Craig Harbour and placed on a narrow beach with few provisions. The Inuit did not volunteer to be permanently separated from extended families and friends in Port Harrison. The Inuit did not volunteer to be placed in small communities of closely related people, and to have to undergo the subsequent difficulties of searching for spouses. Though involved in the planning, DRD abdicated operational responsibility to the RCMP, allowing the relocatees to be placed in isolated colonies under the sole tutelage of police officers, without the moderating influence of permanently stationed personnel from the DRD or other agencies.

Officials chose individuals some of whom had come to rely on alternative sources of income, withdrew those sources, and impelled "the volunteers" to become dependent for their survival on hunting and trapping off the land. In 1953 the Inuit in Port Harrison were not earning the major part of their income from the land. In this instance by relocating the Inuit, planners tried to "turn back the clock". The Inuit did not choose to be deprived of earning their livelihood from carving when officials at times discouraged the practice or did not ensure sufficient supplies of soapstone.

Nor did the Inuit volunteer to be removed from a ready source of health care, a school and other services in Port Harrison to locations where these amenities were lacking. The operation was underfunded: no houses were provided against the extreme cold and winds which the relocatees were unaccustomed to, and not enough supplementary food was available to them. The Inuit did not volunteer to experience the three months of the dark-period, to have to learn new hunting patterns, and to have to change their diet. At the outset they did not receive enough rifles, boats or other necessities for hunting and living in the High Arctic. Moreover, they were charged for supplies necessary for an undertaking which they had not planned. During the first years at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay the Inuit faced their greatest deprivations, though at times they were not individually credited for wages earned and did not receive profits from their fur catches.

If we are to evaluate the meaning of "volunteer" in respect to consultation between the Inuit and the officials, we must appraise the general level of consultation in the context of the times. In a symbolic example, at the first Conference on Eskimo Affairs in 1952 in Ottawa, no Inuit were invited to contribute to the proceedings to discuss what decisions the government should take about their future. Col. Cunningham (1952) explained the DRD's view to a member of the public:

"The only reason why Eskimos were not invited to the meeting was, apart from the difficulties of transportation and language, that it was felt that few, if any, of them have yet reached the stage where they could take a responsible part in such discussions".

Nor were any Inuit asked to participate in the regular committee and sub-committee hearings on Eskimo Affairs which followed on from the 1952 conference. It was not until 25 May 1959 in a conference room of Parliament East Block in Ottawa that the first Inuit delegates of four men were invited to officially speak to the government of Canada and to its Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, at the 10th Meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee. The event was extensively covered in the media, and officials were reportedly astonished at how perceptive these

natives were, and what a good contribution they might make to addressing the Eskimo Problem. Deputy Minister of DNANR, R. G. Robertson (1959), confessed that he "[did] not think that anyone listening could help but be moved and impressed by the extent to which the Eskimo representatives understood what was going on among their people". This revelation and the government's general reaction to the meeting illustrate the former reluctance of officials to consult with Inuit on policy decisions affecting the Inuit's lives. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the Inuit who were moved north in 1953 should profess that they were not properly consulted or informed about the operation. Project development was typified by officials telling the Inuit what they were going to do, rather than by planning based on mutual consent.

Conclusion

The Inuit experienced anguish and infringements of their human rights as a result of the relocation experiment. They endured deprivations in the new colonies, and others fell sick or died, but the families managed to survive and populations gradually increased, despite difficulties encountered in finding spouses. Theoretically, the experiment might have seemed viable: to assist people who lived off the land to move from a region which was allegedly poor in resources to one that was resource rich. Yet the basic plan was intrinsically flawed and numerous unforeseen problems developed from the execution of the project.

The Hickling Report (1990: 57) concludes that "to apologize for a wrongdoing it did not commit would constitute deception on the part of the Government and would imply that the project was a failure, when, in fact, it was a reasonably successful endeavour". Were it not for the suffering that the Inuit experienced from the relocation, the planners of the experiment might simply be deemed ill-advised. In effect, the relocatees were penalized for living in a district which received the highest level of relief; theirs was designated a problem area, and relocation was temporarily seen as a useful solution. It was not the planners' intention to treat the relocatees maliciously; as a general rule they felt they were implementing a policy designed to better the lives of Inuit. This was a paternalistic approach, and given the economic limitations and idealistic moral obligations, planners were hopeful that such relocations would result in an improved standard of living for the Inuit.

The planners called the relocation "an experiment", and as such they could be criticized for doing precisely that – experimenting with people's lives. DRD officials accepted at the time that they did not know if the experiment would succeed (DRD, 1953), and that they were unaware of actual environmental and game conditions. They implemented a policy under the myth that "Eskimos are Eskimos, if they can build igloos in Port Harrison, then there is no reason why they shouldn't be able to do so in Grise Fiord". Relocation to the High Arctic was a concept borne out of idealism and a search for bold initiatives, but it was confounded by ignorance of the human implications. There were those officials like

Stevenson and Marshall who hinted at the possibility that the relocation would result in certain hardships, but these views were brushed aside in the wave of optimism and enthusiasm for the project.

