Indigenous World 2020: Ecuador

Written on 11 May 2020. Posted in Ecuador

Ecuador’s Indigenous population accounts for close to 1.1 million people out of a total population of more than 17,300,000. There are 14 Indigenous nationalities living in the country, grouped into different local, regional and national organisations. Some 24.1% of the Indigenous population live in the Amazon and belong to 10 nationalities; 7.3% of the Andean Kichwa live in the southern Sierra; and 8.3% live along the coast and in the Galapagos Islands.

The remaining 60.3%, comprising Andean Kichwa, live in six provinces of the central-north Sierra; 78.5% of them still live in rural areas and 21.5% live in the towns and cities. The Shuar, a nationality of more than 100,000 people, have a strong presence in three provinces of the central south Amazon, where they represent between 8% and up to 79% of the total population. The rest are dispersed in small groups across the country. There are a number of nationalities with very low populations and which are thus in a highly vulnerable position. In the Amazon these are the A’i Cofán (1,485 inhabitants); the Shiwiar (1,198 inhabitants); the Siekopai (689 inhabitants);  the  Siona (611 inhabitants); and the Sapara (559 inhabitants); on the coast, there are the Épera (546 inhabitants) and the Manta (311 inhabitants).

After more than a decade of a new Constitution and 20 years after ratifying ILO Convention 169, Ecuador still lacks specific and clear public policies that could prevent or mitigate the risk of these peoples disappearing, together with effective instruments that would ensure the enforcement of collective rights that are already widely recognised in the current Constitution.he radical political turn towards neoliberalism made by Lenin Moreno’s government in 2017 continued and intensified in 2019, and could be seen in at least three areas of action. First, in agreements and policies explicitly favourable to the interests of the powerful Guayaquil and Quito oligarchies (large importers, well-known banking and financial groups); second, in a renewed openness to  transnational capital in relation to the extractive industry – mining and oil exploitation on the Amazonian Indigenous territories in particular; and third, in its total alignment with President Trump’s Latin American foreign policy.

The first area has resulted in laws such as that on the “Promotion of Production”, which aims to move the economy from a state-run system to a neoliberal one controlled by large private enterprise. In addition, businessmen such as Pablo Arosemena, president of the Federation of Ecuadorian Chambers of Commerce, have proposed reforms to the Employment Code that would include: making it easier to sack private sector staff; changing the current contractual arrangements (which guarantee job stability and workers’ rights) to hourly contracts; reducing (yet more) corporation taxes; and establishing longer probationary periods. This is a package that will, in sum, make working conditions not only more flexible but also more unstable.

Such elements are likely to have formed part of the agreement reached between the Ecuadorian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which, on 11 March 2019, approved a USD$4,200 million loan as part of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), with an immediate disbursement of USD$625 million, even though the fiscal deficit at this point was more than USD$3 billion.¹ The agreement with the IMF replicates the policies set out in the “Washington Consensus” first implemented back in the 1990s: a rolling back of the state (firing of public officials, merger or elimination of public institutions, reduction in the state’s regulatory capacity); the elimination of subsidies and increases in the cost of fuel; and the privatisation of public oil, telecoms and electricity companies.²

The government has opted for a so-called “austerity plan” focused on the firing of more than 50,000 public sector workers while at the same time cutting the budgets for health and education.

With regard to the second area of government action, the oil-producing companies have achieved their aim of changing the rules of play, previously so favourable to the state during the period of the so-called “People’s Revolution” headed by Rafael Correa. Now the old system of production-sharing agreements has returned, highly favourable to the transnational companies: according to such rules, the distribution of profits obtained through the exploitation and sale of “commodities” provides a minimum share for the state of scarcely 12.5% of audited production in the concession area.³ In this context, the 12th “Ronda de Intercampos” (round of tenders) took place from September 2018 to 9 May 2019, allocating a total of 2,406 oil-producing wells to 21 companies.⁴

