The Indigenous World 2024: Myanmar
There is no accurate information on the number of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar, partly due to a lack of understanding in the country of the internationally-recognized concept of Indigenous Peoples. The government claims that all citizens of Myanmar are “Indigenous” (taing-yin-tha) and, on that basis, dismisses the applicability of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) to Myanmar. Indigenous Peoples’ rights activists use the Burmese language term hta-nay-tain-yin-tha to describe Indigenous Peoples, based on international principles that use the criteria of non-dominance in the national context, historical continuity, ancestral territories and self-identification.[1]
The government recognizes eight ethnic groups as national races or taung-yin-tha: Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Mon, Burman, Arakan and Shan. According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, ethnic groups who have been present in the current geographical area of Myanmar since before 1823 (the start of the first British annexation) are considered taung-yin-tha.[2] In the government’s classification, smaller groups are lumped in with other bigger groups and sub-groupings. However, there are a number of ethnic groups that are considered or see themselves as Indigenous Peoples, such as the Naga, who would not identify with any of those groups.
In accordance with the 2008 Constitution,[3] Myanmar/Burma is divided into seven states, seven regions, and one union territory. These political boundaries are, to some extent, organized according to ethnic demographics. The seven states are named after seven large ethnic groups namely, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Kayin (Karen), Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan States. Although the Bamar (Burmese) do not have a specifically named state, they are the dominant ethnic group living in the country, predominantly in six of the seven regions (Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, Yangon, Ayerywaddy, and Bago) and the Union Territory of Nay Pyi Taw. There are also five self-administered zones and one self-administered division that form part of regions or states, each named after the ethnic group that forms the majority in the area (Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Paluang, and Kokang and the Wa Self-Administered Division.
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar Military (Tatmadaw) attempted a coup d’état by deposing the elected government, the National League for Democracy (NLD), detaining Aung San Su Kyi and members of both Union and State-level Parliaments. The military junta failed to consolidate power after the attempted coup due to resistance from the Myanmar people. Since then, large parts of Myanmar have descended into civil war as a revolution has been taking place, shaped by growing allegiances between elected lawmakers, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations, strike and protest leaders, and civil society organizations. At the centre of this alliance is the National Unity Government (NUG) and the broader, more representative, National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), an inclusive body that includes a range of revolutionary organizations that hold territory and act in alliance with the NUG. Most foreign governments and international institutions have so far been reluctant to formally recognize either the junta or the NUG as the government of Myanmar. Governments and other officials do engage with both entities in international fora.
Myanmar voted in favour of the UNDRIP, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, but has not signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), nor has it ratified ILO Convention No. 169. It is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) but voted against a bill to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the rationale that it was a threat to national sovereignty. In 2017, Myanmar became the 165th State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
State Administrative Council (SAC) continues airstrike campaign
In February, the SAC extended the state of emergency that has served as justification for their claim to legitimate authority in Myanmar and declared martial law in 37 townships across eight of the country’s 14 states and regions, including eight in Chin State.[4] Later, as Operation 1027 commenced (see below), eight further townships located in Shan State were placed under martial law.[5]
As the SAC continued to suffer heavy ground losses throughout 2023, it continued its campaign of airstrikes, many of which seemed to target civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as being in response to ground offensives by resistance actors. This inevitably led to heavy civilian casualties across the country; as many as 320 civilians were reported to have lost their lives across Myanmar/Burma between October 2022 and June 2023 as a result of SAC airstrikes.[6]
In Chin State, the SAC carried out over 100 airstrikes between the period following UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2669 on 21 December 2022 calling for an end to violence by the end of February 2023.[7] Later, as Chin resistance gained ground in many areas of the township, further airstrikes took place. In one such instance, 11 people, including eight children, were killed after an MAF jet bombed a school in Matupi Township’s Vuili village.[8]
Aerial campaigns also took place in Karenni State, where 60 airstrikes were reported to have been carried out in the first nine months of 2023 – more than five times the number during 2022 – with at least 11 camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) in which civilians were taking refuge being hit.[9] On 9 October, the MAF launched an airstrike in Kachin State’s Mung Lai Hkyet village, which was hosting hundreds of IDPs, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children, and injuring a further 60.[10]
Operation 1027
At the end of October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BH) – a resistance alliance formed by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) – announced “Operation 1027” in Northern Shan State, the military objectives of which were stated as “combating widespread online fraud and gambling, asserting their right to self-defence, maintaining control over their territory, and ultimately eradicating oppressive military rule.”[11] By the end of November, the 3BH had claimed 174 SAC camps and checkpoints, and four border towns on the Sino-Myanmar border in Northern Shan State: Chinshawhaw, Mone Koe, Pang Hseng, and Kyinsankyaw.[12]
The operation sparked a fresh impetus for resistance actors across Myanmar. Operation 11.11 was launched in Karenni State,[13] the AA ended the informal ceasefire and launched attacks against SAC positions and outposts in Rakhine State,[14] and the resistance in Chin State[15] and Sagaing Region[16] gained momentum as SAC bases continued to fall under joint military operations by resistance forces.