When relief payments and family allowances were withheld, and the insistence made that Inuit remain in their native dress and not wear rubber boots or other items, it was done with the notion that this was best for the people. When they were discouraged from making handicrafts and told instead to hunt, this was done in the belief that it was better for the Inuit to be as "native" as possible, and not to succumb to southern ways. It was the same paternalistic thinking that was behind the RCMP's attempts to keep Inuit away from the "evil attractions" of settlements and keep whites away from the Inuit village at Resolute. Whites from the base might corrupt the Inuit with alcohol, sex, and cash. The RCMP felt it was as much its mission to protect the Inuit from themselves, as it was to protect them from excessive fraternization with whites. It was for this reason that while the DRD saw the community at Resolute as a success, some members of the RCMP felt early on that a mistake had been made in locating the Inuit so close to a large transient white population. In contrast, Grise Fiord was viewed by the RCMP as a success because of the continuance of a strong hunting culture, and the fact that the community did not have the social problems related to alcohol consumption. Both attributes were a result of Grise Fiord's extreme isolation.

Supt. Larsen felt that Inuit who lived in proximity to white settlements were bereft of moral leadership, and without strong guidance, they would degrade themselves by relying too much on "hand-outs". With the model of the proud, resourceful Inuit hunter in mind, officials believed there was not only hope, but a moral obligation to save the people from their supposed weaknesses and material poverty. Social welfare policies founded on this moral assumption imbued the authorities in the field with the righteous belief that what was being done for the Inuit was necessary "strong medicine" to remedy profound social ills.

If the pre-World War II model of the happy, self-reliant Eskimo had not persisted, then officials in the early-1950s may not have felt so assured in their pursuit of a moral crusade. Time, it was felt, was of the essence, and the Inuit people could and must be saved. It became the mission of the secular authorities of the government, and not the church, to undertake this quest, and provide the political will, ideology and resources necessary for the task. Any action was better than none at all, and the idea for the relocation from Port Harrison to the High Arctic was such a simple solution in its intention and plans for execution that officials felt it was worthwhile to attempt it.

The very act of placing a group of people on a boat and shipping them out was akin to conveniently putting the Eskimo Problem on a

boat. This action has been perceived by its critics as being short-sighted, having resulted from the government's eagerness to take immediate steps to tackle the problem. In their pursuit of a greater goal for solving the Eskimo Problem on a macro-scale, officials did not foresee that by sending families north they would compound the situation on a micro-scale by creating a multiplicity of potential human problems. They did not adequately consider that these individuals might miss their homeland and extended families and friends, and object to permanent separation. In this respect, archival records show that in addition to the many socio-economic complications which arose from the relocation, the government did not honour a promise it made to return the relocatees home after two years.

Because of the government's interest in the early 1950s in exercising sovereignty in its High Arctic Islands, as evidenced by the documents presented in this study and statements made by the Prime Minister, Ministers and MPs in the House of Commons, the RCMP reopened detachments in the High Arctic. The impetus for the Inuit relocation to Ellesmere originated with RCMP Supt. Larsen. The Inuit were an integral component of the decision to reopen flag detachments for the purpose of asserting Canadian sovereignty. The moral crusade espoused by Larsen and officials at the DRD was an additional catalyst for the inclusion of the Inuit in the plans for the new detachments. It was essentially a matter of killing two birds with one stone. If the RCMP had not intended to establish detachments on Ellesmere for reasons of sovereignty, then the Inuit from Port Harrison would never have been moved there. The DRD's original plan prepared in 1952 was to move Inuit from northern Quebec to Baffin Island, not Ellesmere. The subsequent decision to move Inuit to Resolute and the DRD's request that the RCMP establish a new detachment there was a direct result of the plan to stage the move to Ellesmere. The sovereignty issue taints the entire operation, and one cannot easily disassociate the motives of sovereignty from those of social welfare. It is fair to state that according to their moral precepts, officials were hoping that the project would be a successful experiment in social reform.

The project for social reform was, in fact, publicized under the sincere guise of hopes for better hunting. The moral theme was downplayed (until later in the 1950s), and the sovereignty issue, while prominent in national debate, was not associated publicly with the relocation. The Inuit families were sent north in unwitting obedience to a government's wish for "effective occupation". Ironically, in the words of Martha Flaherty (1988), "we were up there starving in the name of Canada and no one told us we were Canadians". The difficulties in finding food in the first years, and the absence of particular foods they were used to were adjustments the Inuit had to make. Yet, the multiple

social effects of the move could continue for generations. It is a testament to the survivors' tenacity that today Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay remain the nation's northernmost communities of Canadian citizens. It is a testament to the impracticality of the basic plan for the relocation that a resettlement of this kind – moving people such a great distance, across environmentally-different regions – was never to be repeated again.

In this enlightened period of white people's relations with native peoples, it is unfortunate that the government does not give greater credence to Inuit views on the circumstances surrounding the relocation. Official views, such as those echoed in the Hickling Report, seem an inadequate explanation for the government's motives, overlooking Inuit hardships experienced as a result of the move. One is led to assume that this is an attempt to advance the questionable notion that government departments are infallible in their implementation of policies. Efforts to rewrite history from such a perspective, and to deny the Inuit the voice they have endeavoured to find as Canadian citizens, is to deny the country of its rightful heritage.

Those officials who deny the truthfulness of Inuit testimonials about the effects of the relocation on their lives did not share those experiences. They perhaps cannot imagine the nearly forty years of personal suffering which resulted for some of those people who heeded a government wish for them to move elsewhere. The official apology, some Inuit say, is of greater importance to them than any cash settlement. One Inuk recently remarked that "to have to go through what we did was hard enough at the time, but to tell my story and then be told today that those hardships were a myth, is unreasonable" (Marcus, 1988). Once the Inuit stepped on board the *C.D. Howe* without recourse for return, the government assumed a far greater obligation than before for the welfare and safety of those individuals. The Inuit who left Port Harrison and Pond Inlet in 1953 and 1955 accepted in good faith the government's offer for a better future, and placed their trust and the future of their children's welfare in the hands of the government officials. At this writing, the Inuit are continuing to seek redress from the government for this controversial experiment in resettlement.