Mining projects form another extraction frontier, particularly the large-scale industrial copper and gold mining that is affecting Indigenous territories and some protected or ecologically fragile areas of the country. There are currently 275 concessions covering 14.8% of the national territory. According to Fernando Benalcázar, Vice-Minister for Mines, the government and the large mining companies are planning multi-million dollar investments and forecasting an “imminent mining boom in the coming years. In the next few months, the strategic Mirador and Fruta del Norte projects will commence operations.” These are located in Zamora Chinchipe, on Shuar territories in the south-east of the Amazon, on the border with Peru.⁵

In terms of the third area of action, foreign policy, Ecuador’s government has confirmed its absolute subordination to the strategies of Donald Trump’s government in the region, strategies that seek to re-establish the USA’s previous control over their so-called “back yard”. Successive visits to Moreno by Craig Faller, head of Southern Command in April,⁶ and Mike Pompeo, North American Secretary of State in July,⁷ were clear signs that the Ecuadorian government was simply going to implement the blueprint imposed by US geopolitical, military and economic interests in the region and which would involve conceding fully to demands regarding the transnational company Chevron-Texaco (responsible for incalculable harm to the country’s north-east Amazon);⁸ the extradition of Julian Assange from the Ecuadorian embassy in London; cutting off of relations with the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro and recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president;⁹ and even the return of North American military operations to Ecuadorian soil through use of Orion P3 and Awac planes, including using the Galapagos Islands – the country’s most important protected area and World Heritage Site – for military purposes under the guise of combating criminal gangs sailing the high seas.

Moreno’s support group encompasses the mainstream media, which have been responsible for defending and constantly repeating the official rhetoric as the best way out of the “country’s crisis”, including the supposed benefits of the agreement with the IMF and the advantage of a subordinate alliance with the US government.

Waorani court victory against the oil siege. The case of Block 22

Against this political and economic backdrop, oil extraction companies have not ceased their offensive to gain control of concessions in the Amazon. Two zones in particular were at the centre of the dispute over this period: firstly, the far north-east of the Yasuní National Park (located within the Waorani territory) in which the so-called Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini (ITT) Project is being implemented, recognised by the government as the biggest project in the sector, extracting 77,333 barrels per day; and, secondly, so-called Block 22, in the north of Pastaza province in the Central Amazon.

In the case of the ITT Project, on 21 May 2019 the government issued Executive Decree No. 751¹⁰ establishing a new map for the intangible zone in the Yasuní National Park, increasing the area in which any kind of extractive activity is prohibited by 59,000 hectares. Article 3 of this decree, however, establishes that oil drilling and production can now commence in the buffer zone – the area between the Exploitation Zone and the Intangible Zone. Such activities would place the existing rich and fragile ecosystem, together with the lives of the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation, in extreme danger.¹¹

On 27 February 2019, accompanied by other Indigenous nationalities such as the Shiwiar, Andes, Achuar, Cofán, Siona, Siekopai, Kichwa, Shuar, Sapara and the Ombudsman, the Waorani walked to the Court of Justice in Puyo, the capital of Pastaza province. There they handed in a protection writ demanding their right to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation and self-determination in order to protect their territory from a new oil tender that included that Block.¹² “We want to live free, healthy and happy. Our territory is not for sale” was one of the phrases most frequently repeated by Inés Nenquimo Pauchi, leader of the Coordinating Body of the Waorani Nationality of Pastaza (CONCONAWEP).¹³

Two months later, Pilar Araujo, judge of Pastaza Provincial Court stated that the court “...determines that the constitutional right to free, prior and informed consultation has been violated and the protection writ for communities belonging to the Waorani nationality of Pastaza is thus considered admissible.”¹⁴

This court ruling was appealed by the Ministry of the Environment and the Attorney-General’s Office but, on 11 July 2019, the Pastaza Provincial Court of Justice ratified the ruling of the court of first instance and acknowledged the violation of the right to free, prior and informed consent, to self-determination and to rights to nature, thus managing to ensure that 200,000 hectares of Waorani territory would remain free from oil extraction.¹⁵