The sharp escalation has led to a surge in resistance actors reclaiming towns and territories. Where Operation 1027 began, the MNDAA has largely retaken the entire Kokang area, previously run by the Kokang Border Guard force, linked to the SAC. In Chin State, joint operations by CDFs and the Chin National Army (CNA) have resulted in the Chin resistance claiming key Indo-Myanmar border posts. The AA overran SAC police stations in Northern Rakhine State and contested Pauktaw Town close to the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe; and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force launched an assault on the Karenni State capital of Loikaw.
In other areas, such as Karen State, Karen resistance actors expanded into territory where SAC administration systems were no longer functioning, such as in the Payathonzu (Three Pagodas Pass) area of Kyainseikgyi Township. According to locals, the SAC’s administrative apparatus was reported as having entirely disintegrated, leaving the Karen National Union (KNU) primarily responsible for managing the town's administrative and judicial affairs.[17]
Self-Determination from the ground up
During 2023, the push for self-determination by resistance actors gathered pace via the establishment of alternative federal governance structures. The most prominent, state-level examples are in Karenni and Chin States, as the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and the Chinland Council were both formed. In other developments, nascent movements from within the traditional Burmese heartland have also begun the push for alternative governance systems and started establishing federal units.[18] In Sagaing Region, various non-NUG-aligned resistance actors convened the Sagaing Forum to discuss cooperation, outlining their goal to “establish the Sagaing Region Consultative Council (or) a body where all political and revolutionary organizations of the state can collectively coordinate and make decisions in order to eliminate all forms of dictatorship.”[19] Although NUG-aligned PDFs reported that they had not received an invitation to the event, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) – the advisory body to the NUG made up of various ethnic armed organizations and majority Bamar groups – was present and delivered a speech to attendees. A spokesperson from the NUG also declared their support for the agenda and that discussions at the forum pertaining to the right to self-determination and self-governance were “in line with the Federal Democratic Charter”, adding that the NUG was “satisfied” with the outcomes of the meeting.[20]
In Karenni State, the IEC was formed on 6 June 2023 with the idea of overseeing governance functions, ensuring checks and balances between legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and coordinating and ensuring cooperation between the various revolutionary forces of Karenni State under the guidance of the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC).[21] In order to develop collective leadership and the executive of an interim state government, they aim to have at least 12 state affairs departments[22] and have reformed the Karenni State Transitional Constitution Drafting Committee in anticipation of when the future federal democratic union is built.[23]
In Chin State, the Working Committee on Chinland Council Conference (W4C)[24] convened the Chinland Council Conference from 4-7 December, at which the Chin National Front (CNF), Chinland Defence Forces (CDFs), and elected members of parliament from the National League for Democracy (NLD) promulgated the Chinland Constitution and formed the Chinland Council. This development came after the CNF departed from the existing platform in January 2023 – the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) founded on 13 April 2021 as a vehicle for Chin unity by the CNF, MPs, Chin political parties, and civil society organizations – due to internal disagreements.
The Chinland Council will comprise all 27 incumbent state-level NLD MPs, 27 CNF representatives, and 86 township and region representatives that correspond to the various CDFs across Chin State. So far, 112 members from three membership clusters have joined: 27 from the CNF, 17 NLD Members of Parliament, and 68 from CDF administrations[25] with the exception of stakeholders from Mindat, Falam, and Mindat Townships who have held back from joining the W4C framework as they oppose the departure from the ICNCC route. On 11 December, the Chinland Council announced it had held its first meeting, outlining procedures for establishing executive, legislative and judicial branches of government within 60 days, in line with the provisions of the Chinland Constitution.