Chronology of Events

Date	Event
1951	
September	The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) establish a detachment at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island. After the ceremony DRD official Alex Stevenson announces that "Sovereignty now is a cinch".
1952	
8 February	In a memo to RCMP Commissioner Nicholson, Insp. Larsen, head of "G" Division, initiates relocation plan to move Inuit families from Pond Inlet on Baffin Island to proposed site for new RCMP detachment at Alexandra Fiord on Ellesmere Island.
11 February	Nicholson informs the Deputy Minister of the Department of Resources and Development (DRD) Major General Young of the relocation project.
19-20 May	The government organizes the first Conference on Eskimo Affairs held in Ottawa. Officials identify northern Quebec as a problem area.
July	DRD official R.G. Johnston visits Port Harrison and reports that he has discussed with Inuit there a plan for relocation to Baffin Island the following summer "for better hunting".
Autumn	RCMP move groups of Inuit from Port Harrison to offshore King George and Sleeper Islands "for better hunting" during the autumn months. Project is considered a success by officials. Inuit return home after the season.
16 October	Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs meets in Ottawa to discuss Larsen's plan for relocating Inuit from

"overpopulated areas" to Ellesmere Island under supervision of the RCMP.

- 8 December The RCMP's plan to move Inuit to Ellesmere Island and the DRD's plan to move Inuit from northern Quebec to Baffin Island are brought together under one relocation scheme. DRD officials omit move to Baffin and now formulate plans for relocating Inuit from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet to Ellesmere Island.
- 18 December DRD widens plans for the relocation project to establish two Inuit colonies on Ellesmere Island and a colony at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island.

1953

- 19 January Prime Minister St. Laurent chairs a Cabinet meeting at which Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, expresses his serious concern about heightened U.S. military activity in the Canadian Arctic Islands. Pearson argues that U.S. actions could result in infringements of Canadian de facto sovereignty. The Prime Minister concurs and directs that steps be taken to address the problem.
- 20 February DRD Deputy Minister asks RCMP Commissioner for assistance in selecting Inuit families for relocation from Port Harrison **and** Fort Chimo in northern Quebec and from Pond Inlet.
- 14 April Larsen sends messages to Port Harrison and Fort Chimo requesting that RCMP officers there prepare lists of volunteers. Cst. Gibson is assigned the task of selecting Inuit "volunteers" for the relocation experiment.
- 4 May Cst. Gibson informs other officials at Port Harrison of his plans for selecting Inuit for the relocation.
- 22 May Officers at Port Harrison and Fort Chimo submit lists of "volunteers" to headquarters.
- 31 May DRD's welfare teacher Margery Hinds in Port Harrison complains to her superiors in Ottawa about the nature of Cst. Gibson's selection process.
- 8 June DRD decides against including Fort Chimo Inuit in relocation plans to the High Arctic on the basis that they are considered too acculturated. They are no longer

deemed to be appropriate for the experiment because of their apparent inability to build igloos, and the need to provide them with wage-employment and housing. Instead, a separate plan is formulated to relocate a group of Fort Chimo Inuit to Churchill, Manitoba to work on an army base.

- July RCMP construct a new detachment at Alexandra Fiord on Ellesmere Island, where it is expected that an Inuit colony will be established the following month.
- 4 July DRD official Alex Stevenson visits Port Harrison and speaks with two Inuit involved in the relocation. He reports that it is understood that if they wish to return after two years they could do so.
- 25 July DRD officials aboard the government ship *C.D. Howe* pick up 34 men, women and children from Port Harrison escorted by Cst. Gibson for relocation to the High Arctic.
- 30 July Deputy Minister of National Defence James Sharpe informs Deputy Minister of DRD Hugh Young of the objections of senior Air Force officers including Air Commodore Ripley to the relocation and their concern that the experiment could result in hardship for the Inuit families.
- 10 August Emergency meeting is held in Ottawa during which DRD explains relocation plans to Air Force officials. DRD admits that no wildlife resource studies have been undertaken prior to conducting "the experiment". DRD official James Cantley remarks that "it was not desirable to break up family groups if possible". As a reason for proceeding with the project, another senior DRD official Ben Sivertz makes reference to sovereignty, stating that "the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this".
- 28 August *C.D. Howe* picks up three Inuit families from Pond Inlet for relocation, one to each of the three new colonies.
- 29 August *C.D. Howe* reaches Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island. Four Port Harrison families and one Pond Inlet family disembark at the RCMP post. The rest of the families

are transferred to the *D'Iberville* for transit to Alexandra Fiord and Resolute Bay.

D'Iberville hits an iceberg, and heavy ice conditions prevent the ship from reaching Alexandra Fiord.

- 4 September *D'Iberville* returns to Craig Harbour where one additional Port Harrison family and one more Pond Inlet family are put ashore. RCMP officers move Inuit camp from Craig Harbour to Lindstrom Peninsula in Grise Fiord, 45 miles away. RCMP detachment and store remain in Craig Harbour until summer 1956.
- 7 September *D'Iberville* reaches Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island where three families from Port Harrison and one from Pond Inlet are left with Cst. Gibson in charge. Gibson establishes an RCMP detachment at the site.
- 9 November DRD official C.J. Marshall reports on his recent visit to Resolute and comments on the "hasty planning" of the relocation which will cause the Inuit unnecessary hardship. Marshall notes that as much as 40% of the supplies for the project were not off-loaded at Resolute, and that many of the families' tents are in poor condition.
- 8 December Prime Minister St. Laurent announces in the House of Commons that "we must leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to the pole".