The judgment of the court of second instance indicated in this respect that: “…given all of the above, there can be no doubt that when conducting prior and informed consultation no consideration was given to the parameters indicated by the court, for example in its paragraph 172 (state duty); nor was the timeframe or the appropriate moment for the consultation considered (paragraph 180). The consultation was considered a mere formality, i.e.: a kind of publicity exercise that it should not have been (paragraph 186). The community were not consulted, only their ancestral authorities (paragraph 201), and nor were the prior consultation processes set out in the paragraph (202) followed”, thus invalidating once and for all the supposed 2012 consultation process and all actions resulting from it.¹⁶

“This victory shows the world the struggle and unity of the communities and that other peoples need to apply pressure (…) so that they leave us to live our lives free in the forest,” said Oswaldo Nenquimo, spokesperson for the Waorani of Pastaza.¹⁷

However, through the Attorney-General’s Office and the Ministry for the Environment, the government challenged the rulings of 26 April and 11 July 2019 issued by the Pastaza Provincial Court in the Constitutional Court. On 2 October, the Admissibility Chamber of the Constitutional Court in Quito heard the case and, on 27 November issued its decision: “…having reviewed the case, it is ruled inadmissible as it does not meet the admissibility requirements”. It argued that one of the requirements of such requests was that “there exists a clear argument with regard to the right being violated and a direct and immediate relationship, through action or omission of the judicial authority, regardless of the events that gave rise to the process”.¹⁸

Breakdown between Indigenous movement/ government and October insurrection

Back in December 2018, the government removed subsidies from a number of fuels as part of the economic measures leading to a reaction from a number of opposition actors such as the unions and local-level peasant and Indigenous organisations, who began to protest in a number of cities.

One of the strongest collective actions was the two closures of the Pan-American Highway in the Panzaleo sector, in Salcedo, Cotopaxi, in the Central Sierra at the end of January 2019 by members of the Indigenous and Peasant Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC).¹⁹ Leónidas Iza, the organisation’s president, denounced the harsh police repression and use of tear gas against a number of protesters. At the same time he explained that during dialogue with the government (commenced in the middle of 2017) he had requested the authorisation of community transport so that vans could carry passengers and goods, and that the price of milk should be held at USD$0.42, neither of which had been done.²⁰

Along the same lines, a large part of the first quarter of 2019 was marked by strong anti-government protests and demonstrations, particularly in Quito, clearly denouncing the massive wave of redundancies in the public sector, increased unemployment, privatisation of state-run enterprises such as CNT (telecoms) and punitive increase in fuel prices. Although the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and its political wing, the Pachakutik Plurinational Movement, maintained its alliance with and participation in Lenin Moreno’s government (including leaders such as Humberto Cholango as National Secretary for Water), its trust in the government, as well as the patience of many grassroots Indigenous organisations, was being eroded due to: the continuing failure to meet commitments such as the amnesty for prosecuted leaders; the postponement of the comprehensive plan with irrigation systems divided out by the water administration; the failure to restructure the debts of organisations in arrears with land repayments and the failure to write off 100% of fines imposed by the National Secretariat for Water (SENAGUA); not to mention the delays in re-opening single-teacher schools in rural areas.

CONAIE’s Annual Assembly, held on 23 August in Archidona, Napo, in the Central Amazon, agreed to end dialogue with Moreno’s government:²¹ “…as we have had no concrete results to our demands and, given that a limited dialogue has been imposed, this decision is taken unanimously”. They also decided “...to convene a national meeting of all social, workers, peasant, student, women, pensioner and other organisations to reject the national government’s economic policies as they are in response to pressures from the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” and “to declare a permanent assembly of resistance in defence of our territories and life to demand the government revoke and cancel all mining, oil, logging and hydroelectric concessions on the sacred territories of the peoples and nationalities”.²²

Five weeks later, on the night of 1 October, President Moreno went on TV and radio to announce six economic measures and 13 draft legislative reforms that would be included in Executive Decree No. 883: enshrining the hike in premium, ecopaís (fuel that includes ethanol) and diesel fuels; removing the subsidies but also ensuring – by way of compensation – the provision of an additional USD$15 a month in vouchers to 300,000 families; removing or reducing tariffs on agricultural and industrial machinery and raw materials; removing tariffs on imports of mobile devices; providing one billion dollars in mortgage loans from November on, at a rate of 4.99%; plus redundancies in the public sector, including the immediate lay-off of 23,000 bureaucrats.²³