Dams and mining operations expand
Largely attributed to the ongoing conflict, development projects and mining operations are being pushed through in an environment in which Indigenous communities have less ability to respond to and safeguard rights. Eighty hydropower dams are reportedly scheduled across Myanmar, with the vast majority in Shan State.[26] Many of these projects, stalled under years of various political transition periods, were restarted in 2023 by the SAC and aligned militias, and, in some cases, ethnic armed actors. For example, communities from 11 village tracts located beside the Namtu River in Northern Shan State’s Kyaukme Township reported concerns in May about the Upper Yeywa hydroelectric dam project after the SAC-appointed village chief told them the area would be flooded and relocation would be required – potentially affecting tens of thousands once the 280-megawatt dam is completed. Given the conflict in many parts of the country, the future of these plans is uncertain. Nonetheless, the military’s initial moves are already disrupting local and Indigenous communities.[27]
Given shifting patterns of control by EAOs operating in these areas – in 2021 the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) ousted the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) from these territories – consistent governance approaches are largely lacking. Since the RCSS was pushed out from Northern Shan State, the TNLA and SSPP have pursued different trajectories in the wider Myanmar paradigm with the SSPP more engaged with SAC negotiation and dialogue while the TNLA, as part of the 3BA, went on the offensive against the SAC from November. This has led to a lack of a formal position regarding dam projects among ethnic armed organizations and both the TNLA and SSPP have stayed silent on this issue.[28]
In other parts of Myanmar, mines are being dug. In Tanintharyi Region, for example, unregulated gold, lead, tungsten and tin mining has reportedly surged, with minerals being exported to Thailand and China. In October, Dawei Watch reported that unregulated and irresponsible gold mining had surged within the Tanintharyi Nature Reserve (TNR) and Zimbar creek – one of the country’s most successful nature reserve projects, claiming areas had been turned into a “moon-like landscape”.[29] According to residents, mining in these areas is again linked to the SAC income-seeking activities and the Karen National Union (KNU), which does not recognize the TNR as a nature reserve and taxes industrial mining operations.
In Kachin State, mining of rare earth minerals has reportedly risen in the state’s north-eastern Pang War and Chipwi areas bordering China.[30] In the first six months of 2023, the value of rare earth minerals exported from Myanmar to China reached approximately USD 773 million (approx. EUR 709 million).
Cyclone Mocha
Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Myanmar on 14 May as a category four tropical cyclone, bringing winds of up to 250 km per hour, heavy rains, storm surges, flash floods, and landslides. [31] As a result, 3.2 million people in the affected area, which included areas inhabited by Indigenous Peoples, were in need of humanitarian assistance. [32]
In June, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the SAC had suspended humanitarian access to western Rakhine State by rescinding existing travel authorizations pending approval from Nay Pyi Taw, which was badly impacted by the cyclone.[33] Médecins Sans Frontières also reported that their travel authorization for Rakhine had been suspended.[34]
The author and publisher of this article are well aware of the existing Myanmar/Burma name dispute; however, Myanmar is used consistently here to avoid confusion.
This article was produced by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO). CHRO works to protect and promote human rights through monitoring, research, documentation, and education and advocacy on behalf of the Indigenous Chin people and other ethnic/Indigenous communities in Myanmar.
This article is part of the 38th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous man harvesting quinoa in Sunimarka, Peru. This photo was taken by Pablo Lasansky, and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2024 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2024 in full here
Notes and references
[1] “Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma.” Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, March 2015, https://www.chinhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Coalition-of-IPs-in-Myanmar_UPR.pdf
[2] Burma Citizenship Law 1982, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No 4 of 1982. Section 3.
[3] “Myanmar´s Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2015.” Comparative Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015.pdf?lang=en
[4] The Irrawaddy, ‘Martial Law Imposed on 37 Myanmar Townships, Including Resistance Strongholds,” 3 February 2023, available at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/martial-law-imposed-on-37-myanmar-townships-including-resistance-strongholds.html
[5] CNI News, “Eight townships in northern Shan State declared martial law,’ 13 November 2023, available at
https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/18528-eight-townships-in-northern-shan-state-declared-martial-law
[6] The Wire, ‘Myanmar Junta's Airstrikes Have Taken 320 Civilian Lives in 9 Months: Report,” 22 November 2023, available at https://thewire.in/south-asia/myanmar-junta-airstrikes-mizoram
[7] Data collected by Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO)
[8] BBC News, “Myanmar: Eight children killed in military strike on school in Chin State,” 17 November 2023, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67448410
[9] The Washington Post, “How Myanmar’s unrelenting airstrikes chase families from camp to camp,” 7 November 2023, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/07/myanmar-military-thailand-refugees-airstrikes/#:~:text=In%20the%20small%20southeastern%20state,Conflict%20Location%20%26%20Event%20Data%20Project.
[10] Human Rights Watch, “Myanmar: Airstrike on Village an Apparent War Crime,” 7 October 2023, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/17/myanmar-airstrike-village-apparent-war-crime
[11] David Scott Mathieson, “Brotherhood Alliance rewriting Myanmar’s war narrative”, Asia Times, 10 November 2023.