1954

- Spring Cst. Fryer at Craig Harbour reports in the press that the Inuit camp is thriving. Report carried by major Canadian newspapers.
- March Cst. Gibson reports that he has forbidden the Inuit to remove articles from the dump at Resolute air base.
- 13 May Jean Lesage Minister of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DNANR – formerly DRD) states in the House of Commons that "we should do everything to assert our sovereignty in those Arctic Islands".
- 2 June Supt. Larsen informs officials at DNANR of his concern that Inuit at Resolute Bay are not being paid for wage labour performed for government departments.

31 July RCMP-designated camp leader Paddy Aqiatasuk from Port Harrison dies at Grise Fiord.

1955

22 March Cst. Gibson reports that the Inuit at Resolute Bay "continue to survive".

23 March Jean Lesage, Minister of DNANR publishes the Department's new policy doctrine espousing the government's moral obligations to the Inuit and rejecting the approach of "segregation and isolation" of Inuit and depriving them of "the most humane services".

August DNANR officials organize the second stage relocation aboard the *C.D. Howe*. One Port Harrison family is relocated to Grise Fiord and three Port Harrison families are relocated to Resolute Bay together with one more Pond Inlet family.

1956

January Cpl. Sargent at Craig Harbour warns Supt. Larsen of problems Inuit are experiencing in finding spouses. Advises that steps should be taken "before they cause trouble".

Summer RCMP move their Craig Harbour detachment and store to Grise Fiord.

21 August J.C. Jackson of DNANR, Supt. Larsen and Cst. Gibson hold a meeting with all the Inuit men at Resolute Bay at which point the Inuit voice their dissatisfaction with circumstances there and express their wish to return to Port Harrison. Jackson denies prior knowledge of a two-year promise of return having been made to them by DNANR.

28 September Supt. Larsen informs Commissioner Nicholson that there is a problem at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord of Inuit trying to find spouses, due to the small community populations.

22 October DNANR senior official Ben Sivertz in an internal memo acknowledges that a two to three year promise of return was made by the department to the Inuit at Port Harrison prior to moving north.

- However, no action is taken by DNANR or the RCMP to provide for relocatees to return to Port Harrison.
- 14 November Cst. Gibson reports that Inuit from Resolute Bay wish to return to Port Harrison.
- 1959-1960** RCMP attempt to prevent Inuit from moving from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay to join relatives. RCMP warn DNANR about possible depopulation of Grise Fiord, citing the attraction now of greater opportunity for wage employment and better services at Resolute.
- 1960**
- 5 May RCMP question DNANR as to why Inuit at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay have not been receiving the profits from their annual fur catches, proceeds of which are managed by DNANR.
- 4 October In confidential internal memos senior DNANR officials
15 November acknowledge that there have been difficulties with supplying Grise Fiord and providing medical services, but affirm that the community should be maintained for political purposes in the exercise of sovereignty over the region.
- 1965 January** Cst. Lucko at Resolute Bay reports that Inuit still have to go to the local dump to obtain building materials for making houses.
- 1966 January** Cst. Vitt at Grise Fiord reports that there are serious problems for the Inuit trying to find spouses.
- 1970 (-1986)** Over the next sixteen years, six families from Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay move back to Inukjuak (Port Harrison) on their own initiative.
- 1978** Makivik Corporation, the northern Quebec Inuit organization, and Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) begin their campaign for compensation from the government for the relocation of Inuit from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay.
- 1984** The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND – formerly DNANR), commissions a report to investigate if a two-year promise of return was made to the relocatees.

3 August The resulting 'Hammond Report' concludes that a two to three-year promise of return was probably made to the Inuit relocated from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet.

1985

February-April Inuit representatives from Resolute Bay, Grise Fiord, Inukjuak, Makivik, and the Inuit Committee on National Issues (ICNI) meet with the Minister of DIAND to discuss the relocation issue and resettlement back to Inukjuak for those who wish to return.

1986 Makivik holds meetings with Inuit from Resolute Bay, Grise Fiord and Inukjuak to discuss demands for compensation and reaffirm the wish of those families who want to return to Inukjuak.

1987 September DIAND agrees to pay \$200,000 for Inuit to move back to Inukjuak, and to provide 10 new houses to be constructed in Inukjuak.

1988

July-September 22 Inuit move back to Inukjuak under the government's financed scheme.

1989

23 March Makivik requests a meeting with DIAND to further discuss the government's compensation package.

12 May Minister of DIAND replies that there is no need for further meetings and the issue is now closed.

1990

19 March Inuit relocatees, including Martha Flaherty, Markoosie Patsauq and John Amagoalik (president of ITC), testify at a Parliamentary hearing before the multi-party House of Commons' Committee on Aboriginal Affairs. Inuit allegations are reported in major Canadian newspapers, and on television and radio.

15 May Deputy Minister Harry Swain responds to Inuit allegations in a letter to the Committee on Aboriginal Affairs. Swain asserts "that there was no malice or wrongdoing by departmental officers in the relocation project".

- 19 June The Committee on Aboriginal Affairs makes its recommendations to Parliament that the government acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in protection of Canadian sovereignty, apologize for wrongdoing, and consider further compensation. DIAND is instructed to report on Inuit allegations.
- DIAND contracts the Hickling Corporation consultancy firm to draft a report responding to the Inuit allegations.
- 19 November Minister of DIAND presents findings of the "Hickling Report" in Parliament. The report dismisses Inuit allegations and argues against the recommendations of the Committee on Aboriginal Affairs.
- 20 November Debate in the House of Commons over the Hickling Report's conclusions.
- 30 November Makivik and ITC write to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, stating that officials of DIAND "are engaged in a campaign of lies to discredit the testimony of Inuit who were relocated". The letter criticizes the Hickling Report and requests the personal intervention of the PM "to correct a distortion of the truth".