A wide coalition of organisations, including the United Workers Front (FUT), Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE), National Federation of Black, Indigenous and Peasant Organisations (FENOCIN), Popular Front (FP), Federation of Public Passenger Transport Cooperatives (FENACOTIP) and groups linked to the People’s Revolutionary Movement (MRC) agreed to participate in and support the protests against Lenin Moreno.

These popular reactions were not long in the making. Four major protests broke out successively between 24 September and 13 October (20 days): the provincial strike in Carchi, on the border with Colombia;²⁴ the national transport drivers’ strike, involving lorry drivers, city and inter-city bus drivers and taxi drivers; the Indigenous and peasant rural and urban uprising; and the popular mobilisations, particularly in cities such as Quito.

The Indigenous mobilisation commenced on 5 October after the organisations leading the Carchi and transport drivers’ strikes had reached an agreement with the government with regard to maintaining road infrastructure, checking and carrying passengers, etc.

The action taken by the transport drivers had led to a suspension of classes, a paralysation of almost all business activity and a takeover of public spaces by numerous neighbourhood, youth and women’s groups in the main cities demanding the cancelling of Decree 883 and President Moreno’s resignation. All these actions, in squares, on highways and on roads, were harshly suppressed by the police and military forces, protected by the “state of emergency” that was declared from 3 October on.²⁵

It was the grassroots Indigenous organisations, however, particularly in the Northern and Central Sierra regions, that launched the greatest protest action from the early morning of Saturday 5 October on, just when the press and government had announced – through all the media and social networks under its control – “that everything was under control and the strikes were coming to an end”.²⁶ An enormous media campaign, coordinated by the government and mainstream media, attempted to ignore the unrest and actions that had only just begun in the rural areas and which were rapidly extending to the towns.²⁷

In Ibarra, capital of Imbabura, 4,000 Indigenous people marched for four hours to present their list of demands to the Imbabura Governor, including the cancellation of the so-called “economic package”. Sofia Fuentes, leader of Kichwa Otavalo People’s Territories, noted that it was the social organisations themselves that had spontaneously risen up against Moreno’s “package”: “We wanted to show the authorities that these economic measures will hit the pockets of all Ecuadorians. We can’t pay the debt that they have run up”.²⁸

Carlos Tagua, President of the Chimborazo Indigenous Movement (MICH), called on the Indigenous people to assemble on the morning of 5 October. “We will radicalise the action as from today. All our people are rising up in their communities and parishes,” indicated Carlos Susuzagñay, President of Ecuarunari.²⁹

In Chimborazo but also in other nearby provinces such as Cañar, Bolívar, Tungurahua and Cotopaxi, working meetings were held and strategies analysed within the organisations, which gradually began to mobilise towards the provincial capitals, gradually closing the roads, taking squares and market places such as in Colta, Guamote, Guaranda, Salasacas, Saquisilí and Latacunga.

A whole range of collective actions took place in the ensuing days, three of which are particularly notable: the taking of the town centres of the provincial capitals, the main public squares and government buildings in 11 provinces (nine in the Sierra and two in the Amazon region); the closure of highways, which paralysed the country for six successive days; and the influx into Quito of more than 30,000 Indigenous people who were put up overnight on 7 October on four university campuses. They set up their operations centre in the Ágora Theatre, in the main complex of the Cultural Centre, where another 5,000 protesters were housed.³⁰

In Panzaleo, Salcedo canton, Cotopaxi province, leaders and representatives of the organisations declared a permanent state of protest until the economic measures were revoked. In the capital, peaceful protest marches were organised every day to the National Assembly and the historic centre where the Carondelet Palace (seat of central government) is located. The Indigenous Peoples were joined by student organisations, unions, neighbourhood and women’s groups.