[12] Burma News International, “Three Brotherhood Alliance Proclaims Successful Capture of Many Military Outposts and Bases,” 8 December 2023, available at https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/three-brotherhood-alliance-proclaims-successful-capture-many-military-outposts-and-bases
[13] Myanmar Peace Monitor, “Our operation period will be extended. Our operation will become more intense. To sum up, the current revolution, our forces and the people will win”, 14 November 2023, available at https://mmpeacemonitor.org/324034/our-operation-period-will-be-extended-our-operation-will-become-more-intense-to-sum-up-the-current-revolution-our-forces-and-the-people-will-win-khun-bee-htoo-chair-of-kndf/
[14] Radio Free Asia, “Arakan Army attacks junta, ending year-long ceasefire in Rakhine state,” 14 November 2023, available at https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rakhine-11142023113631.html
[15] The Irrawaddy, “Success on Myanmar-India Border a Turning Point for Chin Resistance”, 29 November 2023, available at https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/success-on-myanmar-india-border-a-turning-point-for-chin-resistance.html
[16] AP News, “Myanmar resistance claims first capture of a district capital from the military government,” 6 November 2023, available at https://apnews.com/article/military-resistance-pdf-sagaing-kawlin-8168134789c1c26ec945afc82898e235
[17] Burma News International, “KNU Consolidates Full Control over Three Pagodas Pass (Payathonzu) Area Administration, in spite of Junta Battalion and BGF Presence,” 26 Sept 2023, available at https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/knu-consolidates-full-control-over-three-pagodas-pass-payathonzu-area-administration-spite
[18] The Irrawaddy, “Can the Sagaing Forum Take Myanmar’s Spring Revolution to the Next Level?” 2 June 2023, available at https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/can-the-sagaing-forum-take-myanmars-spring-revolution-to-the-next-level.html
[19] Sagaing Forum- Press Statement “Statement by the First Sagaing Forum No:1/2023,” 1 June 2023, available at https://twitter.com/peoplesgoal2022/status/1665256659424546816
[20] Radio Free Asia, “Anti-junta groups align at Myanmar’s Sagaing Forum, minus shadow government,” 9 June 2023, available at https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/forum-06092023154950.html
[21] Kantarawaddy Times, “Karenni State Interim Executive Council officially formed,” 12 June 2023, available at https://mmpeacemonitor.org/320120/karenni-state-interim-executive-council-officially-formed/
[22] Ibid
[23] NMG interview with U Aung San Myint – Chair, Karenni State Transitional Constitution Drafting Committee, “For the building period, we have a plan to form a transitional government in the transitional period after the fall of the military dictator. When we form a government, we need a constitution,” 29 November 2023, available at https://mmpeacemonitor.org/324382/for-the-building-period-we-have-a-plan-to-form-a-transitional-government-in-the-transitional-period-after-the-fall-of-the-military-dictator-when-we-form-a-government-we-need-a-constitution/
[24] Burma News International, “Chinland Council Forms Coordination Team to Rally All Chin Groups,” 30 September 2023, available at https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/chinland-council-forms-coordination-team-rally-all-chin-groups
[25] The Irrawaddy, “The First Chin-Written Constitution: A New Template For Self-Determination?” 26 December 2023, available at https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-first-chin-written-constitution-a-new-template-for-self-determination.html
[26] Frontier Magazine, “Myanmar’s military regime is pushing forward with work on controversial hydropower projects in northern Shan State, where multiple ethnic armed groups operate, while villagers fear for their futures.” 8 May 2023, available at https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/rising-fears-of-inundation-as-northern-shan-dam-projects-gather-pace/
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid
[29] Dawei Watch, “Gold mining devastating forest reserve in Myanmar’s south,” 2 October 2023, available at https://www.mekongeye.com/2023/10/02/mining-myanmar-south/
[30] Radio Free Asia, “Illegal mining of rare earth metals surges in northern Myanmar,” 8 August 2023, available at https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/myanmar-cyclone-mocha
[31] Ibid
[32] ACAPS “ACAPS Briefing note - Bangladesh and Myanmar: Impact of Cyclone Mocha (23 May 2023)” 23 May 2023, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/acaps-briefing-note-bangladesh-and-myanmar-impact-cyclone-mocha-23-may-2023
[33] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Access Suspended in Cyclone-Ravaged Rakhine State,” 12 June 2023, available at
https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/humanitarian-access-suspended-cyclone-ravaged-rakhine-state-enmm
[34] CNN, “Myanmar junta suspends aid access to a million people in state devastated by Cyclone Mocha,” 13 June 2023, available at https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/13/asia/myanmar-rakhine-junta-suspends-access-cyclone-mocha-intl-hnk/index.html
Tags: Business and Human Rights , Climate, Human rights, Autonomy