1991

- January The Canadian Human Rights Commission decides to review the complaints made by the Inuit before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs.
- 21 March The Minister of DIAND Tom Siddon writes to Makivik and ITC on behalf of the Prime Minister, responding to their letter of 30 November. The Minister stands by the findings of the Hickling Report, and states that "I do not feel that the charges now being made against the government are warranted".
- 6 May In a letter to the Minister of DIAND, Senator Charlie Watt, president of Makivik, restates the Inuit's position on the relocation issue, concluding that "we do not accept the findings of the Hickling Report", and that Makivik and ITC "intend to pursue this matter until a comprehensive and equitable settlement" is achieved.

11 December The Canadian Human Rights Commission makes public its report on the relocation issue. The report concludes that the Canadian government "failed to meet its fiduciary duties of care and diligence in planning and carrying out the relocation". The report recommends that the government "formally acknowledge the contribution of the Inuit relocatees at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic and publicly thank them".



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Appendices

Appendix A

List of Port Harrison families selected for relocation to Craig Harbour, Alexandra Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953.+

Relocated to Craig Harbour (Grise Fiord):

*Paddy Aqiatusuk	E9-713	head
*Mary	E9-909	wife
Anna	E9-910	stepdaughter
Elijah	E9-912	stepson
Samwillie	E9-913	stepson
Minnie	E9-914	stepdaughter
Larry	E9-1905	son
*Joadamie Aqiatusuk	E9-715	head
Ekoomak	E9-1525	wife
Lizzie	E9-2223	daughter
*Philipusie Novalinga	E9-718	head
*Annie	E9-719	wife
*Pauloosie	E9-720	son
Elisabee	E9-721	daughter
*Thomasie Amagoalik	E9-1589	head
*Mary	E9-1590	wife
*Alle	E9-1513	son
*Salluviniq	E9-1846	son
Charlie	E9-2215	son

Relocated to Resolute Bay:

Simeonie Amagoalik	E9-899	head
Sarah	E9-1637	wife
Jaybeddie	E9-900	Simeonie's brother
*Nellie	E9-897	mother

*Daniel Salluviniq	E9-1765	head
*Sarah	E9-898	wife
Allie	E9-1860	son
Louisa	E9-1993	daughter
*Jeannie	E9-747	single woman

*Alex Patsauq	E9-723	head
Edith	E9-724	wife
Markoosie	E9-725	son
*Lizzie	E9-727	daughter
Johnny	E9-1512	son

+ *Alexandra Fiord colony not established*

* *now deceased (1991)*

List of Pond Inlet families selected for relocation to Craig Harbour, Alexandra Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953.

Relocated to Craig Harbour (Grise Fiord):

Simon Akpaliapik	E5-834	head
Tatigak	E5-835	wife
*Oorootke	E5-836	daughter
Tookahsen	E5-993	daughter
Iseegee	E5-1039	son

Samuel Anukudluk	E5-787	head
*Qaumayuk	n/a	wife
*Mukpanuk	n/a	grandmother
Tamarisee	n/a	daughter
Rhoda	n/a	daughter
Jonathan	n/a	son
Phoebe	n/a	daughter

Relocated to Resolute Bay:

Jaybeddie Amagoalik	E5-791	head
*Kanoino	E5-792	wife
Ekaksak	E5-793	son
*Sippora	E5-980	daughter
Merrari	E5-1014	daughter

* *now deceased (1991)*

Appendix B

Family relocated from Port Harrion to Craig Harbour (Grise Fiord) in 1955:

*Josephie Flaherty	E9-701	head
Ryneer	E9-1551	wife
Martha	E9-1900	daughter
Mary	E9-2101	daughter
Peter	E9-2139	son

Families relocated from Port Harrison to Resolute Bay in 1955:

Levi Nungak	E9-1762	head
Alici	E9-1763	wife
Annie	E9-1532	daughter
Minnie	E9-1882	daughter
Philipusie	E9-1986	son
Anna	E9-2135	daughter

*Johnnie Echalook	E9-1635	head
Minnie	E9-1636	wife
Lizzie	E9-1638	daughter
Ryneer	E9-1639	daughter
Dora	E9-1640	daughter
George	E9-1641	son
Mary	E9-1909	daughter
Leah	E9-2110	daughter

Andrew Iqaluk	E9-870	head
Martha	E9-872	sister
Emily	E9-873	sister
Jackoosie	E9-871	brother
*Mava	E9-868	mother
*Mary	E9-753	Jackoosie's wife

* now deceased (1991)

Families relocated from Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay in 1955:

*Joseph Idlout	E5-766	head
*Kidlah	E5-767	wife
Leah	E5-770	daughter
Mosesee	E5-771	son
*Pauloosee	E5-772	son
*Noah	E5-976	son
Ruth	E5-1018	daughter
Susan	E5-1051	daughter
*Anknowya	E5-781	Idlout's mother
Erleloo	E5-782	a/son
Daniel	E5-783	a/son
Oodlaleetah	E5-768	head
*Estigytook	E5-779	wife
Philip	E5-1045	son

* *now deceased (1991)*

Appendix C

Minutes of a Meeting Held at 10:00 A.M.
August 10, 1953, in Room 304, Langevin
Block, to Discuss the Transfer of Certain
Eskimo Families from Northern Quebec to
Cornwallia and Ellesmere Islands.

file
40-8-11
Deputy Minister's Records
File No.
IN CHARGE

Chairman -

Col. F.J.G. Cunningham - Resources and Development.