In the centre of Quito, a circle of armoured vehicles, barbed wire and even electric fences was placed around several blocks near the Plaza de la Independencia roundabout (home to  the  Presidency  of  the Republic) and guarded by military forces. Before commencing the marches to the legislature and the Palace of Government, the Indigenous people breakfasted in the universities, which they renamed “areas of peace and humanitarian welcome” and in the “El Arbolito” Park. The protests took place every day for a whole week. The daily demonstrations mobilised an estimated 40-70,000 people.

The strong impact of the Indigenous and popular uprising, its delinking from the acts of violence and even from ‘correismo’ (supporters of Rafael Correa), along with the support it gained meant the protest stretched over the whole country, and was decisive in getting the government to agree to direct political dialogue and finally revoke Decree 883, which had triggered the crisis in the first place.³¹

According to different estimates, between 65-85% of the population were against removing the subsidies and acknowledged the reasons for the mobilisations.³²

The peaceful nature of the Indigenous mobilisations was in contrast to the violent action of the repressive forces, however; particularly of the police. Of the 10 people who died during the protests, one was Segundo Inocencio Tucumbi, a leader from the Yanahurco de Juigua community in Pujilí canton, Cotopaxi province, who was in the vicinity of the National Assembly on the afternoon of 9 October when “…they arrived with horses, motorbikes, dogs. A tear gas grenade hit community member Inocencio [Tucumbe] on the head, splitting it open.” In the words of Leónidas Iza, an apparent “infiltrator” had thrown a stone at the solders, triggering widespread suppression of the Indigenous march, which had been taking place peacefully.³³

According to the Ombudsman, there were 10 deaths between 3 and 10 October, with 1,070 people arrested. Eighty per cent of those people arrested were later released without formal charge, demonstrating that there had been an abuse or excess of power on the part of the National Police as the arrests were unlawful.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) considered the following to be the main human rights violations occurring during the October uprising: aggression and attacks against the press during the protests; violations of the rights to freedom of express and association; violations of personal integrity and life in the context of the social protests; arrests, criminalisation and stigmatisation of demonstrators.³⁴

In terms of the force used by the Ecuadorian state, the IACHR noted:

(…) its concern both at the actions of the security forces, which did not take account of the inter-American and international protocols governing action on such occasions, as demonstrated by the indiscriminate use of tear gas, even in spaces where mothers were assembling with their children, and at the different deaths recorded over the period.

Pablo Ortiz-T. is a sociologist and lecturer at the Salesian Polytechnic University (UPS) in Quito. Contact: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

This article is part of the 34^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is from the Peruvian Amazon inside the Wampis territory, taken by Pablo Lasansky, and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2020 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2020 in full here