Those Present -

W/C W. D. Brodribb - A.F.E.Q., R.C.A.F.
Mr. L. T. Campbell - Meteorological Division, Transport.
Mr. Jas. Cantley - Resources and Development.
Mr. Fred Fraser - Resources and Development.
Mr. C. J. Marshall - Secretariat of the ACND.
S/L P. E. O'Neill - A.T.C., R.C.A.F.
Supt. J. A. Peacock - R.C.M.P.
Dr. E. A. Procter - Indian Health Services, National
Health and Welfare..
Mr. B. G. Siverts - Resources and Development.
Mr. W. B. Smith - Telecommunications Division, Transport.

Col. Cunningham, Director of the Northern Administration and
Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, opened the
meeting with a resume of the duties and responsibilities of the
Department towards the Eskimo of northern Canada and the policy of
the Department in providing for their health and welfare. He pointed
out that three different types of situations now have to be dealt with:

1. In areas where the natural resources will support the
Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic
way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.
2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up,
the Eskimos will be educated to adapt them to this new
situation.
3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the
present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the
Eskimo to areas with greater natural resources.

The Administration has found that the eastern coast of Hudson Bay
cannot continue to supply the Eskimo there with a reasonable standard
of living and, therefore, efforts will be made to re-settle some of the
inhabitants in more prosperous areas. This year the Administration is
carrying out an experiment in which it will transplant a small number
of Eskimo families from the eastern shore of Hudson Bay to certain
settlements in the High North to see if they can find a better living
there.

Mr. Fraser, Chief of the Northern Administration Division, then
took the chair and asked Mr. Cantley, head of the Arctic Services Section
of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch, to explain the details
of the Administration's experiment.

Mr. Cantley said that eleven Eskimo families in all were involved
in this year's experiment. Most of these were taken from Port Harrison,
Que. Three families were from Pond Inlet and would be used to help
adjust the other families to conditions in the High North. All of the
people involved were volunteers and each had been told of the type of

environment and conditions which would be found where he was going. Families are to be settled at Resolute, Craig Harbour, and Cape Herschel. At each of these points the local R.C.M.P. constable will supervise the experiment. Each group will be provided with sufficient supplies to last a year. Of the three points where the families will be settled, Resolute is the only one where there may be the possibility of the Eskimos finding employment. However, the possibility of securing employment was not an important factor in deciding where the Eskimo should be settled. The men of the group are primarily hunters and the main purpose of the experiment is to see if it is possible for the people to adapt themselves to the conditions of the High North and secure a living from the land.

Mr. Fraser asked the R.C.A.F. representatives if they were afraid that the Eskimos taking part in the experiment might become dependent on the R.C.A.F. for food and clothing if the experiment was not successful. S/L O'Neill stated that this was the case and that the R.C.A.F. did not expect to be able to offer any employment at Resolute except if Eskimos there had some type of technical training. He asked how many families would be going to each of the three settlement areas. Mr. Cantley stated that this would be decided on the boat taking the Eskimo to their destination. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible.

Mr. Smith said that the Telecommunications Division of the Department of Transport operates ionosphere stations at various points in the north and had found Eskimos very useful particularly at Baker Lake and Fort Chimo where they worked as general handymen and kitchen help. The Department of Transport would like to hire at least one Eskimo as a general handyman for the ionosphere station at Resolute if any of those settling there are found to be suitable. He asked what arrangements would be made for payment in the event that an Eskimo was hired at Resolute.

Mr. Cantley said that one of the Eskimo at Resolute, under the supervision of the R.C.M.P. constable, would act as trader for the group. An Eskimo employed by the Department of Transport would receive credit on the trader for his services, the bill would be sent to the Department of Resources and Development in Ottawa and forwarded to the Department of Transport.

Mr. Campbell stated that the Meteorological Division did not expect to be able to offer employment to any Eskimos at Resolute for the time being at least since the housekeeping arrangements there were provided by the R.C.A.F.

S/L O'Neill stated that he was afraid that there was not sufficient wildlife in the Resolute area to provide for the proposed Eskimo population. Mr. Cantley replied that he had reason to believe that there was sufficient marine life to support the Eskimo families concerned. No one could say for sure that this was the case and, consequently, the experiment was being staged.

Mr. Siverts pointed out that the Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this.

Mr. Fraser outlined some steps being taken to provide technical training for Eskimo, particularly the trade school to be opened soon at Akilavik. Mr. Smith said that diesel mechanics were always very scarce and that the Department would welcome such a training programme if it could provide qualified diesel mechanics.

A discussion of medical facilities available at Resolute followed. Mr. Cantley stated that all the families taking part in the experiment had been examined beforehand by a doctor and given a clean bill of health. S/L O'Neill said that he understood the R.C.M.P. would be responsible for medical attention given to the Eskimo. Supt. Peacock said that the R.C.M.P. representative had first-aid training and would have first-aid

supplies available. S/L O'Neill said that a doctor visited the Resolute base once a month and that a medical orderly was on duty at all times.

W/C Brodribb requested that in future, when such experiments were being planned, that the Air Force be informed well in advance so that it would have a chance to comment on the plans.

Mr. Siverts summarized the situation by stating that the R.C.M.P. constable in charge of the experiment was representing the Department of Resources and Development, that the Eskimos' prime purpose in going to the High North was to see if it were possible for them to adapt themselves to conditions there and secure a reasonable living. Steps will be taken to see that the Eskimo are provided for in case the experiment is not successful and that every effort will be made to see that the R.C.A.F. is not inconvenienced.

Mr. Cantley stated that those taking part in the experiment were not seeking employment but that the Administration would not stand in their way if employment became available.

At the conclusion of the meeting those attending were satisfied that the arrangements and planning of the experiment were such that the Eskimo families involved would not become a liability to the R.C.A.F.

C. J. Marshall,
Secretariat, ACND.

Appendix D



DEPARTMENT OF
NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES
EDITORIAL AND INFORMATION DIVISION

TEL 9-3139, 9-5663

FOR RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 23, 1955.

It will be moving day this summer for 35 Eskimos in Canada's Arctic. And they are all moving further north.

The "moving van" for the Eskimos will be the Arctic Patrol vessel "C.D. Howe", which leaves Montreal on Saturday on the thirty-fifth Eastern Arctic Patrol to settlements and outposts in the far north.

Moving Eskimos is just one of the many tasks which the "C.D. Howe" will undertake in the course of its 12,000-mile journey, mostly through Arctic waters. The ship is operated by the Department of Transport and the work during the patrol is the responsibility of the Department of Northern Affairs. From Montreal to Resolute, in the Queen Elizabeth Islands, the Officer-in-Charge of the patrol will be R.A.J. Phillips, executive officer of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. There he will be relieved by Alex Stevenson, of the Arctic Division, for the journey back to Montreal.

In addition to studying the problems and needs of these remote settlements and their residents, the 30 government officials on the patrol will carry out many other jobs. A medical party of the Department of National Health and Welfare will give a complete medical and dental examination and x-rays to every one of the 3,200 Eskimos who can reach the ship in the 20 ports of call.

Eskimos will return to their homes from hospitals in the south and others will be brought out for medical treatment. The staffs of remote radio and weather stations will be relieved. Mail will be delivered and collected, in some places the only collection for a year.


Of all the tasks of the "C.D. Howe", however, the moving of the seven Eskimo families from the Fort Harrison area on the east coast of Hudson Bay and from Baffin Island will be one of the most interesting. This is a purely voluntary migration, the continuation of a policy started two years ago by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Under this scheme Eskimos are moved from poor hunting areas to regions where game supplies and other necessities of Arctic life are more readily available. The programme has been an unqualified success, and the Eskimos have been enthusiastic about their new homes farther to the north. Although they are free to return if they wish, the response so far has been to urge their friends and relatives from the "south" to join them.

After leaving Montreal and Quebec, the "C.D. Howe" will call at Koartak, Wakeham Bay, Lake Harbour, Cape Dorset, Sugluk, Ivigvik, Fort Harrison, Churchill, Coral Harbour, Cape Dyer, Fadloping, Cape Christian, Clyde River, Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, and Resolute Bay. After Resolute, weather and ice conditions permitting, the "Howe" will visit the most northerly settlement on its itinerary, Craig Harbour, on August 26, followed by Pond Inlet, Cape Christian, Fangnirtung, Frobisher Bay and Fort Burwell.

Officials on the patrol include: Dr. J.S. Willis, heading the party from National Health and Welfare, and aided by Dr. F.M. Graham, of Cobourg and Miss L.M. Long, of Montreal; M.L. Manning, Northern Affairs' outstanding linguist in Canadian Eskimo dialects; E.N. Grantham, Northern Affairs' educational officer; Superintendent Larson of the R.C.M.P.; R.B. Campbell, of the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys; and W.G. Henderson, of the Post Office Department. A high-school educated Eskimo girl, Faulette Aneroluk, will assist Mr. Manning with the interpreting work.

Appendix E

Canada
DEPARTMENT
of
NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES



Ottawa, October 22nd, 1956.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

ESKIMO SETTLEMENTS AT RESOLUTE AND CRAIG HARBOUR

The comments of Bishop Marsh to you and Mr. Robertson as given in your memo of October 16th are all on the subject of our trading arrangements and handling the Eskimos' income.

It should be remembered that we are feeling our way in these projects. So far things have gone well, -- better than we could properly have hoped. After two years the people seem content to stay on, whereas they only agreed to go in the first place on condition that we promise to return them to their former homes after "two or three years".

The Trading was financed by the Eskimo Loan Fund, and freedom of action under loan fund regulations is circumscribed.

Bishop Marsh is perfectly right in suggesting that the trading should be reviewed and set up on a better basis. My plans for doing so have had to be set aside for lack of staff. We now have a new man in the Projects Section and I have asked Mr. Larmour to assign him to this job. When the new plan is elaborated in a couple of weeks or so, I shall present it to you for approval.

Not all of Bishop Marsh's points are well taken. You ask me what I think of his suggestion that the Eskimos should learn ordering their annual supply of goods the hard way instead of being given guidance by their mentor the R.C.M.P. member. This is rubbish. Bishop Marsh's views as given in your paragraph are in my opinion unsound pedagogically, psychologically, economically and practically. The procedure he suggests is also unkind.

On a previous occasion I have expressed to you my reservations with regard to the Eskimo Affairs Committee as advisers on policy. There is so much weight of special interest there. In a separate memo I am proposing a broadening of the committee. In any case, however, I wonder if it would not be preferable to make our own decisions rather than make recommendations to the Committee. The Committee can not be expected to produce forward-looking and soundly-based policy advice, and this particular group cannot even give us immunity from attack by its own members. As an example, you will recall

.../2

that when we discussed employment of Eskimos on the DEW Line, the weight of opinion in the committee was against any wage employment. We were forced to carry the main point against the Committee, yielding to the extent of promising to go easy in recruitment on Buffin Island and to have none at all in the Igloodik region. These promises have hampered the work. Last May the Committee agreed that the employment program had gone well. They did not, however, note that this good result was contrary to their advice and expectations. I feel sure that if we had had trouble, -- which we should expect -- we would have heard heavy condemnation from the Committee.