Notes and references

1. Available at: https://www.imf.org/es/News/Articles/2019/03/11/ecuador-pr1972- imf-executive-board-approves-eff-for-ecuador More information also in Paz y Miño, J. “Ejes del acuerdo de Ecuador con el FMI” in Historia y Presente, 25 March 2019 http://www.historiaypresente.com/ejes-del-acuerdo-ecuador-fmi/
2. Baez Jonathan “FMI nuevamente en Ecuador: disputa y silencio” at: https://revistacrisis.com/debate/fmi-nuevamente-en-ecuador-disputa-y- silencio; Cf. Also in CDES ¡Primera victoria! Corte obliga publicación del acuerdo con el FMI, available at: https://cdes.org.ec/web/primera-victoria-corte-obliga- publicacion-del-acuerdo-con-el-fmi/
3. El nuevo modelo de contrato petrolero viola la Constitución: A. Tandazo 06 August 2018 at https://mx.ivoox.com/es/nuevo-modelo-contrato-petrolero- viola-la-audios-mp3_rf_27615755_1.html
4. Decreto 449 of 12 July 2018 RO 364 was issued reforming the regulations governing the Law on Hydrocarbons, and implementing the contractual model of
5. “Ecuador a las puertas del Boom Minero”, 01 July 2019. Available at: https:// www.planv.com.ec/investigacion/investigacion/el-ecuador-puertas-del-boom- minero
6. US Southcom Chief Visits Ecuador to Talk “Security Matters” 25 April 2019 at: https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/US-Southcom-Chief-Visits-Ecuador-to- Talk-Security-Matters-20190425-0002.html
7. Pompeo to Meet with Ecuadorian President Moreno on Latest Leg of Latin American Trip VOA 20 July 2019 at: https://www.voanews.com/americas/ pompeo-meet-ecuadorian-president-moreno-latest-leg-latin-american-trip
8. Ecuador remediará pasivos ambientales dejados por Chevron, anunció ministro 26 February 2019 El Universo, at: https://www.eluniverso.com/ noticias/2019/02/26/nota/7209359/ecuador-remediara-pasivos-ambientales- dejados-chevron-anuncio
9. “Ecuador reconoce la presidencia (i) de Juan Guaidó 23 January 2020 El Comercio at: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ecuador-paises-guaido- presidente-venezuela.html
10. Executive Decree No. 751 21 May 2019 published in the Official Registry No. 506 of Tuesday 11 June Supplement. Available at: https://www.derechoecuador. com/registro-oficial/2019/06/registro-oficial-no506--martes-11-de-junio-de- 2019-suplemento
11. “Gobierno modifica Zona Intangible Tagaeri Taromenane del Yasuní” in Diario El Universo, 22 May 2019 at: https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/05/22/ nota/7341731/gobierno-modifica-zona-intangible-tagaeri-taromenane-yasuni
12. Ombudsman, 27 February 2019 at: https://dpe.gob.ec/comunidades-del- pueblo-waorani-y-la-defensoria-del-pueblo-presentan-accion-de-proteccionpara-proteger-su-territorio-ancestral-de-la-licitacion-petrolera/
13. Ecuador: indígenas Waorani de Pastaza se oponen al bloque petrolero 22 en su territorio en Mongabay 14 March 2019 at: https://es.mongabay.com/2019/03/ indigenas-waorani-oposicion-bloque-petrolero-amazonia-pastaza/
14. Waoranis consiguen fallo judicial para frenar avance de explotación petrolera en Amazonía in Diario El Universo 26 April 2019 at: https://www.eluniverso.com/ noticias/2019/04/26/nota/7303388/lucha-guerreros-wao-contra-petroleras- amazonia-este-viernes-corte
15. Vulneración de derechos colectivos y fallo histórico a favor del Pueblo Waorani INREDH 22 July 2019 at https://inredh.org/index.php/actividades-conversatorios-etc/30-conversatorios-on-line/1177-vulneracion-de-derechos- colectivos-y-fallo-historico-a-favor-del-pueblo-waorani Cf. Also in Andrés Tapia “Resistencia Waorani: cinco factores decisivos de una victoria inédita” CONAIE 12 July 2019 https://conaie.org/2019/07/12/resistencia-waorani-cinco-factores- decisivos-de-una-victoria-inedita/
16. Ecuador: fallo a favor de la comunidad Waorani en litigio con el gobierno por explotación petrolera en la selva amazónica NODAL 12 July 2019 https://www. am/2019/07/ecuador-fallo-a-favor-de-la-comunidad-waorani-en-litigio- con-el-gobierno-por-explotacion-petrolera-en-la-selva-amazonica/