Your memorandum directs me to have a report made on these two resettlement projects, setting out our objectives, our methods and appraising the results to date. In the light of our experience to date, the report would then make specific recommendations for the next few years handling of economic and social problems in these two settlements. I believe that such a report and plan is needed at this time, but I would much prefer not to lay it before the Eskimo Affairs Committee for approval. Could it not go to them as a report and forecast? We could then have the benefit of their advice, -- and promise to take note of it -- but this is a different matter from asking for guidance as one does in a reference to Council for advice.

This is the attitude I have instructed our Northern Service Officers to adopt in their dealings in the field with missionaries and traders, so that we always reserve our position, and our right and duty to act independently of their wishes, and, possibly on some occasions against their interests which may not be public or general.

(Sgd.) B.G. Sivertz

B.G. Sivertz,
Chief, Arctic Division.



Note from The Director

Ben -

I am not sure what course is best. Perhaps you could prepare the report, and submit it to the D.M.; give him the pros and cons of each course, and ask for his instructions.

F.J.G.C.

Appendix F



7367
7800
Mr. B. J. P. J. P.

62 VCB/R C D HOWE CK 207 DH

SEP 5 1951 PM 4 10

J G WRIGHT DALB OTTAWA

PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE THE FLAG WAS RAISED TODAY IN FINE
COMMA CLEAR ~~XX~~ WEATHER THAT MARKED THE ~~NEW~~ OPENING OF THE CRAIG HARBOUR
DETACHMENT OF THE RCMP STOP THIS OUTPOST WHICH IS SITUATED ON
ELLESMERE ISLAND NORTHWEST TERRITORIES OF CANADA COMMA IS SEVENTY
SIX DEGREES TWELVE NORTH LATITUDE COMMA IS NOW THE MOST NORTHERLY
ACTIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RMP STOP THE CEREMONY ~~NEW~~ OPENED WITH AN
ADDRESS BY ALEX STEVENSON OIC EASTERN ARCTIC PATROL STOP CAPTAIN
CHOQUINARD COMMA HOWE COMMA ARRIVED FROM SHIP BY HELICOPTER TO
PRESENT FLAG ON BEHALF OF DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT TO INSPECTOR LARSEN
FOR THE CRAIG HARBOUR DETACHMENT STOP FLAG PRESENTED BY INSPECTOR
LARSEN TO CONSTABLE HAROLD A JOHNSON COMMA DARTMOUTH NOVA SCOTIA
STOP THESE TWO CONSTABLES WILL MAINTAIN ESTABLISHMENT ASSISTED BY
TWO ESKIMO FAMILIES STOP ~~XX~~ PRAYERS BY REV G A RUSKELL COMMA ARTLOW
COMMA COUNTY WICKLOW COMMA IRELAND COMMA VISITING ANGLICAN MISSIONARY
STOP SERVICE INCLUDED APPROPRIATE ANTHEMS STOP SHIP PASSENGERS
COMMA ESKIMO FAMILIES IN ATTENDANCE STOP SNOW CLAD MOUNTAINS COMMA
ICEBERGS COMMA GLACIERS TUNDRA AND ~~XX~~ WHITE CARIBOU ~~FORMED~~ FORMED
BACKDROP FOR IMPRESSIVE OCCASION STOP FILM BOARD UNIT COVERAGE STOP
SOVEREIGNTY NOW IS A CINCH

STEVENSON.....230PM

Appendix G

C.M. Bolger:RB



YOUR FILE NO.

OUR FILE NO.

NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

CANADA
DEPARTMENT
OF

OFFICE OF THE ARCTIC
ADMINISTRATOR

NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES

Confidential

Ottawa, October 4, 1960.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STEVENSON

Relocation of Eskimo Groups in the High Arctic


The Director has indicated to me orally that he would like us to give some thought to the possible relocation of small groups of Eskimos in certain areas of the High Arctic. He has been led to wonder about the advisability of this by the fact that the oil companies are now trying to obtain approval from the Air Force for the release of some of the Air Force Eskimo employees for oil exploration work next year.

I pointed out to the Director some of the problems we have had with Grise Fiord in respect of supply and of medical services, and his own feeling is that while Grise Fiord should be continued for sovereignty purposes, it should not be duplicated at other isolated locations. He considers, rather, that any new colonies to be established should be in the vicinity of established weather stations such as Mould Bay, Isachsen and Eureka. He also thinks that a logical development would be to start these colonies as satellites of the Resolute Bay community, since the Resolute Bay people now know the country and many of them have been to these points on labouring jobs.

The Director would like us to give this matter some thought and then send a paper to him outlining the history of the Resolute and Grise Fiord communities and defining the advantages and the problems of establishing additional colonies in the High Arctic. Our paper should ask if it is the wish of the Government to fortify our claims to sovereignty of these islands by establishing Eskimo groups on them and it should contain our best recommendation on

what, if anything, should be done along this line. We should also point out that the Resolute Bay people are becoming an important factor in the economic development taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent islands and suggest that other groups at the locations mentioned might develop a similar importance.

Would you either take this on yourself, or have Mr. Parsons undertake the preparation of a draft submission to the Director. The Director gave me no deadline, but to be sure it is done, I suggest that we have something ready by the 1st of December, 1960.



C. M. Bolger,
Administrator of the Arctic.



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