17. “Pueblo Waorani celebra fallo legal contra explotación petrolera en la selva de Ecuador” in América Economía 13 July 2019 at: https://www.americaeconomia. com/politica-sociedad/politica/pueblo-waorani-celebra-fallo-legal-contra- explotacion-petrolera-en-la
18. Corte Constitucional no dio paso a acción de protección contra sentencia en caso Waorani in El Comercio, 28 November 2019 at https://www. com/actualidad/corte-constitucional-sentencia-caso-waorani. html Cf. Constitutional Court case 2826-19-EP of 18 November 2019 Cf. http://doc.corteconstitucional.gob.ec:8080/alfresco/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/2936c7d0-b637-403b-8168-ddb948458a43/2826-19-ep-razonauto.pdf?guest=true
19. Enfrentamientos entre Policía y comuneros en la paralización en Cotopaxi in La Primicia, 28 January 2019 at: https://laprimicia.ec/2019/01/28/ enfrentamientos-entre-policia-y-comuneros-en-la-paralizacion-en-cotopaxi/
20. “Indígenas de Cotopaxi bloquearon la E35 en rechazo a medidas económicas” El Comercio 28 January 2019 at: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ indigenas-cotopaxi-bloqueo-via-economia.html
21. La Conaie rompe diálogo con el Gobierno, anuncia movilizaciones y pide sumar fuerzas para un paro nacional. El Comercio 24 August 2019 at: https://www. elcomercio.com/actualidad/conaie-rompe-dialogo-gobierno-movilizacion.html
22. CONAIE Resoluciones de la Asamblea Anual Ordinaria 2019 de la CONAIE, Archidona-Napo, 27 August 2019 https://conaie.org/2019/08/27/resoluciones- de-la-asamblea-anual-ordinaria-2019-de-la-conaie/
23. Lenín Moreno anuncia paquetazo económico como parte del acuerdo con el FMI. NODAL 2 October 2019 at: https://www.nodal.am/2019/10/lenin-moreno- anuncia-paquetazo-economico-y-reformas-laborales-como-parte-del- acuerdo-con-el-fmi/; Cf. Also in: Eliminación de subsidio a gasolina y diésel, entre medidas económicas del Gobierno de Ecuador. El Universo 1 October 2019 at: https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/10/01/nota/7543657/ eliminacion-subsidio-gasolina-diesel-medidas-economicas-gobierno
24. Autoridades de Carchi anuncian un paro provincial por demandas insatisfechas. El Universo 23 September 2019 https://www.eluniverso.com/ noticias/2019/09/23/nota/7530859/autoridades-carchi-anuncian-paro- provincial-demandas-insatisfechas
25. Ecuador decreta el estado de excepción ante las protestas por el alza del precio del combustible, El País 3 October 2019 at: https://elpais.com/ internacional/2019/10/03/america/1570125319_107758.html
26. “Federaciones de transporte anuncian el fin del Paro Nacional” Teleamazonas 4 October 2019 at: http://www.teleamazonas.com/2019/10/camara-de- transporte-anuncia-el-fin-del-paro/;
27. El FMI regresa al Ecuador: ¿misma receta, mismo resultado? Russia Today 4 October 2019 Available at: https://youtu.be/VNFi2RZ6sFg
28. Diario La Hora, 04 October 2019 at: https://issuu.com/la_hora/docs/web_04_ octubre
29. Paro continuará indefinidamente anunciaron dirigentes del MICC. La Primicia 5 October 2019 https://laprimicia.ec/2019/10/05/paro-indefinido-anunciaron- dirigentes-del-micc/
30. Data taken from the Colectivo de Geografía Crítica del Ecuador, “Análisis Espacial de la Resistencia, Protesta Social y Represión Vividas en Ecuador entre el 7 y 14 de Octubre de 2019”, Quito, 21 October available at: https://www.cenae.org/uploads/8/2/7/0/82706952/informe_ geografi%CC%81acri%CC%81tica_paroecuador-21oct2019.pdf
31. Diálogo por la Paz entre el Gobierno y el Movimiento Indígena en Ecuador. 13 October 2019 General Department for Communication of the President at: https://youtu.be/Xu2LNwQn8qU
32. Franklin Ramírez “¿Avance u oportunidad perdida en Ecuador?” in Agenda Pública El País, 09 December 2019 at: http://agendapublica.elpais.com/avance- u-oportunidad-perdida-en-ecuador/
33. Report on the International Human Rights Observation Mission to Ecuador. Visit conducted from 17 to 21 October CDES at http://cdes.org.ec/web/wp- content/uploads/2019/11/a.REPORTE-DE-LA-MISION-INTERNACIONAL-10.2019-. docx.pdf
34. IACHR presents observations on its visit to Ecuador 14 January 2020 at: http:// www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/008.asp

Tags: Land rights, Business and Human Rights , Human rights